Com. v. Eure, N.

J-A09023-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
NAJEE EURE, :
:
Appellee : No. 2540 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order July 31, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0002958-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2015
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (“the Commonwealth”),
appeals from the order entered on July 31, 2014, denying its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s order quashing the charge against
Appellee, Najee Eure (“Eure”), of persons not to possess, use, manufacture,
control, sell or transfer firearms.1 After careful review, we reverse the trial
court’s order and remand for trial.
The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On the
evening of February 11, 2014, Officer Matthew York (“Officer York”), along
with two state parole agents and two police officers, visited Eure’s home,
located at 2603 Reed Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Officer York was
accompanying the parole agents on a parole compliance check for Eure, who
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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was part of the Focused Deterrence Program as a convicted felon. During
the visit, Officer York recovered a black and silver Ruger .45 caliber handgun
from between the mattress and box spring of the bed in the middle upstairs
bedroom of Eure’s home.
On February 21, 2014, police arrested Eure, charging him with persons
not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms. At a
preliminary hearing on March 13, 2014, the Commonwealth presented the
testimony of Officer York. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, the
trial ordered Eure’s case held for court. On June 10, 2014, Eure filed a
motion to quash the charge against him, averring that the Commonwealth
failed to present sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to sustain a
prima facie case against Eure for the above-referenced charge. Motion to
Quash, 6/10/14, ¶ 7. Specifically, Eure asserted that the Commonwealth
failed to produce “any actual or direct evidence that [Eure] is the person
who possessed the firearm found in the middle bedroom of the house.”
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, 6/10/14, ¶ 2. Eure asserts
that “[t]he Commonwealth believes that it has established a prima facie case
through the circumstantial evidence that [because Eure] lives at that house,
he and he alone must have possessed that gun.” Id. Therefore, Eure
contends, “[t]he Commonwealth is relying on a tenuous inference based on
circumstantial evidence[,]” and “[t]hat inference is not enough sustain the
Commonwealth’s burden at the preliminary hearing.” Id.
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On June 12, 2014, the trial court granted Eure’s motion to quash at
the conclusion of a hearing on the motion. On June 20, 2014, the
Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order
granting Eure’s motion to quash. On July 14, 2014, the trial court vacated
its June 12, 2014 order granting Eure’s motion to quash, pending its
determination of the Commonwealth’s motion for reconsideration. On July
31, 2014, the trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion for
reconsideration. On September 2, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a timely
notice of appeal and concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Rule 1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
On appeal, the Commonwealth raises one issue for our review and
determination: did the evidence at the preliminary hearing, viewed in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, establish a prima facie case
against Eure for the charge of persons not to possess, use, manufacture,
control, sell or transfer firearms? Commonwealth’s Brief at 1.
We begin by acknowledging our standard of review:
[I]t is settled that the evidentiary sufficiency, or lack
thereof, of the Commonwealth’s prima facie case for
a charged crime is a question of law as to which an
appellate court’s review is plenary. See
[Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 865
(Pa. 2003)]. Indeed, the trial court is afforded no
discretion in ascertaining whether, as a matter of law
and in light of the facts presented to it, the
Commonwealth has carried its pre-trial, prima facie
burden to make out the elements of a charged
crime.
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Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005).
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated the following with regard
to establishing a prima facie case:
At the preliminary hearing stage of a criminal
prosecution, the Commonwealth need not prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
rather, must merely put forth sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case of guilt. Huggins, 836
A.2d at 866 (citing Commonwealth v. McBride, []
595 A.2d 589, 591 ([Pa.] 1991)). A prima facie case
exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence
of each of the material elements of the crime
charged and establishes probable cause to warrant
the belief that the accused committed the offense.
McBride, 595 A.2d at 591 (citing Commonwealth
v. Wojdak, [] 466 A.2d 991 ([Pa.] 1983)).
Furthermore, the evidence need only be such that, if
presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge
would be warranted in permitting the case to be
decided by the jury. Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866.
Id. at 513-14. “When deciding whether a prima facie case was established,
we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and we are to consider all reasonable inferences based on
that evidence which could support a guilty verdict.” Commonwealth v.
