DocketNumber: 601; 1946
Judges: McEwen, Cavanaugh, Cirillo, Sole, Beck, Tamilia, Popovich, Johnson, Hudock, Chullo
Filed Date: 7/31/1996
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The issue presented by these consolidated appeals is one of first impression in this Commonwealth, namely, whether relief is available under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 et seq., where a petitioner files a PCRA petition while still in custody but is fully discharged prior to final adjudication of the petition. We have certified this important issue for en banc consideration.
Clement McGuire, the appellant at No. 01946 Philadelphia, 1994, was arrested on April 1, 1988, two weeks after he fired a shot which narrowly missed a teenager on a Philadelphia street corner. Minutes prior to the gunshot, the teenager had engaged in a fist fight with a passenger in McGuire’s car. On
On May 4, 1990, Clarence A. Ahlborn, appellant at No. 00601 Pittsburgh, 1995, pled guilty to three counts of driving under the influence (DUI)
By Orders dated October 10 and 11, 1995, respectively, we certified these appeals for en banc review.
Initially, section 9543(a)(1)(i) of the PCRA provides as follows:
§ 9543. Eligibility for relief
(a) General rule. — To be eligible for relief under this subchapter, a person must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following:
(1) that the person has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is:
(i) currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime[.]
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(l)(i).
The Commonwealth argues McGuire and Ahlborn are ineligible for PCRA relief since neither is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole. Thus, the Commonwealth concludes, the instant petitions are moot. To the contrary, Ahlborn claims PCRA eligibility on the basis
In support of its claim that appellants have failed to satisfy the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA, the Commonwealth relies principally on two cases. In the first, Commonwealth v. Pierce, 397 Pa.Super. 126, 579 A.2d 963 (1990), we considered “whether the doctrine of ‘collateral consequences’, which prevented a collateral attack on a criminal conviction from becoming moot after the sentence had been served, has been superseded by the provisions of the [PCRA].” Id. at 128, 579 A.2d at 964. Pierce completed the maximum term of a five (5) to fifteen (15) year sentence for second degree murder, then filed a PCRA petition alleging eligibility because of collateral criminal consequences flowing from his conviction.
The Pierce Court began by discussing the “currently serving” provision of section 9543(a)(l)(i), which the trial court determined required dismissal of appellant’s petition. Finding the legislative history of the PCRA scant, the Court turned to its predecessor statute, the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. (1982), amended by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. (1988), which applied when the petitioner “is incarcerated”. The Court then noted that “[b]ecause of the general nature of this requirement, the Supreme Court created an exception to the mootness doctrine, which was known as the ‘collateral consequences’ doctrine.” Id. at 129, 579 A.2d at 964-965. This doctrine, as ultimately crafted by our Supreme Court, provided that a collateral attack upon a conviction for which a sentence has been fully served is not moot where the petitioner can demonstrate that the conviction will affect a subsequent criminal prosecution, Commonwealth
The Post Conviction Relief Act, when read as a whole and in conjunction with its predecessor, the Post Conviction Hearing Act and the law pertaining to federal habeas corpus relief, leads us to conclude that the language of the Post Conviction Relief Act pertaining to eligibility for relief was intended to limit relief to those petitioners whose sentences have not expired and to preclude relief for those whose sentences have expired, regardless of collateral consequences.
Id. at 131, 579 A.2d at 966.
The second case relied on by the Commonwealth is Commonwealth v. Hayes, 408 Pa.Super. 68, 596 A.2d 195 (1991), alloc. denied, 529 Pa. 646, 602 A.2d 856 (1992), in which our Court en banc considered “whether the interpretation of the [PCRA] announced by this court in [Pierce ] should be overruled.” Id. As in Pierce, the PCRA petition in Hayes was both filed and adjudicated after petitioner’s sentence had been fully served. The Hayes Court, tracking the Pierce analysis, engaged in an extensive review of federal habeas corpus law and also found relevant the legislature’s alteration of the PCHA “is incarcerated” requirement to the “currently serving” mandate of the PCRA.
Since the legislature rewrote the eligibility requirements, our examination of the specific language, in particular the*131 inclusion of the adverb “currently,” leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended to limit post-conviction relief under the PCRA to individuals who at the time of filing for PCRA relief are serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for a conviction, regardless of the collateral criminal consequences from the conviction....
