Com. v. Scott, R.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT LEONARD SCOTT :
:
Appellant : No. 1727 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 26, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-10-CR-0002570-2016
BEFORE: OTT, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 12, 2019
Robert Leonard Scott appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
October 26, 2017, in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas. The trial
court sentenced Scott to a term of three to six years’ imprisonment following
his conviction for the offense of incest.1 The court also determined Scott met
the criteria for classification as a lifetime Tier III sexual offender pursuant to
Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). 2
On appeal, Scott claims his lifetime sentence of SORNA registration is illegal.
For the reasons below, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
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 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4302(b)(2).
2 See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.
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Scott was charged with numerous crimes relating to the sexual assault
of his biological daughter in the fall of 2016. On June 23, 2017, he entered
into a negotiated guilty plea for one count of incest (second-degree felony),
which the trial court accepted. On October 26, 2017, the court sentenced
Scott to a term of three to six years’ imprisonment, followed by 48 months of
probation. On November 15, 2017, the court provided Scott with notice that
he was required to register under SORNA as a Tier III sexual offender for his
lifetime. This timely appeal followed.3
In his sole issue on appeal, Scott claims that in light of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 925 (U.S. 2018)4 the trial court imposed an
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3 On November 30, 2017, the trial court ordered Scott to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Scott filed a concise statement on December 11, 2017. The trial court issued
an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on February 15, 2018.
4 On July 17, 2017, the Muniz Court held that SORNA’s registration provisions
constitute punishment, and, therefore, the retroactive application of those
provisions violates the ex post facto clauses of the federal and Pennsylvania
constitutions. Thereafter, on October 31, 2017, a panel of this Court, in
Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal
granted, 190 A.3d 581 (Pa. 2018), recognized that “Muniz was a sea change
in the longstanding law of this Commonwealth as it determined that the
registration requirements under SORNA are not civil in nature but a criminal
punishment.” Id. at 1215. As such, the panel concluded the statutory
mechanism for designating a defendant as an SVP set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §
9799.24(e)(3), which permits a trial court to make the determination based
upon clear and convincing evidence, was “constitutionally flawed” pursuant to
the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Alleyne v. United States,
570 U.S. 99 (2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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illegal sentence because his “Tier III lifetime registration requirement
pursuant to SORNA exceeds his statutory maximum sentence.” Scott’s Brief
at 13.5
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Accordingly, the Butler panel held: “[T]rial courts cannot designate convicted
defendants SVPs (nor may they hold SVP hearings) until our General Assembly
enacts a constitutional designation mechanism.” Butler, supra, 173 A.3d at
1218. Therefore, the panel vacated the order designating the defendant as
an SVP, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine his proper
registration period pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.14 and 9799.15. See id.
We note the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal
in Butler on the issue that this Court “erred in vacating the trial court’s Order
finding [Respondent] to be [a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”)] by
extrapolating the decision in [Commonwealth v. Muniz, 640 Pa. 699, 164
A.3d 1189 (2017),] to declare SVP hearings and designations unconstitutional
under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.24(e)(3).” Commonwealth v. Butler, 190 A.3d
581, 582 (Pa. 2018). However, that specific issue is of no concern in the
present matter because Scott was not determined to be an SVP.
5 Rather than addressing Scott’s argument, the Commonwealth contends:
The changes made to SORNA’s registration requirements under
Act [2018-]29 (“the Act”) have rendered its requirements non-
punitive. The General Assembly passed the Act in response to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in [Muniz, supra], which
held that SORNA’s registration requirements constitute
punishment, and the Superior Court’s decision in [Butler, supra].
The General Assembly declared it was their intention to address
these decisions and to establish a non-punitive statutory scheme.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.1(b).
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4 (footnote). As such, the Commonwealth maintains
Act 29 transformed SORNA from criminal to non-punitive in legal effect, and
therefore, the registration requirements are, again, a “collateral consequence”
of the underlying crime. Id. at 12. Based on our foregoing analysis, we need
not address the Commonwealth’s argument to dispose of this appeal.
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However, a panel of this Court recently rejected the precise argument
Scott currently advances in Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168 (Pa.
