Estate of: Davis, M. Appeal of: Treadway, S.

J-A09038-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ESTATE OF: MARY G. H. DAVIS, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
DECEASED PENNSYLVANIA
v.
APPEAL OF: SUSAN P. TREADWAY,
BETSEY W. DAVIS, MARY G. COOKE AND
JAMES C. TREADWAY
No. 2551 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Decree dated July 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Orphans' Court at No: 1990-X1644
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2015
This appeal involves a dispute over the estate of Mary G. H. Davis
(“Decedent”). In this regard, her daughters Betsey W. Davis, Mary G. Cooke
and Susan P. Treadway, and her son-in-law and Susan’s husband James C.
Treadway (individually “Betsey,” “Mary,” “Susan,” and “James,” and
collectively “Appellants”) appeal from the July 18, 2014 decree entered by
the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Orphans’ Court Division
(“orphans’ court”). The orphans’ court, inter alia, granted Decedent’s son’s,
E. Morris Davis, IV (“Appellee” or “Morris”), summary judgment motion titled
“Motion for Return of Property No Longer in Dispute,” and dismissed
Appellants’ objections to accounting. Upon review, we affirm.
J-A09038-15
The orphans’ court summarized the facts and procedural history of this
case as follows.
[Decedent] died on May 26, 1990, leaving a will dated
September 14, 1989, in which she appointed her son, [Morris],
and her son-in-law, [James], as co-executors. Letters
testamentary were granted by the Montgomery County Register
of Wills on June 1, 1990. The [e]xecutors filed an [i]nventory
dated June 19, 1990 and filed a Pennsylvania [i]nheritance tax
return, as well as a copy of the [f]ederal [e]state [t]ax return in
1991. The [i]nventory incorporated an appraisal of tangible
personal property that was located in Decedent’s residence at
her death. The Pennsylvania [i]nheritance tax return and
[f]ederal [e]state tax return also included an appraisal of
[D]ecedent’s tangible personal property. Apart from a significant
parcel of real estate, the majority of the estate assets were
distributed during the first few years of the administration of the
estate.
Following the 1990 and 1991 tax filings, no activity
occurred in the Register of Wills’ office or in the Clerk of the
Orphans’ Court division until October 12, 2000, at which time an
agreement entitled “Receipt, Release, Waiver and Agreement of
Indemnity” was filed, which had been signed by Mary[.] This
document in paragraph 4 represents that “the only asset
remaining in the estate is the Lafayette Road property.”
This refers to the real property that was the home of [Decedent].
Apparently, complications arose regarding the subdivision of the
real property and the distribution of the property in shares to the
three daughters of [D]ecedent], resulting in lengthy delay of
final distribution under the [w]ill. [Mary] acknowledged in this
[r]eceipt and [r]elease [d]ocument that “the co-executors have
made distribution to her of all of the balance of the proceeds of
the estate” and have “delivered to her the amount distributable
to her”. See Receipt, Release, Waiver and Indemnity Agreement
dated October 12, 2000.
Although there were no proceedings in the [o]rphans’
[c]ourt during the first ten years following the death of
[Decedent], there was a dispute litigated in the Civil Division of
the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County among the
[e]state and Decedent’s daughters, as plaintiffs, and [Morris]
and his wife as defendants. This matter was resolved by
stipulation in open court on February 19, 1991, followed by a
written stipulation signed by the parties’ attorneys.
Civil litigation was again commenced in 2010 among
[Morris] and his sister, Susan [], and his brother-in-law, James
[], concerning certain disputed articles of personal property and
certain real estate. The estate of [Decedent] is not party to this
civil dispute.
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The dispute in the Civil Division of the Montgomery County
Court of Common Pleas arose in 2010 and concerns a home in
which [Morris] and his wife, Bridgitta had been living. Susan
and James [] changed the locks on the home and took
possession of certain items of tangible personal property that
was then within the home. The parties commenced two civil
disputes in which they advanced claims and counterclaims
regarding possession and use of the real estate, a claim for rent
for the real estate, and a vigorous dispute over the ownership of
the items of tangible personal property (hereinafter, collectively,
the “Disputed Items”). Upon consideration of preliminary
objections in this civil action, the claims regarding the tangible
personal property were transferred to the Orphans’ Court
division for disposition.[FN1] See Order dated July 7, 2011,
Docket #2010-15013.
