In the Int. of: D.D. Appeal of: Commonwealth of PA

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.C.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA
No. 999 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered May 12, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000166-2013
CP-67-JV-0000720-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 26, 2015
The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered May 12, 2014, in
the Juvenile Division of the York County Court of Common Pleas, terminating
the delinquency supervision of minor, D.C.D. The juvenile court granted
D.C.D.’s petition for early termination of his supervision to facilitate his
transfer to Southwood Psychiatric Hospital. On appeal, the Commonwealth
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting D.C.D.’s motion
when (1) other treatment options were available under delinquency
supervision, and (2) the court failed to adequately consider the protection of
the community. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We note at the outset that this is a unique case, involving the juvenile
court’s interpretation of Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 632,
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under the specific facts of the matter before it. The pertinent facts are as
follows. On October 15, 2012, a delinquency petition was filed against
D.C.D., then age 10,1 alleging he committed the crime of indecent assault2
against his five-year-old sister and a three-year-old female cousin. On
January 23, 2013, the charges were disposed of under a consent decree,
and D.C.D.’s parents voluntarily placed him in foster care through Pressley
Ridge Counseling. On April 11, 2013, D.C.D. was detained on new charges
—stalking, loitering and prowling at night time, and harassment 3 — which
arose after he sent notes of a sexual nature to an adult neighbor of his
foster family. Following a hearing on April 22, 2013, and by agreement of
the parties, the juvenile court added the charges of harassment and loitering
and prowling to the consent decree,4 and directed D.C.D. be placed with a
new foster family.
On July 10, 2013, D.C.D. appeared before the juvenile court for a
probation violation hearing. It was established that during a home visit on
July 7, 2013, he attempted to set fire to a piece of wood in his bedroom. As
a result of the hearing, D.C.D. was released to his foster home, and ordered
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1
The child’s date of birth is in March of 2002.
2
18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7).
3
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2709.1, 5506, and 2709, respectively.
4
The Commonwealth agreed to withdraw the charge of stalking.
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to undergo a psychosexual evaluation. At a subsequent review hearing on
July 24, 2013, the parties agreed that York County Office of Children, Youth,
and Families (“CYF”) would conduct an investigation to determine whether
D.C.D. should be adjudicated dependent. CYF subsequently filed a
dependency petition, and on August 7, 2013, the juvenile court adjudicated
D.C.D. dependent. The court specifically noted D.C.D. would be subject to
“concurrent supervision” by both Juvenile Probation and CYF, but that CYF
would be the lead agency. N.T., 8/7/2013, at 14, 16.
On September 9, 2013, CYF filed a motion for change of D.C.D’s
placement because the child was continuing to act out sexually in his foster
home. Following a placement hearing on September 25, 2013, the trial
court granted CYF’s motion, and transferred D.C.D. to the Sarah Reed
Residential Treatment facility (“Sarah Reed”).
Thereafter, based upon D.C.D.’s continued violation of the terms of his
consent decree, the juvenile court convened a hearing on the outstanding
delinquency petitions. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6340(d). On January 28, 2014,
D.C.D. entered an admission to the charges of indecent assault and
harassment by communication.5 Accordingly, the juvenile court adjudicated
him delinquent, and directed that he remain at Sarah Reed. On March 26,
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5
The Commonwealth withdrew the second charge of indecent assault, and
the charge of loitering and prowling.
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2014, CYF filed a motion for change of placement, asserting D.C.D. had
sexually offended a younger child at Sarah Reed, and “was in need of a
more specialized residential treatment program that would focus on the
sexual offending issues.”6 Motion for Change of Placement, 3/26/2014, at ¶
9. The motion also averred CYF and Juvenile Probation were recommending
Southwood Psychiatric Hospital’s Choices Program (“Southwood”), “which
has immediate openings and is equipped to deal with the lower functioning
youth.” Id. at ¶ 12. During the March 31, 2014, placement hearing,
counsel for CYF explained why the program at Southwood was the most
appropriate placement for D.C.D.:
First of all, they do specialize in sexual offending, sexual abuse
issues and in addition they are able to facilitate treatment with
those in the lower intellectual function and lower IQ range, which
[D.C.D.] falls into, and they do have available, because they are
associated with the Southwood Psychiatric Hospital that type of
service as well.