Super. 2018),6 which held that SORNA’s registration requirements are not
governed by the statutory maximum sentences as set forth in the Chapter 11
of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code; rather, the panel determined the two
punishments are separate and distinct. Id. at 172-173. Specifically, the panel
explained:
[T]he General Assembly “has the exclusive power to pronounce
which acts are crimes, to define crimes, and to fix the punishment
for all crimes. The legislature also has the sole power to classify
crimes[.]” Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 626 Pa. 512, 98 A.3d
1268, 1283 (2014) (citation and quotation omitted).
Our General Assembly has authorized courts to impose specific
punishments when fashioning a sentence, and specified maximum
terms and amounts of those punishments. These categories of
punishment include (1) partial or total confinement, (2) probation,
(3) state or county intermediate punishment, (4) a determination
of guilt without further penalty, and (5) a fine. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721.
With respect to the punishment of incarceration, 18 Pa.C.S. §
1103 governs the maximum authorized sentence of imprisonment
for felony convictions. By a separate statute, these maximum
allowable terms also apply to probationary sentences, a different
category of punishment authorized by the General Assembly. In
42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(a), the legislature directed that “[i]n imposing
an order of probation, the court shall specify at the time of
sentencing the length of any term during which the defendant is
to be supervised, which term may not exceed the maximum term
for which the defendant could be confined, and the authority that
shall conduct the supervision.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the
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6 “[T]he general rule in Pennsylvania is to apply the law in effect at the time
of the appellate decision.” Commonwealth v. Housman, 986 A.2d 822, 840
(Pa. 2009), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 881 (2010).
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legislature explicitly connected the authorized punishments of
incarceration and probation by statute.
However, most sentencing alternatives are not tied to the
maximum authorized term of incarceration. For example, the
legislature has authorized courts to include in sentences the
requirement that a defendant pay a fine or restitution. These
categories of punishment are not limited by the maximum period
of incarceration; rather, the legislature set different maximum
authorized amounts of punishment a court may impose as part of
its sentence. See, e.g., 18 Pa.C.S. § 1101 (defining maximum
fines); 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106 (providing statutory scheme for
restitution for injuries to person or property).
In SORNA, the legislature authorized courts to include periods of
registration as part of a sentence. Similar to the treatment of the
payment of fines or restitution, the legislature did not tie the
period of registration to the length of incarceration. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.14 (“Sexual offenses and tier system”); 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9799.15 (“Period of registration”). SORNA’s registration
provisions are not constrained by [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 1103. Rather,
SORNA’s registration requirements are an authorized, punitive
measure separate and apart from Appellant’s term of
incarceration. The legislature did not limit the authority of a court
to impose registration requirements only within the maximum
allowable term of incarceration; in fact, the legislature mandated
the opposite and required courts to impose registration
requirements in excess of the maximum allowable term of
incarceration.
Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s lifetime registration
requirement authorized by SORNA does not constitute an illegal
sentence. Appellant is not entitled to relief.
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Strafford, 194 A.3d at 172-173. See also Commonwealth v. Bricker,__
A.3d __, 2018 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1133, 2018 WL 5093265 [623 EDA 2018]
(Pa. Super. Oct. 19, 2018) (accord).7
Because we find Strafford, supra, binding authority in the present
matter, we conclude Scott’s lifetime registration requirement authorized by
SORNA does not constitute an illegal sentence.8 Accordingly, Scott is not
entitled to any relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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7 Scott notes that on January 3, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
granted allowance of appeal on issues similar to the one he raised:
1. Is it unconstitutional to require [Petitioner] to register for a
lifetime when said registration requirement exceeds the statutory
maximum penalty for [Petitioner’s] offense?
2. Is the Adam Walsh Statute unconstitutional in requiring the
[Petitioner] to register for a lifetime?
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 177 A.3d 822, 822-823 (Pa. 2018). At this time,
however, the Strafford decision is controlling.
8 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court requested that we remand the
matter to afford Scott the opportunity to argue Muniz. See Trial Court
Opinion, 2/15/2018. However, we decline to do so as “[t]his Court is not
bound by the rationale of the trial court, and we may affirm the trial court on
any basis.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 73 A.3d 609, 617 n.4 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 320 (Pa. 2014).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/12/2019
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