Com. v. Laston, E.

J-A10043-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ELI ANTHONY LASTON :
:
Appellant : No. 2343 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 23, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0006987-2017
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 07, 2019
Appellant, Eli Anthony Laston,1 appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench
trial convictions for three counts of adulteration of a controlled substance, and
one count each of possession of an adulterated controlled substance,
possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia,
firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a weapon, and
prohibited offensive weapons.2 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Chief Anthony R. Paparo is currently employed by the
____________________________________________
1 Appellant’s last name is spelled variously throughout the certified record as
“Laston” and “Latson.”
2 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(2), (a)(1), (a)(16), (a)(32); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§
6106(a)(1), 907(b), 908(a), respectively.
J-A10043-19
Yeadon Borough Police Department and was previously
employed by the Upper Darby Police Department as a Patrol
Captain, where he was so employed on September 14,
2017.
At approximately 12:30 p.m., on September 14, 2017,
Captain Paparo was on patrol in an unmarked Dodge
Charger on Crosley Road, approaching the area of
Greenwood Avenue and Radbourne Road when he observed
[Appellant] operating a Dodge Ram pickup truck. The truck
was coming off of Greenwood Avenue making a right turn
onto Crosley Road.
Captain Paparo observed the Dodge Ram drive through the
intersection, failing to stop at the stop sign at Greenwood
Avenue and Crosley Road. Captain Paparo estimated the
Dodge Ram was proceeding at a rate of speed of over 30
mph, in excess of the speed limit.
Captain Paparo observed the Dodge Ram fail to stop at the
following intersection and again at the stop sign at the
following intersection of Emerson Street and Atlantic
Avenue. Captain Paparo made a U-turn and pulled up
behind the Dodge and activated his warning lights.
Captain Paparo could see through the rear window of
Appellant’s vehicle, although tinted, and observed Appellant
moving around the front seat of the vehicle and he appeared
to be placing some kind of large object into the backseat.
Due to the tint on the window, Captain Paparo was unable
to determine with certainty that there were any other
occupants of the vehicle.
Captain Paparo the[n] approached driver’s side of the
vehicle; Appellant rolled down his window and the two
began to converse. At that time, Captain Paparo was fairly
certain that Appellant was the only occupant. Captain
Paparo asked for Appellant’s registration and insurance,
which Appellant complied with. Captain Paparo asked
Appellant what happened with the stop signs to which
Appellant said that he didn’t see them.
Captain Paparo asked Appellant about the movements
Appellant was making in the front seat when he was pulled
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over and that he made Captain Paparo concerned. Appellant
stated that he had reached over to open the center console
to find all of his paperwork as he knew he was being
stopped. Appellant demonstrated the movement to Captain
Paparo, which revealed a prescription bottle in the center
console. Appellant then closed the center console.
Captain Paparo asked Appellant if he was taking any
prescription medication and Appellant stated that he was
taking it but hadn’t for a while. Captain Paparo asked
Appellant to hand him the prescription bottle, which
Appellant freely handed over. Captain Paparo observed that
[t]he name on the bottle did not match Appellant’s name.
Appellant stated that it was a friend’s bottle.
At this point, Captain Paparo asked Appellant to step out of
the vehicle for [officer] safety. As Appellant stepped out,
Captain Paparo observed another prescription bottle in the
driver’s [side door] pocket that appeared to have the label
scraped off. Captain Paparo led Appellant to [the] back
area of the truck and conducted a pat down, where [Captain
Paparo] detected what was immediately apparent to him to
be pills in Appellant’s pocket in what felt to be an envelope.
Upon removing the envelope containing the pills, the
envelope turned out to be a…parking ticket. As [Captain
Paparo] was removing the envelope, Appellant stated that
they were his pills and that he did not like to carry his whole
prescription with him so he carried it like that. Captain
Paparo was able to identify the pills as oxycodone.