N.T., 3/31/2014, at 5. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court
granted CYF’s motion, and directed D.C.D. be transferred to Southwood. 7
However, before the transfer was finalized, CYF learned Southwood
would not accept children with an active adjudication of delinquency for a
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6
CYF also noted that since D.C.D. had reached the age of 12, there were
more placement opportunities for him.
7
During the March 31, 2014, hearing, the attorney for the Commonwealth
expressed her agreement with the recommendation of D.C.D.’s transfer to
Southwood. N.T., 3/31/2014, at 12.
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sexual offense. Thereafter, on May 5, 2014, D.C.D. filed a motion for early
termination of his court supervision pursuant to Pa.R.Juv.P. 632(F). 8 See
id. (juvenile court may, for “compelling reasons,” grant early discharge from
supervision). The juvenile court conducted two hearings, the first on May 9,
2014, and the second on May 12, 2014. Following the second hearing, the
court granted D.C.D.’s motion, and this timely appeal follows.9
The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301, et seq., governs the adjudication
and disposition of delinquent and dependent children. With regard to
delinquent children, the stated purpose of the Act is as follows:
Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to provide
for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision,
care and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to
the protection of the community, the imposition of
accountability for offenses committed and the
development of competencies to enable children to
become responsible and productive members of the
community.
42 Pa.C.S.§ 6301(b)(2) (emphasis supplied). “The rehabilitative purpose of
the Juvenile Act is attained through accountability and the development of
personal qualities that will enable the juvenile offender to become a
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8
We note that D.C.D. originally filed a motion to vacate his adjudication of
delinquency, but later withdrew that motion.
9
On June 12, 2014, the juvenile court ordered D.C.D. to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
D.C.D. complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on
June 30, 2014.
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responsible and productive member of the community.” In re R.D.R., 876
A.2d 1009, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quotation omitted). The Act grants the
juvenile court broad discretion in determining the appropriate
disposition for a delinquent child, which this Court will not disturb “absent a
manifest abuse of discretion.” In re L.A., 853 A.2d 388, 394 (Pa. Super.
2004) (emphasis supplied). See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6352.
Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 631, the
court may discharge a juvenile from delinquency supervision after the
juvenile has satisfied all the conditions of his probation, that is, he has
completed the terms of his dispositional order, he has paid in full all
restitution, fines and costs, and he has not committed any new offenses.
See Pa.R.J.C.P. 631 (A), (D). Rule 632, however, permits a juvenile court
to order the early termination of court supervision. The Rule provides, in
pertinent part:
Rule 632. Early Termination of Court Supervision by Motion
A. Motion. Any party may move for early termination of court
supervision. The motion shall state with specificity why early
termination is sought and why the requirements of Rule 631(A)
have not been met.
B. Notice.
(1) In addition to the service requirements of Rule 345, any
party moving for early termination shall serve the motion on the
juvenile probation officer.
(2) The victim shall be provided notice of the motion for early
termination of court supervision.
C. Objection.
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(1) A party or the juvenile probation officer may object to the
motion under paragraph (A) and request a hearing.
(2) Such objection shall be made within thirty days of the date of
the motion; otherwise, objections are deemed waived.
D. Court's determination. The court shall:
(1) rule on the motion and any objections without a hearing; or
(2) schedule a hearing.
E. Hearing. If objections have been made pursuant to
paragraph (C) and/or the court has determined a hearing is
necessary, the court shall hold a hearing and give each party,
the victim, and the juvenile probation officer an opportunity to
be heard before the court enters its final order.
F. Termination. When the requirements of paragraphs (A)
through (E) have been met and the court is satisfied that
there are compelling reasons to discharge the juvenile
prior to the completion of the requirements of Rule
631(A), the court may order an early discharge of the
juvenile from its supervision.
