Com. v. Mattox, A.

J-S11044-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ALNISSA MATTOX, :
:
Appellant : No. 837 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on April 10, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-36-SA-0000013-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2015
Alnissa Mattox (“Mattox”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered after she pled guilty to summary offenses concerning her violations
of a provision of the Public School Code governing compulsory school
attendance.1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant history underlying this appeal as
follows:
On July 10, 2012, [Mattox] appeared without counsel
before Magisterial District Judge Bruce A. Roth (“MDJ Roth”) …,
at which time [Mattox] entered a guilty plea on six separate
non-traffic citations for violations of compulsory school
1
See 24 P.S. § 13-1327(a); see also 24 P.S. § 13-1333(a)(1) (providing,
inter alia, that “[e]very parent … having control or charge of any child or
children of compulsory school age, who shall fail to comply with the
provisions of this act regarding compulsory attendance, shall on summary
conviction thereof, be sentenced to pay a fine and to pay court costs …, not
exceeding three hundred dollars ($300) …, and, in default of the payment of
such fine and costs … by the person so offending, shall be sentenced to the
county jail for a period not exceeding five (5) days.”).
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attendance [], for repeatedly failing to send her [ten-year-old]
child to school on a regular basis. Pursuant to 24 P.S. § 13-
1333, MDJ Roth imposed a statutory fine of $300 on each
citation and directed that [Mattox] pay court costs. A payment
plan was arranged at that time [whereby Mattox] would pay
$50.00 bi-weekly until all fines and costs were paid in full.
[Mattox] did not file an appeal [from] the convictions or the
sentence.
Because [Mattox] failed to pay on her fines and costs, a
payment determination hearing was held before MDJ Roth on
January 6, 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, MDJ Roth
determined that [Mattox] was financially able to pay as ordered
in the current payment schedule agreement. Therefore,
[Mattox] was directed to pay all fines and costs by no later than
February 12, 2014[,] or report to Lancaster County Prison to
begin serving an 80[-]day jail sentence. On January 17, 2014,
[Mattox] filed a summary appeal to the Lancaster County Court
of Common Pleas, objecting to the jail sentence imposed by MDJ
Roth.
On April 10, 2014, a summary appeal hearing [hereinafter
referred to as “the de novo hearing”] was held on the instant
matter, at which time [Mattox] was represented by Carol
Herring, Esq. (“[Attorney] Herring”). During the hearing,
[Mattox] testified and acknowledged that her monthly income
exceeded her monthly expenses.[FN1] Nevertheless, [Mattox]
admitted she had made only one payment on this case since the
date of her guilty plea in July 2012, in the total amount of
$50.00. At the conclusion of the hearing, [the trial c]ourt
determined [that Mattox] was in default of payments on her
fines and costs. Furthermore, the [c]ourt found that [Mattox]
had a past and present financial ability to comply with the
payment plan[,] as implemented on July 10, 2012, which
required her to pay $25.00 per week. [Mattox] simply chose not
to make the payments, prioritizing cosmetics for herself and hair
products for her children over her legal obligation to pay fines
and costs.
[FN1]
[Mattox] testified she was currently receiving
approximately $1,000.00 per month in public assistance
and food stamps. [Mattox] further testified that[,] in
addition to public assistance and food stamps[,] she
received approximately $100.00 per month in child
support for her two children[,] until April of 2013.
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Additionally, [Mattox] stated that for two years[,] she
held a job working 30 hours per week at $10.00 per
hour, but she stopped working in August 2012 (one
month after conviction)[,] and she has not worked since
then. Although [Mattox] claimed [that] she stopped
working due to stomach pain, [Mattox] is not receiving
Social Security Disability and she failed to produce any
documents to substantiate a medical disability.
[Mattox’s] only fixed monthly expense is rent in the
amount of $465. [Mattox] also testified to expenses for
food, clothing, cosmetics for herself, and hair products
for the children.
Following the [de novo] hearing, [Mattox’s] summary appeal
was dismissed. Pursuant to 24 P.S. § 13-1333, the judgment of
[MDJ Roth] was reinstated and [Mattox] was ordered to pay all
fines and costs as originally imposed by MDJ Roth. However, the
sentence of incarceration imposed by [MDJ Roth] was modified
to a sentence of five [] days [of] imprisonment in Lancaster
County Prison for each of the five [] summary offenses included
in this appeal.[FN2] [Mattox was only sentenced on five of her six
summary offenses, as she already had served a term of five
days in the Lancaster County Prison on her sixth conviction.]
Those sentences were to run consecutive to one another,
resulting in an aggregate sentence of twenty-five [] days [of]
incarceration.[FN3]
[FN2]
Because the maximum period of incarceration
allowed by law for each count is “a period not exceeding
five (5) days,” the [sentencing c]ourt modified the jail
sentence imposed by MDJ Roth to reflect a sentence
[that] was consistent with the provisions of that specific
statute. 24 P.S. § 13-1333(a)(1).
[FN3]
Imposition of the jail sentence was deferred until
May 16, 2014, at which time [Mattox] was directed to
report to Lancaster County Prison unless she had paid in
full all fines and costs owing as a result of her guilty pleas
to the underlying summary offenses, or unless [Mattox]
filed an appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in
which case the sentence of incarceration would be
stayed.
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/14, at 1-3 (footnotes in original, citations and some
capitalization omitted).
Mattox timely filed a Notice of Appeal.2 On appeal, Mattox presents
the following issue for our review: “Did the Court of Common Pleas violate
[Mattox’s] right to counsel[,] as per Pa.R.Crim[.]P[]. [] 122 [3] and
[Pa.R.Crim.P.] 454[,4] by affirming [MDJ Roth’s O]rder imposing an 80[-]day
sentence of incarceration in Lancaster County Prison, along with fines and
2
The trial court set forth in its June 4, 2014 Opinion an extensive procedural
history concerning Attorney Herring’s failure to timely file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and her
several requests for continuances. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/14, at 3-8.