Appellant was told to sit down at the rear of his vehicle;
Captain Paparo asked if there were other controlled
substances in the vehicle to which Appellant responded
“no.”
Captain Paparo told Appellant that he was going to look in
the vehicle based on the fact that [Appellant] had a
prescription not properly labeled on his person. Captain
Paparo retrieved the prescription bottle along the [driver’s]
side door. A search of the remainder of the vehicle resulted
in “a bunch of empty bottles” notably, a oxycodone bottle,
one that would hold 100 pills, which [Captain Paparo] knows
at this time to be in excess of what a pharmacy would
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dispense to an individual for use.
In the front portion of the center console, there was another
compartment, which contained a “fake looking gun that was
gold in color.” At that time, Captain Paparo told another
officer who had arrived on scene to watch the gun and
[Captain Paparo] went and placed Appellant into custody for
further investigation, telling Appellant that he was under
arrest for the prescription bottles not having his name on
them and the firearm. Appellant responded that it was a
starter gun.
When Captain Paparo was holding the gun he couldn’t find
a serial number on it and it felt heavy. Captain Paparo
noticed that it actually had a magazine in it that had…four
live 380[-caliber] rounds and [a] round that appeared to be
a blank. Once he cleared the weapon and inspected it
further, Captain Paparo noticed that [it] looked like
someone had actually taken a drill bit and drilled out the
bore of the barrel and the gun was located with live
ammunition (the firearm was later sent to a state police
crime lab and found to be a functioning weapon).
Appellant advised that he did not have a permit to carry or
a sportsman permit to carry. A further search of the vehicle
revealed numerous drug paraphernalia, including multiple
bottles for various types of different pills[, some of which
contained controlled substances].
* * *
On April 23, 2018, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress
seeking to suppress the evidence located in Appellant’s
vehicle and on his person as the searches were unsupported
by probable cause or reasonable suspicion. A hearing was
held on May 7, 2018, at which time the Commonwealth
presented testimony from Captain Anthony Paparo. Captain
Paparo testified to the facts as set forth above. [The c]ourt
took the matter under advisement and permitted both
parties to file briefs. On June 5, 2018, [the c]ourt issued an
Order denying the Motion which included extensive Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law….
On July 3, 2018, the case proceeded to a stipulated non-
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jury trial. … [The c]ourt took the matter under advisement.
On July 11, 2018, after reviewing exhibits, [the c]ourt
issued an order finding Appellant guilty of [nine separate
counts].
Appellant was sentenced on July 23, 2018, to an aggregate
term of 23 months’ intermediate punishment plus seven
years of probation. No Post-Sentence Motions were filed.
On August 10, 2018, Appellant filed a timely Notice of
Appeal and a timely response to [the c]ourt’s [Rule] 1925(b)
request [on August 31, 2018].
(Trial Court Opinion, filed September 10, 2018, at 1-6) (internal citations
omitted).
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
DID THE COURT ERR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
SUPPRESS WHERE THE OFFICER LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE
TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE?
(Appellant’s Brief at 8).
Appellant argues the mislabeled prescription pill bottle did not give
Captain Paparo probable cause to search Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant
contends Captain Paparo could not determine whether the pills contained in
the mislabeled bottle were illegal substances. Appellant posits Captain Paparo
unlawfully searched Appellant’s vehicle without definitive knowledge of
possible contraband and no other facts to give rise to probable cause.
Appellant concludes this Court should vacate the judgment of sentence,
reverse the order denying suppression, and remand for a new trial. We
disagree.
Our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence
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is as follows:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a
challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
determining whether the suppression court’s factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because
the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court,
we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth
and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by
[those] findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where…the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are
not binding on [the] appellate court, whose duty it is to
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the [trial court
are] subject to plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-62 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 618 Pa. 684, 57 A.3d 68 (2012).
