In Re: C.F., Appeal of: G.M.

J-S09041-15 & J-S09042-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: C.F., MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: G.M., BIRTH MOTHER No. 1594 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered September 2, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court, at No(s): TPR 075 of 2014
IN RE: L.F., MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: G.M., BIRTH MOTHER No. 1714 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered September 2, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court, at No(s): TPR 074 of 2014
IN RE: L.F., MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: E.J.F., FATHER No. 1595 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered September 2, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court, at No(s): TPR 074 of 2014
IN RE: C.F., MINOR CHILD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: E.J.F., FATHER No. 1715 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered September 2, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 75 of 2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 23, 2015
J-S09041-15 & J-S09042-15
G.M. (“Mother”) and E.J.F. (“Father”) appeal from the orders which
granted the petitions of Allegheny County Children, Youth and Families
(“CYF”) to involuntarily terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights to L.F.
(born in January of 2000) and C.F. (born in June of 2004) (collectively “the
Children”), and changed their permanency goals to adoption. We affirm.
The family became known to CYF in 2011 due to concerns regarding
the parents’ extreme hoarding and deplorable living conditions. Specifically,
Animal Control had investigated a report that Mother was attacked by a dog
in the family’s home, and found six feet tall debris in the home and front
porch, and the Children sleeping without beds amid debris on the living room
floor.
On March 25, 2011, CYF went to meet with the family and could only
open the front door six inches due to massive clutter obstructing the
entrance. CYF could not get to the second floor of the home due to the
collection of clothing at the base of the stairs. CYF reported that the living
room was packed with clothing and family belongings piled approximately
five feet high. The Children slept on mounds of debris in the living room.
CYF also found that the home smelled of dog urine. CYF implemented a
“safety plan” following their visit, with the Children to remain in the home
under the care of C.L., (“Paternal Aunt”), and the parents to clear the debris
from the home and make it safe. On April 21, 2011, CYF implemented in-
home services through Family Group Decision Making, but found the parents
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had made no progress in clearing the home. The home continued to be rife
with piles of dirty clothing and mounds of personal items. CYF was unable to
move throughout the home due to the excessive debris.
On May 19, 2011, CYF filed petitions for dependency relative to the
Children. On June 7, 2011, the Children were adjudicated dependent,
removed from their parents care and placed with Paternal Aunt. On August
25, 2011, a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) was implemented for Mother and
Father. Mother and Father’s FSP goals were: (1) to clean and maintain a
safe and livable home for the Children; (2) to meet and maintain basic
financial demands of daily living; (3) to address mental health issues that
lead to their hoarding; (4) to meet the medical and dental needs of the
Children; (5) to visit the Children consistently; (6) to obtain and maintain
jobs; and (7) to maintain contact with CYF caseworkers and providers. N.T.,
8/27/14, at 111.
Thereafter, Mother and Father attended therapy with Dr. Lawrence
Glanz, a psychologist who used Cognitive Behavioral Therapy to treat Mother
and Father’s compulsive hoarding. Dr. Glanz found it would take at least
two years of continuous therapy to treat the parents’ hoarding and for them
to achieve a safe and livable home. Dr. Glanz recommended continued
treatment, but Mother and Father abandoned the therapy.
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In the meantime, the conditions in Paternal Aunt’s home deteriorated
due to Paternal Aunt’s hoarding, and on September 4, 2013, the Children
were placed with A.E. (“Foster Mother”), where they have remained.
On April 29, 2014, CYF filed termination petitions, seeking to terminate
Mother and Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act. The trial court held
hearings on August 27, 2014 and September 2, 2014. At the hearings, CYF
presented the testimony of Stacey Good, a CYF caseworker; Dr. Lawrence M.
Glanz, a licensed psychologist; Dr. Neil Rosenblum, a licensed psychologist;
Foster Mother; Father; and Mother. By orders entered September 2, 2014,
the trial court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights to the
Children.
On October 1, 2014, Mother and Father filed notices of appeal, along
with concise statements of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court consolidated the cases sua
sponte.
Mother raises the following issues:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter
of law in concluding that CYF met its burden by clear and
convincing evidence that involuntary termination of Mother’s
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s
parental rights when a more appropriate and less restrictive
option of Subsidized Permanent Legal Custodianship (“SPLC”)
was available?
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3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the consideration and
weight given to the wishes of the [C]hildren?
Mother’s Brief at 7.
Father raises the following issues:
1. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err in granting
the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) of the Adoption Act?
2. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err in finding by
clear and convincing evidence that the Children would not be
adversely affected by severance of the strong bond extant
between [Father] and [the C]hildren?
3. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err as a matter
of law in determining that Foster Mother in this case (and
adoptive resource) would permit post adoption contact
between Father and [the C]hildren when Foster Mother had
previously begun to limit all contact between Father and [the
C]hildren?
4. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err as a matter
of law in determining that the termination of parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) serves
the needs and welfare of [the C]hildren?
5. Did the [t]rial [court] abuse its discretion and err as a matter
of law in determining that there was clear and convincing
evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best
interest of the [C]hildren?
Father’s Brief at 5.
We review the orders involuntarily terminating Mother and Father’s
parental rights according to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
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findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36
A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630,
634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying
an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d
at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
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termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of
parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super.
2009).
This Court must agree with only one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a), in addition to subsection 2511(b), in order to affirm the
termination of parental rights. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (en banc). In the instant case, Mother and Father do not
challenge the trial court’s analysis as it relates to their conduct under
Section 2511(a); rather, Mother and Father focus their appellate argument
on the trial court’s analysis of the best interests of the Children under
Section 2511(b). See Krebs v. United Refining Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797
(Pa. Super. 2006); Dietrich v. Dietrich, 923 A.2d 461, 463 (Pa. Super.
2007).
Mother and Father assert that the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights would
best serve the needs and welfare of the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
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2511(b). Mother also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
because the trial court did not consider the Children’s wishes. Additionally,
Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that
Foster Mother would permit post-adoption contact with the Children because
Foster Mother had previously begun to limit all contact between Father and
the Children.
Section 2511(b) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) (bold in original).
Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must take into account
whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and
whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc).
In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security,
and stability are involved in the inquiry into needs and welfare of
the child.” In addition, we instructed that the orphans’ court
must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,
with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond. Id. However, the extent of the bond-effect
analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the
particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super.
2008).
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While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a
major aspect of the Subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it
is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
The mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. Rather, the orphans’ court must
examine the status of the bond to determine whether its
termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship.” As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483
(Pa. Super. 2010):
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
that the trial court should consider the importance of
continuity of relationships and whether any existing
parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child.
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court found that the Children’s best interests are served
by termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights. Trial Court Opinion
“Exhibit A,” 9/2/14, at 9. The trial court made the following findings of fact:
This family has struggled with a dysfunctional family structure.
In many respects [C.F.], the youngest child, was crippled with
emotional dependency on [M]other and [F]ather.
On the surface, [L.F.] appeared to be productive and resilient in
her behavior. She is the healthiest functioning member of the
family. However, [L.F.] has engaged in concerning behaviors
such as cutting, and suicidal ideations, resulting in
hospitalization and engagement in a partial hospitalization
program. As it turns out she was NOT thriving; she was only
surviving.
Trial Court Opinion, “Exhibit A,” 9/2/14, at 8.
With respect to the Children in their foster home, the trial court found:
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[C.F.] and [L.F.] are currently placed in an excellent foster home
with [Foster Mother]. This is a pre-adoptive foster home.
[Foster Mother] possesses an intuitive understanding of the
children’s needs and demonstrates an ability to help both [C.F.]
and [L.F.] move forward in improving in their emotional
adjustment and social development.
[C.F.] is now participating in several social programs that are
clearly helping her build an improved self-concept and greater
confidence in her ability to function independently. Both girls
have made progress in their mental health functioning and
personal adjustment, and are moving forward with their lives in
an increasingly healthy and productive manner since being
placed with [Foster Mother].
Trial Court Opinion, “Exhibit A,” 1/3/14, at 8.
Regarding the Children’s bond with Mother and Father, the trial court
found:
[The Children] love their parents and miss aspects of their
former family life. However, [the Children] have now been
removed from parents’ care for more than three years and need
an opportunity to move forward in their lives in a different
direction. [The Children] have confidence in [F]oster [M]other.
Birth parents do try to pull the girls back by reinforcing their
desire to return home and be a family again. Yet on some level
the girls, particularly [L.F.], seem to recognize that [M]other and
[F]ather also hold them back from pursuing more age-
appropriate experiences and accomplishments.
Given the current mental health status and dysfunction of
parents, reunification is no longer a viable goal. Mother and
Father are overwhelmed with too many psychiatric impairments
and mental health concerns, making their ability to function as
effective or suitable parents for the girls severely compromised.
They have made limited progress in improving the physical
conditions in their home that led to the girls’ removal in the first
place.
