PR Financing Ltd v. Weng, Z.

J-A22024-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
PR FINANCING LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ZHEN XIANG WENG AND YUE YING
DONG, TRADING AS SUKURA EXPRESS
Appellants No. 274 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order January 8, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Civil Division at No(s): 2013-NO-7486-30
2014 SU-1030-40
BEFORE: BOWES, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2015
Appellants Zhen Xiang Weng and Yue Ying Dong (“Appellants”) appeal
the January 8, 2015 order of the York County Court of Common Pleas
denying their Petition to Open Confession of Judgment. We affirm.
On October 22, 2012, while represented by counsel, Appellants
entered into a commercial lease agreement with PR Financing Limited
Partnership (“PR Financing”) to operate a Chinese restaurant in the North
Hanover Mall, located in Hanover, Pennsylvania. The parties amended the
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A22024-15
lease on November 28, 2012.1 The restaurant opened on August 31, 2013,
but closed within two weeks.
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1
The lease’s confession of judgment clause provides, in pertinent part:
Confession of Judgment – Rent. Tenant covenants and
agrees that if there is an Event of Default, then Landlord may,
without limitation, cause judgments for money to be entered
against Tenant and, for those purposes, Tenant hereby grants
the following warrant of attorney: Tenant hereby irrevocably
authorizes and empowers any prothonotary, clerk of court,
attorney of any record of court, and/or Landlord (as well as
someone acting for Landlord) in any and all actions commenced
against Tenant for recovery of the Rent and/or other amounts to
be paid to Landlord by Tenant to appear for Tenant, assess
damages, and confess or otherwise enter judgment against
Tenant for all or any part of the Rent and/or other amounts to be
paid to Landlord by Tenant including, without limitation, sums
under Section 16.02(a), together with interest, costs, and an
attorneys’ commission of five percent (5%) of the full amount of
such Rent, amount and sums. Thereupon, writs of execution as
well as attachment may forthwith issue and be served without
any prior notice, writ, or proceeding whatsoever except as may
otherwise be required by applicable law. The warrant of
attorney herein granted shall not be exhausted by one or more
exercises of it; successive actions may be commenced and
successive judgments may be confessed or otherwise entered
against Tenant, from time to time, as often as any of the Rent
and/or other amounts and sums shall fall or be due or be in
arrears. This warrant of attorney may be exercised during the
Term of this Lease, any extension or renewals thereof, and/or
after the termination or expiration of the Term. The provisions
of Section 16.02(d) are incorporated herein by this reference.
Lease, Section 16.02(b).
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PR Financing sent Appellants a notice of default on September 17,
2013. On October 22, 2013, PR Financing sent Appellants a notice that it
had taken possession of the premises without termination of the lease.
On November 15, 2013, PR Financing filed a complaint in confession of
judgment, and the York County Court of Common Pleas prothonotary
entered judgment against Appellants. That same day, the prothonotary
served Appellants with a notice of entry of the confessed judgment.
Appellants received the notice within a few days. PR Financing also served
Appellants with the Important Notice of Intent to Execute on the Judgment,
which Appellants received via overnight delivery to their home on November
22, 2013.
Over four months later, on March 26, 2014, Appellants filed a Petition
to Open Confession of Judgment (“Petition to Open”). The trial court allowed
discovery on the Petition to Open. Appellants were deposed with the aid of a
Chinese-Mandarin interpreter. During the deposition, Appellant Weng
testified that he is a naturalized citizen of the United States who has been in
the United States for 20 years and doing business as a restauranteur for
over 18 years; he was educated as an accountant in China; he has retained
attorneys before for the purposes of entering two prior English-language
leases for his restaurants; he consulted with numerous attorneys during the
four month period between receiving the notice of confession of judgment
and the filing of the Petition to Open; and he was aware of the need to act in
response to the Confession of Judgment.
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The trial court conducted a hearing on the Petition to Open on October
16, 2014. At the hearing, the parties relied on the deposition testimony and
exhibits to make argument to the court. On January 12, 2015, the trial
court denied the Petition to Open. Appellants timely appealed.