[FN1:] While the Petition to compel the filing of an
Account was pending but before the Account had
been filed, the Honorable William Carpenter issued
an order dated July 7, 2011 in the civil matter listed
at docket no. 2010-15013, captioned E. Morris
Davis, IV v. Susan P. Treadway. This order
granted preliminary objections to certain counts in
that civil matter, (Count I (Conversion), Count II
(Fraud), Count V (Accounting), Count VI (Injunctive
Relief) and Count VII (Replevin) of the Amended
Complaint of E. Morris Davis), and transferred
jurisdiction over the disputes regarding ownership of
certain items of tangible personal property to the
Orphans’ Court division to be raised in conjunction
with the proceedings in the Estate of Mary G. H.
David, docket no. 1990-X1644.
There are several categories of Disputed Items of tangible
personal property. The parties do not dispute that the Disputed
Items originally belonged to [Decedent] and her husband during
their lives. Nor is there any dispute most of that [sic] the
Disputed Items were in the possession of [Morris] as of March of
2010. However, there are certain items that [Morris] claims that
he never possessed and certain other items that [Morris]
received but sold. [Morris] claims that the remaining Disputed
Items belong to him and were received by him as gifts from his
mother during her lifetime. With respect to most of the Disputed
Items, [Morris] claims that he received them as gifts from his
mother decades before her death. [Appellants] claim that the
Disputed Items belonged to [Decedent] and were property of her
estate at the time of her death, although they acknowledge that
many of the Disputed Items were in the possession of [Morris] at
the time of their mother’s death.
More than two decades after the death of Decedent,
following the commencement of the civil litigation, Susan [],
Betsey [], Mary [] and James [] . . . filed on March 8, 2011, a
[p]etition for citation to show cause why an [a]ccount should not
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be filed, seeking to compel [Morris], one of the two co-executors
to account for the Disputed Items of tangible property that they
allege he held in his capacity as [e]xecutor of the [e]state of
[Decedent]. No [a]ccount had previously been filed by the
[e]xecutors. [Appellants] assert that in 2010 they discovered
that [Morris] had in his possession certain items of tangible
personal property that “they recognized as having been in
[D]ecedent’s possession at or shortly before the time of her
death.” See Petition for Citation dated March 8, 2011. [Morris]
asserts in his [a]nswer that the Disputed Items of personal
property at issue “were not owned at the time of [D]ecedent’s
death.” To the contrary, [Morris] asserts that most of the items
of personal property had been given to him by his mother
decades before her death.
Thus, this [instant] controversy was initially brought to the
attention of the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt division by the filing on March
8, 2011, of a [p]etition to [c]ompel the filing of an [a]ccount.
Th[e orphans’ court] ordered [Morris] to file an [a]ccount of his
administration of the [e]state of [Decedent.] After several
extensions of time, [Morris] filed an [a]ccount on November 30,
2011. [Morris] filed a [l]imited [a]ccount, limited to jewelry and
tangible personal property with an aggregate value of
$23,637.50, which he acknowledges were assets of the estate.
The items listed on this [l]imited [a]ccount were previously
disclosed on the [i]nventory and [t]ax returns filed by the
[e]state. [Morris] denie[d] knowledge of the disposition of these
items and assert[ed] that the disposition of these items [was]
known only to his co-executor, James[.] On February 3, 2012,
[o]bjections were filed by [Appellants] . . . to this [a]ccount.
[Appellants] listed approximately 37 additional items of tangible
personal property which were not listed in the [l]imited
[a]ccount filed by [Morris], but which [Appellants] assert[ed]
actually belonged to Decedent at the time of her death and
should have been accounted for as part of the [e]state.
[Morris] has filed in the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt [d]ivision a
[summary judgment] [m]otion entitled “Motion for Return of
Property No Longer in Dispute and/or For Which There is Not a
Substantial Dispute and Overrule All Remaining Objections to the
Account of E. Morris Davis, IV[.]”[1] A Rule was issued,
returnable February 5, 2013. No party appeared to show cause
why the [m]otion should not be granted, and no response to the
[m]otion was filed by the opposing parties. [Appellants] filed
voluminous exhibits, a memorandum and two sworn declarations
on February 11, 2013, immediately before oral argument.
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1
Appellants point out Morris’s summary judgment motion was unverified.