We conclude that the language changes in the PCRA were deliberately made to confront and alter the collateral criminal consequences rule. Therefore we decline to interject the collateral criminal consequences rule into the PCRA. To do so ignores the legislature’s intent and the plain meaning of the word changes made in the PCRA.
In summary, we find that the legislature has clearly modified the eligibility requirements under the PCRA from those that previously existed under the PCHA.... [W]e find the enactment of the PCRA precludes post-conviction relief under the PCRA where the petitioner’s sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole has expired prior to filing for relief....
Id. at 75-77, 596 A.2d at 199-200 (footnote omitted).
From Pierce and Hayes, the Commonwealth concludes a case is moot under the PCRA when the defendant has finished serving his sentence. Although we address the mootness argument infra, we reject the Commonwealth’s contention that Pierce and Hayes assist our resolution of whether “currently serving” applies at the date of hearing or the date of adjudication. Both Pierce and Hayes involved PCRA petitions which were filed after the appellants had completed their sentences; the present cases were filed before petitioners were released from custody and pose the question of their eligibility for PCRA relief and whether Pierce and Hayes are distinguish
Having found the question at issue has not been squarely addressed in Pennsylvania, we look to analogous case law from other jurisdictions. While Pierce and Hayes are of little assistance because the PCRA petitions in both cases were filed after release, their references to federal habeas corpus law provide us with a starting point. For instance, the Pierce court found the “currently serving” requirement of our PCRA “is consistent with the federal habeas corpus provision requiring that a petitioner be ‘in custody’ in order to obtain relief.” Id. at 131, 579 A.2d at 965. Since “currently serving” and “in custody” are analogous, we turn to factually similar habeas corpus cases defining “in custody.”
Foremost among these cases is Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). In Carafas,
We conclude that under the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached in the District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings on such application.
The federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be “in custody” when the application for habeas corpus is filed.
Id. at 238, 88 S.Ct. at 1559-60, 20 L.Ed.2d at 558-559 (emphasis added).
Consequently, unlike Pierce and Hayes, Carafas resolved the specific question at issue herein and found that “in custody”, a statutory requirement which our Court has found “consistent” with “currently serving”, Pierce, supra at 128-31, 579 A.2d at 964-965, applies to the date of filing rather than the date of adjudication.
The continuing validity of Carafas is beyond question. In fact, beginning a mere 21 days after the decision was rendered, an unbroken line of Supreme Court cases has relied on
We find that this authority suggests the proper construction of section 9543(a)(1)® of our PCRA to be that “currently serving” under that section is determined at the time of filing, regardless of whether petitioner is thereafter unconditionally released from custody.
Notwithstanding, our conclusion that the “currently serving” requirement necessary for jurisdiction is to be determined at the time the petition is filed does not preclude the possibility that the petition may thereafter become moot. In re Gross, 476 Pa. 203, 209, 382 A.2d 116, 119 (1978), citing G. Gunther, Constitutional Law, 1578 (9th ed. 1975) (“The moot
[Appellant’s] PCRA claims are moot. Since the collateral consequences doctrine has been eliminated in the PCRA statute, the sole PCRA relief that may be granted is release from custody. Where the petitioner is no longer in custody, there is nothing for the PCRA court to grant. It does not matter whether custody ended before or after the PCRA petition was filed. The only relief the PCRA court can grant is relief from non-collateral consequences of the conviction: i.e., custody. When the petitioner completes his sentence, whether before or after filing his petition, there are no more non-collateral consequences for the PCRA court to address.
Commonwealth’s McGuire brief at 7.
For reasons that follow, we agree with the Commonwealth’s ultimate conclusion that the PCRA petitions filed by McGuire and Ahlborn are moot. In clarification of our analysis we initially note that the Commonwealth’s argument ignores the distinction between jurisdiction and mootness. Specifically, the issue upon which we granted en banc review, and which we decided above, required us to determine the point in time (filing or hearing date) at which a petitioner satisfies the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA. This requirement must be met in order to confer upon a court jurisdiction to hear a PCRA petition. The fact that the case thereafter becomes moot, although relevant to the ultimate adjudication, is irrelevant in determining whether and at what point jurisdiction attaches under the PCRA. In short, jurisdiction must be determined independent of mootness. The Common
The Commonwealth’s mootness argument is identical to the holding of Parker, supra, in which the Supreme Court found that a petitioner’s unconditional release from custody renders a habeas petition moot, even where the petitioner filed while still in custody. Id. at 574, 80 S.Ct. at 910, 4 L.Ed.2d at 965 (1960). Relying on Parker, the state of New York also advanced this argument before the Carafas Court. In rejecting New York’s argument and overruling Parker, the Carafas , court held as follows:
The substantial issue, however, which is posed by Parker v. Ellis, is not mootness in the technical or constitutional sense, but whether the statute defining the habeas corpus jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in respect of persons in state custody is available here. In Parker v. Ellis, as in the present case, petitioner’s application was filed in the federal District Court when he was in state custody, and in both the petitioner was unconditionally released from state custody before his case could be heard in this court____ We conclude that under the statutory scheme, once the federal jurisdiction has attached in this District Court, it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings of such application.... [Hence], Parker v. Ellis must be overruled.
