Com. v. Murdock, M.

J-S19039-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
MARK ANTHONY MURDOCK, :
:
Appellant : No. 2749 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered on September 4, 2014
in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-15-CR-0000993-2014
BEFORE: STABILE, JENKINS and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 15, 2015
Mark Anthony Murdock (“Murdock”) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his conviction of harassment.1 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in
its Opinion, which we adopt for purposes of this appeal. See Trial Court
Opinion, 11/12/14, 1-2, 3-5.
On appeal, Murdock raises the following question for our review:
“Whether the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient for a conviction on the
charge of harassment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1)?” Brief for
Appellant at 4 (capitalization omitted).
Murdock contends that the evidence was so inconsistent that, as a
matter of law, the essential elements of the crime of harassment could not
1
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1).
J-S19039-15
have been found as a matter of law. Id. at 13. Murdock asserts that the
victim, Amber Brown (“Brown”), gave three different accounts of the event.
Id. Murdock claims that the Commonwealth failed to connect Brown’s
injuries with her differing versions of the event. Id. Murdock contends that
Reading Hospital found no physical evidence of the complaints made by
Brown. Id. at 16. Murdock asserts that, even if the Commonwealth
established the physical elements of harassment, the evidence was
insufficient to establish that he possessed the requisite mens rea. Id.
Murdock claims that the prior incident, which occurred on December 3,
2013, is evidence that he lacked the requisite mens rea for the subject
incident. Id. at 17.
The trial court addressed Murdock’s claim, set forth the relevant law,
and concluded that his claim lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion,
11/12/14, 5-7. We agree with the trial court’s sound reasoning and affirm
on this basis. See id.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/15/2015
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J-S19039-15
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COMMONWEAL TH OF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
PENNSYLVANIA CHESTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v. NO.: CP-15-0000993-2014
2749 EDA 2014
MARKANTHONYMURDOCK
CRIMINAL ACTION - LAW
Nicholas J. Casenta, Jr., Esquire, Attorney for the Commonwealth
Nathan M. Schenker, Esquire, Attorney for Defendant
RULE 1925(a) OPINION
BY: WHEATCRAFT, J. NOVEMBER 10, 2014
Mark Anthony Murdock ("the defendant") appeals this Court's September 4, 2014
guilty verdict and submits that this Court made certain errors. For the reasons set forth
below, we find no errors were made.
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
c . .J5"n February 18, 2014, the defendant was charged on two counts: Simple Assault
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:~18:;P~cfC.S. §2701 (a)(1)), and Harassment (18 Pa.C.S. §2709(a)(1 )). A preliminary
7'~ t;s(:.J'
he~{ii':J':g was held on April 1, 2014 and both charges were held over for trial. On
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September 4, 2014, the charge of Simple Assault was withdrawn by the Commonwealth
and the summary charge of Harassment proceeded immediately to a bench trial.
During the bench trial, both the Commonwealth and the defendant presented
evidence. At the conclusion of the trial, this Court found the defendant guilty of
Harassment and sentenced the defendant to 90 days of probation, including a condition
that the defendant complete an anger management program.
The defendant filed an appeal to our September 4, 2014 judgment of sentence on
September 22, 2014. We issued a Rule 1925(b) Order on September 26, 2014. The
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defendant filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal on October 17,
2014. Our Rule 1925(a) Opinion follows.
ERROR CLAIMED BY THE DEFENDANT
In his Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, the defendant sets
forth the following error:
1. There was insufficient evidence for this Court to convict the defendant with the
offense of Harassment (18 Pa.C.S. §2709(a)(1)) because:
a. Amber Brown, the victim, gave multiple inconsistent statements; and
b. Amber Brown's statement to the police and the photographs taken by the
police were inconsistent with the content of Reading Hospital's treatment
records.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the appropriate test is 'whether the
evidence, and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient to establish all the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt."' Commonweelth v. Williams, 554
Pa. 1, 9, 720 A.2d 679, 682-683 (1998), citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 536 Pa. 355,
639 A.2d 763, 766 (Pa.1994). "[W]here no single bit of evidence will by itself
conclusively establish guilt[;] the verdict will [nonetheless] be sustained where the
totality of the evidence supports the finding of guilt." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 522 Pa.
256, 561 A.2d 699, 704 (1989). Evidence will be found to be insufficient only when "a
defendant has shown that the fact-finder overlooked such a preponderance of the
evidence that the resulting verdict shocks the conscience." Williams, supra, citing
Commonwealth v. Walker, 656 A.2d 90, 97 (Pa.1995).
