In the Interest of: M.A.C., a Minor

J-S37034-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 223 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1805 of 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.L.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 224 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1804 of 2015
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.X.C., a Minor : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 225 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1803 of 2015
J-S37034-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.C.S., a : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
Minor : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.C., Mother : No. 226 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Decree entered January 31, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Orphans’ Court Division, No(s): 1802 of 2015
BEFORE: STABILE, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JUNE 27, 2017
H.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed by
the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (“the
Agency”) for the involuntary termination of her parental rights to M.A.C.
(born in 2010), M.L.C. (born in 2009), M.X.C. (born in 2008) and D.M.C.S.
(born in 2006) (collectively “Children”) under the Adoption Act. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.1 We affirm.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and
procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See Trial
Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 1-7.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1
In its Decree, the trial court also changed Children’s permanency goals to
adoption. However, Mother challenges only the termination of her parental
rights to Children, and does not challenge the changing of Children’s
permanency goals to adoption.
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A. Whether the evidence presented at the [t]ermination of
[p]arental rights hearing was sufficient to support [the]
termination of Mother’s [parental] rights[?]
B. Whether the evidence presented at the [t]ermination of
[p]arental rights hearing was sufficient to find that it was in
the best interests of [C]hildren to terminate Mother’s parental
rights[?]
Brief for Mother at 7.2
Our standard of review is as follows:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to
accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual
findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if
the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As
has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
… [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to
make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where
the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant
hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings
regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where the
facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must
resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its
own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must
2
Although Mother has identified two issues in her Statement of Questions
Presented, she failed to separate her issues in the Argument section of her
brief, or provide headings for the issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing
that “[t]he argument shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in
distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated
therein….”).
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defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not
the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–27 (Pa. 2012) (citations
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is controlled by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The burden is on the petitioner to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for
seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d
273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). “[C]lear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the
trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of
the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Satisfaction of any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with
consideration of subsection 2511(b), is sufficient for the involuntary
termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.
2004) (en banc). In this case, we will review the trial court’s decision to
terminate Mother’s parental rights based upon subsections 2511(a)(8) and
(b), which state the following:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
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an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
With respect to subsection 2511(a)(8), Mother contends that the
conditions which led to placement of Children were “truancy [], chaos in the
home, concerns for drug use[,] and domestic violence in the home.” Brief
for Mother at 24. Mother asserts that “[t]he evidence offered in the
[termination] hearings suggests that those issues have been addressed.”
Id.
“Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to
remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In
re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period
has been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions
that led to the children’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable
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good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time period. Id.The “relevant inquiry in this regard is whether the conditions that led to
removal have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and
child[ren] is imminent at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5,
11 (Pa. Super. 2009). Further,
the application of [subs]ection (a)(8) may seem harsh when the
parent has begun to make progress toward resolving the
problems that had led to removal of her children. By allowing
for termination when the conditions that led to removal continue
to exist after a year, the statute implicitly recognizes that a
child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is unable
to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a
parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. Indeed, we
work under statutory and case law that contemplates only a
short period of time, to wit eighteen months, in which to
complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a
child who has been placed in foster care.
Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted, emphasis in original).
In its Opinion, the trial court considered the requirements of
subsection 2511(a)(8), and determined that the Agency had met its burden
of proving the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights to
Children. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 10-11 (wherein the court
determined that Mother’s efforts have been minimal, she has never secured
stable income or suitable housing, and Children have been in placement for
33 months). We agree with the trial court’s determination, which is
supported by the record and free of legal error, and affirm on this basis as to
Mother’s first issue. See id.-6-
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With respect to subsection 2511(b), Mother contends that Suzanne Ail,
Ph.D (“Dr. Ail”), the psychologist who performed the bonding assessment,
utilized improper or incorrect information to make her recommendation that,
despite the existence of bonds between Mother and Children, Mother’s
parental rights should be terminated. Brief for Mother at 24. Mother asserts
that, while it is commonplace in custody proceedings to evaluate a child’s
bonds with the biological parents as well as the foster parents, this practice
is “inappropriate and out of place in an attachment evaluation.” Id. at 24-
25. Mother claims that, whereas a biological parent’s relationship with a
child will be strained by separation when placement occurs, “the foster
family’s interactions with the child[] will almost always appear to be stronger
… than those of a biological parent’s.” Id. Mother argues that Dr. Ail’s
assessment failed “to account for the tremendous disparity in time that
[M]other had with [C]hildren compared with that of the foster families.” Id.Mother also points to Dr. Ail’s observations of Mother playing with Children,
and contends that Dr. Ail’s conclusions drawn from such observations do
“not allow for such realities as a child who is willful, and does not wish to
follow the prompts of an adult.” Id. Mother asserts that, in making her
recommendation, Dr. Ail improperly considered the level of progress that
Mother had made in her plan which, Mother claims, is irrelevant to an
attachment analysis. Id. at 26. Mother further argues that, in making her
assessment, Dr. Ail improperly conducted a “best interests” analysis which,
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Mother contends, is the exclusive province of the trial court. Id. Mother
asserts that Dr. Ail’s judgment was clouded by her belief that, despite the
termination of Mother’s parental rights, Mother would always be permitted to
be a part of Children’s lives. Id. Mother claims that the trial court failed to
recognize Dr. Ail’s bias, and the flaws in her assessment. Id.Mother also contends that her inability to obtain appropriate housing
and income, in order to support herself and Children, is beyond her control.
Id. at 21, 22. Mother asserts that her panic attacks prevent her from
maintaining employment. Id. at 21; see also id. at 22 (wherein Mother
claims that mental health diagnoses are “beyond the control” of a parent).
Mother argues that her lack of adequate housing was also caused by the
removal of Children from her home. Id. at 22. Mother contends that,
“[o]nce the [A]gency removed [C]hildren from [her] home[,] the
[supplemental security income] payments [that she had been receiving for
Children] were then paid to the [A]gency or county, not [M]other.” Id.Regarding subsection 2511(b), the court inquires whether the
termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. See In re C.M.S.,
884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and
welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). The court must also
discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention
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to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id.; see also
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (stating that “the court
must take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and
whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship.”). Additionally, “the strength of emotional bond between a
child and a potential adoptive parent is an important consideration in a ‘best
interests’ analysis.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d at 13; see also In re T.S.M., 71
A.3d 251, 268 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “courts considering termination must
also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether
they have a bond with their foster parents.”). Finally, the focus in
terminating parental rights under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is
on the child under section 2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d
999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008) (en banc).
In its Opinion, the trial court considered the requirements of
subsection 2511(b), and determined that the Agency had met its burden of
proving that it was in Children’s best interests to terminate Mother’s parental
rights. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/22/17, at 12 (wherein the court
determined that, while each of the Children have an attachment to Mother,
the court “does not see a bond between Mother and [C]hildren sufficient to
interfere with the termination of Mother’s parental rights[;]” and their bonds
with their respective placement parents are considerably stronger and
warmer than their attachments to Mother); see also id. (wherein the court
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noted that D.M.C.S. and M.X.C. have “fractured” relationships with Mother).
We agree with the trial court’s determination, which is supported by the
record and free of legal error, and affirm on this basis as to Mother’s second
issue. See id.Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/27/2017
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Circulated 06/08/2017 12:05 PM