We, however, need not address this issue because Appellants did not raise
it before the orphans’ court. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
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The issue in dispute before th[e orphans’ court] with
respect to this [a]ccount and the [o]bjections, and the [m]otion
filed by [Morris], is whether the 39 items of tangible personal
property (plus an automobile) identified by [Appellants] are
property of Decedent’s estate subject to distribution under her
[w]ill. [Morris] also seeks to raise a claim to 7 additional items
of tangible personal property not identified in the [o]bjections.
Of these 47 items in dispute, [Morris] addresses in his motion
only 32, although he also takes the position with respect to 11
items that he does not know their location and that [Appellants]
should be estopped from asserting a claim with respect to these
items as well. There are several distinct categories of tangible
personal property, which the [c]ourt has been at pains to
categorize, and which are itemized on a [t]able attached hereto
as Schedule A, with respect to which the parties make slightly
different claims. The categories of items of tangible personal
property can be described as follows:
I. Four Items claimed by [Appellants] to be property of the
[e]state, in the possession of [Morris] at date of Decedent’s
death until the present.
II. Fifteen Items claimed by [Appellants] to be property of the
[e]state, that were in the possession of [Morris], at Decedent’s
date of death until 2010, but are now in the possession of Susan
and James Treadway.
III. Three Items that were in [Morris’s] possession until 2010 are
now in possession of Susan and James Treadway, but as to
which [Appellants] assert they were in Decedent’s residence at
her date of death.
IV. Four Items claimed by [Appellants] to be property of the
[e]state, that were in the possession of [Morris] following
Decedent’s death but were sold following Decedent’s death and
before 2010.
V. Eleven Items claimed by [Appellants] to be property of the
[e]state, as to which [Morris] claims he does not know the
whereabouts of these items and does not possess them.
VI. Seven Items claimed by [Morris] to be his property that are
now in the possession of Susan and James Treadway, but which
are not specifically identified by [Appellants] on the [o]bjections
to the [a]ccount as assets of the [e]state (although the
[o]bjections include a “catch-all” objection number 4, regarding
other items not specifically identified by [Appellants] but that
may belong to the [e]state).
VII. Decedent’s [a]utomobile and two other items to which
[Morris] does not refer in his motion, but which were listed in the
[o]bjections to the [a]ccount.
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Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/18/14, at 1-6 (emphasis added). On July 18,
2014, the orphans’ court granted Morris’s summary judgment motion and,
as a result, dismissed Appellants’ objections to the account. In granting the
summary judgment motion, the orphans’ court principally applied the
doctrine of laches to conclude Appellants were barred from instituting the
instant action. Appellants timely appealed to this Court.2
In arguing the orphans’ court erred in granting Morris’s motion for
summary judgment, Appellants raise two issues on appeal. 3 First,
Appellants argue the orphans’ court erred in applying the affirmative defense
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2
The orphans’ court did not order Appellants to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court, however, issued a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, incorporating the reasons set forth in its July 18,
2014 opinion granting Morris’s summary judgment motion.
3
Although Appellants present us with the following five issues, we have
consolidated them into two for ease of disposition.
1. Whether the lower court erred in considering laches as a
defense to Appellants’ objections to [Morris’s] account as co-
executor of the Estate of Mary G. H. Davis, given [Morris’s]
failure to plead it in his answers to Appellants’ petition for an
account and to their objections to his account.
2. Whether the lower court properly formulated and applied the
“undue delay” element of laches.
3. Whether the lower court erred in holding that the summary
judgment record demonstrated “undue delay” beyond genuine
dispute.
4. Whether the lower court properly formulated and applied the
“prejudice” element of laches.
5. Whether the lower court erred in holding that the summary
judgment record demonstrated “prejudice” beyond genuine
dispute.
Appellants’ Brief at 4.
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of laches sua sponte. Appellants argue Morris failed to raise laches in his
response to, inter alia, the petition for accounting. Second, and
alternatively, Appellants argue the orphans’ court erred in determining there
were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the “undue delay”
and “prejudice” elements of laches.
When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we must
determine whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion or committed an
error of law.4 See In re Estate of Hooper, 80 A.3d 815, 818 (Pa. Super.
2013); accord Hovis v. Sunoco, Inc., 64 A.3d 1078, 1081 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation omitted); Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 A.2d 344,
347 (Pa. Super. 2006). Our scope of review is plenary. See Sevast v.
Kakouras, 915 A.2d 1147, 1152 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted); accord
Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 2001). In reviewing an
orphans’ court’s grant of summary judgment, we apply the same standard
employed by the orphans’ court, i.e., we review all of the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all doubts as to
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against the moving party.