An officer may order an occupant to exit his vehicle after the detention
of the vehicle for a violation of traffic law until the traffic stop is completed,
even absent reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1020-21 (Pa.Super. 2017). The
officer can conduct a pat-down of a suspect’s outer garments if the officer
observes conduct that leads him to reasonably believe the suspect may be
armed and dangerous. Commonwealth v. Mack, 953 A.2d 587, 590
(Pa.Super. 2008) (noting officer’s observation of suspect’s reaching
movements while suspect was in vehicle can lead officer to reasonably
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conclude his safety is in jeopardy).
“[T]he Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures and, to that end, a search conducted without a warrant
is generally presumed unreasonable unless it is undertaken pursuant to a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.” Commonwealth v.
Lechner, 685 A.2d 1014, 1016 (Pa.Super. 1996).
The level of probable cause necessary for warrantless
searches of automobiles is the same as that required to
obtain a search warrant. The well-established standard for
evaluating whether probable cause exists is the “totality of
the circumstances” test. This test allows for a flexible,
common-sense approach to all circumstances presented.
Probable cause typically exists where the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient
to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed. The evidence
required to establish probable cause for a warrantless
search must be more than a mere suspicion or a good faith
belief on the part of the police officer.
Id. (internal citations omitted). “[P]robable cause does not require certainty,
but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily
even the most likely inference.” Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271,
1275 (Pa.Super. 2005).
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords no greater
protection with respect to warrantless searches of motor vehicles than does
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Commonwealth
v. Gary, 625 Pa. 183, 242, 91 A.3d 102, 138 (2014). Under either
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constitutional provision, “[t]he prerequisite for a warrantless search of a motor
vehicle is probable cause to search; no exigency beyond the inherent mobility
of a motor vehicle is required.” Id. Additionally, “[i]f a car is readily mobile
and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth
Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more.” Id. at 199,
91 A.3d at 111-12 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940,
116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1031, ___ (1996)).
Instantly, Captain Paparo witnessed Appellant disregard multiple stop
signs and stopped his vehicle. Captain Paparo then saw Appellant place a
large object in the rear of his vehicle. The captain approached the vehicle and
asked Appellant about his movements; Appellant stated he had searched for
his registration and insurance. Appellant opened the center console to
demonstrate his earlier movements, and Captain Paparo noticed a prescription
pill bottle in the console. The captain asked Appellant to hand over the pill
bottle, and Appellant complied. The captain observed that the name on the
pill bottle was not Appellant’s name.
Captain Paparo asked Appellant to exit his vehicle. Upon Appellant’s exit,
the captain saw another prescription pill bottle in the driver’s-side door pocket
with the label torn off. Captain Paparo conducted a pat down for officer safety
and detected pills, which the captain later determined to be oxycodone, in an
envelope in Appellant’s pants pocket. Appellant denied having any more pills
in his vehicle. Captain Paparo searched Appellant’s vehicle and discovered
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multiple prescription bottles for other pills, some of which contained controlled
substances, and a firearm in the center console. Appellant filed a motion to
suppress the items found on his person and in the vehicle based on an illegal
search without reasonable suspicion or probable cause; the court
subsequently denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.
Here, Captain Paparo legally stopped Appellant after he disregarded
several stop signs and asked Appellant to exit his vehicle for officer safety.
See Harris, supra. Captain Paparo’s observation of Appellant moving a large
object in the back seat gave the captain a reasonable belief that his safety
was in jeopardy, which justified his pat down of Appellant and the seizure of
the loose oxycodone pills on Appellant’s person. See Mack, supra. Further,
under the totality of the circumstances, Captain Paparo had probable cause to
believe Appellant’s vehicle contained contraband, after he saw a mislabeled
prescription pill bottle, a prescription pill bottle with the label ripped off, and
recovered loose oxycodone pills from Appellant’s person. See Gary, supra;Spieler, supra; Lechner, supra. Therefore, Captain Paparo legally searched
Appellant’s vehicle; and the court properly denied Appellant’s motion to
suppress. See Hoppert, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/7/19
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