Appellants raise a single claim for review:
Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt improperly denied Appellant’s [sic]
Petition to Open Confession of Judgment, thereby committing
abuse of discretion?
Appellants’ Brief, p. 5.
We have noted that:
[a] petition to open judgment is an appeal to the equitable
powers of the court. As such it is committed to the sound
discretion of the hearing court and will not be disturbed absent a
manifest abuse of discretion.
PNC Bank v. Kerr, 802 A.2d 634, 638 (Pa.Super.2002); Huntington Nat.
Bank v. K-Cor, Inc., 107 A.3d 783, 785 (Pa.Super.2014) (“We review a
court’s order denying a petition to open a confessed judgment for an abuse
of discretion.”).
This Court’s standard of review regarding the denial of a petition to
open or strike a default judgment requires that the Court:
examine the entire record for any abuse of discretion, reversing
only where the trial court’s findings are inconsistent with the
clear equities of the case. Moreover, this Court must determine
whether there are equitable considerations which require that a
defendant, against whom a default judgment has been entered,
receive an opportunity to have the case decided on the merits.
Where the trial court’s analysis was premised upon record
evidence, where its findings of fact were deductions from other
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facts, a pure result of reasoning, and where the trial court made
no credibility determinations, this Court may draw its own
inferences and arrive at its own conclusions. Finally, where the
equities warrant opening a default judgment, this Court will not
hesitate to find an abuse of discretion.
Aquilino v. Philadelphia Catholic Archdiocese, 884 A.2d 1269, 1280
(Pa.Super.2005) (quoting Reid v. Boohar, 856 A.2d 156, 159
(Pa.Super.2004)).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permit judgment by
confession and govern the opening of such a judgment. See Pa.R.C.P. 2950
et seq.
[A] petition to open rests within the discretion of the trial court,
and may be granted if the petitioner (1) acts promptly, (2)
alleges a meritorious defense, and (3) can produce sufficient
evidence to require submission of the case to a jury.
Hazer v. Zabala, 26 A.3d 1166, 1169 (Pa.Super.2011) (quoting PNC Bank,
Nat. Ass’n v. Bluestream Tech., Inc., 14 A.3d 831, 835-36
(Pa.Super.2010)). Once a written notice of a judgment entered by
confession is served, a defendant/petitioner has 30 days in which to file a
petition to open the judgment. Pa.R.C.P. 2959(a)(3). “Unless the
[petitioner] can demonstrate that there were compelling reasons for the
delay, a petition not timely filed shall be denied.” Id.
As this Court has explained:
a court should open a confessed judgment if the petitioner
promptly presents evidence on a petition to open which in a jury
trial would require that the issues be submitted to the jury. A
petitioner must offer clear, direct, precise and believable
evidence of a meritorious defense, sufficient to raise a jury
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question. In determining whether sufficient evidence has been
presented, we employ the same standard as in a directed
verdict: we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to
the petitioner and accept as true all evidence and proper
inferences therefrom supporting the defense while we reject
adverse allegations of the party obtaining the judgment.
Stahl Oil Co. v. Helsel, 860 A.2d 508, 512 (Pa.Super.2004) (internal
citations omitted).
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying the Petition to
Open because the combination of a failure to retain counsel despite having
contacted 10 different attorneys during the 30 days after receiving the
notice of confessed judgment and an alleged language barrier provided a
compelling reason justifying their four-month delay in filing the Petition to
Open. See Appellants’ Brief, pp. 9-13. We disagree.
The instant case turns on whether Appellants promptly filed their
petition to open judgment. Appellants admit they received notice of the
confession of judgment within a few days of November 15, 2013, but did not
file their Petition to Open until four months after receiving service of the
notice. Because they did not file their petition to open within 30 days of
service of the notice, Appellants must demonstrate a compelling reason for
the delay. See Pa.R.C.P. 2959(a)(3). Without citing to any legal authority,
Appellants claim that an inability to speak, read, or understand the English
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language well is a per se compelling reason to excuse their delay.2
Alternatively, they claim their alleged language barrier, combined with a
failure to retain counsel despite visiting at least 10 law firms in the 30 days
that followed receipt of the Notice of Intent to Execute, prevented timely
filing of the Petition to Open and thereby provides a compelling reason for
the delay.
