Com. v. Medina, L.

J-S67040-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
LUIS MEDINA, :
:
Appellant : No. 665 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 6, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000039-2016
CP-45-CR-0000594-2016
BEFORE: OTT, J., NICHOLS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JANUARY 03, 2019
Luis Medina (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
March 6, 2017, after he pleaded guilty to robbery and receiving stolen
property. Upon review, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and
remand with instructions.
On May 25, 2016, Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of robbery at
docket number CP-45-CR-0000039-2016 and one count of receiving stolen
property at docket number CP-45-CR-0000594-2016. N.T., 5/25/2016, at 12.
Pertinent to this appeal, as part of Appellant’s plea agreement, the
Commonwealth informed the trial court that it was in “agreement with a state
intermediate punishment sentence in connection with these offenses.” Id. As
such, the Commonwealth requested the trial court, prior to sentencing,
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court
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“remand [Appellant] to a state correctional institution for an evaluation for the
state intermediate [punishment] program [(State IP program)].”1 Id.
Appellant’s plea was accepted, and the trial court directed Appellant be
committed to the Department of Corrections for an State IP program
evaluation, noting the “Commonwealth has waived [Appellant’s] ineligibility
for the State [IP p]rogram based on the instant conviction and his prior
criminal history.” Id at 14-15. Sentencing was deferred pending the outcome
of Appellant’s evaluation.
On February 8, 2018, prior to his sentencing hearing, Appellant filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therein, Appellant averred that
unbeknownst to him, his counsel, and the district attorney, charges were filed
against Appellant in Northampton County and a detainer was placed on
Appellant. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 2/8/2018, at 1 (unnumbered).
Because of this detainer, Appellant was denied participation into the State IP
program. Id. In Appellant’s motion, defense counsel asserted that he would
not have advised Appellant he was eligible for the State IP program had he
1
This agreement was memorialized in Appellant’s written guilty plea and
colloquy wherein the Commonwealth agreed, in exchange for Appellant’s plea,
to “nolle pros remaining charges” and request Appellant be “sent for
evaluation into the State IP program. If accepted into the program the
Commonwealth will waive all disqualifying charges and [Appellant] will be
responsible for restitution.” Guilty Plea and Colloquy, 5/27/2016, at 1
(unnumbered). Appellant acknowledged that this agreement, as it pertained
to sentencing was “not binding” on the trial court, and Appellant was not
“guaranteed a specific sentence in exchange for” his plea. Id. at 2.
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been aware of the outstanding detainer which “automatically disqualified”
Appellant from participating in the State IP program. Id. Based on the
foregoing, Appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea “due to [Appellant’s]
unknowing and uncounseled plea. But for counsel’s presentation that he was
eligible for the State IP Program, [Appellant] would not have” pleaded guilty.
Id. at 2. Upon receipt of the motion, the trial court scheduled a hearing.
Order of Court, 2/13/2017.
On March 6, 2016, the parties appeared for the hearing, which was short
and consisted solely of arguments from Appellant’s counsel and the
Commonwealth, as well as a brief inquiry by the trial court. N.T., 3/6/2016,
at 2-5. Appellant’s counsel reiterated the same arguments set forth in
Appellant’s motion. Id. at 2 (“But for the State IP [program, Appellant] would
not have entered into that guilty plea; and without that still being on the table,
I don’t believe that his plea would be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.”). In
response, the Commonwealth argued the trial court should deny Appellant’s
motion because the language used during Appellant’s plea colloquy made it
clear that there was no guarantee that Appellant would be accepted into the
State IP program. Id. at 3 (“[L]ooking back at the plea colloquy, there is very
clear language in here that says ‘if’ [Appellant] is accepted into the State IP
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Program.”). Ultimately, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion 2 and
proceeded directly to sentencing.
[Appellant was sentenced] within the standard guideline range to
an aggregate sentence of [48 to 120] months in a state
correctional institution. Appellant received a time credit
commencing on December 12, 2015. On March 9, 2017, Appellant
filed a motion to reconsider sentence[, which the trial court]
denied on March 10, 2017. On April 6, 2017, Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal to th[is] Court[.] … On October 17, 2017,
th[is] Court issued an order dismissing [] Appellant’s appeal for
failing to file a brief. On November 2, 2017, Appellant filed a Pro
Se motion for post[-]conviction collateral relief (hereinafter
“PCRA”), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. [The trial
court] appointed counsel and granted counsel leave to file an
amended PCRA petition, which counsel did on December 8, 2017.
Thereafter, [the trial court] scheduled and held a hearing on
January 25, 2018. After hearing [the trial court] entered an order
granting Appellant’s PCRA petition[] and reinstated [h]is appellate
rights before th[is] Court. On February 23, 2018, Appellant filed
a notice of appeal[.3]
Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/2018, at 1-2 (unnumbered) (unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal challenges the court’s denial of
Appellant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant’s Brief
7. Specifically, Appellant avers the trial court erred in denying his motion
when he “asserted his plea was unknowing, uncounseled and not made
2
In denying Appellant’s motion, the trial court determined that the fact that
Appellant was evaluated for but ultimately not accepted into the State IP
program was not a “fair and just reason” warranting the withdrawal of
Appellant’s plea. N.T., 3/6/2016 at 4.
