S & R Coal Company v. Rausch Creek Land, L.P.

J-A12019-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
S & R COAL COMPANY, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
RAUSCH CREEK LAND, L.P., :
:
Appellant : No. 1589 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered August 22, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County,
Civil Division at No. S-559-2012
S & R COAL COMPANY, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
RAUSCH CREEK LAND, L.P., :
:
Appellee : No. 1688 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order entered August 22, 2014,
Court of Common Pleas, Schuylkill County,
Civil Division at No. S-559-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED MAY 15, 2015
Rausch Creek Land, L.P. (“RCL”) appeals from the August 22, 2014
order entered by the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas (the “trial
court”). Specifically, RCL appeals the trial court’s determination that the
phone and electrical lines for use by S & R Coal Company (“S & R”) must be
along the newly constructed roadway. S & R cross-appeals from the August
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22, 2014 order based upon the trial court’s denial of its request for costs,
expenses and attorneys’ fees. After careful review, we find no error by the
trial court in requiring the phone and electrical lines to be placed along the
newly constructed roadway, but that it erred by denying S & R’s request for
costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees.1
1
On December 12, 2014, S & R filed a motion to strike certain documents
included by RCL in its reproduced record filed with this Court on appeal. In
particular, S & R contends it was improper for RCL to include RCL’s motion
for reconsideration, an application for stay of the trial court’s August 22,
2014 order filed before the trial court, the notes of testimony from the
October 30, 2014 proceeding regarding RCL’s motion for stay, the exhibits
entered at the October 30, 2014 proceeding, and an application for relief
related to the stay request before this Court. According to S & R, these
items were not available for the trial court’s consideration prior to its August
22, 2014 decision in the matter and thus not properly considered on appeal.
Rule 2152 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
addresses the contents of the reproduced record, provides, in relevant part:
(a) General rule. The reproduced record shall
contain:
(1) The relevant docket entries and any relevant
related matter (see Rule 2153 (docket entries and
related matter)).
(2) Any relevant portions of the pleadings, charge or
findings or (see Rule 2175(b) (order and opinions)
which provides for a cross reference note only to
orders and opinions reproduced as part of the brief
of appellant).
(3) Any other parts of the record to which the parties
wish to direct the particular attention of the appellate
court.
Pa.R.A.P. 2152(a). All of the complained-of filings are included in the
certified record on appeal. Thus, pursuant to the above-quoted rule, we find
no error in RCL’s inclusion of these filings in its reproduced record. We
therefore deny S & R’s motion to strike.
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The inception of this case dates back to March 15, 2012, at which time
S & R filed a complaint seeking an injunction to prohibit RCL from interfering
with S & R’s use of an easement (a road) over RCL’s property that RCL’s
predecessor in interest had granted to S & R’s predecessor in interest.
Thereafter, RCL filed a competing complaint for an injunction seeking to
terminate S & R’s use of the easement. Following hearings on both matters
before the trial court, the parties entered a stipulation on December 6, 2012,
entitled “Memorandum of Understanding with Regard to Settlement” (the
“Stipulation”), providing for a new easement for S & R’s use across RCL’s
land and for utilities – phone and electrical service – also to be located on
RCL’s land. The Stipulation set forth various rights and responsibilities of
both parties as it related to the easements and a general description of what
the completed road would look like, but contemplated that the parties would
have a survey performed to determine its precise location. The Stipulation
further anticipated the completion of the bulldozing and excavation of the
road by December 6, 2013.
On March 6, 2014, RCL filed a document in the trial court entitled,
“Petition for Rule to Show Cause Why an Easement in the Form Attached
Hereto Should Not Be Executed and Recorded as Contemplated Under the
Stipulation Approved and Entered as an Order of Court on December 7,
2012” (“RCL’s Petition”). Therein, RCL indicated that the location of the new
road was decided and agreed to by S & R but that RCL had not met the
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December 6, 2013 deadline for completion of construction, detailing the
efforts it had made leading up to the filing of RCL’s Petition. At the time of
the filing of RCL’s Petition, RCL also had not entered into agreements with
PP&L and Frontier (the electric and telephone companies) regarding the
placement of lines for S & R’s use. RCL requested that the trial court order
S & R to execute the draft easement, attached to RCL’s Petition as Exhibit L
(“draft easement”), “or in such form as the [trial c]ourt determines to be
reasonable according to the circumstances of this case.” RCL’s Petition,
3/6/14, ¶ 23.
