In The Int. of: A.K.S., Appeal of A.W., Mother

J-A34031-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE A.K.S. AND A.L.S., MINORS IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF A.W., MOTHER
Nos: 1108 MDA 2014, 1109
MDA 2014, 1173 MDA 2014,
1174 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Orders Entered June 6, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at Nos: CP-67-DP-0000082-2010 and CP-67-DP-0000004-
2011, and the Decrees Entered June 6, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas
of York County Orphans’ Court at Nos: 2013-0005 and 2013-0007
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2015
Appellant, A.W. (“Mother”), appeals from the June 6, 2014 orders
changing the goal for minor children A.K.S. and A.L.S. (the “Children”) from
reunification to adoption, and the June 6, 2014 decrees terminating Mother’s
parental rights to the Children.1 We affirm.
The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion sets forth the pertinent
facts and procedural history:
The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families
(hereafter the “Agency”) received an initial referral regarding the
____________________________________________
1
The four consolidated docket numbers correspond to one goal change
order and one termination order for each child.
J-A34031-14
minor Children […], on August 13, 2010 for a lack of supervision
on the part of the Children’s Mother. Protective services were
offered, but despite the withdrawal of the dependency Petition,
such services failed. On January 4, 2011, legal and physical
custody of the Children were given to the paternal Grandparents
by Court Order. A hearing was held on February 7, 2011 which
reaffirmed that order. Unfortunately, the Agency was forced to
file a dependency Petition on February 23, 2011, as the
Grandparents were not supervising the Children. The Children
were adjudicated dependent on March 3, 2011. However,
physical custody remained with the Grandparents. By March 16,
2011, the Children were placed in foster care as a result of
concerns regarding the appropriateness of care in the
Grandparents’ home. At that time, both parents were living with
paternal grandparents.
Multiple family service plans were put into effect starting
October 7, 2010 and continuing through April 1, 2013. All plans,
with the exception of the April 1, 2013 plan, were reviewed by
the Court for the parent’s degree and level of compliance. The
record is supported by Exhibits “A” through “G”, and Exhibit “P”
regarding Mother’s compliance. We note that this Court has not
reviewed Father’s compliance with the family service plans, as
his parental rights were previously terminated.
The family service plans of April 2011 and November 2011
revealed substantial compliance by Mother. These were the only
two occasions in the thirty-eight months that these Children
have been dependent that Mother was compliant to any degree.
All prior plans reflected minimal compliance or effort by Mother
to achieve the goals set for her. Mother was never in jail,
probation or parole, in the United States armed services, in any
rehabilitation recovery program, or engaged in any other
capacity which would, up until the time of filing the instant
Petition to Terminate Parental Rights and Change of Goal,
interfere with her ability to work towards her goals.
Mother participated in a psychiatric evaluation by Doctor
Mark Famador and a neuropsychological evaluation by Doctor
David Nicodemus. Mother expended limited energy in dealing
with her psychological needs and was sporadic in taking her
medication. Three teams were assigned to work with Mother to
aid and assist her, the first being Pressley Ridge, which closed
unsuccessfully after only two months; Catholic Charities, which
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J-A34031-14
closed unsuccessfully after three months; and, lastly, the Justice
Works team. They worked with Mother from April 2011 until
January 2013, at which time they closed unsuccessfully.
Mother was partially successful in obtaining housing.
However, by the count of this Court, Mother has had nine
different addresses from August 2010 to the present. Mother’s
last address was 427 W. Market Street, York, Pennsylvania,
which was Section 8 housing and from which Mother was evicted
as a result of Father’s criminal activities on the premises. While
Mother was ultimately successful in her appeal and now again
has obtained Section 8 housing, it was Mother’s poor choices
which cost her the home.
