Com. v. D'Adderio, K.

J-A06041-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KELLY MARIE D'ADDERIO :
:
Appellant : No. 833 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 16, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0005317-2016
BEFORE: OTT, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JUNE 17, 2019
Appellant Kelly Marie D’Adderio appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following her jury trial conviction for harassment.1 Appellant alleges
that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to support her
conviction because Appellant engaged in speech that was protected under the
United States and Pennsylvania constitutions. Appellant also argues that the
harassment statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as follows:
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4).
J-A06041-19
On Friday, June 10, 2016, Appellant posted a message on her
Facebook page[2] that read:
Dear Miss Maria Memmi, you were a life-long friend of mine,
my son’s Godmother even. The day you crossed the
friendship line and married my ex was the day you exposed
your true colors. Ironically, that was the least of my
concerns. Sadly, I find some pleasure that he cheated on
you. I kind of feel you had it coming anyway. You seem
obsessed with playing mommy to my kids. Let’s see how
that works out for you. #slouchback #truefriend
#hunchcunt #pretendmom #hecheated.
Soon thereafter, Appellant posted another message:
Dear Derry Township School Board Member, the board
president was notified about you turning a blind eye about
drug use in my home by some of your students. After being
notified, he called it a family matter. That’s fine. I would
like to see what the PSBA thinks. If they think it’s a family
matter, then I will let it rest.
Maria Memmi is the current wife of Phillip D’Adderio, Appellant’s
former husband. She is also a member of the Derry Township
School Board. Ms. Memmi, who did not have a Facebook account
at the time, became aware of the posts later that day when her
stepchildren showed them to her. Ms. Memmi thereafter reported
the posts to Detective Robert Matthew Dotts of the Derry
Township Police, who in turn contacted Appellant and suggested
that she take them down. Appellant did not follow this suggestion.
She continued to post increasingly offensive comments
throughout the weekend, referring to Ms. Memmi as “hunch cunt”
and “whore,” questioning the paternity of Ms. Memmi’s minor
daughter, and suggesting that Ms. Memmi was carrying on an
inappropriate relationship with the detective.[fn4]
____________________________________________
2“Facebook is a social networking site where ‘[u]sers of that Web site may
post items on their Facebook page that are accessible to other users, including
Facebook ‘friends’ who are notified when new content is posted.’”
Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation
omitted).
-2-
J-A06041-19
[fn4][Appellant’s additional comments, posted on Facebook
between June 10, 2016 and June 12, 2016, included the
following:] “Dear Little Memmi Girl, [referring to Ms.
Memmi’s 9-year-old daughter,] who is your daddy? The
entire town is requesting a paternity test. Many others have
told me Phil [D’Adderio] is your daddy. What is the truth?
Call the popo hunchback.”
“Dear hunch cunt, that’s what Phil called you. LOL. You’re
fat, gross, and ugly. You can arrest me. I really don’t care
as long as I get the truth out.”
“Haha, hunch cunt called the police. I thought you weren’t
on FB. You whore.”
“Dear hunch cunt, talked to the detective. Are you sucking
his cock? After all, he is a cutie patootie.”
“When you ride Phil’s ginormous cock, do you ever think of
the last pussy it was in? I would.”
Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/18, at 3-4 (record citations omitted).
The Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint against Appellant on June
16, 2016. The complaint alleged that Appellant directed multiple Facebook
posts to Ms. Memmi “that were vulgar and inflammatory,” and Appellant
“called [Ms. Memmi] derogatory names, questioned the paternity of her child,
and challenged her to pursue legal prosecution.” 3 Criminal Compl., 6/16/16,
at 3. On March 13, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information
charging Appellant with harassment.
____________________________________________
3The complaint also noted that the Commonwealth had charged Appellant at
another docket number with a separate count of harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. §
2709(a)(3), for phone calls and text messages Appellant made to Ms. Memmi
on May 27, 2016. Ultimately, a jury acquitted Appellant of that separate
charge.