S & R responded on March 21, 2014, filing an answer to RCL’s Petition
with new matter and counterclaim, requesting that the trial court deny RCL’s
Petition, order RCL to pay S & R’s costs, expenses, and counsel fees
associated with responding to RCL’s Petition (as provided for in the
Stipulation), and require RCL to comply with the Stipulation. Specifically, S
& R identified the following differences between the draft easement and the
Stipulation:
32. The documents are significantly different with
respect to the grade of the roadway, in that:
a. The Stipulation states “the cartway shall not at
any point have a grade greater than 10%.”
[Stipulation] P. 3;
while
b. The easement R.C.L. seeks to impose states “to
the greatest extent possible, the East/West Access
Road shall not have grades of greater than ten
percent (10%) that would make travel by tri-axle
dump trucks or tractor and single dump trailer-
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combinations unreasonably difficult.” R.C.L.’s
Petition, Ex. “L”, P. 4. …
33. Another component relating to the grade of the
road is also significantly different between the
documents in that:
a. The Stipulation states that “the C to F leg of
the original Easement shall have no sharp turns and.
shall not have a grade that is greater than five
percent (5%) on any portion of the cartway erected
thereon.” [Stipulation] P. 4;
b. The easement which R.C.L. seeks to impose
contains no such equivalent provision, and instead
states that “to the greatest extent possible” the
grade will not exceed ten percent. R.C.L.’s Petition,
Ex. “L”, P.3;
34. The documents are also significantly different
with respect to agreed-upon turning radiuses, which
are critical given the nature of S & R’s business, in
that:
a. The Stipulation states that “the width of the
cartway turns and the easement may exceed thirty
(30’) feet in width as may be reasonably necessary
to facilitate adequate turning radius for large trucks
and heavy equipment. [Stipulation] P. 3;
while
b. The easement R.C.L. seeks to impose states
“the East/West Access Road shall be configured so
that there are no turns of a radius that would make
the East/West Access Road impassible by tri-axle
dump trucks and tractor and single dump trailer
combinations.” R.C.L.’s Petition, Ex. “L”, P. 3-4.
35. Another major difference with respect to the
documents pertains to utilities, and the costs to be
paid with respect to installation of utility, in that:
a. The Stipulation not only grants the utility
easement, but states “all costs associated with this
Utility Easement and the construction of the phone
and electric lines shall be borne by R.C.L.”
[Stipulation] P. 2;
while
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b. The easement R.C.L. seeks to impose does not
state that R.C.L. will pay for the costs associated
with the construction of utilities, and further states
that “S & R and R.C.L. agree that this stipulation and
order described in the background section of this
Agreement, above, ... shall be superseded by this
Agreement...” R.C.L.’s Petition, Ex. “L”, P.11.
36. The documents are also significantly different
with respect to requirements of S & R to obtain
insurance, in that:
a. The Stipulation contains absolutely no provision
whatsoever requiring S & R to maintain insurance,
let alone to name R.C.L. or its affiliates as additional
insureds. See generally [Stipulation];
while
b. The easement R.C.L. seeks to impose extensive
insurance provisions spanning almost two full pages,
requiring a multitude of insurance, including workers
compensation, two million dollars in comprehensive
general liability, at least one million dollars in
automobile liability, and which further demands S &
R to name various R.C.L. entities and affiliates as
additional insureds, place further insurance
requirements on tenants of S & R which use the S &
R property, and which also impose insurance
requirements on other persons and entities which
utilize the East/West access road to get to and from
the S & R property, and for S & R and such
persons/entities to provide insurance certifications to
R.C.L. R.C.L’s Petition, Ex. “L”, P. 8-10.
