Hetrick, B. v. Manorcare of Carlisle, PA

J-A03026-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
BRANDON HETRICK, EXECUTOR OF THE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ESTATE OF: WILLIAM WASHINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA
DECEASED,
Appellee
v.
MANORCARE OF CARLISLE PA, LLC
D/B/A MANORCARE HEALTH SERVICE,
CARLISLE; HCR MANORCARE, INC. ET AL
Appellants No. 266 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered January 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Civil Division at No: 11-7979
BEFORE: MUNDY, STABILE, and FITZGERALD, * JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2017
This case returns to this Court following a remand from our Supreme
Court. On November 15, 2016, the Court granted the petition for allowance
of appeal filed by Appellants (collectively ManorCare), vacated our previous
order affirming the overruling of preliminary objections to compel arbitration
of claims brought under the Wrongful Death and Survival Acts,1 and
remanded the case to us for further proceedings consistent with Taylor v.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Respectively, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8301 and 8302.
J-A03026-15
Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., ___A.3d___, 2016 WL 5630669 (Pa.
Sept. 28, 2016). Upon review, we reverse and remand.
Briefly, the claims arise from the death of William Washington, after he
was a resident at a nursing home operated by ManorCare.
We previously noted that wrongful death claims are not subject to
arbitration, because a decedent’s agreement to arbitrate is not enforceable
against the decedent’s wrongful death beneficiaries. Pisano v.
Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 661 (Pa. Super. 2013). In our
previous decision, we relied exclusively on this court’s decision in Taylor v.
Extendicare Homes, Inc., 113 A.3d 317, 320 (Pa. Super. 2015), rev’d,
____A.3d _____, 2016 WL 5630669 (Pa. Sept. 28, 2016). We held that
Pa.R.C.P. No. 213(e), requires compulsive joinder of Survival Act claims and
wrongful death claims and such joinder does not violate the Federal
Arbitration Act.2 Unpublished Memorandum, 6/3/2015, at 2. Following
reversal in Taylor, it is now settled that Pa.R.C.P. No. 213(e) does violate
the Federal Arbitration Act, and therefore is preempted. Taylor, 2016 WL
563069 at 16. This preemption requires that Appellants’ preliminary
objections to compel arbitration be sustained and the wrongful death and
Survival Act claims be severed unless the Arbitration Agreement is
unenforceable. In our June 3, 2015 unpublished memorandum we noted
____________________________________________
2
9 U.S.C. § 2.
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J-A03026-15
that we need not address Appellee’s argument that the unconscionability of
the Arbitration Agreement provides an alternative basis to affirm. “The only
exception to a state’s obligation to enforce an arbitration agreement is
provided by the savings clause, which permits the application of generally
applicable state contract law defenses such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, to determine whether a valid contract exists.” Taylor,
2016 WL 5630069 at 14 (citations omitted). As the trial court did not
address these issues we remand to the trial court to address Appellee’s fact-
based defenses. Should the defenses prove not to have merit, then the
wrongful death and survival claims shall proceed consistent with Taylor.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/13/2017
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