Com. v. Cramer, W.

J-S72005-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
WILLIAM AMOS CRAMER,
Appellant No. 1916 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 4, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-11-CR-0002128-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 2, 2014
Appellant, William Amos Cramer (“Cramer”), appeals from the
judgment of sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
and a consecutive term of 45 to 90 months’ imprisonment, imposed after he
was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault by a
prisoner. On appeal, Cramer’s counsel, Ryan D. Gleason, Esq., seeks
permission to withdraw his representation of Cramer pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), as elucidated by our Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981), and amended
in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review,
we agree with counsel that an appeal on Cramer’s behalf would be frivolous.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Accordingly, we affirm Cramer’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s
petition to withdraw.
The trial court set forth a detailed recitation of the facts of this case as
follows:
Sometime, on August 4, 2012, Cambria County Prison
officials transferred William Sherry ("Sherry") from the general
prison population to Cell 67 of the Disciplinary Housing Unit
("DHU"). Because of the transfer, Sherry became cellmates with
William Amos Cramer ("Cramer"). At 8:10 P.M. of the same day,
when the prison staff distributed medications, they observed no
problems occurring between the two inmates. In fact,
Correctional Officers Daniel Link, Alan Bertram, and John Frank
did not observe any problems between the two inmates either
from the moment Sherry and Cramer became cellmates until
approximately 9:15 P.M.
Roughly fifteen minutes later, however, at 9:30 P.M.,
chaos erupted. More specifically, someone activated the
intercom in Cell 67 and attempted to communicate with the
control unit by yelling into it. The unknown inmate's yelling,
however, garbled his speech and Corrections Officers Jim
Townson ("C.O. Townson") and Alan Bertram ("C.O. Bertram")
were unable to decipher the message. Unsure what was
occurring, C.O. Bertram informed C.O. Townson he would
investigate the problem.
Upon arriving at Cell 67, C.O. Bertram noticed Cramer
standing in front of the cell door's window and therefore
obstructing his view into the cell. Cramer yelled: "[G]et this
molester out of my cell, what did you put him in here for[?]"
C.O. Bertram instructed Cramer multiple times to "to get away
from the window" — to "move away from the window" — so he
could assess the situation. But Cramer refused to budge. Finally,
C.O. Bertram faked Cramer one way and ultimately shifted
Cramer's body enough that he could spot "what appeared at the
time to be blood on the bottom bunk[‘s mattress]."
Recognizing something was amiss, C.O. Bertram pushed
his Personal Alarm Transmitter button. Next, the control center
signaled a Code One for the DHU, which means an officer needs
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assistance. Before any help could arrive, though, C.O. Townson
opened Sherry and Cramer's door from the control unit. While
the door opened, C.O. Bertram jammed it partially and
instructed Cramer to "put his hands out" through the cracked
door. Cramer complied and C.O. Bertram cuffed one of Cramer's
hands. After C.O. Bertram cuffed one hand, he noticed
Corrections Officers John Frank ("C.O. Frank”) and Terry Shean
were relatively close. So he left the door he was jamming go,
cuffed Cramer's other hand, and removed Cramer from the cell.
Once C.O. Bertram removed Cramer, he passed him to
C.O. Frank. C.O. Frank then escorted Cramer twenty feet to the
shower area to get Cramer "away from the situation." During
their short walk, C.O. Frank asked Cramer "what had
happened?" Cramer responded three times: "[Sherry] had a
n[*****] baby." Soon after that statement, C.O. Frank locked
Cramer in the shower area, which doubles as an extra holding
unit, until the prison staff has a situation — like the present one
— under control. Locked in the shower area, C.O. Frank
instructed Cramer he "had to go over to the cell" to check on
Sherry, which caused Cramer to blurt out "there's no sense
checking on him, he's dead."
Cramer was right. Sherry was dead. After C.O. Frank
removed Cramer from the cell area, C.O. Bertram spotted Sherry
partially "on the floor at the corner of the bunk closest to the
door." A sheet was tied around Sherry’s neck, run through his
mouth, and tied around the bunk. That same sheet enabled
Sherry's head to hover 12-inches from the floor, face down.