Id. at 238-240, 88 S.Ct. at 1559-61, 20 L.Ed.2d at 558-560.
Pursuant to Carafas, the question to be determined is not mootness, but rather “whether the statute defining ... jurisdiction ... is available here[;]” and “once the ... jurisdiction has attached ... it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings^]” Id.
In Carafas, the petitioner filed his habeas application while he was actually incarcerated under the sentence he sought to attack, but his sentence expired and he was unconditionally discharged from custody while his appeal from the denial of habeas relief below was pending before this Court. The state argued that the unconditional discharge rendered the case moot. We rejected this argument, holding that the “collateral consequences” of the petitioner’s conviction — his ability to vote, engage in certain businesses, hold public office, or serve as a juror — prevented the case from being moot. We went on to say, however, that the unconditional release raised a “substantial issue” as to the statutory “in custody” requirement. While we ultimately found that requirement satisfied as well, we rested that holding not on the collateral consequences of the conviction, but on the fact that the petitioner had been in physical custody under the challenged conviction at the time the petition was filed.
Id. at 492, 109 S.Ct. at 1926, 104 L.Ed.2d at 545 (emphasis added).
Consequently, according to Maleng, the Carafas holding that petitioner had satisfied the “in custody” requirement of the statute was premised not on the absence of mootness “but on the fact that the petitioner had been in physical custody under the challenged conviction at the time the petition was filed.” Id. It follows that Carafas and Maleng stand for the principle that the incarceration requirement of a jurisdictional statute must be determined independent of mootness. Similarly, our conclusion that the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA is determined at the time of filing means only that the instant PCRA courts had jurisdiction over appellants’ petitions. A subsequent determination of mootness does not
Having clarified that jurisdiction and mootness are separate inquiries, and in determining jurisdiction over the petitions before us existed in the PCRA courts, we can proceed to determine if those petitions now are rendered moot.
It is axiomatic that an actual case or controversy must exist at all stages of appellate review. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (1974). Since the existence of an actual controversy is essential to appellate jurisdiction, if, pending an appeal, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate court to grant any relief, the appeal will be dismissed. Commonwealth ex rel. Watson v. Montone, 227 Pa.Super. 541, 323 A.2d 763 (1974).
The cases presenting mootness problems involve litigants who clearly had standing to sue at the outset of the litigation. The problems arise from events occurring after the lawsuit has gotten under way — changes in the facts or in the law — which allegedly deprived the litigant of the necessary stake in the outcome. The mootness doctrine requires that “an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”
In re Gross, supra at 209, 382 A.2d at 119, quoting G. Gunther, Constitutional Law, 1578 (9th ed. 1975). The appellate courts of this Commonwealth will not decide moot questions. Id., see also Ridley Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 407 Pa. 230, 180 A.2d 1 (1962); Graziano Construction Co., Inc. v. Lee, 298 Pa.Super. 311, 444 A.2d 1190 (1982).
Initially, we agree with the Commonwealth that the legislative abrogation of the collateral consequences doctrine
Our conclusion that the petitions here appealed are moot also appears to be supported by Commonwealth v. Smith, 336 Pa.Super. 636, 486 A.2d 445 (1984), the sole Pennsylvania case we have found involving a hearing after the petitioner’s release from custody where the petition was filed prior to release. The pro se habeas corpus petition in Smith was filed on February 22, 1983, while petitioner was incarcerated. The petition, alleging petitioner’s lack of access to an adequate law library violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Appellant’s appeal is rendered moot by the intervening change in the facts of his case, i.e., his release from the custody and control of the Lebanon County Prison in January of 1984. Thus, appellant no longer suffers from any alleged unconstitutional inadequacy of the Lebanon County Prison law library. Appellant no longer has any stake in the outcome of his case.
