Ruch, E. v. Williams, V.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
EDWARD RUCH AND DORIS JEANNE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
O’HANDLY RUCH, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellees :
:
v. :
:
VERNE WILLIAMS, II AND ANGELA M. :
WILLIAMS, :
:
Appellants : No. 1052 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment entered June 19, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County,
Civil Division at No. 2010-CV15485-EJ
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED MAY 05, 2015
Appellants, Verne and Angela Williams (together, the “Williams”),
appeal from the order entered on June 19, 2014, following the trial court’s
entry of an order requiring the Williams to, inter alia, relocate a fence
constructed on the property of Appellees, Edward and Doris Ruch (together,
the “Ruches”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in
part.
After a bench trial commencing on January 23, 2014 and concluding
on April 1, 2014, the trial court decided the case in favor of the Ruches by
order dated April 30, 2014. In its subsequent written opinion in support of
its order, the trial court set forth the following findings of fact relevant to the
determination of this appeal:
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In 1976, Edward Ruch [] purchased the property
located at 106 Nagle Street. At that time a hedge
existed between the properties of 106 and 108 Nagle
Street. The hedge was a privet hedge and
approximately five feet tall and three feet wide. All
parties believed that the property line was
somewhere within this hedge. Also, on the 108 side
of the hedge there was an old fence. Mr. Ruch
believed that at least a portion of the hedge was on
his property and he would care for the hedge by
routinely trimming his side of the hedge and the top,
and removing dead branches from within the hedge.
It is believed that the prior owner of 106 Nagle
Street also cared for the hedge, as Mr. Ruch
purchased hedge clippers from the prior owner when
he purchased the property. Mr. Ruch's children and
wife would also help maintain the hedge by caring
for the portion of the hedge that was located on the
property at 106 Nagle Street. This care for the
hedge had continued up until the hedge was
removed by [the Williams], and all parties are in
agreement that Mr. Ruch would care for the hedge.
Around 1987, a dog owned by the individual residing
at 108 Nagle Street got through the hedge and bit
[the Ruches’] son. To keep this from reoccurring,
Mr. Ruch trimmed the hedge back and placed a new,
green painted four-feet fence within the hedge. As
Mr. Williams [] was removing the hedge in March of
2010, he discovered a chain-link fence within the
hedge. Mrs. Williams [] discovered the fence
approximately six months prior when her dog tried to
get through the fence.
Verne Williams first saw the properties of 108 and
106 Nagle Street in 2001, when he moved into the
property at 110 Nagle Street with his wife, Angela
Williams. Mrs. Williams was familiar with the
properties all her life, but only obtained title to the
property at 108 Nagle Street in 2004. Prior to [the
Williams] residing at that property, James Miller
resided there until 1972. At the time Mr. Miller
resided at the property, he recalled a hedge as the
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boundary between 108 and 106 Nagle Street and a
wire fence on the 106 side of the properties. Mr.
Miller described the fence as a "wire-mesh fence,”
located down around the roots of the hedge on the
106 side of the roots. When he moved from the
property in 1972, the property became a rental
property. In 1988, Mr. Miller obtained the property
by deed from his father, but continued to use it as a
rental.
Mr. Williams claimed that he spoke with Mr. Ruch
many times about the hedge and about replacing the
hedge with a fence, to be placed where the roots of
the hedge were located. Mr. Ruch denied ever
having an agreement, and Mr. Williams admitted
that the two never discussed any details. Mr.
Williams stated that he had to rely on the fence as a
property line when he removed the hedge. The wire
fence within the hedge was apparently attached to
[the Ruches] shed. When [the Williams] removed
the fence, they cut the wire fence at the shed line.
As [the Williams'] were removing the hedge, they
decided that the property line must be along the root
base of the hedge, but apparently placed the new
fence directly where the old fence was located.
In March of 2010, Mr. Ruch retumed to his property
to find pieces of the hedge in a pickup truck and a
new fence on his property, erected by [the Williams].
