Com. v. Hamilton, M.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
MICHAEL HAMILTON, : No. 1246 EDA 2018
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, June 24, 2009,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at Nos. CP-51-CR-0008274-2007,
CP-51-CR-0009838-2007
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 15, 2019
Michael Hamilton appeals from the June 24, 2009 judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after he entered
an open guilty plea to one count each of robbery and possession of an
instrument of crime1 (“PIC”) at Case No CP-51CR-008274-2007 and one count
of robbery at Case No. CP-51-CR-0009838-2007 in connection with his
commission of multiple armed robberies. The trial court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 8 to 18 years of imprisonment. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the following procedural history.
On July 1, 2009, [appellant] filed a pro se
post-sentence motion, claiming that he pled guilty
under duress and asked the sentencing court to
reconsider the sentence imposed This motion was
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 907(b), respectively.
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denied on August 20, 2009. [Appellant] did not file a
direct appeal. On February 24, 2010, [appellant] filed
a pro se PCRA[2] petition, alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to file post-sentence
motions and a direct appeal. Emily Cherniak, Esquire
was appointed as PCRA counsel on April 1, 2011. On
June 28, 2012, PCRA counsel filed an Amended PCRA
petition and requested an evidentiary hearing as to
whether [appellant] should have his post-sentence
motion and appellate rights reinstated nunc pro
tunc. On August 3, 2017, the Commonwealth filed a
Motion to Dismiss, stating that it would agree to an
evidentiary hearing regarding the reinstatement of
[appellant’s] appellate rights but would not agree to
reinstatement of [appellant’s] post-sentence motion
rights as [appellant] had failed to show prejudice. On
December 6, 2017, the Honorable Roger F. Gordon
sent [appellant] a Notice pursuant to [Pa.R.Crim.P.]
907, indicating that his petition would be dismissed
as without merit. On January 12, 2018, the matter
was reassigned to this Court for further proceedings.
On March 28, 2018, both parties appeared before this
Court and stated that they had reached an agreement
to reinstate [appellant’s] appellate rights, but not his
post-sentence motion rights nunc pro tunc. PCRA
counsel agreed to remain on appeal. On April 24,
2018, [appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal. On
April 25, 2018, he filed an Amended Notice of Appeal.
On July 11, 2018, upon receipt of all notes of
testimony, this Court ordered that [appellant] file a
Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
[p]ursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and defense counsel
did so on July 31, 2018.
Trial court opinion, 8/11/18 at 2-3.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review: “Whether the
appellant’s guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because
2 Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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defense counsel misrepresented the nature of the guilty plea to the appellant
and the appellant wanted to assert his innocence and have a trial?”
(Appellant’s brief at 5; full capitalization omitted).
In reviewing this appeal, we are mindful that:
after the court has imposed a sentence, a defendant
can withdraw his guilty plea only where necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. [P]ost-sentence motions
for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny since
courts strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas as
sentencing-testing devices. . . .
To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently entered. [A] manifest
injustice occurs when a plea is not tendered
knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and
understandingly. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure mandate pleas be taken in open court and
require the court to conduct an on-the-record colloquy
to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights
and the consequences of his plea. Under Rule 590,
the court should confirm, inter alia, that a defendant
understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which
he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea;
(3) he is giving up his right to trial by jury; (4) and
the presumption of innocence; (5) he is aware of the
permissible ranges of sentences and fines possible;
and (6) the court is not bound by the terms of the
agreement unless the court accepts the plea. The
reviewing Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea
colloquy and the voluntariness of the resulting plea by
examining the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the entry of that plea. Pennsylvania law
presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was
aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears
the burden of proving otherwise.
Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 352 (Pa.Super. 2014) (internal
citations and quotations omitted), appeal denied, 105 A.3d 736 (Pa. 2014).
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Additionally, “a defendant is bound by the statements which he makes
during his plea colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167
(Pa. 1997) (citations omitted). As such, a defendant “may not assert grounds
for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements made when he pled
guilty,” and he cannot recant the representations he made in court when he
entered his guilty plea. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the law does not
require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to plead
guilty. The law only requires that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty be
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See Commonwealth v.
Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 528-529 (Pa.Super. 2007).
Here, appellant contends that “defense counsel misrepresented the
nature of his guilty plea, claiming that defense counsel[] told him he had
negotiated a 5 to 10 year sentence and had one of [appellant’s] friends meet
with [appellant] to talk him into it.” (Appellant’s brief at 11-12.)
Contrary to appellant’s contention, the record demonstrates that
appellant tendered his pleas knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily, and
understandingly. Appellant read, completed, and signed a four-page written
guilty plea colloquy for the crimes to which he pled guilty in both cases, which
are part of the certified record. (Written guilty plea colloquies, 6/24/09.) On
those two separate colloquies, appellant affirmed, in writing, among other
things, (i) that he committed the crimes to which he pled guilty; (ii) that his
lawyer explained to him the elements of the offenses to which he pled guilty
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and that the Commonwealth must prove those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to obtain a conviction; (iii) that appellant knew that he could
go to jail for up to 22½ to 45 years for the crimes he committed; (iv) that
appellant did not need to enter a guilty plea, but was able to plead not guilty
and go to trial; (v) that appellant had sufficient time to discuss his cases with
his lawyer and was satisfied with his lawyer’s advice and services; (vi) that
although he was assisted by counsel, the final decision to plead guilty was his
and his alone; and (vii) that he read the colloquies, or they were read to him,
and that he understood the colloquies. (Id.)
The record further reflects that at the beginning of the oral guilty plea
colloquy, the trial court took a great deal of time not only to explain to
appellant his options – jury trial, bench trial, or entry of a negotiated or open
plea – but to describe those options, as well as their potential ramifications,
in detail. (Notes of testimony, 6/24/09 at 6-14.) After the trial court did so,
appellant expressed his desire to attempt to negotiate a plea, and the trial
court recessed the proceedings so the parties could speak privately as they
saw fit. (Id. at 14-15.)
When the proceedings reconvened, the record reflects that appellant
agreed to enter an open guilty plea to two counts of robbery and one count of
PIC in exchange for the Commonwealth’s nolle prossing the remaining
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charges.3 (Id. at 15-17, 19.) During that colloquy, appellant affirmed that
he understood the written guilty plea colloquies; that he went over them with
his attorney; that he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation; and that
the signatures on the forms were his own. (Id. at 19-21.) Appellant further
affirmed that no one in any way forced or coerced him to enter a guilty plea
on either case. (Id. at 21.) Appellant denied being under the influence or
suffering from any mental illness and acknowledged his understanding of the
maximum sentences he faced. (Id. at 21-23.) After the Commonwealth read
the facts underlying the charges, appellant admitted to the factual basis of the
charges and entered his open pleas. (Id. at 27-30.)
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the totality of
the circumstances surrounding appellant’s entry of his guilty pleas
demonstrates that appellant fully understood the nature and consequences of
his pleas and that he entered the pleas knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily,
and understandingly.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
3 The remaining charges included criminal conspiracy, in violation of
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1), graded as a first-degree felony; aggravated assault
in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a), graded as a first-degree felony;
firearms not to be carried without a license, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6105(a)(1), graded as a third-degree felony; together with six misdemeanor
charges. (Criminal information, CP-51-CR-0009383-2007, 9/4/07.)
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/15/19
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