Marusco, D. v. Wilkerson, R.

J-S03040-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DOMENIC MARUSCO IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RICHARD WILKERSON, SHARON
WILKERSON, AND DOUGLAS STILLMAN
Appellants No. 2101 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment Entered June 25, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Civil Division at No(s): 14-002731
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 18, 2015
Richard Wilkerson, Sharon Wilkerson, and Douglas Stillman
(collectively “the Defendants”) appeal from the judgment in the amount of
$4,300.00, entered June 25, 2014, in the Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas. Domenic Marusco initiated this landlord tenant action to
recover unpaid rents. Judgment was entered against the Defendants after
the trial court granted Marusco’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. On
appeal, the Defendants argue the trial court erred in granting judgment on
the pleadings because their answer and new matter established issues of
material fact regarding the habitability of the property in question. Based on
the following, we affirm.
The facts underlying this appeal are gleaned from Marusco’s complaint.
Sometime during the 1990’s, Richard Wilkerson entered into a verbal
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agreement with Marusco to lease a property located at 26 Morton Avenue in
Linwood, Pennsylvania. After Wilkerson took possession of the property,
Sharon Wilkerson and Douglas Stillman moved in, and the three made
timely, monthly rental payments to Marusco until the fall of 2013. On
November 14, 2013, Marusco served the Defendants with written notice to
vacate the property no later than February 28, 2014.1 The notice stated the
Defendants were in arrears in the amount of $800.00 for past due rental
payments, and that they would still be responsible for the $750.00 monthly
rent due for December 2013, January 2014, and February 2014. See
Complaint, 4/9/2014, at Exhibit A, Notice, 11/14/2013. The Defendants
failed to pay the arrears, or any rent due in the ensuing three months. The
Defendants remained at the property until they were removed on March 24,
2014. See Id. at ¶¶ 6-17.
Marusco initiated a suit in the magisterial district court and received a
judgment on February 27, 2014. Thereafter, on March 26, 2014, the
Defendants filed an appeal to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.
Marusco subsequently filed a breach of contract complaint on April 9, 2014,
asserting the Defendants owed him $4,300.00 for past due rents and repair
costs. The Defendants filed an Answer and New Matter on April 28, 2014,
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1
Marusco averred the written notice was provided “in accordance with the
agreement between the parties.” Complaint, 4/9/2014, at ¶ 12.
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which contained general denials to most of Marusco’s allegations, and
asserted that the property was “substantially damaged and made not
habitable” as a result of Hurricane Sandy in October of 2012. Answer and
New Matter, 4/28/2014, at ¶ 29. Marusco filed a Reply to New Matter on
April 29, 2014, followed by a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on May
16, 2014. Marusco argued the Defendants’ general denials to the allegations
in his complaint constituted admissions, and, accordingly, he was entitled to
judgment in the amount of $4,300.00. The Defendants failed to respond to
Marusco’s motion, and, on June 25, 2014, the trial court entered judgment
against the Defendants in the amount of $4,300.00. Thereafter, the
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration nunc pro tunc on July 14,
2014, followed by a timely appeal on July 21, 2014.2
On appeal, the Defendants argue the trial court erred in granting
judgment on the pleadings when material facts were in dispute. Specifically,
they claim their answers to paragraphs 24 through 28 of the complaint were
not general denials, but rather specific denials asserting that (1) an
agreement between the parties did not exist and (2) the Defendants were
not obligated to pay rent while the property was not habitable. Further, the
Defendants assert their New Matter raised an affirmative defense, namely,
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2
The trial court did not order the Defendants to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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“that conditions in the premises, the alleged leasehold, were in such
disrepair and damaged that they were rendered not habitable breaching
[Marusco’s] Covenant of Habitability and releasing [D]efendants from their
covenant to pay rent during the pendency of the breach.” Defendants’ Brief
at 6. The Defendants also assert their failure to answer the motion for
judgment on the pleadings was the result of their ill-fated attempts to obtain
legal aid.
A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “after the relevant
pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay the
trial[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). When considering the propriety of a trial court’s
ruling granting judgment on the pleadings, we are guided by the following:
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer.