Bertram cut the sheet around Sherry's neck and lowered him the
rest of the way to the floor with C.O. Frank's assistance, who
had just come from the shower area.
Now on the floor, the corrections officers severed the
bindings from Sherry's hands — which were behind his back —
rolled his lifeless body over and discovered his feet were bound
too. Next, C.O. Bertram worked to sever the foot bindings and
C.O. Frank began chest compressions. The two officers
alternated performing CPR until the medical team arrived.
Unfortunately, the medical team could not save Sherry's life.
While these events transpired, Corrections Officer
Christopher Alexander ("C.O. Alexander") stood between the
shower area Cramer was locked-in and Cell 67 where Sherry
was. At that distance, C.O. Alexander could hear Cramer —
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despite the commotion in Cell 67 and the yelling of the other
inmates — say: "[Y]eah, he is dead. I killed him."
Two weeks passed before a new twist took place. Namely,
Cramer and fellow inmate John Teston ("Teston") found
themselves being held next to each other in the DHU for a few
days. Cramer was in Cell 37 and Teston in Cell 38. Because of
the close proximity, the two inmates began to talk through the
vents in their cells. Cramer initiated the rapport by asking Teston
if he was white. Teston answered affirmatively and a lengthy six
to seven hour conversation ensued.
During that long conversation, Cramer told Teston that he
murdered Sherry. That it began as a physical altercation. That
he strangled Sherry with a bed sheet. That he knocked him
unconscious. That he "slapped him around some more," "made
him kiss his boot by kicking him in the forehead" and ultimately
hung Sherry. He did all this for one reason: Sherry "had a
n[*****] baby[ ] and he was a n[*****] lover." Then Cramer
informed Teston he would send him a letter.
And send him a letter he did. At suppertime, on August 17,
2012, hours after their extended chat, Teston received his meal
tray as usual through his cell door's four-by-fifteen inch pie slot.
What was unusual about this supper delivery, however, was it
contained some reading material. A letter concealed under the
tray addressed to "John" — which is Teston's first name. Teston
read the letter. He read Cramer's detailed description of how he
murdered Sherry and "why he had done it."
That letter says:
John[:]
Dude, what's up bro? Yeah that’s [sic] crazy how they put
you on suicide watch for nothing ! [sic] [B]ut yeah dude I
don't and didn't want to talk about what happened the
other week exspecially [sic] in the vent. I don't trust dude,
exspecially [sic] when we gots them n[******] up above
us!
[B]ut yeah dude, he was a half-breed, and he had a
n[*****] baby he was cheating on this girl named Megan
with a full blooded n[*****]! [T]here's 4 things I hate the
most, a n[*****], a half-breed, a n[*****] lover, and
some who associates with them. [B]ut anyways CO Frank,
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good dude, one of us, he's a skin. [H]e came up to my cell
earlier in the day, opened the door and came in, he gave
me a can of chew and we bull shifted [sic] for a few. I
guess Frank knew the dude from Ebensburg or some place,
I don't know, but he said dude was a half-breed mongral
[sic]. I was like yeah. [H]e was like yeah! So Frank
punched the s[***] out of this dude. So we slapped him
around for a few. (LOL). [T]hen we went on about our
business. Well later on that night, dude tried to stab me
with a unsharpened toothbrush, and while I was taking a
s[***]. [H]e was f[******] me up on the shiner,
punching[,] stabbing, p[****] s[***] he did. So I beat the
n[*****] half-breed the f[***] up, tied him up, beat him
some more, gave him a last word, made him kiss my boot
and say the white man marches on, then threw him on the
bed took a peace [sic] of sheet[,] strangled him, watched
him die then I hung me a n[*****], you know I didn't
intend to do it he just pushed the wrong buttons by
sneaking me on the toilet.
So yeah dude. Rip this up and flush it, if and when you
decide, I have a spot on the crew for you!
[Swastika symbol] Pearl Icings [Swastika symbol]
Shocked Cramer provided him with a written confession,
Teston notified an officer he wanted to talk to either a supervisor
or a state trooper about the letter he received. Corrections
Officer Randall Baker ("C.O. Baker") consented and contacted
Lieutenant Donald Ochenrider ("Lieutenant Ochenrider"), the
shift commander. Next, Lieutenant Ochenrider, C.O. Baker, and
C.O. Bertram traveled to Teston's cell and entered it.
