Com. v. Motter, K.

J-S07006-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KEVIN MICHAEL MOTTER,
Appellant No. 1101 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 25, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000780-2013
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2015
Appellant, Kevin Michael Motter, appeals from the judgment of
sentence of 30 days’ incarceration, followed by 60 days’ house arrest,
imposed after he was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol
(DUI) and the summary offense of careless driving. Appellant challenges the
trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. We affirm.
On March 1, 2013, Pennsylvania State Trooper John Huffstutler
stopped Appellant’s vehicle for the summary offense of following too closely,
75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(a). When the trooper approached Appellant’s vehicle, he
smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Appellant’s breath, and observed that
Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot and glassy. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO),
8/15/14, at 4. After having Appellant perform several field sobriety tests,
Trooper Huffstutler placed him under arrest for suspicion of DUI. Id. A
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sample of Appellant’s blood was subsequently taken, confirming that he had
a blood alcohol content of .169 percent. Id.
Based on these facts, Appellant was charged with DUI, as well as the
summary offenses of following too closely and careless driving. Prior to trial,
he filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Trooper Huffstutler did not
possess probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for following too closely, a
violation of the Motor Vehicle Code (MVC). A suppression hearing was
conducted on November 6, 2013, after which the trial court denied
Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on April
7, 2014, and was convicted of DUI and careless driving. The jury acquitted
him of the charge of following too closely. Appellant was subsequently
sentenced to a term of 30 days’ incarceration, followed by 60 days’ house
arrest.1
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Herein, he
raises two issues for our review:
I. Did the suppression court err in denying Appellant’s motion to
suppress evidence when the police officer failed to articulate
specific facts that would provide that he had probable cause to
believe Appellant was in violation of section 3310 of the [MVC]?
____________________________________________
1
The trial court notes in its opinion that Appellant received a sentence of
incarceration because this was Appellant’s second DUI conviction. See TCO
at 5.
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II. Did the police officer fail to articulate specific facts that would
provide that he had probable cause to believe Appellant was in
violation of section 3310 of the [MVC]?
Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Initially, we note that Appellant’s two issues differ in only one regard.
In Appellant’s first claim, he alleges that Trooper Huffstatler’s suppression
hearing testimony was insufficient to demonstrate that the trooper had
probable cause to stop his vehicle. In Appellant’s second issue, he argues
that the trooper’s trial testimony was also insufficient to prove probable
cause. However, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we only
assess whether the court’s decision is supported by the evidence presented
at the suppression hearing. See In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1084 (Pa. 2013)
(concluding that the language of Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 (governing the
suppression of evidence) “strongly suggests that the record of the
suppression hearing is intended to be the complete record for suppression
issues, and those issues are to be finally determined before trial, not during
trial or after trial”). Consequently, we will not consider Appellant’s argument
regarding Trooper Huffstatler’s trial testimony in assessing the court’s denial
of his pretrial motion to suppress.
Our standard of review for denial of a suppression motion is as follows:
In reviewing an order from a suppression court, we consider the
Commonwealth’s evidence, and only so much of the defendant’s
evidence as remains uncontradicted. We accept the suppression
court’s factual findings which are supported by the evidence and
reverse only when the court draws erroneous conclusions from
those facts.
Commonwealth v. Hoopes, 722 A.2d 172, 174-75 (Pa. Super. 1998).
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We begin our assessment of the suppression court’s decision by noting
that it properly concluded that Trooper Huffstatler was required to possess
probable cause to justify the stop of Appellant’s vehicle for a violation of 75
Pa.C.S. § 3310(a), as the stop did not “serve a stated investigatory
purpose.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super.
2010). In Feczko, this Court held that “[m]ere reasonable suspicion will not
justify a vehicle stop when the driver’s detention cannot serve an
investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation. In such an
instance, it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts
possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide
probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of
some provision of the [MVC].” Id. at 1291 (citations, internal quotation
marks, and emphasis omitted).
Appellant contends that Trooper Huffstatler failed to articulate
sufficient facts to prove that he had probable cause that Appellant’s vehicle
was following too closely in violation of section 3310(a) of the MVC. That
statute states:
(a) General rule.--The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow
another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent,
having due regard for the speed of the vehicles and the traffic
upon and the condition of the highway.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(a). Appellant primarily avers that Trooper Huffstatler
failed to proffer any testimony regarding the speed at which the vehicles
were traveling. He maintains that “[w]ithout any evidence of speed, there
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can be no probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle.” Appellant’s Brief at
15. In support, Appellant relies on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth
v. Phinn, 761 A.2d 176 (Pa. Super. 2000). There, we found that an officer’s
observation of the defendant’s vehicle “traveling less than a motorcycle-
length distance behind a tractor-trailer on Interstate 80 where the vehicles’
respective rates of speed were at or near the speed limit for that highway[,]”
was sufficient to justify the stop of the defendant’s vehicle for a violation of
section 3310(a). Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
While in Phinn, we considered the officer’s testimony regarding the
speed of the defendant’s vehicle in assessing the legality of the stop, we did
not hold that there must be evidence regarding speed in order to prove that
a stop under section 3310(a) is valid. In any event, Trooper Huffstatler did
offer testimony regarding Appellant’s speed. At the suppression hearing, he
stated that he observed Appellant’s vehicle “pull[] out from a stop sign while
accelerating at an unreasonably high rate of speed….” N.T., 11/6/13, at 4
(emphasis added). Trooper Huffstatler went on to state:
[Trooper Huffstatler:] [Appellant’s] vehicle then continued to
travel east onto Market Street in the borough of Jonestown,
approached the rear of another vehicle traveling the same
direction ahead of [Appellant’s] vehicle, and then began to follow
that vehicle at the intersection of Mulberry Street and Market
Street at a distance not reasonable. Based on the speeds of
these vehicles and the roadway conditions, it is an urban area, if
there had been an application of the brakes by the lead driver
for any reason, abruptly or otherwise, it would have caused
[Appellant’s] vehicle to essentially rear-end the lead vehicle.
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Id. at 5 (emphasis added). The trooper later elaborated that Appellant’s
vehicle was within five feet of the vehicle in front of him. Id. at 5-6. He
also added that Appellant’s vehicle was traveling in this manner at
approximately 4:30 p.m. on a weekday. Id. at 4. When asked why he
ultimately decided to stop Appellant’s vehicle, the trooper stated: “Based on
[] what I observed, the speed [at] which the vehicles were traveling, I
immediately observed that it wasn’t reasonable[,] that the distance would
have constituted a hazard so I did initiate a traffic stop.” Id. at 7 (emphasis
added).
In sum, Trooper Hoffstatler’s testimony indicated that he considered
Appellant’s speed in assessing whether Appellant was following the lead car
“more closely than is reasonable and prudent….” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3310(a). The
trooper ultimately determined that, based on the speed at which Appellant’s
vehicle and the lead car were traveling, the distance between them was
unreasonable and hazardous, as Appellant’s vehicle would have collided with
the lead vehicle had that car applied its brakes. We conclude that this
“evidence clearly bespeaks a hazard within the contemplation of [s]ection
3310.” Phinn, 761 A.2d at 180. Therefore, the record supports the
suppression court’s legal determination that Trooper Huffstatler had
probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for a violation of section 3310(a).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/20/2015
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