Pa.R.J.C.P. 632 (emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, the juvenile court has the discretion to order early
termination of a delinquent child’s supervision for “compelling reasons.” We
note the Rule does not define what constitutes “compelling reasons,” and
our research has uncovered no appellate decisions interpreting Rule 632.
The Merriam Webster Dictionary, however, defines “compelling” as “capable
of causing someone to believe or agree[;] strong and forceful [;] causing
you to feel that you must do something.” http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary.
Here, the Commonwealth argues that no compelling reasons exist in
the present case for the early termination of D.C.D.’s delinquency
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supervision. It characterizes this matter as one involving “the unusual
circumstance of a juvenile whose diagnostic indicators are so bad that few
facilities are equipped to handle his problems.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 11.
The Commonwealth asserts that, although the trial court determined
Southwood was the only facility available to meet D.C.D.’s treatment needs,
Juvenile Probation proposed two other treatment facilities, Mars Home and
Abraxas Youth and Family Services (“Abraxas”), which would not require
termination of D.C.D.’s delinquency supervision. Moreover, the
Commonwealth contends the juvenile court focused solely on D.C.D.’s
treatment and rehabilitation, to the exclusion of “the statutorily mandated
goals of holding juveniles accountable and protection the community.” Id.
at 12. In fact, the Commonwealth notes the reason D.C.D. could not
transfer to Southwood while under delinquency supervision is because the
facility has a zoning agreement with its local community “based on not
treating dangerous delinquent juveniles.” Id.
The juvenile court, however, determined that D.C.D. presented
compelling reasons for the early termination of his delinquency supervision,
namely, his urgent need for the specialized care offered at Southwood. The
court opined:
D.[C.]D. is undeniably in need of specialized care: he has been
both a victim and perpetrator of sexual abuse; he functions
intellectually at a low level and is socially immature; he has
exhibited fire-setting behaviors. These needs limit the
placements available for appropriate treatment.
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Sarah Reed, his placement at the time supervision was
terminated, was inadequate for D.[C.]D.’s needs. Sarah Reed
failed to provide him with adequate supervision and appropriate
therapeutic services. In fact, the facility had ceased providing
D.[C.]D. with the necessary therapy before his removal from
their program and after just a few sessions. In order for
D.[C.]D. to receive the necessary treatment, his immediate
removal from Sarah Reed was imperative. One alternative
placement capable of treating D.[C.]D. and available to take him
immediately was identified.1 Southwood Hospital, however,
could not accept D.[C.]D. if he was actively adjudicated
delinquent for a sexual offense. Without the active adjudication,
D.[C.]D. could receive the treatment he needed; with the
delinquency supervision, contrary to the purpose of the Juvenile
Act, he would be precluded from immediately receiving
appropriate treatment.
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1
A second placement, Valley Youth House, had accepted
D.[C.]D. at the time of the May 12, 2014 hearing, but the
County had no contract with that facility. A third option,
Abraxas Sexual Offender Open Program, had not yet
accepted D.[C.]D. as of May 12, 2014, but even if it had, a
bed was not available until the end of July or early August.
Due to the lack of treatment D.[C.]D. received while at
Sarah Reed, this Court found it was contrary to D.[C.]D.’s
best interest to wait for admission into the program or for
a bed at Abraxas.
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At the time of the hearing, D.[C.]D. was receiving no
services particular to his adjudication of delinquency. The
services [the child] received were all as a result of his
involvement with [CYF] as a dependent child. Ceasing to
monitor D.[C.]D. through delinquency court would have no, and
in fact had no, effect on the judicial oversight of, or therapeutic
services provided to, D.[C.]D.
This Court’s paramount concern is providing D[C.]D. with
the treatment necessary to enable him to become a
responsible, law-abiding citizen upon completion of
treatment. This Court acted within its discretion on May 12,
2014 when it terminated delinquency supervision pursuant to
Rule 632 in order to permit D.[C.]D. to receive the appropriate
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and necessary treatment at a facility that could address his
needs.
Juvenile Court Opinion, 7/9/2014, at 3-5 (emphasis supplied).