[The Ruches’] backyard should be approximately 12
½ feet wide, however, the fence reduces the width of
their property by about two feet. In addition to the
fence encroachment, [the Williams] have nailed
things to [the Ruches’] roof and shed wall. [The
Ruches] shortly thereafter commenced this action to
eject [the Williams] from their property.
[The Ruches’] expert, Keith Heigel, is a professional
land surveyor with Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc.
Mr. Heigel has been a surveyor since 1983 and is
licensed in the state of Pennsylvania. Mr. Heigel
testified that there were encroachments from the
108 Nagle Street property (owned by [the Williams])
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onto the 106 Nagle Street property (owned by [the
Ruches]). Mr. Heigel further testified that that the
fence located between the two properties is
encroaching on [the Ruches’] property.
[The Williams] attempted to offer to the court the
opinion of Bruce Yager. Mr. Yager was unable to
produce his license number for the court on January
23, 2014. The court scheduled the conclusion of the
non-jury trial for April 1, 2014 at 1:30 p.m. At the
conclusion of the April 1, 2014 non-jury trial, [the
Williams] were unable to produce the license number
of Mr. Yager. Numbers that were given to [the
Williams'] counsel in regards to Mr. Yager's license
did not match up with any of the records that the
Department of State has for his registration. [The
Ruches’] counsel spoke to somebody who works at
the Bureau of Professional Occupational Affairs. This
individual confirmed that she never sent an E-mail
confirming Mr. Yager's license number. This E-mail
had stated that there was a mix-up with numbers
and that Mr. Yager was actually licensed. It turns
out this E-mail was completely false and was never
sent. This individual also confirmed to [the Ruches]
counsel that Mr. Yager is not licensed and that they
have no knowledge of him being a licensed surveyor.
Furthermore, Mr. Yager was not in court on April 1,
2014 due to "allegedly" being in the hospital.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/2014, at 1-5.
In its April 30, 2014 order, the trial court, inter alia, ruled that the
property line between 106 and 108 Nagle Street is defined as set forth in the
Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. survey, and requires the Williams (1) to
remove the fence between the two properties, (2) remove the
encroachments to the Ruches’ roof and shed, and (3) to be responsible for
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the creation of a new survey prepared by Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. and
recorded with the Dauphin County Recorder of Deeds.
On appeal,1 the Williams raise four issues for our consideration and
review:
1. Did the [trial court] err in refusing to permit Bruce
Yager to testify as an expert witness [?]
2. Did the [trial court] err in locating the property line
between the lands of [the Ruches and the Williams],
in accordance with the Light-Heigel survey, east of
the line of the fence and hedge, where both deeds of
the parties failed to have a metes and bounds
description other than to call the other property as
an adjoiner?
3. Did the [trial court] err in failing to find that the old
fence which existed between the properties of [the
Ruches and the Williams] for over twenty-one years
and which was replaced by [the Williams] was a
consentable boundary line between the lands of [the
Ruches and the Williams]?
4. Did the [trial court] err in ordering [the Williams] to
make changes to roof encroachments which have
existed for more than twenty-one years, and which
1
On appeal, the Ruches contend that this appeal is untimely because the
Williams’ Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days of the entry of the
trial court’s April 30, 2014 order. We disagree. The April 30, 2014 order set
forth the trial court’s verdict following trial, and thus post-trial motions were
required before judgment could be entered resulting in an appealable order.
See, e.g., Chalkey v. Roush, 805 A.2d 491, 496 (Pa. 2002) (“a trial
court's order at the conclusion of a trial, whether the action is one at law or
in equity, simply cannot become final for purposes of filing an appeal until
the court decides any timely post-trial motions”). In this case, on May 9,
2014, the Williams timely filed a Motion for Post-Trial Relief, which the trial
court denied by order dated May 21, 2014. The Williams thereafter
praeciped for the entry of judgment on June 19, 2014 and filed a timely
Notice of Appeal therefrom.