37. In addition to the foregoing, yet another
fundamental difference between the documents
involves the maintenance obligations as to the
easement route, in that:
a. The Stipulation does not impose any ongoing
maintenance obligations upon S & R, and simply
requires S & R to provide crushed stone during the
construction phase of the easement, to be placed
upon the cartway by S & R to S & R’s satisfaction.
[Stipulation] P. 3 & 4;
while
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b. The proposed easement agreement imposes
the additional burden upon S & R to maintain the
easement;
c. In the easement (Exhibit “L”) R.C.L. seeks to
impose an extensive maintenance provision,
requiring S & R to not only maintain the road, but to
place additional crushed stone for paving, as well as
perform snow removal, deicing, and all related costs
and expenses necessary to keep the road in a
usable-condition, with the only exception being for
maintenance needed due to the use of parties other
than S & R. R.C.L’s Petition, Ex. “L”, P. 6. The effect
of which is to provide R.C.L with a roadway and to
require that it be maintained without R.C.L. having
any responsibility to maintain the roadway or to
correct damage to that roadway which it causes,
regardless of whether S & R uses or continues to use
the roadway;
d. For a matter of clarity, this maintenance
provision is especially burdensome upon S & R, as it
would require S & R to not only keep the road
serviceable from wear and tear from the S & R use,
but also assume the risk of and abate road damage
caused by others, including R.C.L.
* * *
40. Other major differences between the documents
at issue involve the requirements of S & R with
regard to the bonded haul road:
a. The Stipulation requires that “S & R shall take
no action to vacate or abandon the existing
easement across the property of Timber Coal
Company and commonly referred to by the parties is
the bonded haul road.” [Stipulation] P.6;
b. The equivalent provision the proposed
easement imposes a duty upon S & R as follows: “at
no time shall the use of the then existing location of
the bonded haul road be abandoned or terminated
until work on its succeeding location has been
completed.” See R.C.L.’s Petition, Ex. “L”, P.7.
c. The effect of the new and added language in
the proposed easement is to compel S & R to
perform construction on an easement in the event
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the other party using the easement wishes to
relocate it or cause it damage. This effectively
requires S & R to police the actions of others with
regard to the easement, a duty which was not
imposed by the Stipulation.
41. The proposed [e]asement [a]greement also
differs from the Stipulation as follows:
a. The Stipulation requires that the construction
and installation of both the electric utility and
telephone lines be completed before R.C.L. is able to
remove the existing roadway. [Stipulation] P.5 iii D,
E;
b. The proposed easement does not provide for
the connection of the telephone and electric
easement prior to the excavation of the haul road.
R.C.L.’s Petition Ex. “L”, P.10.
42. Another major difference between these
documents involves the termination of S & R’s ability
to use the property:
a. The Stipulation does not contain any provision
terminating S & R’s right and, in fact, states that S &
R shall “at all times” have access both for electric
and telephone lines, as well as to its property over
and across R.C.L.’s property. [Stipulation] P.6 iii F;
b. The proposed easement in paragraphs 7, 15
and 16 of the proposed easement provide express
language which results in the termination of S & R’s
easement. R.C.L.’s Petition, Ex. “L”, P.5, 10, 11.
43. With respect to the requirement of R.C.L. to
provide title insurance for the original easement to S
& R the following provisions are applicable:
a. The Stipulation provides: “Title to the
easement shall be good and marketable title, and
R.C.L. shall provide a title insurance policy insuring
the same with a value of $500,000.00.” [Stipulation]
P.3;
b. There is no comparable provision in the
proposed [e]asement [a]greement. R.C.L.’s Petition,
Ex. “L”, P.11.
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44. Another major difference between the
documents at issue involves the use of the proposed
easement by Russell White:
a. The Stipulation states the [S & R] shall not
authorize the use of the easement by Russell White,
Whitey Wash Enterprises or any of his or its
employees, heirs, successors or assigns.”