Teston appeared nervous and asked if he could be removed
from his cell "to another area where [he] could not be heard"
because he "didn't want anybody to hear what [he] was saying"
— especially Cramer. The corrections officers declined Teston's
request. Teston then opened his hand and handed Lieutenant
Ochenrider the letter. Lieutenant Ochenrider placed the letter in
his pocket, exited Teston's cell with the other two officers, and
headed back to his office. Once at his office, Lieutenant
Ochenrider read the letter, realized he had information
concerning Sherry's death, placed the letter in "a sealed bag,
labeled it, and" locked it in a "contraband box in the
administration area of the prison."
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Before the next day's breakfast, Cramer contacted Teston
again through the vent. In that conversation, Cramer told Teston
that he wrote him another letter — a second letter — and that a
block worker would deliver it. Sure enough, at breakfast, Teston
received another letter from Cramer the same way he received
the first — passed at a mealtime and hidden under a food tray.
The contents and tone of the second letter, though, changed.
Rather than describe how he murdered Sherry, Cramer directed
his attention to Teston and Teston's failure to flush the letter.
Not surprisingly, after reading the second letter, Teston felt
threatened and feared both for himself and for his family. Soon
afterwards, Teston gave Corrections Officer John Kirsch the
second letter.
The second letter states:
What the f[***] dude! What the f[***] was you talking
with the Lt and s[***] for last night? I know you
f[******] told[,] dude. [sic] "I was listening in the vent"!
[sic] What, you think this s[****] a joke? I trusted you!
What the f[***] is your problem? I heard every word that
was spoken in that cell, you f[******] Rat. Your [sic]
playing a game that shouldn't be played. [sic] "What, did
you give the letter to them, to"? [sic] [T]hat letter was
supposed to be flushed down the toilet!. [sic] [T]hat Letter
can get me booked for the rest of my life. What's Ms.
Debbie going to think? [sic] When she finds you put her
and the family in harms way. Man there was so much said
about, in that letter.!. [sic] so much incriminating s[***].
You just don't understand do you? [Y]ou didn't only put me
in a f[*****] up position, you put a fellow skin and his
family in a f[*****] up position. [N]ow people are going to
look at me, f[*****] up. [sic] asking questions as what
type of dude I f[***] with and bring into or make a fellow
skin. (dude, you f[*****] up)! [Y]ou crossed Lines. Lines
that should [not] be crossed.
Over a month later, on September 24, 2012, Lieutenant
Daniel Kearns ("Lieutenant Kearns") of the Pennsylvania State
Department of Corrections transported Cramer, who was now no
longer housed at the Cambria County Prison, to Mount Nittany
Medical Center for testing. During their four hours together,
Cramer volunteered some incriminating information. Specifically,
Cramer stated: "[H]e had killed his cell mate [sic] in the Cambria
County Jail." "[H]e tied him up, stabbed him, and choked him."
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And he did it "because the guy had a biracial child." Cramer went
on to say "he didn't care about telling" the State Corrections
Officers who accompanied him that night "because he had
already told the media."
On October 10, 11, and 14, 2013, a jury trial took place and
the testimony of Coroner Dennis Kwiatkowski ("Coroner
Kwiatkowski") and pathologist Dr. Curtis Steven Goldblatt ("Dr.
Goldblatt") confirmed what Cramer told both Teston and the
State Corrections Officers and the other evidence suggested:
Cramer murdered Sherry. Coroner Kwiatkowski testified: "[T]he
cause of death was manual strangulation, the manner of death
would have been a homicide." Dr. Goldblatt testified: "This 28-
year old white male prisoner died as a result of asphyxia
secondary to ligature strangulation." In layman terms, that
means when Sherry was strangled with the bed sheet, "the force
produced by [the sheet] compress[ed] the blood flow to the
brain." Once "the blood flow to the brain is blocked, the brain
doesn't get enough oxygen." If "the brain doesn't get enough
oxygen," then the person will die. And that is what happened to
William Sherry.1
1
Suicide by hanging was an impossibility because of “the
horizontal furrow that encircled the neck.” Hangings have
furrows that slant upwards because gravity suspends the
body.