After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ brief, we detect
no abuse of discretion on the part of the juvenile court in granting D.C.D.’s
petition for early termination of his delinquency supervision. The
Commonwealth does not dispute the fact that D.C.D. has not been receiving
the treatment he needs at Sarah Reed. Rather, it points to the fact that
there were two other treatment programs willing and able to care for D.C.D.,
neither of which would have required termination of his delinquency
supervision. The Commonwealth also contends the court improperly focused
solely on D.C.D’s rehabilitative needs without adequately considering the
need to protect the community.
With regard to the other treatment options, we find very little
consideration was given to Mars Home as a viable treatment program for
D.C.D. At the May 9, 2014, hearing, Mickeal Pugh, D.C.D.’s juvenile
probation officer testified he made a referral to Mars Home, but learned the
facility does not have a contract with Juvenile Probation. N.T., 5/9/2014, at
94. He also indicated he had never sent a juvenile to that program before.
Further, Pugh testified that although Mars Home would address D.C.D.’s fire
setting issues, “they’re basically a sex offender treatment program.” Id.
Moreover, he did not indicate whether the program had any openings for
D.C.D.’s immediate placement.
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Conversely, the viability of Abraxas as an appropriate treatment
facility for D.C.D. was thoroughly explored at the May 9, 2014, hearing. Lisa
Front, admission liaison for the facility, testified the program “is specifically
designed for fire setters, sex offenders[, and] has a fully-functioning special
education department and emotional support department[.]” Id. at 128.
However, she acknowledged the program would not have an opening for
D.C.D. until July or August. Id. at 132. Moreover, Front agreed the “core
population” of Abraxas was not “lower-functioning or borderline intellectual”
individuals, although she testified that the facility had “successfully worked
with kids with a wide variety of IQ’s.” Id. at 133, 138-139. Further, when
asked whether Abraxas had accepted D.C.D. into its program, she replied
the clinical team “felt he would be a good fit for the program,” but
acknowledged Abraxas did not offer the in-house occupational therapy that
D.C.D. would require.10 Id. at 141.
Jana Emig, a CYF caseworker supervisor, testified the Agency
considered nine treatment facilities, including Abraxas, before
recommending Southwood. With regard to Abraxas, Emig explained that
CYF determined it would not be the best placement for D.C.D. because it did
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10
Front did explain, however, that Abraxas would permit an outside provider
to come into the facility and provide such services to D.C.D. N.T., 5/9/2014,
at 141.
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not have an immediate opening, and CYF was concerned about D.C.D.’s
“lower functioning” intellect in the facility’s general population.11 Id. at 51.
However, with regard to Southwood, Emig testified: “It specifically
specializes in children who have sexual abuse offending issues who are lower
functioning.” Id. at 53. Indeed, Southwood’s Director of Admissions,
George Lee, explained:
We focus our program to deal specifically with sexually reactive
youth in the age range that [D.C.D.] is in, who have experienced
some form of trauma history, whether that be reactive
attachment or something more severe along those lines, as far
as trauma is concerned, and at the same time target youth with
an IQ between 60 and 110, so everything I’ve read about
[D.C.D.] qualifies him for the program.
Id. at 113.
Emig testified that D.C.D. is “taught at a lower grade level,” and has
social immaturity issues. Id. at 54. She emphasized the significance of
D.C.D. receiving treatment suitable to his intellectual level:
It’s very important. Specifically for [D.C.D.], we have found out
that [he] doesn’t even understand what he is doing is wrong.
There was also an understanding that when he had the incident
in February, he had [stated] … that he ejaculated into the child’s
mouth, and in fact, he actually only had an erection, so not
understanding what those terms meant and what his body was
doing, he had no clue.
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11
During the May 12, 2014, hearing, D.C.D.’s counsel explained she was
very familiar with Abraxas and had sent “multiple” children there, but that
her “experience with the younger children that [have been placed there and
that have] special needs has not been good.” N.T., 5/12/2014, at 39. She
stated “I’m just not convinced that they will be able to handle [him] at this
point. I think he’s too immature.” Id. at 40.