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were not made the subject of the request for relief
by [the Ruches] in the pleadings filed in this
action[?]
Williams’ Brief at 2-3.
For their first issue on appeal, the Williams argue that the trial court
erred in “failing to permit Bruce Yager (“Yager”) to testify as an expert
witness based upon the qualifications submitted into the record.” Williams’
Brief at 6. Whether to qualify a person to testify as an expert witness rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not reverse
absent an abuse of that discretion. Miller v. Brass Rail Tavern, Inc., 664
A.2d 525, 528 (Pa. 1995). A person need not necessarily be licensed to
testify as an expert witness, and also need not “be possessed of all of the
knowledge in a given field.” Id. To qualify as an expert witness in a given
field, “the test to be applied when qualifying an expert witness is whether
the witness has any reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the
subject under investigation.” Freed v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 971 A.2d
1202, 1206 (Pa. 2009), on reargument, 5 A.3d 212 (Pa. 2010).
Based upon our review of the certified record in this case, we must
agree with the Ruches that the Williams have not preserved this issue for
appellate review, since counsel for the Williams never asserted any objection
to the trial court’s preclusion of Yager’s testimony on the grounds now
claimed. During the first day of trial on January 23, 2014, Yager testified as
to his qualifications generally but could not provide his surveyor’s license
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number. The trial court, recognizing that trial would not be concluded that
day, proposed that Yager’s testimony be continued so that he could obtain
his license information. N.T., 1/23/2014, at 74-75. The trial court then
stated, “Once that is resolved, I don’t think I have any issue with him
testifying as an expert.” Id. at 75. Counsel for the Williams did not object
to this approach, and instead agreed to it and called his next witness. Id. at
75-76.
On March 31, 2014, the day before the scheduled resumption of trial
on April 1, 2014, counsel for the Williams filed a motion for continuance
because “no satisfactory evidence of his [Yager’s] registration has been
forthcoming,” and because Yager was apparently hospitalized. Motion for
Continuance, 3/31/2014, ¶¶ 5-6. At the beginning of trial the next day, the
trial court reviewed the issues relating to Yager’s registration number and
the fraudulent facsimile. N.T., 4/1/2014, at 3-6. Counsel for the Williams
represented that “I’m not sure whether that [the license information] will
ever be forthcoming.” Id. The trial court denied the motion for
continuance,2 noting that despite the more than two-month time period
between the first and second days of trial, the issues regarding Yager’s
license still had not been resolved. Id. at 6 (“this matter should have been
handled probably in the first two weeks afterwards”).
2
The Williams have not appealed this ruling.
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Counsel for the Williams commented that “Well, we’ve been trying to
get it, Your Honor,” id., but did not object either to the denial of the motion
for continuance or the refusal to permit Yager to testify in the absence of
providing his license number. Instead, counsel for the Ruches called the
next witness to testify, without further comment from either counsel. As a
result, counsel for the Williams never raised before the trial court the issue
now raised on appeal, namely whether Yager should have been permitted to
testify despite his failure to produce his license number. The Williams’ first
issue on appeal is thus waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Commonwealth v.
Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 580 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[O]ne must object to errors,
improprieties or irregularities at the earliest possible stage of the criminal or
civil adjudicatory process to afford the jurist hearing the case the first
occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly avoid an unnecessary appeal to
complain of the matter.”) (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 667 A.2d
1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. 1995), affirmed, 699 A.2d 710 (Pa. 1997)).
For their second issue on appeal, the Williams contend that the trial
court erred in finding that the property line was in the location set forth in
the Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. survey, because “both deeds of the
parties failed to have a metes and bounds description other than to call the
other property as an adjoiner.” Williams’ Brief at 2. Again, however, we are
constrained to conclude that this issue has not been preserved for appellate
review. Rule 2119 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure requires
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an appellant to set forth in the argument section of the appellate brief
“discussion and citation to authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P.