Furthermore, no exception to the mootness doctrine applies herein.... [Thus], [s]ince appellant seeks relief through a habeas corpus proceeding on the basis of an inadequate law library for a prisoner of the Lebanon County Prison, and since appellant no longer suffers from this alleged unconstitutional condition, we find that the matter before this Court is moot, and we dismiss the appeal....
Id. at 641-642, 486 A.2d at 448-449.
Although appellant’s petition was filed prior to his release, it was dismissed by the Smith Court because petitioner’s subsequent release rendered the case moot. While Smith did not involve the “currently serving” requirement of the PCRA, and therefore did not assist our previous discussion of jurisdiction, we agree with the holding that a petitioner’s appeal “is rendered moot by the intervening change in the facts of his case, i.e. his release from ... custody”, id., regardless of when the petition was filed.
Finally, our conclusion that the petitions herein are moot also appears to be supported by section 9546 of the PCRA, which provides as follows:
§ 9546. Relief and order
(a) General rule. — If the court finds in favor of the petitioner, it shall order appropriate relief and issue supplementary orders as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail,*142 discharge, correction of sentence or other matters that are necessary and proper.
All of the named remedies in this section — rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge and correction of sentence— suggest that the petitioner has not fully served the sentence imposed, since none would be appropriate where the petitioner has been fully discharged. Further, as to “appropriate relief’ and “other matters that are necessary and proper,” we are aware of no construction of these phrases indicating that relief is available after a sentence has been fully served.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the “currently serving” requirement of 9543(a)(l)(i) is determined at the time a PCRA petition is filed. Petitions not filed prior to the petitioner’s unconditional release from custody are not cognizable under the PCRA and our courts are without jurisdiction to hear such petitions. Even where a petition is filed prior to the petitioner’s release from custody, it is nevertheless rendered moot by petitioner’s subsequent unconditional release.
Orders affirmed.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108.
. Id., § 2705.
. Id., § 907.
. Following sentencing on October 21, 1988. Thereafter, McGuire filed a motion to modify and the sentence was vacated. However, the original sentence was reimposed on January 12, 1989.
. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731. Ahlborn also pled guilty to various summary offenses.
. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3742.
. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 397 Pa.Super. 126, 579 A.2d 963 (1990), does not disclose the nature of the "collateral criminal consequences” alleged.
. Our research indicates that Pennsylvania is the only jurisdiction, state or federal, which has expressly abrogated the doctrine of collateral consequences.
. In attempting to diminish this important factual difference, the Commonwealth argues, without citation, that "the mootness doctrine simply does not distinguish between a petitioner who completed his sentence before filing and one who completed his sentence before the hearing was completed.” Thus, according to the Commonwealth, PCRA eligibility is determined at the time of the hearing and the filing date is irrelevant. If this is true, it is interesting to note that Commonwealth v. Hayes, 408 Pa.Super. 68, 596 A.2d 195 (1991), expressly and repeatedly focused on the date of filing. For instance, the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of appellant’s petition "because appellant had fully served his sentence of probation prior to filing for PCRA relief.” Hayes, supra at 69, 596 A.2d at 196 (emphasis added). Further, the Court states "the legislature intended to limit post-conviction relief under the PCRA to individuals who at the time of filing for PCRA relief are serving a sentence.” Id. at 75, 596 A.2d at 199 (emphasis added). The Court also found "the enactment of the PCRA precludes post-conviction relief ... where the petitioner's sentence ... expired prior to filing for relief....” Id. at 77, 596 A.2d at 200 (emphasis added). Finally, the Hayes court concluded, "we affirm the PCRA court’s finding that appellant is not eligible for PCRA relief because appellant had already fully served his sentence of probation at the time he filed his PCRA petition.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, despite the Commonwealth’s reliance on Hayes, the express language of the case appears to indicate that McGuire and Ahlborn are eligible for PCRA relief, since they filed their petitions prior to expiration of their sentences. However, since Hayes did not involve a petition filed prior to release, any reliance on its use of filing date, as opposed to hearing date, would be tenuous.
. In so holding, the Court also overruled Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909, 4 L.Ed.2d 963 (1960), which held that upon a petitioner’s unconditional release his habeas corpus application becomes moot, regardless of when the application was filed. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 240, 88 S.Ct. at 1560, 20 L.Ed.2d at 560. In their Carafas Concurring Opinion, Justices Harlan and Stewart also stated, "although we joined the Per Curiam decision in [Parker ], we are now persuaded that what the Court there decided was wrong insofar as it held that even though a man be in custody when he initiates a habeas corpus proceeding, the statutory power of the federal courts to proceed to a final adjudication of his claims depends on his remaining in custody." Id. at 242-243, 88 S.Ct. at 1562, 20 L.Ed.2d at 561.