PR Financing argues that an inability to understand or communicate
well in the English language is akin to “any other insufficiency of knowledge
or risk that a business person must appreciate or take the consequences[,]”
and does not provide a valid excuse to avoid liability on contracts. 3 See PR
Financing’s Brief, p. 8 (citing Fried for Use of Berger Supply Co. v. Feola,
129 F. Supp. 699 (W.D. Pa. 1954) (difficulty understanding English does not
render contract unenforceable) and Morales v. Sun Constructors, Inc.,
541 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2008) (“In the absence of fraud, the fact that an
offeree cannot read, write, speak, or understand the English language is
immaterial to whether an English-language agreement the offeree executes
is enforceable.”)). PR Financing likens a language barrier to a failure to read
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2
Appellants simply conclude that “it is common sense that a language
barrier is [p]er [s]e a compelling reason.” Appellants’ Brief, p. 12.
3
This Court’s research has revealed no Pennsylvania case discussing
whether an alleged language barrier provides a per se compelling reason for
delay in filing a petition to open a confession judgment after receipt of
notice.
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a contract, which, as supine negligence, does not provide a compelling
reason to avoid the terms of the contract.4 See PR Financing’s Brief, pp. 7-
8.
In any event, regardless whether an alleged language barrier alone is
a defense, Appellants’ claim fails. Appellant Weng admitted that he received
the notice of confession of judgment. Further, his actions in attempting to
secure representation in the 30 days that followed his receipt of the notice
illustrate that he knew action was required. This is not simply a case of
foreign language-speaking individuals not understanding the contents of the
warning and/or not being able to find representation until after the 30-day
period had passed. Rather, Appellants’ problem stems from the nearly three
months delay5 between the 30-day period during which they claim to have
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4
Pennsylvania courts have found that a failure to read a confession of
judgment is not grounds to open the judgment: Dollar Bank, Fed. Sav.
Bank v. Northwood Cheese Co., 637 A.2d 309 (Pa.Super.1994);
Pittsburgh Nat. Bank v. Larson, 507 A.2d 867 (Pa.Super.1986); T. W.
Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Kline, 84 A.2d 301 (Pa.1951); Germantown
Sav. Bank v. Talacki, 657 A.2d 1285, 1289 (Pa.Super.1995) (allegation
that party did not read the documents she signed and would not have
understood the documents even if she had read them insufficient reason to
open judgment).
5
Appellants received the notice of confession of judgment via overnight mail
on November 22, 2013. Therefore, the 30-day period during which
Appellant claimed to have contacted 10 attorneys ended on December 22,
2013. Appellants did not secure the services of counsel until March 17,
2014. Appellants offer no explanation for the intervening 82 days.
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contacted 10 attorneys and when they retained representation and filed the
Petition to Open.
The trial court found Appellants’ excuses insufficient, explaining:
The Petition to Open was filed over four months after confession
of judgment was entered, well beyond the 30 day requirement.
The excuse for the delay was [Appellants’] difficulty retaining
counsel and their difficulty communicating in English; however,
[Appellant] Weng consulted with numerous attorneys during that
four month period and was aware of the need to act in response
to the Confession of Judgment. In addition, [Appellant] Weng
has been in the United States for approximately 20 years, has
operated two business [sic] for over 18 years and is a
naturalized citizen who was educated as an accountant in China.
The alleged language barrier also did not prevent [Appellants]
from retaining counsel and entering into the lease that is subject
of the confession of judgment or entering into two prior
restaurant leases that were also drafted in English.
Order Denying Petition to Open Confession of Judgment, January 8, 2015, 6
p. 2.
We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that
Appellants’ alleged language barrier and difficulty retaining counsel did not
present a compelling reason or reasonable explanation for their delay in
filing the Petition to Open.
For the preceding reasons, we affirm the trial court’s January 8, 2015
denying Appellants’ Petition to Open Confession of Judgment.
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6
While signed on January 8, 2015, this order was not docketed until January
12, 2015. The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion incorporates this
order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, March 6, 2015, pp. 1-2.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/28/2015
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