McCullough, 86 A.3d 896, 898-99 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
“The weight and credibility of the evidence is not a factor at this stage.” Id.
at 899 (quotations and citation omitted).
Section 6105(a)(1) defines the crime of persons not to possess, use,
manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms as follows:
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(a) Offense defined.—
(1) A person who has been convicted of an
offense enumerated in subsection (b), within
or without this Commonwealth, regardless of
the length of sentence or whose conduct meets
the criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess,
use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or
obtain a license to possess, use, control, sell,
transfer or manufacture a firearm in this
Commonwealth.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1). Importantly, the Commonwealth may prove
illegal possession of a firearm by constructive possession. Commonwealth
v. Cruz, 21 A.3d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Constructive possession is a legal fiction, a pragmatic
construct to deal with the realities of criminal law
enforcement. Constructive possession is an
inference arising from a set of facts that possession
of the contraband was more likely than not. We
have defined constructive possession as “conscious
dominion.” We subsequently defined “conscious
dominion” as the power to control the contraband
and the intent to exercise that control. To aid
application, we have held that constructive
possession may be established by the totality of the
circumstances.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
The trial court explained its reasoning for dismissing the charge
against Eure as follows:
[The Commonwealth] here failed to establish any
real evidence that the bedroom where the gun was
found was under the exclusive possession and
control of [Eure], or … that he ever exercised
dominion over it, and thus failed to establish the
existence of any evidence that would demonstrate
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that he ever knowingly had the power or the
intention at a given time to exercise dominion and
control over the weapon that was found there, either
directly or through others.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/15/14, at 9.
We disagree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth and considering all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
we conclude that the Commonwealth established a prima facie case against
Eure for the charge of persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control,
sell or transfer firearms. The certified record on appeal reveals the
following. Eure is a convicted felon and subject to section 6105(a)(1). 2 See
N.T., 3/13/14, at 23. While Eure was not present for the compliance check,
Officer York stated that he knew him well, that he knew him to live at 2603
Reed Street for his entire police career, and that 2603 Reed Street was the
address he was released to from state parole. Id. at 6. Officer York
reported that Eure’s mother, who was home at the time in question,
answered the door and told Officer York that Eure’s room was the back
upstairs bedroom, but that he stayed in the middle upstairs bedroom. Id. at
14-15. Officer York testified that he observed clothing in both the middle
and back bedrooms, but that he observed a black North Face jacket in the
middle bedroom that he had seen Eure wearing approximately one month
prior. Id. at 7, 16. Officer York further stated that he also noticed that the
2
Additionally, Eure has not contested the fact that he is subject to section
6105(a)(1).
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bed in the middle bedroom, although unmade, was dressed with sheets
while the bed in the back bedroom contained no sheets. Id. at 21.
Specifically, Officer York testified:
The back bedroom, in my opinion, was not lived in,
Your Honor. There [were] no sheets on the bed.
There was no indication to me that anyone had
stayed in there recently. The middle bedroom[] was
lived in. There [were] sheets on the bed. The
blankets were strewed. There was clothing
throughout the bedroom on the floor, indicative that
someone was living in there.
Id. Finally, Officer York reported that he recovered the black and silver
Ruger .45 caliber handgun from between the mattress and box spring of the
bed in the middle bedroom. Id. at 5.
Officer York’s testimony supports a reasonable inference that Eure was
in possession of the firearm recovered from the middle bedroom of his
home. Officer York’s testimony indicated that Eure’s mother indicated that
Eure used the middle bedroom and that upon entering it, it was apparent
that Eure slept in and kept his belongings in the middle bedroom.
Therefore, because the middle bedroom was the room from which Officer
York recovered the firearm, the reasonable inference that follows is that
Eure had the power to control the firearm and the intent to exercise that
control. See Cruz, 21 A.3d at 1253. Accordingly, because Eure is subject
to section 6105(a)(1), we conclude that the trial court erred in granting the
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motion to quash the charge against Eure of persons not to possess, use,
manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms and remand the case for trial.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/21/2015
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