See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Weryha, 931 A.2d 739, 741 (Pa. Super. 2007).
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4
To the extent Morris argues the orphans’ court did not rule on his summary
judgment motion, such argument is belied by the record. As noted earlier,
the orphans’ court expressly granted Morris’s summary judgment motion,
and in so doing, dismissed Appellants’ objections.
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“Only when the facts are so clear that reasonable minds could not differ can
a trial court properly enter summary judgment.” Hovis, 64 A.3d at 1081.
With this standard in mind, we first address Appellants’ argument that
the orphans’ court erred in applying the doctrine of laches sua sponte.
The doctrine of laches is an equitable bar to the prosecution of stale
claims and is the practical application of the maxim: those who sleep on
their rights must awaken to the consequences that they have disappeared.
Fulton v. Fulton, 106 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Because the application of laches involves a
question of law, we are not bound by the orphans’ court’s ruling on the
issue. Id. As we recently explained, the doctrine of laches:
is an equitable doctrine which bars relief when the complaining
party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to promptly
institute the action to the prejudice of another. In order to
prevail on an assertion of laches, respondents must establish: a)
a delay arising from petitioner’s failure to exercise due diligence;
and, b) prejudice to the respondents resulting from the delay.
The question of laches is factual and is determined by examining
the circumstances of each case. . . . [L]aches is an equitable
doctrine that should not be applied in favor of a person who has
failed to take required action on his own.
Vill. of Four Seasons Ass'n, Inc. v. Elk Mountain Ski Resort, Inc., 103
A.3d 814, 823 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). The party asserting
laches as a defense must present evidence demonstrating prejudice from the
lapse of time. Such evidence may include establishing that a witness had
died or become unavailable, that substantiating records were lost or
destroyed, or that the defendant has changed his position in anticipation
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that the opposing party has waived his claims. Fulton, 106 A.3d at 131
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, our review of the record reveals the orphans’ court did not raise
laches sua sponte. On the contrary, Morris raised it in his pleadings. In
particular, Morris asserted in his pro se response to the petition for
accounting that Susan “had entered the property numerous times
previously, and had never made a mention, reference, comment or made
any other sign of a contest of ownership of the chattels, despite [Morris’s]
continued and exclusive ownership and customary acts of ownership during
such visits.” Morris’s Answer to Petition for Accounting, 4/12/11, at ¶ 9.
Moreover, in his response to Appellants’ objections, Morris argued:
Each of the [Appellants] had personally been in his house and
seen [Morris’s] in full and outright possession and ownership of
the majority of the above mentioned items over the last 25+
years. Upon his father’s passing, [D]ecedent gifted [Morris]
many items. At no point was possession or ownership ever
contested or questioned.
Morris’s Response to Objections, 2/27/12, at ¶ 4. Although we recognize
Morris did not use the term “laches,” he certainly alleged facts to establish
laches as a defense to Appellants’ objections. T here is no need to name an
affirmative defense “if facts sufficient to constitute the defense are pled.”
Iorfida v. Mary Robert Realty Co., 539 A.2d 383, 397 (Pa. Super. 1988)
(finding that a single paragraph of defendant’s new matter sufficiently raised
abandonment as an affirmative defense). Thus, based on the foregoing, we,
like the orphans’ court, construe Morris’s pleadings to include laches. As a
result, we cannot conclude the orphans’ court raised laches sua sponte.
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Having determined laches was properly raised, we now turn to
Appellants’ alternative argument that the orphans’ court erred in concluding
Morris satisfied the undue delay and prejudice elements of laches.
As noted earlier, to prevail on an assertion of laches, Morris must
establish a delay arising from Appellants’ failure to exercise due diligence
and prejudice to Morris resulting from the delay. See Elk Mountain,
supra.
With respect to undue delay, Appellants argue the orphans’ court erred
in concluding they were aware of Morris’s possession of the disputed items
because evidence of awareness was controverted in the record. In other
words, Appellants argue the existence of genuine issues of material fact
relating to their awareness of the disputed items. Appellants, however, fail
to support their argument with record evidence. They do not cite to the
record to establish they were unaware of Morris’s possession of the disputed
items.5
In the argument section of their brief, Appellants do not even appear
to challenge knowledge of possession. On the contrary, they argue only that
“knowledge of possession is NOT necessarily knowledge of an undisclosed
claim of ownership by gift.” Appellants’ Brief at 20 (emphasis added). Thus,
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5
Our review of the record does not reveal any evidence to support
Appellants’ contention that their awareness of Morris’s possession of the
disputed items was an issue of material fact.