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[The Children] would like to return to the care of their parents.
If they cannot return, they wish to remain with [Foster Mother].
[L.F.] would prefer adoption as opposed to SPLC.
The real issue in this case is the needs and welfare of the
[C]hildren. Admittedly, this is a difficult issue as we have two
children who love their parents and wish to return to their care.
We also have two parents who dearly love [the C]hildren and
who have made [the C]hildren the focus of their lives.
However, [the Children] have been in care for more than [three]
years and need permanence. For the first time in their lives,
they are functioning normally. They live in a clean and safe
home. The have friends and social lives. They now have a
home where friends can visit. Their caregiver understands their
bond with their parents and the importance of continued contact
with their parents if the children are adopted by her.
Trial Court Opinion, “Exhibit A,” 9/2/14, at 8.
Stacey Good, the CYF caseworker, stated, “there is no doubt that this
family loves each other,” and they “show a great deal of affection towards
each other.” N.T., 8/27/14, at 130-31. However, Ms. Good also testified
that Mother and Father are not meeting any of the Children’s educational,
psychological, and developmental needs. Id. at 131. Ms. Good testified
that the Children are very comfortable with Foster Mother, who is “willing to
adopt.” Id. at 130-131. Ms. Good testified that “the girls are in dire need of
permanency. The girls have been left in care for 38 months, which has left
their lives in limbo at this point.” Id. at 132.
Furthermore, Dr. Rosenblum testified about the bond between Mother
and Father and the Children. He testified:
The emotional connection to the parents is very strong. And in
the past, their reliance on the parents to guide them and provide
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safety and security for the Children was particularly strong, but
as I’ve tried to explain, there are aspects of the bond and the
attachment that are not healthy: Parents are overprotective
parents. Parents are enmeshed. Parents had prevented the
Children, you know, more so [C.F.] than [L.F.], from developing
healthy self-esteem and a healthy sense of developmental
maturation to the point that I believe that it has particularly
affected [C.F.], and to some degree [L.F.] as well.
We have a reversal here, where [L.F.] in particular, had to worry
about Mother and Father and not feel free to just focus on
herself and her own personal needs. So she started stuffing
those feelings and pretending to the outside world that she was
fine, when in fact she was not fine. So there is a bond and there
are aspects, as I said, in which these parents, they adore [the
C]hildren and they live for [the C]hildren, but there are also a
number of very unhealthy psychological aspects to their
relationship.
The second part of the question, as I understand it is, how this
will affect the Children if that relationship is changed, because I
don’t believe the bond is going to change. I think the
relationship is going to change. The relationship has changed.
The Children no longer depend on [Mother] and [Father] to be
their primary people who they look to meet their needs. That
has changed slowly with [C.F.] much more rapidly with [L.F.],
who had a much easier time developing a good relationship with
Foster Mother than [C.F.] did, because Foster Mother doesn’t
baby [C.F.] and Foster Mother has encouraged [C.F.] to develop
her own sense of self-worth and her ability to feel good about
herself, which I believe was long overdue.
Like I said, I think it will sadden the [Children] if termination is
the outcome here or [when] the Court makes that decision. But
I also believe that it will remove some things that are shackling
the Children and troubling them, and that is the confusion of will
they come back, will they not come back? How are Mother and
[Father] doing? Are they stressed? Are they agonizing? Are
they depressed? Are they anxious? And those are not good
dimensions, developmentally. Those are not appropriate
dimensions for the Children to have to deal with.
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N.T., 8/27/14, at 77-90. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251 (Pa. 2013) (stating
that the strong parent-child bond was an unhealthy one that could not by
itself serve as grounds to prolong foster care drift). We have stated that the
mere existence of a bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not
necessarily result in the denial of a termination petition. See In re K.K.R.-
S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). This Court will not prolong
instability for children when it is clear that their biological parents are unable
to provide for their basic needs in the near future. See In re T.S.M., 71
A.3d at 270.
Given the foregoing, we find that the trial court gave adequate
consideration to the developmental, physical, and emotional needs of the
Children in terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights pursuant to
section 2511(b), including consideration of the Children’s wishes, and that
the record supports the trial court’s best interest analysis. In re N.A.M.,
supra. We find no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in terminating Mother
and Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
2511(a) and (b).
Mother additionally argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
terminating Mother’s parental rights when a more appropriate and less
restrictive option of a subsidized permanent legal custodianship (“SPLC”)
was available. Mother’s Brief at 23. Mother observes that Dr. Rosenblum
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considered a recommendation of SPLC, but rejected it in favor of adoption.