Consequently, on October 14, 2013, the jury convicted Cramer
of: (1) Criminal Homicide — Murder in the First Degree, (2)
Aggravated Assault, and (3) Assault by Prisoner.
Trial Court Opinion 1 (TCO1), 1/23/14, at 1-9 (citations to the record
omitted).
The trial court sentenced Cramer to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment for first degree murder, and a consecutive term of 45 to 90
months’ imprisonment for assault by a prisoner. Cramer did not file post-
sentence motions; instead, he filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a
timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 23, 2014.
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On July 1, 2014, Attorney Gleason filed with this Court a petition to withdraw
and an Anders brief.
“When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not
review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on the
request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 638, 639 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 1301, 1303
(Pa. Super. 1997)).
Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under
Anders, counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements
established by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous; and
(4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal
is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide a copy of
the Anders brief to his client. Attending the brief must be a
letter that advises the client of his right to: “(1) retain new
counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or
(3) raise any points that the appellant deems worthy of the
court[']s attention in addition to the points raised by counsel in
the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349,
353 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 704, 936 A.2d 40(2007).
Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 880 (Pa. Super. 2014). After
confirming that counsel satisfied these requirements, this Court must then
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conduct its own review of the record and independently determine whether
the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999
A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Instantly, Attorney Gleason’s Anders brief provides a detailed
summary of the procedural history and facts of Cramer’s case with citations
to the record. It also includes a discussion of the four issues Cramer seeks
to raise on appeal, and an explanation of Attorney Gleason’s conclusion that
an appeal on Cramer’s behalf would be wholly frivolous. Attorney Gleason
supports his rationale with citations to the record, as well as relevant case
law. He has also certified in his petition to withdraw that he sent a copy of
his Anders brief to Cramer. Attorney Gleason attached to his petition a
letter he sent to Cramer advising Cramer of the rights enumerated in
Nischan, 928 A.2d at 353. Therefore, we conclude that Attorney Gleason
has complied with the above-stated requirements for withdrawal.
Accordingly, we will now independently review the four issues Cramer seeks
to raise herein, and also determine whether there are any other issues he
could arguably present on appeal.
Cramer first seeks to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain his first degree murder conviction. Specifically, he avers that the
Commonwealth failed to prove he killed Sherry “in an intentional, deliberate,
and premeditated manner.” Anders Brief at 22 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. §
2502(d)). We disagree. Our Supreme Court has stated that “the period of
reflection required for premeditation to establish the specific intent to kill
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‘may be very brief; in fact the design to kill can be formulated in a fraction
of a second.’” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1220 (Pa.
2009). Here, according to Cramer’s own words in his letter to Teston, he
beat Sherry, tied him up, and beat him some more. See TCO1 at 5-6
(quoting Commonwealth’s Exhibit 29). Cramer then paused his attack to
give Sherry “a last word,” and “made [Sherry] kiss [his] boot and say the
white man marches on” before strangling Sherry with a bed sheet. Id. This
evidence demonstrates that Cramer killed Sherry in an intentional,
deliberate, and premeditated manner. Accordingly, we agree with counsel
that Cramer’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his first
degree murder conviction is frivolous.
Next, Cramer seeks to challenge the court’s denial of his pretrial
motion to suppress.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the factual findings are supported by the record and
whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. Since the prosecution prevailed in the suppression court,
we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so
much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
record supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1274-1275 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citations omitted).
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In Cramer’s motion to suppress, he sought to exclude several
statements he made to corrections officers around the time of Sherry’s
murder, arguing that the statements were “the product of custodial
interrogation” that was not preceded by Miranda warnings.1 This Court has
explained:
A law enforcement officer must administer Miranda warnings
prior to custodial interrogation. Commonwealth v. Johnson,
373 Pa. Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332, 336 (Pa. Super. 1988). The
standard for determining whether an encounter with the police is
deemed “custodial” or police have initiated a custodial
interrogation is an objective one based on a totality of the
circumstances, with due consideration given to the reasonable
impression conveyed to the person interrogated.
Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d 143, 148
(1998). Custodial interrogation has been defined as “questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her] freedom
of action in any significant way.” Johnson, 541 A.2d at 336
quoting Miranda…, 384 U.S. [at] 444…. “Interrogation” is police
conduct “calculated to, expected to, or likely to evoke
admission.” Id. [(]quoting Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa.
219, 226, 252 A.2d 575, 578 (1969)[)]. When a person's
inculpatory statement is not made in response to custodial
interrogation, the statement is classified as gratuitous, and is not
subject to suppression for lack of warnings. Id.Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999)).
We will address each of Cramer’s challenged statements in turn,
beginning with a statement he made to C.O. Bertram. To reiterate, C.O.
Bertram responded to Cramer and Sherry’s cell to investigate the yelling
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1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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that the officers heard over the cell’s intercom system. When C.O. Bertram
arrived at the cell, he found Cramer standing at the door, blocking the
officer’s view inside the cell’s interior. C.O. Bertram instructed Cramer to
move aside, at which point Cramer said, “get this molester out of my cell,
what did you put him in here for?” See Trial Court Opinion 2 (TCO2),
9/4/13, at 17 (opinion accompanying trial court’s order denying Cramer’s
motion to suppress). Cramer contended in his suppression motion that this
statement should be excluded because he had not been provided with
Miranda warnings before making this comment.
The trial court, however, concluded that Cramer’s statement was
gratuitous and, thus, no Miranda warnings were required. We agree.
Cramer’s statement was not made in response to any comment or question
by C.O. Bertram that was “calculated to, expected to, or likely to evoke
admission.” Baker, 24 A.3d at 1019 (citation omitted). Instead, it was an
unforeseen and arbitrary response to the officer’s order that Cramer move
aside from the cell door’s window. Accordingly, Cramer’s claim that the trial
court erred by not suppressing this statement is frivolous.
The next statements Cramer challenged in his pretrial motion to
suppress were those he made to C.O. Frank after C.O. Bertram had
handcuffed Cramer and removed him from the cell. See TCO2 at 18. At the
suppression hearing, C.O. Frank testified that as he approached the cell, he
could not see inside because C.O. Bertram was blocking his view. N.T.
Suppression Hearing, 6/25/13, at 10. C.O. Frank was directed to escort
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Cramer to the shower area and, as the officer did so, he asked Cramer,
“what happened?” Id. at 13. Cramer responded by stating, “he had a
n[*****] baby….” Id. at 9. Cramer repeated this same statement three
times. Id.
Again, the trial court found Cramer’s three statements “were
gratuitous” and were not provided during a custodial interrogation. TCO2 at
25. That determination is supported by the record. C.O. Frank responded
to an emergency situation and asked Cramer “what happened” before the
officer even knew that a crime had occurred. As far as C.O. Frank knew,
Cramer was not a suspect in any offense when the question was posed to
Cramer, and nothing indicates the officer intended to elicit an incriminating
response. Therefore, the court did not err in concluding that these three
statements by Cramer were not the product of a custodial interrogation.
See Commonwealth v. Umstead, 916 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(holding that a corrections officer’s asking an inmate if he witnessed an
assault on another inmate, and “what happened,” did not constitute an
interrogation; the inmate questioned “was not a suspect when the
questioning occurred, nor was he asked to disclose facts linking himself to
the attack….”).
Next, Cramer asked the court to suppress his statements to C.O. Frank
that “[t]here is no sense in checking on him. He is dead.” N.T. Suppression
Hearing at 10. C.O. Frank testified at the suppression hearing that Cramer
made these statements after the officer “told him to stand by until we went
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over and checked on … [Sherry]….” Id. at 14. The trial court concluded
that Cramer’s statements were not made during the course of an
interrogation. Once again, we agree. C.O. Frank’s comment to Cramer to
“stand by” while they checked on Sherry was not a question, and nothing
indicated that C.O. Frank’s directive was “calculated to, expected to, or likely
to evoke admission.” Baker, 24 A.3d at 1019 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Cramer’s motion to
suppress these statements.
Finally, we ascertain no error in the trial court’s decision not to
suppress a statement made by Cramer to C.O. Alexander. C.O. Alexander
was asked to keep watch outside the shower area where Cramer was
detained “and note anything Cramer may say.” TCO2 at 22. After Sherry
was pronounced dead, Cramer stated: “There goes the rest of my life, I’m
only twenty-one years old.” Id. at 23. Because these comments were not
made in response to any question or statement by C.O. Alexander, they
were not proffered during an interrogation.