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Appellants essentially argue Morris failed to provide them notice of his
ownership of the disputed items.6 We, however, need not decide whether
disclosure by Morris occurred here. For purposes of establishing undue
delay under laches, it is sufficient that Appellants were aware of Morris’s
possession of the disputed items at time of Decedent’s death in 1990.
Indeed, even if they were unaware of Morris’s possession of the items at the
time of Decedent’s death, they certainly were put on notice with respect to
the disputed items when the executors filed the inventory on June 19,
1990.7 Nonetheless, despite their awareness of Morris’s possession, it was
not until March 2011, when Appellants petitioned the orphans’ court to order
Morris to file an account of the estate.
Here, the orphans’ court recounted the following undisputed facts of
record:
First, [Appellants] admit in their depositions testimony and
sworn declarations, that they were aware, both before and after
Decedent’s death, that [Morris] was in possession of most of the
Disputed Items. Second, [Morris’s] co-executor, [James], took a
position as [e]xecutor on [t]ax filings and [i]nventory regarding
the tangible personal property that was included in the [e]state
and did not include these Disputed Items. Third, [Appellants]
never objected to [Morris’s] possession of the Disputed Items
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6
To buttress this point (lack of disclosure), Appellants refer to Mary’s and
James’s sworn declarations and Susan’s and James’s depositions.
7
“[A] function and object of an inventory is to fix presumptively the
existence of property in the fiduciary’s possession, and, while the listing
therein does not affect true ownership, it is prima facie evidence of
ownership.’” In re Hendrickson’s Estate, 130 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa. 1957).
The inventory lists property belonging to the estate that is under the control
of the executor.
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until 2010. Fourth, [Appellants] did not demand an accounting
until nearly twenty-one years after Decedent’s death.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/18/14, at 12. Given these undisputed facts, the
court reasoned:
[Appellants] had an affirmative duty to inquire or object if
they were concerned about the [e]state’s interest in the
Disputed Items, including making an inquiry regarding any
missing items, now missing for more than 20 years. [James] in
particular, as co-executor, had a duty to determine the nature,
value and disposition of all of the assets of the [e]state, and
repeatedly identified the assets of the [e]state on an inventory
and [f]ederal and [s]tate tax returns, always without any
reference to the Disputed Items. [Appellants] do not allege that
[Morris] kept secret from them his possession of the assets.
Indeed, [Mary] admits she knew [Morris] had possession of
many of these items long before the Decedent’s death.
Id. at 12-13. We, therefore, agree with the orphans’ court’s determination
that Appellants are guilty of delay in instituting the instant action.
Appellants next argue the orphans’ court erred in granting Morris’s
summary judgment motion because there existed issues of material fact
regarding whether Morris suffered any prejudice because of Appellants’ delay
in instituting the action. Again, Appellants provide no record support to
underscore their argument that disputed issues of material fact exist
regarding whether Morris suffered prejudice because of the undue delay.
Indeed, our review of the record yields no facts tending to negate the
orphans’ court’s determination that Morris suffered prejudice as a result of
Appellants’ delay. Thus, we find no reason to disagree with the court’s
determination with respect to the prejudice element. As the orphans’ court
noted:
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[Appellants’] lengthy delay has inevitably impaired the ability of
the parties to produce evidence regarding the claims of gifts
made in the 1970s, the specific location or instructions regarding
certain items of jewelry as to which none of the parties knows
where they are or who had them last, and many other facts
relating to these various items of tangible personal property.
Id. at 13. The orphans’ court also noted that, to dispose of the instant
matter, Morris relied on a 1991 in-court release,8 which he and Appellants
had executed with respect to the 1990 civil action. The court further noted
that the transcript of the release was no longer available. In this regard, the
orphans’ court determined “[t]he fact that the transcript of the proceedings
can now no longer be obtained and appears to have been lost or destroyed
by all of the parties and their counsel, is another confirmation of the
prejudice caused by the lengthy delay in this case.” Id. at 14. Accordingly,
given the circumstances here, the orphans’ court did not err in concluding
Morris suffered prejudice because of Appellants’ delay in bringing this action.
The court, therefore, did not err in granting Morris’s summary judgment
motion based on the equitable doctrine of laches.