-3-
J-A06041-19
Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion on December 5, 2017, which
included a motion to quash or dismiss the criminal information. Appellant
argued that, “to the extent that the Commonwealth is charging [Appellant]
solely with engaging in ‘lewd’ and ‘lascivious’ speech, the information must be
dismissed because such speech is protected speech under the First
Amendment.” Omnibus Pretrial Mot., 12/5/17, at ¶12. The trial court denied
Appellant’s motion.
Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of one count of harassment.
On April 16, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to twelve months of
probation, one hundred hours of community service, plus fines and costs. The
court also ordered Appellant to have no contact with the child referenced in
the Facebook posts, until the child reaches age eighteen.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court
filed a responsive opinion concluding that the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Specifically, the
Commonwealth’s evidence enabled the jury to determine that Appellant
posted lewd messages on Facebook, which served no legitimate purpose of
communication, with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm the complainant.4
____________________________________________
4 The trial court acknowledged Appellant’s argument “that her conviction is an
unconstitutional restriction on speech unless it is based either on comments
made directly to the victim, or on obscene comments about the victim.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 6. However, the court did not address this argument, “[b]ecause
the jury did not make any specific findings regarding these distinctions. . . .”
Id.
-4-
J-A06041-19
The court further concluded that the statute governing harassment is not
unconstitutionally overbroad, relying on this Court’s holding in
Commonwealth v. Duncan, 363 A.2d 803, 808 (Pa. Super. 1976).
Appellant now raises two questions for this Court’s review:
[1]. Was not the evidence insufficient to support [Appellant’s]
conviction for harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4), where
[Appellant’s] engaging in purportedly lewd and lascivious speech
about―not to―another person is protected speech under the
United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and where
[Appellant’s] speech cannot be construed as obscene?
[2]. Is the version of harassment set forth at 18 Pa.C.S. §
2709(a)(4) unconstitutionally overbroad on its face because a
substantial number of its applications criminalize constitutionally
protected free speech?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (full capitalization and quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis in original).
In her first issue, Appellant contends her sufficiency challenge “is based
on the premise that her conduct was protected speech under the Federal and
Pennsylvania Constitutions,” and this Court must engage in an independent
review of the record to ensure that “the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.” Id. at 14, 15 (citation
omitted). Appellant acknowledges that the jury was not required to make a
finding as to whether her remarks were directed “to” or “about” the
complainant. Id. at 18. Appellant contends, however, “[t]he Facebook
postings must be construed as communications about the complainant and
-5-
J-A06041-19
not to the complainant, especially because the complainant did not maintain
a Facebook account.” Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).
Appellant insists that criminal liability cannot attach to lewd and
lascivious speech “about” another person, because such speech is
constitutionally protected.5 Id. Appellant claims that her harassment
“conviction can survive only if [Appellant] made ‘obscene’ communications
about the complainant, as that word is defined in the constitutional
jurisprudence.” Id. Further, Appellant argues that her speech did not satisfy
the definition of obscenity, because the posts were “not an appeal to the
prurient interests of the intended Facebook audience.” Id. at 29. Appellant
concludes that “the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for the
version of harassment at [Section] 2709(a)(4) to the extent that that
provision can be interpreted consistently with the free speech protections of
the First Amendment.” Id. at 30.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of harassment, in
pertinent part, as follows:
____________________________________________
5 Appellant cites numerous federal cases that generally stand for the
proposition that speech cannot be construed as criminal conduct merely
because it is crude or arouses contempt. See Appellant’s Brief at 21-22. For
her contention that lewd and lascivious speech “about” another person is
constitutionally protected, Appellant relies on a law review article and a
decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. at 22-25. However,
Appellant has not cited, nor has this Court found, any binding case law
adopting the distinction between communications “to” and “about” a person
referenced by Appellant. Consequently, we emphasize that this Court is not
bound by the decisions of other states’ courts and the federal courts, except
for the Supreme Court of the United States. See Commonwealth v. Lukach,
163 A.3d 1003, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2017).
-6-
J-A06041-19
§ 2709. Harassment
(a) Offense defined.―A person commits the crime of
harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another,
the person:
* * *
(4) communicates to or about such other person any lewd,
lascivious, threatening or obscene words, language,
drawings or caricatures[.]