3
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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voluntarily[.]” Id. (unnecessary capitalization omitted). We consider
Appellant’s issue mindful of the following principles.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a pre-sentence motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 591(A) provides:
At any time before the imposition of sentence, the
court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of
the defendant, or direct, sua sponte, the withdrawal
of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the
substitution of a plea of not guilty.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A). The official comment to Rule 591 provides:
“After the attorney for the Commonwealth has had an opportunity
to respond, a request to withdraw a plea made before sentencing
should be liberally allowed.” Similarly, in Commonwealth v.
Forbes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded: “Although
there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, properly
received by the trial court, it is clear that a request made before
sentencing ... should be liberally allowed.” The Court in Forbes
went on to explain:
[I]n determining whether to grant a pre-sentence
motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea, the test to be
applied by the trial courts is fairness and justice. If the
trial court finds “any fair and just reason,” withdrawal
of the plea before sentence should be freely
permitted, unless the prosecution has been
“substantially prejudiced.”
In [Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254 (Pa. Super. 2013)], this
Court explained the rationale for the rule of liberal allowance of
withdrawal of guilty pleas before sentencing:
The policy underlying this liberal exercise of discretion
is well-established: The trial courts in exercising their
discretion must recognize that before judgment, the
courts should show solicitude for a defendant who
wishes to undo a waiver of all constitutional rights that
surround the right to trial—perhaps the most
devastating waiver possible under our constitution.
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In contrast, when a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea
after sentencing, the standard is far more stringent. “[P]ost-
sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny
since courts strive to discourage entry of guilty pleas as sentence-
testing devices. A defendant must demonstrate that manifest
injustice would result if the court were to deny his post-sentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea.”
Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1187–88 (Pa. Super. 2017) (some
citations and emphasis in original omitted).
Before addressing the merits of Appellant’s arguments on appeal, we
note that in its 1925(a) opinion to this Court, the trial court, “[u]pon review
of the record in preparation for [its opinion], and in consideration of relevant
law pertaining to pre-sentence withdrawal of guilty plea requests” concluded
that it “may have erred in denying Appellant’s request to withdraw his guilty
plea[]” and requested this Court vacate its March 6, 2017 sentencing order
and “remand the matter back to th[e trial court] so that [it] can conduct an
on-the record colloquy of Appellant to determine whether to grant his request
to withdraw his guilty plea.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/2018, at 4-5
(unnumbered). In finding as such, the trial court expressed that “Appellant
signed the written guilty plea and colloquy form with the expectation that he
would be eligible for [the State IP Program]. Therefore, [the trial court] now
question[s] whether or not [Appellant’s] guilty plea was voluntarily, knowingly
[] and intelligently made.” Id. at 4.
In his brief on appeal, Appellant, referencing the trial court’s
acknowledgment “that it may have erred in denying [] Appellant’s motion to
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withdraw[,]” requests this Court vacate his “judgment of sentence entered in
the above-captioned case and allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea[].”
Appellant’s Brief at 11, 21. Conversely, the Commonwealth urges this Court
to affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8.
Upon review, based on the facts before us and the averments by
Appellant’s plea counsel, we agree with the trial court that the parties would
benefit from a more thorough and comprehensive hearing on Appellant’s
motion. In finding as such, we are cognizant that trial courts are not required
to hold a hearing on a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, nor is
this Court required to remand a case based solely on a trial court’s request.
However, in the context of motions to withdraw a guilty plea, this Court has
held that a hearing may be necessary in “borderline” cases. See
Commonwealth v. Cappelli, 489 A.2d 813, 819 (Pa. Super. 1985) (“It is
true that in ‘borderline’ cases [involving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,]
a hearing should be granted.”).
In this case, Appellant filed a pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty
plea based on, inter alia, plea counsel erroneously advising Appellant that he
was eligible for the State IP program when in fact, he was automatically
disqualified due to an outstanding detainer. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
2/8/2018, at 1 (unnumbered). Because of this, Appellant avers his plea was
not knowingly or voluntarily entered. Id. Based on these averments alone,
we believe Appellant may have set forth a “fair and just reason” to warrant
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the withdrawal of his plea. C.f. Commonwealth v. Dicken, 895 A.2d 50, 54
(Pa. Super. 2006) (“Being advised that you are eligible for boot camp, when
i[n] fact you are not, may be a fair and just reason for withdrawal of a plea.
See Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136 (Pa. Super. 2002) (plea
counsel’s erroneous advice about boot camp eligibility under negotiated
sentence invalidated Appellant’s guilty plea)”).
While the Commonwealth urges this Court to affirm Appellant’s
judgment of sentence, we cannot make credibility determinations in the first
instance to assess Appellant’s understanding of the plea and agreements
between the parties and therefore find, as the trial court has suggested, that
a hearing4 is necessary. Thus, we remand for a hearing on Appellant’s motion
to withdraw. On remand, “the test to be applied by the trial court[] is fairness
and justice. If the trial court finds ‘any fair and just reason,’” the trial court
should freely permit Appellant’s request to withdraw his plea “unless the
prosecution has been ‘substantially prejudiced.’” Islas, 156 A.3d at 1188
(citation omitted).
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for proceedings
consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
4
As noted supra, before sentencing, the trial court entertained arguments set
forth by the parties, as well as engaged in a brief questioning of plea counsel
before ultimately denying Appellant’s motion. As alluded to by the trial court,
we find this was inadequate to conduct a proper assessment into the facts
surrounding Appellant’s plea.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/3/19
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