2009(a). Where an appellant fails to do so, this Court has routinely found
the issue to be waived. See, e.g., Connor v. Crozer Keystone Health
System, 832 A.2d 1112, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2003); Middleton/DPW v.
Robinson, 728 A.2d 368, 371 n.3 (Pa. Super. 1999).
The argument section of the Williams’ appellate brief contains no
discussion or citation to authorities relating to the contention that the trial
court erred with respect to its rulings related to the testimony of Keith Heigel
and/or the conclusions of the Light-Heigel & Associates, Inc. survey. The
brief does reference a variation between the Ruches’ “own deed and their
survey,” Williams’ Brief at 9, but offers no explanation regarding either the
nature of this alleged variation or its relevance in the present dispute.
Instead, the argument section of the Williams’ appellate brief is primarily
limited to a discussion of the Williams’ contention, pursuant to Zeglin v.
Gahagen, 812 A.2d 558 (Pa. 2002), that the property line here should have
been determined based the doctrine of consentable line (to be discussed
hereinbelow in connection with the Williams’ third issue on appeal).
For their third issue on appeal, the Williams claim that the trial court
should have held “that the property line in issue was defined by the hedge
and fence for such a long time and recognized by the respective owners as
the line dividing their properties that the hedge with fence became the
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property line.” Williams’ Brief at 6. Our standard and scope of review in an
appeal from a non-jury verdict is as follows:
Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial
verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the
trial court are supported by competent evidence and
whether the trial court committed error in any
application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial
judge must be given the same weight and effect on
appeal as the verdict of a jury. We consider the
evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict
winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its
findings of fact are not supported by competent
evidence in the record or if its findings are premised
on an error of law.
J.J. DeLuca Co. v. Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 410 (Pa. Super.
2012) (quoting Rissi v. Cappella, 918 A.2d 131, 136 (Pa. Super. 2007);
Corbin v. Cowan, 716 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa. Super. 1998).
The Williams contend that the trial court failed to recognize that the
conduct of the parties over many years had established the boundary line
between the two properties. The doctrine of consentable lines has its
doctrinal roots in adverse possession theory, as “occupancy with open
manifestations of ownership throughout the statutory period will generally
satisfy the traditional elements of adverse possession.” Zeglin, 812 A.2d at
562. In Moore v. Moore, 921 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2007), this Court
described the doctrine of consentable lines in detail:
“The establishment of a boundary line by
acquiescence for the statutory period of twenty-one
years has long been recognized in Pennsylvania” to
quiet title and discourage vexatious litigation.
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Zeglin v. Gahagen, 571 Pa. 321, 812 A.2d 558,
561 (2002); see also Corbin [v. Cowan], 716 A.2d
[614,] 617 [(Pa. Super. 1998)]. Based upon a rule
of repose sometimes known as the doctrine of
consentable line, the existence of such a boundary
may be proved either by dispute and compromise
between the parties or recognition and acquiescence
by one party of the right and title of the other. See
Corbin, 716 A.2d at 617…
“Acquiescence,” in the context of a dispute over real
property, “denotes passive conduct on the part of
the lawful owner consisting of failure on his part to
assert his paramount rights or interests against the
hostile claims of the adverse user.” Zeglin, 812
A.2d at 562 n. 5 (quoting Edward G. Mascolo, A
Primer On Adverse Possession, 66 Conn. B.J. 303,
312–13 (Aug. 1992)). A determination of
consentable line by acquiescence requires a finding
1) that each party has claimed the land on his side of
the line as his own and 2) that he or she has
occupied the land on his side of the line for a
continuous period of 21 years. See Zeglin, 812
A.2d at 561. Significantly, because the finding of a
consentable line depends upon possession rather
than ownership, proof of the passage of sufficient
time may be shown by tacking the current claimant's
tenancy to that of his predecessor. See id. at 566.