The Agency filed a Petition to Change of Goal [sic] and to
Terminate Mother’s parental rights in January 2013. The matter
was tried on August 9, 2013 and the goal was changed from
reunification to adoption, and Mother’s parental rights were
terminated. Mother had asked the Court to appoint her new
counsel prior to the hearing. When we declined to do so, Mother
asked to represent herself, which we permitted. Mother
appealed, counsel was reappointed after the Superior Court
reversed and remanded on the issue of counsel with instructions
that this case was to be retried within forty-five days. At the
time of the first hearing, the Children had been in care for
twenty-nine months. On May 30, 2014, a second hearing was
held pursuant to the Superior Court’s mandate. Rather than
litigating the relationship between counsel and Mother, this Court
appointed a substitute counsel. Mother confirmed to the Court
at the time of the hearing that she was satisfied with her new
counsel and wished to proceed.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/14, at 1-4.
After the May 30, 2014 hearing, the trial court took the matter under
advisement and issued the orders on appeal on June 6, 2014. On appeal,
Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights and in
changing the goal for each child from reunification to adoption.
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J-A34031-14
The following standard governs our review of the decrees terminating
Mother’s parental rights:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence.
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient
evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must
stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily
terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing
judge’s decision the same deference that it would give to a jury
verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 821 (Pa. 2012). “The burden is upon
the petitioning person or agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that its asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are
valid.” In the Interest of T.M.T., 64 A.3d 1119, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2013).
“Moreover, we have explained: The standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id.
We review the goal change orders as follows:
An order granting a goal change pursuant to the Juvenile
Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301-6365, is final and appealable. Our
standard of review in such cases is abuse of discretion. When
reviewing such a decision we are bound by the facts as found by
the trial court unless they are not supported in the record.
Furthermore, in a change of goal proceeding, the trial court must
focus on the child and determine the goal in accordance with the
child's best interests and not those of his or her parents.
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J-A34031-14
In the Interest of C.J.R., 782 A.2d 568, 569 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations
omitted).
We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, the trial court’s opinion, the
applicable law, and the certified record. We concluded that the trial court’s
thorough and well-reasoned opinion June 3, 2014 opinion adequately
addressees Appellant’s arguments. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
decrees for the reasons explained in that opinion. We direct that a copy of
the trial court’s June 3, 2014 opinion be attached to any future filings in this
case.
Orders and Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/24/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF YORK COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
In Re:
".3_, A Minor
No. 2013-0007
CP-67 -DP-00082-201 0
Orphan's COllrt Division
In Re:
~ .. ~,
A Minor
No. 2013·0005 c';.'
CP-67 -DP-00004-iO{1 "1J'
Orphan's Court DiVision
MEMORANDUM OPINlm\1
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
The York County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (hereafter the
"Agency") received an initial referral regarding the minor Childre
(hereafter the "Children'), on AUrJlIst ~3, 20'IC
for a lack of supervision on the part of tile Children'S Mother. F'rotectlve S6rV,C('; lV(,W
offered but, despite the withdrawal of the dependency Petition. such services ',lied
On January 4.2011, legal and physical custody of the Children were given to il1('
paternal Grandparents by Court Order. A hearing was held on February 7. 2C '1
whicll reaffirmed that Order.
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Unfortunately, the Agellcy was forced to file a clepenclency Petition ali
February 23,2011. as the Grandparents were not supervisin(1 the Children. Tll'"
Children were adjudicated dependent on March 3, 2011. However, physical:lI"toely
remained with the Granciparents. By March 16, 2011, tile Children were placed in
foster care as a result of concerns regarding the appropl'iatencss of ccm~ in th,,,
Grandparent's home, At that time, both parents were living with paternal
grandparents,
Multiple family service plans were put into effect startillg October 7, ZQ 1) aile!
continuing through April 1, 2013, All plans, with the exception of the April 1, 2013
plan, were reviewed by the Court for the parent's degree and level of compliance.
