In the Interest of: A.A.S., a Minor

J-S95001-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.A.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF T.J.B., MOTHER
No. 2848 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 24, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos: CP-51-DP-0001784-2013; CP-51-AP-0000850-2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF T.J.B., MOTHER
Nos. 2850 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 24, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at Nos: CP-51-DP-0001785-2013; CP 51-AP-0000849-2015
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2017
T.J.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered August 24, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (“trial court”), which
involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her minor children, A.A.S. and
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A.S (together “the Children”) and changed the permanency goal to adoption.
After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following factual and procedural summary.
The children were born as follows: A.A.S., on August 30,
2005[,] and A.S. on April 20, 2009.
On August 26, 2013, DHS[(Department of Human
Services)] received a substantiated Child Protective Services
(CPS) report alleging that A.A.S. had two lumps on his head and
belt marks and welts covering his body. [Mother’s] paramour
beat him with a belt. [Mother] pushed A.A.S.’ head against the
wall approximately three days prior. Furthermore, A.A.S. was
lethargic and complained of a headache. A.A.S. was transported
to Saint Christopher’s Hospital. The report indicated that
[Mother] used physical discipline on A.A.S. for touching her
personal belongings. Moreover, DHS learned that A.A.S. had old
scars on his arms and chest. A.A.S. indicated that he had been
subjected to severe physical discipline in the past.
Subsequently, the Special Victims Unit of the Philadelphia Police
Department conducted an investigation into A.A.S.’ injuries.
[Mother] was arrested on charges of [a]ggravated and [s]imple
[a]ssault, [e]ndangering the [w]elfare of a [c]hild as a [p]arent
[(“EWOC”)] and [r]ecklessly [e]ndangering [a]nother [p]erson
[(“REAP”)]. She was incarcerated at Riverside Correctional
Facility [(]RCF).
On August 26, 2013, DHS obtained an Order of Protective
Custody (OPC) for A.A.S. and A.S. A.A.S. and A.S. were
subsequently placed in foster care.
A [s]helter [c]are [h]earing was held on August 28,
2013[,] before the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine
lifted the OPC and ordered the temporary commitment of A.A.S.
and A.S. to the care and custody [of] DHS.
On September 4, 2013, an adjudicatory hearing was held
before the Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine
adjudicated A.A.S. and A.S. dependent and committed them to
the care and custody of DHS. [Mother’s] visits with the children
were suspended.
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The matter was listed on a regular basis before the Judges
of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas-Family Court
Division-Juvenile Branch pursuant to section 6351 of the Juvenile
Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351, and evaluated for the purpose of
determining or reviewing the permanency plan of the children.
On February 19 2014, a [p]ermanency [r]eview and
[a]ggravated [c]ircumstances [h]earing was held before the
Honorable Jonathan Q. Irvine. Judge Irvine found that there was
clear and convincing evidence to establish that [a]ggravated
[c]ircumstances existed as to [Mother]. Furthermore, Judge
Irvine found that [Mother] committed child abuse regarding
A.A.S.
In subsequent hearings, the DRO’s reflect the [trial
court’s] review and disposition as a result of evidence presented,
addressing, and primarily with the goal of finalizing the
permanency plan.
[On November 24, 2015, DHS filed petitions to
involuntarily terminate Mother and Father’s1 parental rights.]
On April 25, 2016[,] and August 24, 2016, a [t]ermination
of [p]arental [r]ights hearing was held for [Mother] in this
matter.
On August 24, 2016, the [trial court] found by clear and
convincing evidence that [Mother’s] parental rights of A.A.S. and
A.S., should be terminated pursuant to the Pennsylvania Juvenile
Act. Furthermore, the [trial court] held it was in the best
interest of the children that the goal be changed to adoption.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/2016, at 1-2.
Mother filed a notice of appeal on September 1, 2016, and the trial
court issued a 1925(a) opinion on October 14, 2016.
Mother raises five issues on appeal, which we quote verbatim.
____________________________________________
1
Father consented to the termination of his parental rights to the Children.
The trial court confirmed the consent on August 24, 2016.
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I. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
by terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(1) where [Mother]
presented evidence that she was compliant with all of her
Family Service Plan Goals.
II. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
by terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(2) where[Mother] presented
evidence that she will remedied her situation by meeting
her goals of housing, parenting and mental health
treatment and therefore does have the capacity to care for
her children in her home.
III. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
by terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to
23 Pa. C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(5) where evidence was
provided to establish that [Mother] is capable of caring for
her children.
IV. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
by terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to
23 Pa. C.S.A. sections 2511(a)(8) where evidence was
presented to show that [Mother] is capable of caring for
her children since she was has completed her FSP goals.
V. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion
by terminating the parental rights of [Mother] pursuant to
23 Pa. C.S.A. sections 2511(b) where evidence as
presented that established the children lived with Mother
prior to being placed bond.
Appellant’s Brief at 7 (sic).
Our standard of review for an order involuntarily terminating parental
rights is well established.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
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unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standards of the best interests of the child. One major aspect of
the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of
the emotional bond between parent and child, with close
attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing
any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In the matter sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to
affirm the trial court, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one
subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d
1141 (Pa. 2004). Here we analyze the trial court’s decision to terminate
under Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows.
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(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity abuse, neglect or refusal
cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to
subsection (a)(1), (6), or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
Mother’s argument is that the trial court discounted the evidence that
she completed all of the family service plan goals including parenting and
mental health treatment, took responsibility for her actions and plead guilty
to EWOC and REAP. “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity
that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216
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(Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super.
2002)).
The trial court found that Dr. Erica Williams completed a parenting
capacity evaluation on Mother in March 2016 and found that “she did not
present the capacity to provide safety and/or permanency to either child.”
See Goal Change Hearing, 4/25/16, at 10. Furthermore, Mother continued
to have extensive contact with her paramour, the same paramour that beat
A.A.S. with a belt. The trial court found that Mother visited him thirty-seven
times while he was incarcerated. Moreover, the trial court found that A.A.S.
and A.S. are afraid of Mother and A.A.S. is afraid of Mother’s paramour.
After careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court had a
factual basis for its decision and did not abuse its discretion by terminating
Mother’s parental rights to the Children under Section 2511(a)(2).
We must next determine whether the trial court abused its discretion
when it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether termination of parental
rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of
J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). As this Court has
explained, “Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding
analysis and the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act.
Case law, however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond,
if any, between parent and child is a factor to be considered as
part of our analysis.” In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.
Super. 2008). “While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her
child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest
analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be
considered by the court when determining what is in the best
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interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.
Super. 2011) (citing K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 533-36).
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court
stated that the trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed
without detrimental effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
N.A.M., 33 A.3d at 103).
Mother’s entire argument is that because she was unable to have any
contact or visit with the Children, her opportunities to mend their
relationship was limited, and therefore termination does not serve the
Children’s needs or welfare. Mother fails to develop her argument in her
brief; however, this Court will address the merits of her claim. The trial
court found that the Children
reside in a kinship home with their maternal aunt. [The
Children] consistently tell the DHS social worker that they are
afraid of [Mother] and do not want to see her. The [Children]
look to the maternal aunt for love, comfort[,] and support. The
maternal aunt meets the daily needs of the [C]hildren.
Furthermore, [the Children] would not suffer permanent
emotional damage if [Mother’s] parental rights were terminated.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/2016, at 6 (citations omitted). Our review of the
record confirms that the trial court had a factual basis for its decision and did
not abuse its discretion when it terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
to Section 2511(b).
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Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/13/2017
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