Com. v. Castro, R.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT CASTRO :
:
Appellant : No. 2239 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 15, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004151-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2023
Robert Castro appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after a
jury found him guilty of Possession of an Instrument of Crime (“PIC”), Simple
Assault, and Recklessly Endangering Another Person (“REAP”). The charges
were based on allegations Castro stabbed Hector Pagan. On appeal, Castro
claims the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the original
sentence was illegally increased. We find the weight of the evidence claim is
without merit, however, we remand to the trial court for resentencing.
The essential factual background of this appeal is largely undisputed.
Castro was involved in an argument with the mother of his child, Lena Ladson,
regarding declaration of the child for tax purposes. As the argument
escalated, Pagan, a friend who was staying with Lena Ladson, intervened in
the argument. A scuffle between Castro and Pagan ultimately ensued,
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resulting in Castro stabbing Pagan in the stomach and leg. The factual disputes
at trial revolved around how Castro obtained the knife and whether he was
the aggressor. See Appellant’s Brief, at 31 (“Indeed, the only defense raised
at trial was that Mr. Castro acted in justified self-defense with respect to all
charges. [Castro] testified that he stabbed [Pagan] and stipulated that serious
bodily injury resulted.”)
Castro was arrested and charged with Aggravated Assault, Simple
Assault, PIC, and REAP. The jury found Castor not guilty of aggravated assault
and guilty of the remaining charges. The trial court sentenced Castro to an
aggregate term of forty to eighty months of confinement. Following a motion
for reconsideration of sentence, Castro was resentenced to a new aggregate
term of thirty-six to eighty-four months of confinement.
First, Castro argues that the guilty verdict was against the weight of the
evidence. It is well established, “the weight attributed to the evidence is a
matter exclusively for the fact finder, who is free to believe all, part, or none
of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”
Commonwealth v. Hicks, 151 A.3d 216, 223 (Pa. Super. 2016). The
determination of whether to grant a new trial rests within the discretion of the
trial court to find that the jury verdict shocked the conscience. See id. The
trial court’s role “is to determine that, notwithstanding all of the facts, certain
facts are so clearly of greater weight, that to ignore them or to give them
equal weight with all of the facts is to deny justice.” Id. A mere conflict in the
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testimony or reassessment of the credibility of witnesses are not sufficient
foundation to grant a new trial. See id. “[T]he trial court's denial of a motion
for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable
of its rulings” because the appellate court’s review is extremely limited to
determining if the trial court abused its discretion in determining whether the
jury verdict shocked its conscience. Id. (citations omitted; brackets in
original).
More specifically, on appeal, Castro claims that “[t]he jury’s acquittal of
Mr. Castro on the charge of aggravated assault could only have been premised
upon a belief that Mr. Castro acted justifiably in self-defense.” Appellants Brief,
Castro bases his appeal on the alleged inconsistency of the jury’s verdict, but
the United States Supreme Court has held that “[c]onsistency in the verdict is
not necessary.” Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932).
Pennsylvania courts agree that it is not considered a reversible mistake for a
jury to reach verdicts that are seemingly inconsistent. See Commonwealth
v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 120 (Pa. Super. 2017). Inconsistent verdicts are
allowed to stand "so long as the evidence is sufficient to support the
conviction." Commonwealth v. Miller, 35 A.3d 1206, 1208 (Pa. 2012).
Courts have specifically addressed instances, like here, where a
defendant was acquitted of aggravated assault but found guilty of simple
assault: “[A]lthough simple assault is a lesser included offense in the crime of
aggravated assault, the verdict acquitting appellant of the greater inclusive
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offense does not conclusively establish that there was insufficient evidence to
support a conviction for the lesser offense.” Commonwealth v. Irvin, 393
A.2d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super. 1978) (internal citations omitted). More recently,
this Court has found arguing that Castro’s argument “conflates two distinct
charges, each of which has separate elements and intent requirements.”