To do so, however, the claimant must show
“sufficient and credible proof of delivery of
possession of land not within (but contiguous to)
property described by deed of conveyance, which
was previously claimed and occupied by the grantor
and is taken by the grantee as successor in such
interest.” Id. “[W]hen a consentable line is
established, the land behind such a line becomes the
property of each neighbor regardless of what the
deed specifies. In essence, each neighbor gains
marketable title to that land behind the line, some of
which may not have been theirs under their deeds.”
Soderberg v. Weisel, 455 Pa. Super. 158, 687
A.2d 839, 843 (1997) (internal citation omitted).
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Id. at 5.
In considering whether the trial court should have applied the doctrine
of consentable lines to establish the boundary line here, we must first
determine where the Williams claim the boundary line is. In their appellate
brief, the Williams alternatively point to the hedge between the properties
and to the fence within the hedge. Williams’ Brief at 6, 10. The hedge
cannot be the boundary, as it was three feet wide and thus cannot serve as
a precise property “line” at all, particularly where the present dispute
involves a claimed intrusion of only about two feet onto the Ruches’
property. Instead, the Williams’ Answer and New Matter and Counterclaim
makes clear that the Williams’ actual contention is that the fence inside the
hedge should demarcate the boundary, as they allege that “there had been
an existing wire fence between the two properties which had been in
existence for more than forty (40) years separating the lands of Plaintiffs
and Defendants.” Answer and New Matter and Counterclaim, 9/12/2011, ¶
7. Moreover, while the trial court found that there were two fences inside or
near the hedge (a white wire mesh fence at the base of the roots of the
hedge, and a green four-feet fence installed by Mr. Ruch in 1987 after a dog
bit his son), the Williams consentable line argument focuses on the white
wire mesh fence inside the hedge. We note that on the second day of trial,
the Williams introduced into evidence a portion of a white wire mesh fence,
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which the Williams’ current tenant testified was retrieved from inside the
hedge. N.T., 4/1/2014, at 7-16, Exhibit 16.
Accordingly, we proceed to consider the Williams’ contention that the
white wire mesh fence within the hedge marked the consentable line of
demarcation between 106 and 108 Nagle Street. As set forth in Moore, the
existence of a consentable line may be proved either by (1) dispute and
compromise between the parties, or (2) recognition and acquiescence by
one party of the right and title of the other. Moore, 921 A.2d at 5. With
respect to dispute and compromise, there is no evidence in the record to
support the existence of a compromise of a dispute between the owners or
possessors of 106 and 108 Nagle Street for 21 years regarding the boundary
line. While not referencing any dispute, Mr. Williams did testify that he and
Mr. Ruch had agreed to remove the hedge and put up a new fence running
at the roots of the hedge. N.T., 1/23/2014, at 100. Mr. Ruch did not so
testify, however, and his reaction when discovering the new fence (he was
“livid” and immediately called his attorney, id. at 36-37) strongly suggests
that he did not believe there was a firm agreement to replace the hedge with
a new fence. The trial court, as the finder of fact, noted the conflicting
testimony and concluded that no firm agreement had been reached. Trial
Court Opinion, 10/8/2014, at 3.
With regard to the second alternative, recognition and acquiescence by
one party of the right and title of the other, there is again insufficient
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evidence to establish a consentable line. As rehearsed above, acquiescence
requires a finding (1) that each party has claimed the land on his side of the
line as his own and (2) that he or she has occupied the land on his side of
the line for a continuous period of 21 years. Moore, 921 A.2d at 5. For
each of the landowners to “claim the land on his side of the line as his own,”
they must first acknowledge (implicitly or explicitly) the existence of the
specific boundary during the period of adverse possession and then act in
accordance with this acknowledgement (by occupying “the land on his side
of the line for a continuous period of 21 years”). The certified record,
however, contains insufficient evidence to satisfy this requirements for either
the Ruches or the Williams. While Mr. Ruch testified that he was aware that
there was a white mesh fence inside the hedge, he did not testify that he
ever believed that this fence constituted the boundary between the two
properties. To the contrary, Mr. Ruch testified that he always understood
the boundary to be approximately two feet from the edge of his sidewalk.