[Stipulation] P.6;
b. The proposed easement expands the
prohibition to any business in which Russell White or
Ronald White has an interest and prohibits such
parties’ presence on the easement;
c. The proposed easement further provides for the
forfeiture of S & R’s rights under the easement in the
event that any person described in the proposed
easement is found to be present on the easement.
R.C.L.’s Petition, Ex. “L”, P. 5, 6;
d. This proposed provision in the easement
effectively requires S & R to place a guard at the
entrance of the proposed easement and to perform
the background check on any and all persons who
enter the easement area.
45. Another major difference between these
documents at issue involves attorneys’ fees for a
breach of the agreements, in that:
a. The Stipulation states that “if there is a breach
of this agreement by any party, the prevailing party
in any litigation to enforce these provisions, shall be
entitled to recover all costs, expenses and attorneys’
fees incurred in such litigation.” [Stipulation] P. 3;
while
b. There is no equivalent provision on litigation
costs in the easement which R.C.L. seeks to impose,
but that easement does contain a provision
superseding the terms of the Stipulation which would
nullify the provision pertaining to attorneys’ fees in
the event of breach. See generally, [Stipulation] P.
3.
* * *
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49. The Stipulation does not contain any provision
relating to an indemnification by either party of the
other party in this proceeding. However, Exhibit “L”
to [RCL’s] Petition contains[,] at paragraph 13[,] a
completely new provision with respect to
indemnification of R.C.L. by S & R.
Counterclaim, 3/21/14, ¶¶ 32-49 (emphasis in the original).
The trial court held hearings on April 30, May 28 and June 11, 2014.
Both parties presented testimony and evidence in support of their respective
positions. Following its receipt and review of proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law and memoranda filed by both sides, the trial court issued
an opinion and order on August 22, 2014. The trial court ordered RCL to
grant PP&L and Frontier Communication an easement for the placement of
utility lines along the newly constructed roadway and to pay for the cost of
the electric and telephone lines; denied S & R’s request for counsel fees; and
approved the easement agreement drafted by S & R and submitted with its
proposed order of court. The easement agreement provides as follows:
1. [RCL] does hereby grant and convey unto the
[S & R], its successors and assigns, an easement
over and across the property of the [RCL] for
purposes of ingress, egress and regress access, and
the placement of utilities, which easement shall be
generally thirty (30) feet in width and shall be
located as more specifically shown in red on the
attached exhibit.
2. [S & R] accepts the general path of this
easement as set forth on Exhibit “B” and agrees that
the grade of the constructed roadway is acceptable.
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3. The [e]asement may be expanded to greater
than 30 feet wide as required by Paragraph I (D) of
the [Stipulation] to accommodate large trucks and
heavy equipment.
4. All other duties, obligations, requirements of
the parties as set forth in the [Stipulation] are
hereby affirmed, acknowledged, and incorporated
herein by reference.
Easement Agreement.
On September 10, 2014, RCL filed a motion for clarification or
reconsideration, requesting “an order confirming that relocating electric and
phone utilities” to a location other than adjacent to the newly constructed
road “would be consistent with the [trial court’s] August 22, 2014 [o]rder,”
or for the trial court reconsider its prior decision and to enter an order
permitting the same. Motion for Clarification or Reconsideration, 9/10/14, at
4. S & R filed an answer on September 16, 2014 opposing RCL’s request.
Also on September 16, 2014, RCL filed its own motion for reconsideration of
the trial court’s denial of its request for counsel fees. On September 17,
2014, the trial court entered an order denying RCL’s motion for
reconsideration. There is no order in the record indicating that the trial
court ruled upon S & R’s motion for reconsideration.