Commonwealth v. Lavalliere, 1056 EDA 2014, 2016 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Where verdicts have been alleged to be inconsistent, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has “refuse[d] to inquire into or to speculate upon the nature
of the jury's deliberations or the rationale behind the jury's decision.” Miller,
35 A.3d at 1213. Therefore, our job is not to speculate as to why the jury
found Castro not guilty of aggravated assault; instead, we must determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion in not finding that the convictions
were so against the weight of the evidence as to shock the conscience.
In that vein, the trial court explained that the verdict came down to an
assessment of the credibility of competing stories:
Even considering [Castro’s] acquittal on Aggravated Assault and
convictions on the remaining counts to be inconsistent, there is no
appropriate basis for reversal on this ground. It was within the
jury’s sole prerogative to convict [Castro] of Simple Assault, PIC,
and REAP. The record demonstrates that although there were
testimonial conflicts, the jury conceivably could have accepted
witness testimony that provided sufficient evidence to support
[Castro’s] convictions. [Pagan’s] testimony, if accepted as true,
established that he was defending Lena Ladson from [Castro]
when he was stabbed twice with a knife by [Castro.] Lena Ladson’s
original statement given to Detective Lindsey, if accepted as true,
established that she saw [Castro] holding a knife and stabbing
[Pagan] in his ribs. [Castro’s] claim is thus without merit and no
relief is due on this ground.
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Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/21, at 20.
Our review of the record reveals the trial court’s summary of testimony
is accurate. Further, we can find no abuse of discretion in its conclusions.
While Castro and Pagan told different stories about the circumstances of their
scuffle, Pagan’s story was not beyond rational belief. As such, the jury was
entitled to credit it. Castro’s first issue on appeal merits no relief.
Next, Castro claims that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial
court illegally increased his maximum sentence in granting his post-sentence
motion. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court agreed with Castro
and requested that we remand the case for resentencing:
[Castro] first claims that the sentence this Court imposed on
October 15, 2020[,] is illegal because this Court was without
authority to impose an increased sentence because the
Commonwealth did not file a post-sentence motion seeking
modification of the sentence. In support of his claim, [Castro]
states that the original aggregate sentence he received on
September 23, 2020[,] was forty to eighty months of
confinement, while the new aggregate sentence he received on
October 15, 2020[,] was thirty-six to eighty-four months of
confinement. This Court concurs with Appellant's claim that his
new sentence is illegal.
…
[The trial court originally] sentenced [Castro] to an aggregate
term of forty to eighty months of confinement, which include
twenty to forty months of confinement for the Simple Assault
charge. After [Castro] filed a post-sentence motion challenging
that the sentence for Simple Assault charge exceeded the
statutory maximum term of twenty-four months, [the trial court]
resentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-six months to eighty-
four months of confinement. This new sentencing scheme included
a corrected sentence for the Simple Assault charge of twelve to
twenty-four months of confinement. It also included a new
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sentence of twenty-four to sixty months of confinement for the
PIC charge, which marked an increase from the original sentence
of twenty to forty months.
[The trial court] was within its rights to increase [Castro’s]
sentence on the PIC charge, as doing so was intended to preserve
the integrity of the original aggregate sentence. At the
resentencing hearing, both [the trial court] and [Castro’s] counsel
understood the new sentence to be a small increase in [Castro’s]
minimum term and a small decrease in [Castro’s] maximum
term…. However, upon further review, [the trial court] finds that
it mistakenly increased [Castro’s] maximum sentence from eighty
months to eighty-four months, contrary to its understanding that
[Castro’s] maximum sentence had decreased. … Accordingly, [the
trial court] requests that this matter be remanded for
resentencing.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/3/21, at 16-18.
Moreover, the Commonwealth is not opposing Castro’s request for
resentencing. See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 12.
We agree that Castro’s maximum sentence was illegally increased and
hereby remand to the trial for resentencing. See Commonwealth v.
Nickens, 923 A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that a sentencing
court may not increase a sentence where only the defendant has filed a post-
sentence motion to modify sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Fennell,
105 A.3d 13, 15 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding proper action in instance where
court imposed illegal sentence that alters entire sentencing scheme is to
vacate sentence and remand for resentencing).
Convictions affirmed. Judgments of sentence vacated. Case remanded
for resentencing on all counts. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/24/2023
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