18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4).
With the enactment of 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 2709, our legislature has
sought to prohibit such conduct, including speech, which is not
Constitutionally protected and which is intended to alarm or
seriously annoy another person. The purpose of the legislature,
undoubtedly, was to extend to the Individual the protections
which have long been afforded the general public under disorderly
conduct and breach of the peace statutes.
Duncan, 363 A.2d at 807.
Where an issue raises constitutional concerns, this Court “must make
an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case as to whether
the material involved is constitutionally protected.” Commonwealth v. Lebo,
795 A.2d 987, 991 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, “it has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech
or press to make . . . conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part
initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken,
written or printed.” Commonwealth v. Schierscher, 668 A.2d 164, 171
(Pa. Super. 1995) (quoting Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965)).
-7-
J-A06041-19
“[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at
all times and under all circumstances.” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (footnote omitted). “There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.” Id. at 571-72(footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 855-
56 (8th Cir. 2012) (explaining that First Amendment protections are often less
rigorous where matters of purely private significance are at issue, because
restricting speech on private matters does not implicate the same
constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest;
further, the public had no legitimate interest in the private sexual activities of
the victim or in the embarrassing facts revealed about her life). “Resort to
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as
a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.” Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 572 (citation omitted).
Instantly, Appellant’s Facebook posts did not express social or political
beliefs or constitute legitimate conduct. See Duncan, 363 A.2d at 807
(explaining that the defendant did not engage in any legitimate conduct when
he made repeated requests for the victim to participate in lewd acts). Rather,
Appellant made lewd comments, including sexualized language and references
to the complainant’s sexual activity, which could only serve to harass, annoy
or alarm the complainant. See Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721-
-8-
J-A06041-19
22 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding that sufficient evidence supported a conviction
under Section 2709(a)(4), where the defendant communicated “lewd”
sentiments in a Facebook post indicating that the victim was sexually active
and suffered from a sexually transmitted disease; noting that the definition of
“lewd” is “sexually unchaste or licentious”).6
To the extent one can argue that “lewd” and “lascivious” must be
interpreted as synonymous with “obscene,” the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has declined to validate such an argument, albeit in a different statutory
context. See Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290, 304 (Pa. 1975)
(plurality) (rejecting the Commonwealth’s argument that “lewd” is a synonym
for “obscene” when analyzing a statute that authorized an injunction against
the use of any building for the purpose of fornication, lewdness, assignation,
and/or prostitution; when viewed in context, the statute proscribed the use of
any building for purposes involving illicit sexual conduct, thereby strongly
indicating a legislative intention to prescribe only purposes of that type by
using the word “lewdness”). Moreover, “[w]hen reviewing a statute, we may
not render language superfluous or assume language to be mere surplusage.”
Commonwealth v. Dischman, 195 A.3d 567, 571 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Because “lewd” is not synonymous
____________________________________________
6 Appellant notes that Cox “did not assert any constitutional claim based on
freedom of speech under the First Amendment.” Appellant’s Brief at 20.
Although Appellant is correct in this regard, Cox remains instructive for the
proposition that Facebook posts regarding a complainant’s sexual activity can
be characterized as “lewd” under Section 2709(a)(4).
-9-
J-A06041-19
with “obscene,” we do not examine whether Appellant’s posts also satisfy the
definition of “obscene,” because the posts qualify as “lewd” under existing
Pennsylvania case law. See Cox, 72 A.3d at 722.
Based upon our own independent review of the record, Appellant’s
comments are not entitled to First Amendment protection, regardless of
whether the posts were “to” or “about” the complainant. See Chaplinsky,
315 U.S. at 571-72; Lebo, 795 A.2d at 991; Duncan, 363 A.2d at 807.
Therefore, Appellant’s first issue warrants no relief.