The record is supported by Exhibits "A" through "G", and Exhibit "P" regareling
Mother's compliance, We note tllat this Court has not reviewed ['ather's cOlllpl·aneE,
with the family service plans, as his parental rights were previously lerllllilLll8d
The family service plans of April 2011 and November 2011 revealed
substantial compliance by Mother. These were the only two occasions in the thirly'
eight months that these Children have been dependent that Mother was compliant to
any degree. All prior plans reflected minimal compliance or effort 'oy Mother to
achieve the goals set for her. Mother was never in jail, probation or parole. in the
. United States armed services, in any rehabilitation recovery program, or en~Jaqed ill
any other capacity which would. Lip until the time of filing tile IIlstant Petition 1.0
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Terminate Parental Rights and Change of Goal, interfere Witll her Clbility to work
towards her goals,
Mother participated in a psychiatric evaluation by Doctor Mark Famador and a
neuropsychological eva luation by Doctor David Nicodemus, Mother expended
limited energy in deali~g with her psychological needs and Wiile depend.ancy
action, CYS must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the cllilnge of po;]1
would be in the child's best interest. In the Interest of M.B, 674 A.2d 702, 704 (P".
Super. Ct. 1996). In addition to the factors outlined in the Juvenile Act. any and all
other factors that bear upon the welfal'e of the child must be t,lkel! into
consideration. If) re Davis. 465 A.2d 614 620 (Pa 1983)
Tile purpose of the Juvenile Act IS to preserve family uility-or proviGc' elll
alternative family when required-and to "provide for the care, protecti011, silfc'ly ClI'(1
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wholesome mental and physical development" of the child. 4:2 P<1.CS. § 6301 (i)l\ 1,
(1.1). The Juvenile Act was not intended to place children in a 1110"e perfoclllOillO:
instead, the Act gives the Court the authority to "intervene to ensure that parenls
meet certain legislatively determined irreducibfe minimulIl standards in exeGlJtiri~i
their pal'ental rights." In re J.W" 578 A.2d 952,958 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (emJ:hasis
added).
Because the Juvenile Act addresses the concerns of both child and p665 A.2d 1260, 1264 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995),
reversed 011 other grounds, 731 A.2d 1276 (Pa. 1999).
Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, the Court Illust make a deterillilli.ltion as to e8ch of the
following factors
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of tile plav~ment
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with Ihe
permanency plan developed for the child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the circumstances
which necessitated the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal
for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child might be
achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the
permanency plan in effect.
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(6) Whether the child is safe
42 Pa,C.S, § 6351{f)(1) - (6),
Based on our considerations of these factors, the Court muslthcn decidt~
what disposition would be best suited to protect the physical, l11ent81 Clnci mOlal
welfare of the child, Id. § 6351 (g). Specifically, the Court must determine:
(a) If and when the child will be returned to the child's parent, guardian
or custodian; or
(b) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and tile cOlinty
agency will file for termination of parental rights,
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f1),
The present goal of the family service plan IS reunification of the Chiidr'~n Wltll
Mother. CYS is seeking to change the current goal of termination of parental ri9hts
and placement for adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act. 42 Pa.C,S. § 6301 at sou,
A. Continuing Necessity For and Appropriateness Of P~acernent
In this case, continued placement is necessary due to Mother'S iailurE, if) 1Il'::tj
any of the goals set forth by the Agency for Mother and approved by the COLIlt
without objection by Mother.
Mother has done little on her own to ach'leve the goals which were set by the
Agency, Whether it is mental health issues or jllst plain orneriness, Mother do'"s nOi
work well wittl others, As we indicateci, the first two teams put In p,ace for Moillel,
while initially successful, were Ultimately closed ullslIccessfully ,)S set forth i:l (he
closing summaries of those teams in Exhibits ",)" and "K". Wtllie it is true :J~i1i r\~(\the;
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worked well with Justice Works, this was because sho was al;Gepting of then I I c;n'i
her transportation to attend her appointments, to look for work, to apply for Social
Security disability, and any other service that the team could provide for her. What
Mother was incapable of doing was attaclling with her Children, boncling with tholli.
and playing any parental role in their lives.
B. Appropriateness, Feasibility, And Extent Of Compliance With
Permanency Plan.
There was ample testimony at the lime of the hearing as to Mother's
opportunity to visit with her Children and her failures to do so. In 2012, Motile; hal:
an opportunity to visit the Children three times a week - tWice at tne Agency ;,lI]}" I or
placement of tile child within a reasollable period of ;illle and
termination of the parental rights would best serve Ihe needs ancl
welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(1), (5).