However, this matter is not relevant to our disposition of Mattox’s appeal.
This Court reinstated the appeal following Attorney Herring’s omission and
our initial dismissal of the appeal, after which new counsel entered his
appearance on behalf of Mattox.
3
Rule 122 provides, in relevant part, that “[c]ounsel shall be appointed … in
all summary cases, for all defendants who are without financial resources or
who are otherwise unable to employ counsel when there is a likelihood that
imprisonment will be imposed[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(A)(1).
4
Rule 454 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[I]f, in the event of a conviction [in a summary case], there is a
reasonable likelihood of a sentence of imprisonment or
probation, the defendant shall be advised of the right to counsel
and
(a) upon request, the defendant shall be given a
reasonable opportunity to secure counsel, or
(b) if the defendant is without financial resources or is
otherwise unable to employ counsel, counsel shall be
assigned as provided in Rule 122[.]
Pa.R.Crim.P. 454(A)(2).
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costs, as a result of [Mattox’s] indigence …?” Brief for Appellant at 2
(footnotes added).
Based upon Rules 122(A)(1) and 454(A)(2), supra, Mattox maintains
that she is entitled to dismissal of all charges,5 arguing as follows:
Mattox is indigent. [] Mattox made both MDJ Roth and [the trial
court] Judge [] aware of her indigency and lack of financial
resources to pay the assessed fines. As a result of her inability
to pay the assessed fines, there was a likelihood imprisonment
would ensu[]e. Due to [] Mattox’s indigency and the likelihood
imprisonment would ensu[]e, [she] should have been advised of
her right to counsel and had counsel appointed. As [Mattox] was
not advised of her right to counsel and because no counsel was
appointed for [her], the charges [] from the Magisterial District
Court should be dismissed.
Id. at 6-7. Because Mattox’s issue presents a question of law, our standard
of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v.
Williams, 84 A.3d 680, 684 (Pa. 2014).
Generally, “there is no requirement, either under the United States
Constitution or under the Pennsylvania Constitution, that defendants in all
summary cases be provided with counsel.” Commonwealth v. Thomas,
507 A.2d 57, 59 (Pa. 1986) (footnote omitted); see also Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 43 (1972). Rather, the right to counsel in summary
cases attaches only to those defendants who are indigent or “unable to
employ counsel when there is a likelihood that imprisonment will be
imposed[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(A)(1) (emphasis added); see also
5
Mattox does not challenge the propriety of her underlying convictions for
compulsory school attendance, as she did not timely file an appeal from
these convictions. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 460(a).
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Commonwealth v. Cannon, 954 A.2d 1222, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(stating that “Pa.R.Crim.P. 122 authorizes the court to conduct case-by-case
evaluations of individual defendants’ circumstances in order to ascertain
whether counsel should be appointed.” (footnote, quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Therefore, “[t]here is no right to counsel where the only
sentence provided for in a summary violation is a fine and costs.”
Commonwealth v. Smith, 868 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citing
Commonwealth v. Long, 688 A.2d 198, 201 (Pa. Super. 1996)).
In the instant case, the summary offenses for which Mattox was
charged did not carry a possible sentence of imprisonment; rather, the only
possible penalty, and the penalty that was actually imposed, was the
imposition of fines and costs. See 24 P.S. § 13-1333(a)(1). Accordingly,
Mattox was not entitled to the appointment of counsel. See Smith, supra;
see also Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa. Super.
2006) (where the indigent appellant was charged with a summary offense
that was punishable by imprisonment, but she was penalized with only a fine
and court costs, holding that “[b]ecause the trial court determined before
trial that a term of imprisonment was unlikely, and no term of imprisonment
was imposed, the trial court correctly concluded that it had no obligation to
appoint counsel. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 122(A)(1).”).
Moreover, in the trial court’s Opinion issued after the de novo hearing,
the court correctly observed that “[e]ven when the possibility of
imprisonment may arise upon a default of fines and costs payments, the
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right to counsel does not attach at proceedings to determine a defendant’s
guilt or innocence of the summary offense itself.” Trial Court Opinion,
6/4/14, at 7 n.5 (citing Bacik v. Commonwealth, 434 A.2d 860, 862-63
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) (applying the predecessor Rules to Pa.R.Crim.P. 122 and
456,6 and holding that the Magisterial District Court properly denied the
indigent defendant’s request for the appointment of counsel where (1) the
only penalty authorized by the ordinance in question was fines and costs;
and (2) “the possibility of a sentence of imprisonment only comes into play
upon a determination of default in a second and subsequent hearing” if the
court finds that the defendant had the ability to pay.)).
At the de novo hearing in this case, the trial court conducted a
thorough inquiry concerning Mattox’s financial status, income, employment
history, medical status, and monthly expenses, in order to determine her
ability to pay the fines and costs. See N.T., 4/10/14, at 25-55. Mattox was
represented by Attorney Herring at the de novo hearing. After considering
Mattox’s testimony, and evaluating her credibility, the trial court found that
Mattox had the ability to pay her fines and costs (under the installment plan
of $25.00 per week), but refused to do so. See id. at 57-58, 63; see also
Trial Court Opinion, 6/4/14, at 2.
6
Rule 456 provides, in relevant part, that, if a defendant fails to pay fines,
costs or restitution as ordered, he or she can only be imprisoned if, after
hearing, it is determined that the defendant has the ability to pay and
refuses. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 456(B), (C).
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Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that there was no violation of
Mattox’s right to counsel, and thus affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/26/2015
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