In her second issue, Appellant contends that “a law may be invalidated
as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional,
judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Appellant’s Brief
at 31 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, Appellant relies on
Commonwealth v. Omar, 981 A.2d 179, 185-86 (Pa. 2009), for the
proposition that “a litigant asserting an overbreadth challenge is not required
to demonstrate that the statute violated his own protected speech, but instead
may prove a statute’s unconstitutionality by demonstrating that the statute’s
very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.” Id. at 32 (quotation marks
omitted). Appellant concludes that Section 2709(a)(4) is overbroad, because
it criminalizes “lewd and/or lascivious speech about another person[, which]
is constitutionally protected.” Id. at 33 (emphasis in original).
“As the constitutionality of a statute is a pure question of law, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
- 10 -
J-A06041-19
Commonwealth v. Berry, 167 A.3d 100, 104 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted).
[T]here is a strong presumption in the law that legislative
enactments do not violate the constitution. Moreover, there is a
heavy burden of persuasion upon one who challenges the
constitutionality of a statute. While penal statutes are to be
strictly construed, the courts are not required to give the words of
a criminal statute their narrowest meaning or disregard the
evident legislative intent of the statute. A statute, therefore, will
only be found unconstitutional if it “clearly, palpably and plainly”
violates the constitution.
Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d 1127, 1144-45 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citation omitted).
“An overbreadth challenge is generally limited to issues falling under the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, protecting the right to free
speech.” Omar, 981 A.2d at 185 (citation omitted).
We have recognized that the Constitution provides significant
protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First
Amendment’s vast and privileged sphere. When protected
expression, such as political speech, is at issue, both the U.S.
Supreme Court and [the Pennsylvania Supreme] Court have
recognized that the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial
invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment
rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial
when judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.
It has been the judgment of [the Pennsylvania Supreme] Court
that the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that
protected speech of others may be muted and perceived
grievances left to fester because of the possible inhibitory effects
of overly broad statutes.
* * *
- 11 -
J-A06041-19
The standard for determining whether a statute is overbroad is
well established:
A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad only if it punishes
lawful constitutionally protected activity as well as illegal
activity. Thus, in determining whether a statute is
unconstitutional due to overbreadth, a court’s first task is to
determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct. The
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly
legitimate sweep. Consequently, if a statute’s overbreadth
is substantial, it may not be enforced against anyone until
it is narrowed to reach only unprotected activity.
Id. at 185-86 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Regarding Section 2709, this Court has determined that a prior version
of the statute passed constitutional muster:
In enacting 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 2709(3), our legislature did not intend
to proscribe isolated acts which would be of only minor annoyance
to the average person, or which are constitutionally protected.
The statute requires . . . acts which would seriously offend, we
find, the average person; it requires the fact finder to infer a
specific intent on the part of the accused, and it specifies that the
conduct must be of a non-legitimate nature—conduct which is not
constitutionally protected.
Duncan, 363 A.2d at 808.7
Instantly, Section 2709(a)(4) requires an intent to harass, and it seeks
to preclude communications lacking some legitimate purpose. As such, the
____________________________________________
7 The version of Section 2709 at issue in Duncan defined the offense of
harassment as follows: “A person commits a summary offense when, with
intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person[, he or she] engages in a
course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy
such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose.” Duncan, 363
A.2d at 805. We note that the current version of Section 2709(a)(4) is graded
as a misdemeanor of the third degree.
- 12 -
J-A06041-19
statute does not punish constitutionally protected speech, and the statute is
not facially overbroad. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Hendrickson,
724 A.2d 315, 318 (Pa. 1999) (evaluating an overbreadth challenge to the
now-repealed harassment by communication statute and concluding that the
defendant was not convicted for exercising his constitutional right to free
speech; the statute at issue was directed at the harassing nature of the
communications, which the legislature had a legitimate interest in
proscribing). In light of the applicable scope and standard of review and
relevant case law, we conclude that Section 2709(a)(4) is not
unconstitutionally overbroad. See Omar, 981 A.2d at 185-86; Berry, 167
A.3d at 104. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Ott joins in the memorandum.
Judge Pellegrini noted to dissent.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/17/2019
- 13 -