CYS has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that
statutory grounds exist to justify the involuntary termination of parental righls III re
Child M., 681 A.2d 793, 797 (Pa Super. Ct. 1996). The clear nlld cOllvlllci'lg
standard meallS that the evidence Presented by CYS is so "clear, direct WCI'li,iy
and convincing that one can come to clear conviction, without Ilesitancy, of the truth
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of the precise facts in issue." Maller of Sylvester. 555 A.2d 12:12. 1203-120!,.i'"
1989).
CYS must also present evidence proving that the termination of til" parentai
rights will serve the Children's needs and welfare. In 1110 Matler or Adoplion 'Jf
Charles E.D.M. 11,708 A.2d 88. 92-93 (Pa 1998). FUI·ther, Section 2511. SlIiJS"ctj,)ll
(b) of the Acloption Act provides:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a
parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental. physical
and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a pElfcnt
shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors
such as inadequate housing. furnishing's, income. c!othi'lg and medic,)1
care if found to be beyond the contml of the pclrent. With respect to
any peWion filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1). (6) or (8;, IIle court
shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy tile conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to tile glvlllg or
notice of the filing of the petition
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (b).
CYS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of c'
parent should be involuntarily terminated pursuanUo 23Pa. C 8;§25 i 1(a)(5) ,\(ld
(a)( 8)
The most critical part of the Court's allalysis of the six Illonths Ilnllledlntd;
preceding the riling of the petition. III re O)'S .. 737 A.2d 283, ?8Cl ;Pa Supe; Cl
1999), (citing In re A.P., 692 A.2d 240 (Pa Super Ct. 1997)). However. the Court
'mllst consider the whole history of a given case and not mechanically apply the six-
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month statutory provisions. but instead consider the indivrdual crrcumstancesJf
each case." Id. (citation omitted) FLI rthermore, the Su pe rior COli it has s tat8ci:
To be legally significant, the [post-abandonmerlt] contact must br, stemi'J ,m.j
consistent over a period of time, contribute to the psychological health of thr:!
child, and must demonstrate a serious intent on th8 pil It of the pment to
recultrvate a parent-child relationship and must also deillonslr'ate "
willingness and capacity to undertake the parental role TIlf) parent wish'llg lc
reestablish his parental responsibilrties bears tile burden of proof orl his
question. lei. (quoting In re Hamilton. 549 A.2d 1291, .~. Wi ·;IOa, Super:.:!
1988)).
A § 2511 (a)(5) AnalysiS
The Agency contends that this Court should involuntarily t8rminate Molher's
parental rights under subsection (a)(5) of Section 2511 of the .i\cloption Act. To
satisfy the statutory provision the Agency must prove by clenr 81lC corlVincinSi
evidence that several conditions exrst. First. the Children IIlll,',l i1[;Ve beerl r"';'IOVi'U
from parental care by court order or Agency agreement for Cit lei1s1 six rnOliL1S
before tile filing of the petition totenninate parental rights. Second, the condi:ioil~.
that led to the removal must continue to exist. Third, Mother must 110t lJe able or
willing to remedy those conditions within a reasonable period)f time. Forth. Ii;E
services or assistance reasonably available to the parent must not be I:keiy (0
remedy the conditions that led to the removal within a reasonilble Deliacl of time.
Fifth, termination of parental might rights must best serve the neecls and wcl:arc of
the child. See III re C.G .. 791 A.2d 430, 435-36 (Pa Super. CL 2002)
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In this case, the oldest Child 11as been removed rrolll MOUlds (;,11,' will'l1 sh"
was eighteen months old and the youngest child since she was one month oid Tlw
conditions that led to this removal still exist. Mother has taken ollly minor steps to
reunify and continues to not have tile capacity to care for the girls 8t the prese:lt
time.
The conditions are not likely to be remedied within a reasonable period c,f
time. Of great concern is Mother's statement that she would no longer work willi
anybody at the Agency if the Children were to be returned to her and Mother's Litle;
refusal to deal with her mental health issues. There is no indie