In sum, having reviewed each of the statements Cramer challenged in
his motion to suppress, we conclude that none of them were made during
the course of a custodial interrogation. Rather, they were gratuitous and, as
such, Miranda warnings were not required. Thus, the trial court did not err
in denying Cramer’s motion to suppress.
In Cramer’s third issue, he avers that the trial court improperly
admitted “certain photographs of Sherry’s dead body that were possibly
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prejudicial due to their depiction of the injuries to Sherry.” Anders Brief at
25. Our Supreme Court has explained:
We will affirm a trial court's admission of photographs absent an
abuse of discretion. Further,
When considering the admissibility of photographs of a
homicide victim, which by their very nature can be
unpleasant, disturbing, and even brutal, the trial court
must engage in a two-step analysis:
First a [trial] court must determine whether the
photograph is inflammatory. If not, it may be
admitted if it has relevance and can assist the jury's
understanding of the facts. If the photograph is
inflammatory, the trial court must decide whether or
not the photographs are of such essential evidentiary
value that their need clearly outweighs the likelihood
of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1033-1034 (Pa. 2012)
(citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court found the photographs admissible, stating:
In the instant matter, the photographs satisfy both steps
of the two-step analysis – even though the satisfaction of one
step would suffice to deny Cramer’s Motion. First, the
photographs are not inflammatory. Exhibit #37 depicts a close
up of the horizontal furrow from the front and Exhibit #38
provides a close up of the contusions on Sherry’s face that were
“consistent with the edge of an object” and not a fist. Both
photographs demonstrate unpleasant images of Sherry’s injuries
in a homicide case but unpleasantness is not enough. The
photographs must “inflame the minds and passions of the jury.”
These images do not. They are simply documentation of the
neck and facial injuries Sherry received.
Second, even if the Court assumes the photographs are
inflammatory, their evidentiary value “outweighs the likelihood
that the photograph[s] will inflame the minds and passions of
the jury.” Dr. Goldblatt testified that a suicide hanging was an
impossibility because a horizontal furrow was present on
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Sherry’s neck as opposed to a furrow that slanted upwards.
Exhibit #37 illustrates this analysis. Dr. Goldblatt also testified
the contusions on Sherry’s face suggest he was hit “with the
edge of an object” and not a fist. And Exhibit #38 demonstrates
that analysis. Consequently, if the Commonwealth uses the
photographs to not only make sense of a witness’s testimony but
also [to] corroborate it,6 then their evidentiary value supersedes
any inflammatory effect.
6
As the Court noted [previously]…, not only do the
photographs corroborate Dr. Goldblatt’s testimony but they
also lend credibility to Teston’s testimony and Cramer’s
first letter.
TCO1 at 13.
We ascertain no error in the trial court’s determination that the at-
issue photographs were admissible for the reasons stated above. In
particular, we have reviewed the pictures and agree with the court that they
are not inflammatory. They depict Sherry’s face from the front and side,
and show cuts and scrapes that are not overly gruesome. See
Commonwealth’s Exhibits 37, 38. While the court is correct that the images
are unpleasant, it is also correct that they do not rise to the level of being
inflammatory. Accordingly, the court did not err in admitting this evidence.
In Cramer’s fourth and final issue, he seeks to challenge the trial
court’s discretion in imposing a term of 45 to 90 months’ imprisonment
consecutive to his sentence of life imprisonment. However, Cramer has
waived this claim by failing to file a post-sentence motion asserting it before
the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818 (Pa. Super.
2008) (stating the right to appeal a discretionary aspect of sentence is not
absolute and is waived if the appellant does not challenge it in post-sentence
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J-S72005-14
motions or by raising the claim during the sentencing proceedings).
Accordingly, Cramer’s final issue is frivolous.
In sum, each of the issues Cramer seeks to raise on appeal is
frivolous, and our review of the record has revealed no other issue(s) he
could assert herein. Consequently, we affirm Cramer’s judgment of
sentence and grant Attorney Gleason’s petition to withdraw.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/2014
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