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8
To memorialize the in-court agreement, the parties executed a written
stipulation releasing Morris “of and from any and all claims arising out of
[Decedent’s estate] as well as from any and all claims which has been or
could be brought on behalf of the [e]state for any acts or omissions
involving [Morris and his wife] during the lifetime of [Decedent].” Orphans’
Court Opinion, 7/18/14, at 14 (citing Stipulation and Agreement under
docket nos. 1990-21209 and 1990-20688). The record also indicates that
Mary separately executed a release in 2000, wherein she declared that “the
co-executors have made distribution to her of all of the balance of the
proceeds of the estate” and have “delivered to her the amount distributable
to her.” Id. (citing Receipt, Release, Waiver and Indemnity Agreement
dated October 12, 2000).
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To the extent Appellants cite In re Estate of Aiello, 993 A.2d 283
(Pa. Super. 2010), to compel a different outcome, such reliance is
inapposite. In Aiello, decedent Donald Aiello died testate on March 27,
1977, leaving his entire estate to appellee, his wife. Under his will, he
named appellee as executrix. Because appellee was not familiar with
decedent’s financial and business affairs and because English was not her
native language, she renounced her right to serve as the executrix in favor
of appellant, her husband’s brother and successor executor under the will.
In the summer of 2000, upon appellee’s petition, the orphans’ court directed
appellant to file an accounting of his administration of decedent’s estate.
Upon the filing of the account, appellee filed objections, raising numerous
allegations of self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duty on the part of
appellant. The orphans’ court sustained all but one objection.
On appeal, appellant argued, inter alia, that the orphans’ court erred
in failing to apply laches. In support of his argument, appellant pointed out
that the active administration of the estate had ceased many years ago and
that appellee’s twenty-year delay in petitioning the court for accounting “was
detrimental to him in that bank records and other records [had] been lost,
memories [had] faded and his ability to piece together the specifics of his
administration [had] been generally impeded.” Aiello, 993 A.2d at 287.
Relying on the orphans’ court’s reasoning, we affirmed its ruling.
The [orphans’] court concluded that [appellant] failed to
prove that he had changed his position [to his detriment] as a
result of the delay. Furthermore, the court found that
[appellant] continued to actively administer the estate for
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many years after decedent’s death. For example, in 1997 he
signed a deed, in his capacity as executor, transferring a parcel
of property owned by the decedent. He signed liquor license
renewals for a bar owned by the decedent in his capacity as
executor until 1999, when the bar was sold. Additionally, there
are 18 shares of St. Mary’s common stock that continue to be
held in the name of the estate.
Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we concluded the orphans’ court did not
err in determining that laches did not bar appellee’s claims. Id. Moreover,
this Court observed in passing that the doctrine of unclean hands 9 also
would bar laches. We remarked:
[Appellant’s] actions in this case require that he not be allowed
to benefit from the delay. The evidence shows that [appellee]
was unsophisticated in financial matters and relied heavily on
her brother-in-law’s advice, trusting him to act in her best
interests. However, [appellant] repeatedly breached his
fiduciary duty as executor, engaging in numerous transactions
that had the effect of enriching himself to the detriment of the
estate and, by extension, [appellee], the sole beneficiary of the
estate.
Aiello, 993 A.3d at 287-88 (noting appellant continued to actively
administer the estate for many years after decedent’s death).
Instantly, there is no evidence of record to indicate that Morris actively
administered the estate long after Decedent’s death in 1990. The record
reveals Morris’s active administration of the estate essentially terminated in
1992, when he disposed of the estate’s tax issues. Thereafter, there was a
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9
The orphans’ court may invoke the doctrine of unclean hands sua sponte.
In re Bosley, 26 A.3d 1104, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2011). The decision to apply
the unclean hands doctrine against a party is subject to review for abuse of
discretion. In re Vincent J. Fumo Irrevocable Children’s Trust ex rel.
Fumo, 104 A.3d 535, 539 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
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J-A09038-15
general lull on the docket,10 until Appellants filed the instant action in 2011.
Thus, unlike the executor in Aiello who actively administered the estate for
over twenty years, Morris did not actively administer the estate long after
Decedent’s death. Accordingly, the case sub judice is distinguishable from
Aiello and, therefore, inapposite.
In sum, the orphans’ court did not err in granting Morris’s motion for
summary judgment on the basis of laches, because Morris suffered prejudice
as a result of Appellants’ undue delay in bringing this action.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/11/2015
____________________________________________
10
The only notable actively that occurred on the docket was Mary’s release
dated October 12, 2000.
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