RCL filed a timely notice of appeal on September 19, 2014, and
thereafter, S & R filed a timely notice of cross-appeal. Both parties complied
with the trial court’s orders requiring the filing of concise statements of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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On September 22, 2014, RCL filed an application for stay pending the
disposition of its appeal. S & R filed an answer and new matter, requesting
that the trial court dismiss RCL’s application for stay, or, in the alternative, if
the trial court was to grant the request for stay, that the trial court require
RCL to post security in the amount of $1,000,000 with the prothonotary of
the trial court. The trial court held a hearing on October 14, 2014, and on
October 30, 2014, the trial court entered an order staying the August 22,
2014 order pending disposition of the instant appeal, and requiring RCL to
deposit with the trial court prothonotary security in the amount of $510,000
as a condition of the stay. On December 1, 2014, RCL filed a request for
relief from the requirement that it post security as a condition of the stay,
which this Court denied on December 12, 2014.
We begin by addressing RCL’s appeal, wherein RCL presents the
following issues for our review:
A. Whether the trial court committed an error of law
and abused its discretion in ordering RCL to execute
and record an easement that located electric and
phone utility lines along the newly constructed
roadway and further directing RCL to grant PP&L and
Frontier Communications an easement along said
newly constructed roadway for electric and phone
lines[?]
B. Whether the trial court committed an error of law
and abused its discretion in ignoring the provisions of
the [S]tipulation and order that allow RCL to relocate
electric and phone lines that service the S & R
property to a location or locations other than
adjacent to the newly constructed roadway[?]
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RCL’s Brief at 6.
We review a trial court’s decision following a bench trial according to
the following standard:
Our review in a non-jury case is limited to whether
the findings of the trial court are supported by
competent evidence and whether the trial court
committed error in the application of law. We must
grant the court’s findings of fact the same weight
and effect as the verdict of a jury and, accordingly,
may disturb the non-jury verdict only if the court’s
findings are unsupported by competent evidence or
the court committed legal error that affected the
outcome of the trial. It is not the role of an appellate
court to pass on the credibility of witnesses; hence
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the
factfinder. Thus, the test we apply is not whether we
would have reached the same result on the evidence
presented, but rather, after due consideration of the
evidence which the trial court found credible,
whether the trial court could have reasonably
reached its conclusion.
Agostinelli v. Edwards, 98 A.3d 695, 704 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
The interrelated questions raised on appeal question the trial court’s
interpretation of the parties’ agreement. “Since contract interpretation is a
question of law, our review of the trial court’s decision is de novo and our
scope is plenary.” Bair v. Manor Care of Elizabethtown, PA, LLC, 108
A.3d 94, 96 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The
goal of contract interpretation is to “ascertain the intent of the parties.”
Lenau v. Co-eXprise, Inc., 102 A.3d 423, 429 (Pa. Super. 2014)
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In the cases of a written contract, the intent of the
parties is the writing itself. If left undefined, the
words of a contract are to be given their ordinary
meaning. When the terms of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, the intent of the parties is to be
ascertained from the document itself. When,
however, an ambiguity exists, parol evidence is
admissible to explain or clarify or resolve the
ambiguity, irrespective of whether the ambiguity is
patent, created by the language of the instrument,
or latent, created by extrinsic or collateral
circumstances.
Id. at 429-30 (internal citations omitted). Language in a contract is
“ambiguous” “if it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and
capable of being understood in more than one sense.” Id. at 430. (citation
omitted). Furthermore, “contractual clauses must be construed, whenever
possible, in a manner that effectuates all of the clauses being considered. It
is fundamental that one part of a contract cannot be so interpreted as to
annul another part and that writings which comprise an agreement must be
interpreted as a whole.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted).
With this legal predicate in mind, we address RCL’s first issue raised on
appeal. RCL contends that the trial court erred by requiring RCL to locate
the utility lines for S & R’s phone and electric service along the newly
constructed roadway. RCL’s Brief at 15. RCL asserts that this requirement
is at odds with the language contained in the Stipulation, which permitted
RCL to negotiate the location of the utility lines with the electric and phone
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companies – PP&L and Frontier – without limitation. Id. at 15-16. RCL also
points to a statement made by its counsel at the December 6, 2012
proceeding, whereby RCL’s counsel indicated that it was the parties’
intention that placement of the utility lines along the newly constructed road
would only occur if RCL was unable to work out arrangements with PP&L and
Frontier for the placement of the lines elsewhere on RCL’s property. Id. at
17-18, 23-26. RCL further cites to testimony provided at the hearings on
RCL’s Petition in support of this position. See id. at 19-22.