Id.
Initially, our standard of review of an order regarding a
placement goal of a dependent child is the abuse of discretion
standard. In reviewing the court’s denial of permanent legal
custody, we are bound by the facts as found by the trial court
unless they are not supported in the record. Once a child is
adjudicated dependent, the court may order the family goal to
be return home; it may terminate parental rights and place the
child for adoption; or it may order the child be placed with a
permanent legal custodian.
In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 982 (2008) (citations and quotations omitted).
Section 6351(f.1) of the Juvenile Act lists the court’s options in
determining a dependent child’s placement:
§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child
***
(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the
determination made under subsection (f) and all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one
of the following:
(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s parent,
guardian or custodian in cases where the return of the child is
best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and
moral welfare of the child.
(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and the
county agency will file for termination of parental rights in cases
where return to the child’s parent, guardian or custodian is not
best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and
moral welfare of the child.
(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal custodian in
cases where the return to the child’s parent, guardian or
custodian or being placed for adoption is not best suited to the
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safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the
child.
(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and willing
relative in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian or
custodian, being placed for adoption or being placed with a legal
custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
(5) If and when the child will be placed in another living
arrangement intended to be permanent in nature which is
approved by the court in cases where the county agency has
documented a compelling reason that it would not be best suited
to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare
of the child to be returned to the child’s parent, guardian or
custodian, to be placed for adoption, to be placed with a legal
custodian or to be placed with a fit and willing relative.
(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent that places
the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including
evidence of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that
places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be
presented to the court by the county agency or any other party
at any disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the
conduct was the basis for the determination of dependency.
(g) Court order.—On the basis of the determination made
under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the continuation,
modification or termination of placement or other disposition
which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical,
mental and moral welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(1)-(5), (f.2), (g).
SPLC transfers permanent legal custody to the dependent child’s
legal custodian without requiring the termination of natural
parental rights. When deemed appropriate the [ ] court has the
power to permit continued visitation by the dependent child’s
natural parents. To be eligible for SPLC, the legal custodian
must meet all of the requirements for foster parenthood, submit
to an annual eligibility evaluation, and have the ability to provide
for the child without court supervision.
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In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004). The court may consider
permanent legal custody, upon the filing of a petition that alleges the
dependent child’s current placement is not safe, and the physical, mental,
and moral welfare of the child would best be served if SPLC were granted.
Id. Upon receipt of this petition, the court must conduct a hearing and
make specific findings focusing on the best interests of the child. Id. The
“court must find that neither reunification nor adoption is best suited to the
child’s safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child”
for the court to name the custodian a “permanent legal custodian.” Id.
(holding Section 6351(f.1) governs appointment of permanent legal
custodian).
In the instant case, after more than three years of dependency, the
trial court changed the family goal for the Children to adoption. The trial
court found that reunification was no longer a viable goal due to the current
mental health status and dysfunction of the parents. Trial Court, “Exhibit A,”
9/2/14, at 9. The trial court found that Mother and Father are
“overwhelmed with too many psychiatric impairments and mental health
concerns, making their ability to function as effective or suitable parents for
the [Children] severely compromised.” Id. While the Children do love and
wish to return to their parents, the trial court found that they are functioning
normally for the first time in their lives. Id. The trial court stated that
Foster Mother “understands [the Children’s] bond with their parents and the
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importance of continued contact with their parents, if the Children are
adopted by her.” Id.
Dr. Rosenblum’s recommendations were:
Well, I really grappled with that and struggled with it. On
surfaces, I said many times, it is very difficult to make a
recommendation that parents should lose their parental rights
because of something like hoarding issues, you know. Again, I
have tried to amplify a lot of the psychological dimensions of
neglect and a lot of the concerns I have about the type of
relationship and over-connectedness and enmeshment within the
family, but as an evaluator, we are more accustomed to, and I
believe it is likely with the Court as well, more accustomed to
people losing parental rights for violating the law, using drugs,
physical abuse of children. There was none of that within this
family. And so, I do recognize that on some level it seems
severe for Mother and Father to lose their parental rights. They
are guilty perhaps of loving their children too much and not
promoting a healthy psychological environment. But it is tough
to take that stand, but I don’t believe that it is healthy for the
Children to just continue living this way indefinitely, and, while I
consider the permanency goal of SPLC, my concern was that it
wouldn’t—the same message that “you are going to be coming
home soon.” We are rectifying this and the guilt induction, and
the unhealthy dimensions of the relationship between parents
and the girls would continue.