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FACTS
During the bench trial held on September 4, 2014, the defendant stipulated to the
admission of evidence of a prior bad act committed on December 3, 2013 by the
defendant against the same victim, Amber Brown. (N.T., 09/04/14, p. 3, II. 15-23). The
Commonwealth and the defendant also stipulated to the admission of the following
documents into evidence: (1) the police incident report of December 3, 2013 (the prior bad
act incident) (Exhibit, C-5; N.T., 09/04/14, p.3, I. 24 - p. 4, I. 8), (2) the medical records
from Reading Hospital for Amber Brown's1 treatment on January 24, 2014 (Exhibit, C-4;
N.T., 09/04/14, p. 3, II. 11-13, p. 24, II. 16-24), and (3) the police incident report of January
23, 2014 (Exhibit, C-6; N.T., 09/04/14, p.4, 11.11-22).
The Commonwealth presented three fact witnesses: Amber Brown, Trooper
Matthew Truscott, and Trooper Amos Glick. The Commonwealth also moved for the
admission of the written statement prepared by Ms. Brown on January 23, 2013 (Exhibit,
C-1; N.T., 09/04/14, p. 12, I. 12 - p. 13, I. 4), and two photographs, taken January 23,
2013 by Trooper Truscott, of injuries to Ms. Brown's arm and hand. (Exhibits, C-2, C-3;
N.T., 09/04/14, p. 15, II. 2-17). The defendant did not object to the admission of these
exhibits. The defendant was the only witness for the defense case. (N.T., 09/04/14,
Defendant, pp. 35-41). There was no other evidence presented by the defendant.
The chronology of events that occurred on January 23, 2014 is as follows:
1. At about 7:30 p.m., the defendant presented himself at the lobby of
the Pennsylvania State Police Embreeville Barracks. The defendant stated to Trooper
Matthew Truscott that Amber Brown is his ex-girlfriend and her apartment is located at
1
The medical records identify the patient as Amber Dausi. The parties stipulated that these
records were for the treatment of the victim in this case, Amber Brown. (N.T., 09/04/14, p. 3, II.
11-13, p. 24, II. 16-24).
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1010 Sugarsbridge Road, West Bradford Township, Chester County. The defendant
explained that he had returned earlier that day to Ms. Brown's apartment to retrieve his
personal belongings and while he was there they had an argument. The defendant
reported to Trooper Truscott that the two men who lived in the upstairs apartment entered
Ms. Brown's apartment, grabbed him, and pulled him outside. The defendant testified that
he called the State Police to report the assault by the neighbors and was instructed to
drive to the barracks. (Exhibit, C-6; N.T., 09/04/14, Trooper Truscott, p. 22; N.T., 09/04/14,
Defendant, p. 40, II. 3-18).
2. After taking the defendant's statement at the barracks, Trooper
Truscott and Trooper Glick proceeded to 1010 Sugarsbridge Road to interview. Amber
Brown. (N.T., 09/04/14, Trooper Truscott, p. 22, I. 24 - p. 23, I. 3).
3. At about 8:30 p.m., during her interview with the troopers, Ms. Brown
reported that the defendant had arrived at her apartment to pick up his personal
belongings and they began to argue. (Exhibit, C-6; N.T., 09/04/14, Brown, p. 9, I. 10 - p.
10, I. 12; N.T., 09/04/14, Trooper Glick, p. 32, II. 9 - 20). She explained that her two
upstairs neighbors heard the argument and came downstairs to investigate. (N.T.,
09/04/14, Brown, p. 10, I. 25 - p. 11, I. 2). They confronted the defendant, and the
defendant then grabbed Ms. Brown and placed her between him and the neighbors. In his
effort to place Ms. Brown between himself and the neighbors, the defendant pushed Ms.
Brown into a wall or door causing bruising to Ms. Brown. The neighbors grabbed the
defendant and pulled him outside. (Exhibit, C-6; N.T., 09/04/14, Brown, p. 11, II. 1-11;
N.T., 09/04/14, Truscott, p. 26, II. 16-25).
4. Ms. Brown also reported to Trooper Glick that, as of January 23,
2014, she was six months pregnant with the defendant's unborn child. (N.T., 09/04/14,
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Trooper Glick, p. 32, II. 21-24 N.T., 09/04/14, Brown, p. 7, I. 22 - p. 8, I. 3).
5. During the interview with Ms. Brown, Trooper Truscott saw a bruise
on her right elbow, a bruise on her left hand, and two small scratches on her left hand.
(Exhibits, C-2, C-3; N.T., 09/04/14, Brown, p.14, I. 16 - p. 15, I. 13; N.T., 09/04/14, Trooper
Truscott, p. 23, II. 11-20).