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… He did not fully understand what was going on [with his body].
Id. at 75.
Therefore, despite the feasibility of Abraxas as a potential treatment
option for D.C.D., we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its
discretion in concluding that Southwood was the most appropriate treatment
facility for D.C.D.’s specialized needs, and, therefore, compelling reasons
existed to warrant the early termination of D.C.D.’s delinquency supervision.
The Commonwealth also argues, however, that the juvenile court
focused solely on D.C.D.’s treatment needs without adequately considering
“the statutorily mandated goals of holding juveniles accountable and
protecting the community.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. It contends the
victim of D.C.D.’s harassment adjudication opposed his early termination
from supervision. Moreover, Southwood’s zoning agreement with its local
community prohibits the facility from treating “dangerous juvenile
delinquents” like D.C.D. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. In support of this
claim, the Commonwealth presented to the court a letter, dated September
16, 2013, from Southwood CEO Steve Quigley to North Strabane Township
Manager Frank Siffrinn, which states that Southwood “do[es] not and will
not accept children who have been adjudicated/or convicted of violent
crimes.” N.T., 5/12/2014, at 29. The Commonwealth argues “the Juvenile
Court’s slight of hand in hiding the dangerous nature of [D.C.D.] to get
[him] into a non-violent offender program actually creates a greater risk to
the community.” Id.
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Our review of the testimony of the harassment victim reveals that,
while she opposed early termination of D.C.D.’s delinquency supervision, she
was unaware that the treatment and supervision D.C.D. had been receiving
was through CYF rather than through Juvenile Probation, and that the
proposed treatment facility was a residential program in which D.C.D. would
be supervised. See N.T., 5/12/2014, at 19-20. She also did not appear to
understand that D.C.D. would continue to be monitored by the juvenile
court. See id. at 24. Further, the victim testified:
… I do hope that [D.C.D.] does get the help that he so
desperately needs. I don’t know the young man, but for him to
– I can’t imagine what he’s going through, but for him to have
behaved this way at such a young age, it scares me, and I hope
he gets the help that he needs so that he can have a good life.
Id. at 27. By transferring D.C.D. to Southwood, the juvenile court was
attempting to comply with the victim’s request to “get [him] the help that he
so desperately needs.” Id. We do not find that the victim’s “opposition” to
the early termination of his supervision controlling.
Moreover, with regard to Southwood’s purported zoning issue, the
juvenile court credited the testimony of Mr. Lee, the program’s admission
director, who stated that D.C.D. would qualify for their program even
though he had an adjudication of delinquency, if he was presently not under
probation supervision. See N.T. 5/9/2014, at 121. We emphasize that
whether D.C.D.’s admission into the program violates a zoning ordinance is a
question for Southwood, not for the juvenile court.
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We conclude the juvenile court made a fact-specific, reasoned, and
difficult decision when it granted D.C.D.’s motion for early termination of his
delinquency supervision. The court considered all of the relevant factors
before concluding that D.C.D.’s need for the specialized treatment offered at
Southwood outweighed his need to be supervised by juvenile probation. As
D.C.D. notes in his brief:
It was to the community’s benefit for D.[C.]D. to be moved into
appropriate treatment at Southwood. Southwood could provide
treatment for D.[C.]D.’s issues on a level that he could
understand and start to apply to his daily life rather than let
[him] languish for months waiting for a bed in a facility that was
not capable of treating his specialized issues.
D.C.D’s Brief at 12. We agree. Although the effect of the court’s ruling
means that D.C.D. is no longer supervised by juvenile probation, he
continues to be monitored both by CYF and the juvenile court. Moreover, he
is being transferred to a secure, residential facility equipped to treat his
particular mental health needs. Therefore, we find the court adequately
considered all the goals of the Juvenile Act, including the protection of the
community, before granting early termination of D.C.D.’s delinquency
supervision.
Accordingly, because we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
juvenile court in concluding “compelling reasons” existed for the early
termination of D.C.D.’s delinquency supervision, we affirm the order on
appeal.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/26/2015
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