The relevant language of the Stipulation states the following:
I. General Requirements.
A. RCL shall grant an easement to [S7R] over and
across the portions of land owned by [RCL]. This
easement will be for ingress, egress and regress
access, and phone and electrical utilities, which
easement shall be 30 feet in width and shall
generally follow and be part of the easement
described in Paragraph III(C) and I(D) hereof.
B. RCL shall grant PP&L and any phone company
providing service to S & R and easement on the
property of RCL, which easement shall be for the
placement of power lines to be constructed by PP&L,
and phone lines to be installed by the phone
company, and RCL will cooperate and assist in
obtaining approval from PP&L to place the power
lines and phone lines. The easement shall be in a
form as required by PP&L and the phone
company, and as is acceptable to RCL, PP&L,
and the phone company. …
* * *
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D. RCL shall grant an easement for ingress,
egress and regress, as well as location of
electric and phone utilities for business
purposes thirty (30) feet in width connecting
the lands of S & R to Main Street (Route 4011)
generally through points A to B, B to C, and C to
F[.] …
* * *
III. Phase II
C. The easement leg from Point A to Point B, Point B
to Point C, and Point C to Point F is intended to be a
permanent easement by the parties and to be a
permanent source of access for S & R, provided that
if RCL wishes to relocate the easement and the
roadway located thereon, RCL shall relocate the
roadway and easement and phone and
electrical utilities, and shall bear all costs
associated with the relocation of such easement and
phone and electrical utilities[.]
* * *
F. It is the intention of the parties that S & R shall at
all times have electrical and phone utility services to
its property, and access over and across the property
of RCL, which access, electrical and phone utility
service shall be uninterrupted and generally
consistent with the quality of the access and utility
services existing at the time of this agreement.
Stipulation, 12/7/12, ¶¶ I(A), (B), (D), III(C), (F) (emphasis added).
The above-quoted language is clear and unambiguous. All of the
provisions concerning the location of the utility lines state that they will be
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located along the newly constructed road.2 The language of paragraph I(B)
concerning the grant of a separate easement to PP&L and Frontier for the
placement of utility lines on RCL’s property addresses only the form, not the
location, of the easement. See id., ¶ I(B). It does not itself permit RCL to
place the utility lines at any location on its property agreed to by PP&L and
Frontier, as RCL suggests. Rather, reading the relevant language of the
Stipulation together, as we are required to do, the Stipulation provides for
the placement of utility lines for S & R along the thirty-foot stretch of road
that RCL constructed for S & R’s use.
Because the language of the Stipulation is clear and unambiguous, it is
improper for the trial court or this Court to look to testimony provided at any
of the proceedings to determine the intention of the parties with respect to
the intended location of the utility lines. See Lenau, 102 A.3d at 429-30.
As the trial court committed no error in its application of the law, this issue
does not afford RCL relief. See Agostinelli, 98 A.3d at 704.
RCL further claims error in that the trial court’s order prohibits RCL
from relocating the utility lines that service S & R to locations other than
along the newly constructed road, as the Stipulation expressly permits RCL
to do so. Our review of the trial court’s order, however, reveals no such
2
RCL does not contest the trial court’s decision to enforce the terms of the
stipulation as opposed to its draft easement. It is nonetheless worth noting
that in its draft easement, RCL included a provision that required the
location of the utility lines to be “along the edge of the [newly constructed
road.]” RCL’s Petition, 3/6/14, at Exhibit L, ¶ 3.