6. Ms. Brown sought medical treatment for pain in her hip on January
24, 2014. (Exhibit, C-4, p. 9); N.T., 09/04/14, Brown, p. 15, I. 19 - p. 16, I. 6). She reported
to the medical staff at Reading Hospital that her injury resulted from a physical altercation
with the defendant. (Exhibit, C-4, pp. 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 19; N.t., 09/04/14, Brown, p. 15, I.
19 - p. 16, I. 6; N.T., 09/04/14, Truscott, p. 23, I. 21- p. 24, I. 10).
DISCUSSION
The offense at issue is Harassment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §2709(a)(1). Section
2709(a)(1) provides that a person is guilty of Harassment if that person, "with intent to
harass, annoy or alarm another, ... strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other
person to physical contact." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1). The question presented to this
Court, as the fact finder, was whether the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had physical contact with Ms. Brown with the intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm. We found that the Commonwealth sustained its burden.
We agree with the defendant that some of the evidence presented was conflicting,
as is often the case in trials involving domestic violence. The defendant testified that the
only physical contact on January 23, 2014 was between him and the two male neighbors.
(Exhibit, C-6; N.T., 09/04/14, Defendant, p. 39, I. 18-23). A few hours after the incident,
Ms. Brown reported to the police and prepared a written statement describing how the
defendant grabbed her and used her as a shield against the two male neighbors. She
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described the physical contact as taking place in the doorway to the outdoor deck. (Exhibit,
C-1 ). The next day, she reported to the treating staff at Reading Hospital that she was
"shoved" against a wall or a door by the defendant. (Exhibit, C-4, pp. 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 19).
At the time of trial, in the presence of the defendant, Ms. Brown recanted her prior
statements, and testified that the defendant had not grabbed her or touched her on
January 23, 2014. (N.T., 09/04/14, Brown, p. 11, II. 17-23, p. 19, II. 5-17).
As the fact finder, this Court was "free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence
presented." Commonwealth v. Miller, 555 Pa. 354, 724 A.2d 895, 901 (1999), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 903, 120 S. Ct. 242 (1999). Credibility determinations and the weight given to the
testimony presented and the out-of-court statements entered into evidence were within
this Court's exclusive control. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 576 Pa. 23, 838 A.2d 663, 671
(2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1008, 125 S. Ct. 617 (2004); Commonwealth v. DeJesus,
580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102, 107 (2004).
After considering all of the evidence presented, we did not find the defendant's
testimony to be credible. We found that Ms. Brown's out-of-court statements were credible
and persuasive in that those statements corroborated each other and the pictures of her
injuries. (Exhibits C-1, C-2, C-2, C-4). The only discrepancy between Ms. Brown's written
statement and the report she gave at the hospital relates to the terms used in the
description of events. At different times, Ms. Brown used the words: door, doorway, or
wall, to describe the area impacted by her body. We also find that the words: grabbed,
shoved, pushed, and thrown, are consistent in describing the defendant laying his hands
on her and physically moving Ms. Brown. Thus, although she uses different descriptive
words, the scene described by Ms. Brown in her written statement to the police and the
statements given to the medical staff at Reading Hospital are materially consistent.
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We also found, and continue to find, that the photos taken by Trooper Truscott are
consistent with the medical records from Reading Hospital. The injuries documented on
the photographs are to an upper arm and a hand. The complaint at the hospital was of
severe hip pain. The medical notes reflect the complaint made. We found Ms. Brown's
testimony that she did not feel pain in her hip until the next day to be credible. Thus, she
did not have an opportunity to give this complaint to the police or add it to her written
statement.
We also found it significant that the written statement and the statements given to
the medical providers were voluntary and made soon after the incident. It is important to
note that Ms. Brown's statements to the medical staff were given to obtain medical
treatment for herself and her unborn child. We accept the factual statements made in the
medical records as substantive evidence. Turner v. Valley Housing Development Corp.,
972 A.2d 531 (Pa.Super. 2009)(medical records are admissible under the hearsay rules as
evidence of facts contained therein); Pa.RE. 803.1(1 ). Consequently, we found the written
statement and the statements to the medical staff to be more credible and persuasive than
her testimony recanting them nine months later. See Commonwealth v. Buford, -- A.3d --,
2014 WL 5018593 (Pa.Super. 2014)(facts stated out-of-court and recanted at trial can
provide legally sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction).
Considering the above credibility determinations,we find that the defendant has
not shown that we, as the fact-finder, have overlooked competent and credible evidence
or that our verdict shocks the conscience. Williams, supra. It was and continues to be our
determination that given the totality of the credible evidence, and all reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence, the Commonwealth has sustained its burden and
proved the defendant guilty of Harassment beyond a reasonable doubt.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully ask that the Superior Court
AFFIRM our September 4, 2014 judgment of sentence finding the defendant guilty of
Harassment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1).
BY THE COURT:
Ann Marie Wheatcraft J.
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