It may be entered when there are no disputed issues of fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
determining if there is a dispute as to facts, the court must
confine its consideration to the pleadings and relevant
documents. The scope of review on an appeal from the grant of
judgment on the pleadings is plenary. We must determine if the
action of the court below was based on a clear error of law or
whether there were facts disclosed by the pleadings which
should properly go to the jury.
Miller v. Nelson, 768 A.2d 858, 860-861 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 782 A.2d 547 (Pa. 2001).
Here, the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings after
concluding that the Defendants admitted all the relevant factual averments
in Marusco’s complaint. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/24/2014, at 1-2.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029 provides, in relevant part:
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Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is
required are admitted when not denied specifically or by
necessary implication. A general denial or a demand for
proof, except as provided by subdivisions (c) and (e) of this
rule, shall have the effect of an admission.
Pa.R.C.P. 1029(b) (emphasis supplied).3 Indeed, it is well-settled that
“[g]eneral denials constitute admissions where—like here—specific denials
are required.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 466-467 (Pa.
Super. 2014).
In the present case, the Defendants admitted the first eight
paragraphs of Marusco’s complaint, and provided the following answer to
paragraphs 9 through 22, and 28: “Denied. Strict proof of this assertion is
demanded at time of trial.” Answer and New Matter, 4/28/2014, at ¶¶ 1-22.
Such denials are deemed admissions pursuant to Rule 1029(b). As the trial
court opined:
[T]he Defendants effectively admitted that [they] entered into a
lease contract with [Marusco], [they] fell behind on rent in the
amount of $3,800.00 and [Maruso] incurred costs of $500.00 to
clean the property.[4] … Based upon the fact that the Defendants
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3
Neither Subsections (c) nor (e) is not relevant to the facts in the present
case. See Pa.R.C.P. 1029(c) (providing that party’s statement “after
reasonable investigation the party is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment” has the effect of a
denial); (e) (relating to actions seeking “monetary relief for bodily injury,
death or property damage”).
4
See Complaint, 4/9/2014, at ¶¶ 9 (averring “[a]ll Defendants resided in
the Property, entered into verbal lease agreements with [Marusco], and
made rent payments in accordance with verbal lease agreement for many
years”); 10 (averring “[d]uring the year 2013, Defendants began to fall
behind on rent”); 18 (calculating “rent due and owing” as $3,800.00); 19
(explaining Defendants left house in “deploable condition”); 20 (averring
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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made general denials, this Court properly accepted such as
admissions. Furthermore, the Defendants failed to even respond
to [Marusco’s] Motion for Judgment on the [P]leadings.
Therefore, this Court properly deemed the general denials as
admissions and entered judgment in the amount of $4,300
against all Defendants[.]
Trial Court Opinion, 9/24/2014, at 2.
We agree with the ruling of the trial court. While we acknowledge that
the Defendants now claim they raised material issues of fact in their specific
denials to paragraphs 24 through 27 of the complaint and their affirmative
defense pled in new matter, we find this argument belated. Indeed, as the
trial court pointed out in its opinion, “Defendants failed to even respond to
[Marusco’s] Motion for Judgment on the [P]leadings.” Id. Accordingly, the
Defendants have waived the right to provide an explanation for their general
denials to the substantive facts supporting Marusco’s right to relief.5 See
Swift v. Milner, 538 A.2d 28, 31 (Pa. Super. 1988) (rejecting appellant’s
claim that counsel could have corrected pleading defects by filing amended
answer; “[o]nce having notice by the trial court that the presentment to the
court was defective, Appellant's counsel had the opportunity to cure the
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(Footnote Continued)
“[Marusco] has incurred costs of approximately $500.00 associated with
cleaning and repair of Property as a result of Defendants’ actions”).
5
We also reject the Defendants’ attempt to place blame for their failure to
respond on their ill-fated attempt to obtain legal aid. The Defendants do not
claim that they failed to receive Marusco’s motion. Thus, it was incumbent
upon the Defendants to file a timely reply.
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flaw” but never filed motion for leave to amend, and “effectively abandoned”
efforts to cure defect).
Accordingly, because we find no error on the part of the trial court in
granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings, we affirm the judgment
entered in favor of Marusco.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/18/2015
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