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prohibition. To the contrary, the trial court’s order requires RCL to grant
PP&L and Frontier an easement for the placement of utility lines along the
newly constructed road and pay for the cost of construction related thereto,
and further states that terms of the Stipulation remain in effect. See Trial
Court Order, 8/22/14; Easement Agreement. The Stipulation expressly
provides for the relocation of the utilities if necessary:
The easement leg from Point A to Point B, Point B to
Point C, and Point C to Point F is intended to be a
permanent easement by the parties and to be a
permanent source of access for S & R, provided that
if RCL wishes to relocate the easement and the
roadway located thereon, RCL shall relocate the
roadway and easement and phone and electrical
utilities, and shall bear all costs associated with the
relocation of such easement and phone and electrical
utilities, including the excavation and construction of
the roadway and the stone necessary for its
construction shall be paid solely by RCL, and the
relocation of such easement and roadway and phone
and electric utilities shall be performed and
completed prior to the removal of the roadway as
currently provided for herein. It is not intended at
this time that RCL will require the relocation of the
roadway and the easement at any time in the
reasonably foreseeable future (10-20 years);
however, RCL may, because of its mining plans or
other development plans for its lands, relocate the
easement for the roadway providing access to Route
4011 for S & R and phone and electric utilities,
provided the new easement has good and
marketable title and the construction of the roadway
and electric and phone utilities is substantially in
conformity with the elevations, grades and widths
and condition of the roadway and electric and phone
utility service as existed at the time of the requested
relocation. The parties agree at the time of any
relocation to execute and record all commercially
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reasonable documents necessary to relocate the
easement phone and electric utilities and terminate
the rights as to their prior location.
Stipulation, 12/7/12, ¶ III(C).
The trial court’s order did nothing to alter this provision in the
Stipulation. As such, RCL’s contrary claim is entirely without merit.
We now turn to S & R’s cross-appeal, wherein S & R raises the
following issues for our review:
A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error of law
in failing to find that RCL had breached the
Stipulation and [o]rder of [c]ourt of December 6,
2012 by failing to enforce the provisions of that
document which enable the prevailing party, here S
& R, to recover all costs, expenses and attorneys[’]
fees incurred in litigating matters pursuant to that
Stipulation and [o]rder which the [t]rial [c]ourt
found to be a contract between the parties[?]
B. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of
discretion when it failed to find that RCL breached
the Stipulation and [o]rder which constituted a
contract between the parties and that S & R, as the
prevailing party in the matter before the [t]rial
[c]ourt, was entitled to recover its costs, expenses
and attorneys[’] fees incurred in this litigation from
RCL[?]
C. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed an error of law
in failing to find that RCL’s actions in repudiating the
Stipulation or [o]rder constituted a breach of the
Stipulation and [o]rder when that factual conclusion
is supported by both the record evidence in this
matter and the factual findings of the [t]rial
[c]ourt[?]
S & R’s Brief at 4-5 (citations to the reproduced record omitted).
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S & R asserts that by filing RCL’s Petition and the draft easement, RCL
committed an anticipatory breach of the Stipulation, as the terms of the
draft easement were vastly different and, in some circumstances,
contradictory to the terms of the Stipulation. Id. at 23-26. In its claim for
attorney’s fees, S & R relies upon the final paragraph of the Stipulation,
which states: “If there is a breach of this agreement by any party, the
prevailing party in any litigation to enforce these provisions[] shall be
entitled to recover all costs, expenses, and attorneys[’] fees incurred in such
litigation.” Stipulation, 12/7/12, ¶ IV.
The trial court found that the draft easement filed by RCL included
terms not called for in the Stipulation, and that it attempted to make
“significant changes” to the terms of the agreement. Trial Court Opinion,
8/22/14, at 9. The trial court stated that the draft easement was RCL’s
attempt to “renegotiat[e]” the Stipulation because “RCL was not satisfied
with the deal it had made,” attempting to “place[] additional requirements
on S & R and fewer obligations on RCL.” Id. at 10. The trial court further
found “that the Stipulation was to be the final settlement agreement and
must be abided by except where the change is by mutual agreement of the
parties under [p]aragraph III G of the Stipulation[3] which allows further
3
Paragraph III(G) of the Stipulation states: “The parties agree to execute
such further documents and take such further actions as are necessary or
convenient to the implementation of this [Stipulation], and the recording of
the easements described herein.” Stipulation, 12/7/12, ¶ III(G).