And I believe there has always been a need for healthier
boundaries, and I have difficulty believing that a goal of
SPLC would give the Children the sense of closure and the
sense of permanence that they need.
Even [C.F.] said because she knows she has a right to choose
SPLC or adoption, . . . She is telling me she would choose
adoption, because she doesn’t want the Court to continue to be
involved and I think as much as she loves her parents—excuse
me—[L.F.] is ready to move on with her life and accept that this
is probably what it is going to be. And I think that is the issue
that the Court should review in terms of making that decision,
you know, what is going to be the permanency goal that
gives the Children a clear message that their future is
going in a certain direction as opposed to maintaining the
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confusion, the anxiety, the doubt, and the worry, and
been sort of the underlying sense of loss that the Children
need closure, and in my opinion, it is likely that a goal of
open adoption would give the Children a greater sense of
certainty, a greater sense of finality.
N.T., 8/27/14, at 71-73 (emphasis added).
Dr. Rosenblum further testified:
This is agonizing for everyone. And it is like a slow death. I said
in my report an inevitable train wreck. And there has been no
ability of the parents to take control of their lives. And the
Children’s lives have lost control. As I said that was one of the
reasons I believe that [L.F.] was cutting herself at one time.
The Children need closure. They need a definition of how
their lives are going to proceed. And I think that there have
been three years now that have gone by. Or I know that three
years have gone by without any improvement, without any
clarity.
N.T., 8/27/14, at 75 (emphasis added).
Given the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s decision to forego the option of SPLC in favor of
termination/adoption.
In a related claim, Father asserts that the trial court erred by finding
that Foster Mother will allow post-termination contact between Children and
the parents. We initially note that we will not disturb factual findings that
are supported by the record. Here, Foster Mother testified that she would
“absolutely” be willing to adopt the Children. Id. at 37. She also stated:
There is no doubt in my mind that the girls need to have a
relationship with their birth parents. So I would absolutely be on
board for an agreement to allow them to see their birth parents.
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Id. at 37. Father’s assertion regarding continued post-adoption parental
contact with the Children is thus belied by the record.
Moreover, we recently determined that in termination proceedings, the
termination analysis under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 may not be conflated with
the Adoption Act and an adopting parent’s willingness to enter into an
agreement for continuing contact. In re K.H.B., --- A.3d ----, 2014 WL
7331022 (Pa. Super.).1
1
Act 101, which pertains to adoption, states in relevant part:
§ 2731. Purpose of subchapter.
The purpose of this subchapter is to provide an option for
adoptive parents and birth relatives to enter into a voluntary
agreement for ongoing communication or contact that:
(1) is in the best interest of the child;
(2) recognizes the parties’ interests and desires for ongoing
communication or contact;
(3) is appropriate given the role of the parties in the child’s life;
and
(4) is subject to approval by the courts.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2731. An agreement under Act 101 “shall be filed with the
court that finalizes the adoption of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2735(a). The
agreement shall not be legally enforceable unless approved by the court,
which the court shall approve when the statutory conditions are satisfied.
The statute by its plain language makes an agreement optional, and such
agreement is plainly not required by Section 2511. When amendments were
made to the Adoption Act in 2010, effective in 2011, a voluntary agreement
for continued contact was not added to Chapter 25. Chapter 25 Proceedings
Prior to Petition to Adopt remain separate from Chapter 27 Petition for
Adoption. See 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 2511-2558; 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 2701-2742;
In re K.H.B., supra.
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In sum, the trial court in this case conducted a thorough review,
hearing from the parties, Foster Mother, and expert witnesses, considering
SPLC as an option, but concluding that termination and adoption best suited
the safety and protection, physical, mental and moral welfare of the
Children. The trial court, consistent with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, determined:
The circumstances that led to removal and placement of the
[C]hildren continue. Although the agency is only required to
make reasonable efforts to reunify children with their parents, in
this case I find that Allegheny County OCYF has made
EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS in this case. Despite these
extraordinary efforts, the parents have made no progress in this
case. I find that continued services would not remedy the
conditions the led to removal within a reasonable period of time,
if ever.
Trial Court Opinion, “Exhibit A,” 9/2/14, at 9. The trial court “also found that
termination of [M]other and [F]ather’s parental rights best served the needs
and welfare of the [C]hildren.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 5. The
competent evidence in the record supports the trial court’s determinations.
Thus, we will not disturb them, and we affirm the trial court’s orders. See
In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 982.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/23/2015
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