. Analytically, jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine of collateral consequences apply it as one of two recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 51, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1896, 20 L.Ed.2d 917, 928 (1968). The second exception, applying to those cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review” was recognized
. In his Dissenting Opinion, President Judge Emeritus Cirillo argues at length that the enhancement provisions of our law impose "heightened consequences on a subsequent conviction” and, on this basis, we should adjudicate the instant PCRA petitions. However, as the dissent certainly realizes, these “heightened consequences” are precisely the collateral criminal consequences which Pierce and Hayes prevent us from considering. Thus, in reality, the dissent does not dispute our interpretation of current Pennsylvania law, which expressly forbids consideration of the factors upon which the dissent is premised. Rather, the true thrust of the dissent is that Pierce and Hayes should be overruled and the doctrine of collateral consequences reinstated. While Judge Cirillo’s position is consistent with his joinder of Judge Cavanaugh’s dissents in both Hayes and this case, the propriety of the doctrine of collateral criminal consequences is not now before us and, rather than reopening this settled issue, we rely upon the rationale for abrogating the doctrine set forth by the en banc majority in Hayes.
We also acknowledge the concern expressed by Judge Del Sole, in the dissenting portion of his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, that our holding "would conclude that a properly filed petition which is delayed by the court for years becomes moot when a petitioner is released from custody." Judge Del Sole would have us adjudicate such a petition, as well as those presently before us, on the basis that "there are collateral consequences to a conviction which continue despite that fact that a defendant has completed serving the sentence imposed---- The potential for collateral consequences in [the instant] cases is real.” Thus, like Judges Cirillo and Cavanaugh, Judge Del Sole urges that we revive the doctrine of collateral consequences laid to rest by our Court en banc in Hayes. As discussed above, we defer such reconsideration of Hayes to a future case presenting appropriate circumstances. Similarly, as to Judge Del Sole’s concern that judicial delay may unnecessarily cause PCRA petitions to be moot, we mention without deciding that the Southern Pacific exception to the mootness doctrine (discussed in note 11, supra) might prevent an unduly delayed PCRA petition from being deemed moot, since such a case may be "capable of repetition, yet evading review.” However, while we are troubled at such an extended and unexplained delay by the trial court in the McGuire case, today we decide only that we are simply unable to consider the exception to mootness advanced by Judges Cavanaugh, Cirillo and Del Sole.
. It is also suggested that deeming petitions which were filed while the petitioner was in custody moot because he is unconditionally released prior to hearing might encourage judges or prosecutors to delay adjudication until after the petitioner’s sentence has expired. While we will not impute such base motives to the trial judiciary, this does not change the fact that we are unable to recognize claims of PCRA petitioners after they are unconditionally released. As noted, Pierce and Hayes found that our legislature, in abrogating the doctrine of collateral consequences, left petitioners without a basis upon which to attack convictions after they are released. Thus, an unconditional release necessarily deprives a petitioner of a stake in the outcome of a case and the courts have no choice but to dismiss the case as moot. In re Gross, supra, citing G. Gunther, Constitutional Law, 1578 (9th ed. 1975) ("The cases presenting mootness problems ... arise from events occurring after the lawsuit has gotten underway — changes in the facts or in the law — which allegedly deprived the litigant of the necessary stake in the outcome.”). The unconditional release of McGuire and Ahlbom and the abrogation of the collateral consequences doctrine are such “changes in the facts [and] in the law” that render the instant petitions moot and we are unwilling to ignore the clear mandate of these principles based on nothing more than the possibility that the trial judges and prosecutors of this Commonwealth might engage in misconduct. Similarly, the fact that a petitioner’s sentence is too short for final adjudication of his PCRA claims does not somehow revive a stake in the outcome of his case where that stake has been expressly abrogated by our legislature and the relief requested is no longer available.
. Although McGuire’s petition was dismissed on the merits, and not on the basis of mootness, we may affirm a decision of the trial court when it is correct on any basis, regardless of the basis upon which the trial court relied. Commonwealth v. Allem, 367 Pa.Super. 173, 178, 532 A.2d 845, 848 (1987).