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action to implement the [Stipulation] as opposed to the execution of a new
agreement that has fundamental differences.” Id. (footnote added).
Nonetheless, the trial court determined that the underlying proceedings were
“not the result of a breach of the Stipulation, but involve[d] a modification of
the original [Stipulation],” and that S & R therefore was not entitled to
counsel fees. Id. at 11.
“[T]o constitute anticipatory breach under Pennsylvania law there
must be “an absolute and unequivocal refusal to perform or a distinct and
positive statement of an inability to do so.” 2401 Pennsylvania Ave.
Corp. v. Fed'n of Jewish Agencies of Greater Philadelphia, 489 A.2d
733, 736 (Pa. 1985) (quoting McClelland v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 185 A. 198 (Pa. 1936) (Per Curiam)). Our Supreme Court has
“adamantly [] reinforced the clear predicates of repudiation … reject[ing]
any argument suggesting a dilution of our long recognized standard of an
‘absolute and unequivocal refusal to perform.’” Harrison v. Cabot Oil &
Gas Corp., 110, A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2015) (citing 2401 Pennsylvania Ave.
Corp., 489 A.2d at 737).
As stated above, the draft easement attached to RCL’s petition
included language and obligations not contemplated or included in the
Stipulation. The record supports the trial court’s finding that these
differences were significant, placing additional burdens on S & R and
alleviating many of those originally placed upon RCL and bestowing upon
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RCL additional benefits not originally contemplated or provided for in the
Stipulation. See supra, pp. 4-10. We observe that as of June 11, 2014,
the final day of litigation in this matter, RCL had completed the construction
of the road, at which time the grading and width of the road was in large
part in conformity with the Stipulation. See N.T., 6/11/14, at 44 (S & R’s
corporate representative testifying that, with the exception of “one bad
turn,” he had no complaints about the road). However, RCL continued to
make demands for the inclusion of terms not called for in the Stipulation,
attempting to alter the terms of the agreement. Specifically, in the
easement agreement RCL attached to its proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, RCL included terms that differed substantially from the
Stipulation, including:
• Changing in the location of the placement of the utility lines;
• adding additional prohibitions as to who may use the easement;
• providing for RCL’s entitlement to costs, expenses and attorneys’
fees if prohibited persons are found to be using the newly
constructed road fourteen days after S & R is notified of the
prohibited persons’ use;
• imposing additional maintenance requirements for S & R related to
the newly constructed road;
• requiring only RCL’s prior written approval to relocate the
easement;
• including extensive indemnity and insurance requirements;
• prohibiting the use by anyone of the newly constructed road
without first providing proof of insurance to RCL;
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• permitting the recovery of costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees not
just for breach of the agreement, but in any action to enforce the
easement agreement; and
• the easement agreement would supersede the Stipulation.
See Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Argument in
Support of the March 6, 2014 Petition of [RCL], 7/17/14, at Exhibit A, ¶¶ 2-
4, 7, 9-11, 13, 18.
As stated above, the trial court found that the parties intended “that
the Stipulation was to be the final settlement agreement.” Trial Court
Opinion, 8/22/14, at 10. Through its actions, RCL has demonstrated a clear
and unequivocal refusal to perform pursuant to the final settlement
agreement, and therefore, has anticipatorily breached the Stipulation. See
2401 Pennsylvania Ave Corp., 489 A.2d at 736. We therefore reverse the
trial court’s denial of S & R’s request for costs, expenses and attorneys’ fees
as provided for by the Stipulation.
In summary, we agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the
Stipulation and find no error in its order requiring placement of the utility
lines along the newly constructed road. We reverse the trial court’s denial of
counsel fees to S & R, as RCL anticipatorily breached the Stipulation and S &
R was the prevailing party in the litigation, entitling S & R to costs, expenses
and attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Stipulation.
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Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded. Motion
to Strike denied. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/15/2015
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