N.T., 1/23/2014, at 29. While Mr. Ruch maintained his side of the hedge,
Trial Court Opinion, 10/8/2014, at 2, this did not constitute any proof that
Mr. Ruch acknowledged that the white mesh fence inside the hedge marked
the property line with the Williams’ property.
With respect to the Williams, Mr. Williams testified that he was not
even aware of the existence of the white mesh fence until he removed the
hedge in 2010. Because he did not know of its existence until 2010, he
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could not possibly have “claim[ed] the land on his side of the line as his
own” and occupied it. Moreover, because the Williams did not purchase 108
Nagle until 2001, to establish the 21-year period of adverse possession, it
would be necessary to “tack” their possession with that of the predecessor
owner. A predecessor owner, James Miller, testified that he was aware of
the existence of a white mesh fence within the hedge, but he did not testify
that he ever considered this fence to constitute the boundary line between
the two properties. N.T., 1/23/2014, at 78-80.
For their fourth issue on appeal, the Williams argue that the trial court
erred in ordering them to make changes to their porch and roof overhang,
since the Ruches made no claim for such damages in their pleadings.
Williams’ Brief at 6. The Williams properly preserved this issue for appellate
review. Motion for Post-Trial Relief, 5/12/2014, ¶ 4.
As a general matter, there must be consistency between the
allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint and the proof presented at trial in
support of claims for relief. Holt's Cigar Co. v. 222 Liberty Associates,
591 A.2d 743, 750 (Pa. Super. 1991). The required consistency between
the allegata and the probata “derives from the belief that absent prior notice
of what an opponent intends to prove at trial, a party may be surprised at
trial and thereby deprived of the opportunity to prepare an adequate
defense.” Id. (citing Freer v. Parker, 192 A.2d 348, 349 (Pa. 1963) and
Computer Print Systems, Inc. v. Lewis, 422 A.2d 148, 152 (Pa. Super.
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1980)). Rule 1021 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring
that “[a]ny pleading demanding relief shall specify the relief sought,” codifies
this policy against prejudicial surprise. Id.
The Ruches’ amended complaint sets forth causes of action for
ejectment and trespass. All of the allegations in connection with both counts
relate solely and specifically to the Williams’ removal of the hedge and
placement of a new fence on their property. With respect to the ejectment
count, the prayer for relief requests “an order directing Defendants to
remove the fence.” Amended Complaint, 3/18/2011, ¶¶ 7-8. Similarly, the
trespass count demands money damages resulting from the need to employ
a professional surveyor and legal counsel “as a result of placing the fence on
Plaintiffs’ property.” Id. ¶¶ 11-12. The Ruches’ pleadings (including their
subsequently filed answer to the Williams’ new matter and counterclaim), do
not allege any encroachment related to the porch or roof overhang or
request any relief in connection therewith.
In fact, it would appear that the first reference to the porch and roof
overhang in the certified record on appeal was during Mr. Ruch’s testimony
at trial on January 23, 2014, in response to a question from his counsel
regarding any other encroachments by the Williams. N.T., 1/23/2014, at
40-41. The only other testimony regarding the porch and roof overhang was
a brief exchange on April 1, 2014, when Mr. Ruch indicated that he built the
roof in question in 1979. N.T., 4/1/2014, at 32-33.
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For these reasons, we agree with the Williams that the trial court
lacked any basis for awarding the Ruches relief related to the porch and roof
overhang. In this regard, we note that the trial court denied the Williams’
post-trial motions without comment on this issue and did not offer any
explanation for its decision in its subsequent written opinion in support of its
order awarding relief to the Ruches. As a result, we must reverse paragraph
3 of the trial court’s April 30, 2014 order.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part as set forth herein.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2015
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