Com. v. Wheeler, A.

J-S76014-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
AARON CHRISTOPHER WHEELER :
: No. 273 EDA 2017
Appellant :
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 30, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0118351-1992
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 18, 2018
Aaron Wheeler appeals pro se from the order dismissing his fifth petition
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) as untimely. Wheeler’s
sprawling appellate brief identifies no less than seven issues he wishes to
argue in this Court. After careful review, none of Wheeler’s assertions are
capable of establishing the applicability of any valid exceptions to the PCRA’s
time-bar provisions. Thus, we affirm.
After a bench trial, the court found Wheeler guilty on various charges
arising from his participation in the robbery of a convenience store during
which the store clerk was shot four times. The court imposed an aggregate
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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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sentence of imprisonment of 27½ to 55 years, to be served consecutively to
lifetime sentences imposed for other violent armed robberies.
In his current PCRA petition, and his various amendments,1 Wheeler
seeks a cornucopia of remedies, from “correction” of the criminal complaint to
a reconsideration of issues raised in his previous PCRA petitions. Ultimately,
however, all of his claims are centered on his belief that he was wrongfully
convicted of being involved in the robbery. See, e.g., Appellant’s Brief, at 2.
The PCRA court found that Wheeler had failed to establish any exception
to the PCRA’s time-bar provisions. Thus, it dismissed Wheeler’s facially
untimely petition. This timely appeal followed.
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA by examining
whether the court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and
is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 799 n.2
(Pa. 2005).
The timeliness of a PCRA petition is jurisdictional. See Commonwealth
v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, a petition for
relief under the PCRA, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed
within one year of the date the judgment is final unless the petition alleges,
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1Wheeler titled these documents in various ways, including “motion to correct
official version,” and “petition for writ of habeas corpus.” Despite Wheeler’s
arguments to the contrary, the PCRA court correctly determined these
documents sought relief cognizable under the PCRA. Thus, the PCRA court did
not err in treating the documents as amendments to his pending PCRA
petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
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and the petitioner proves, an exception to the timeliness requirement. See §
9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A PCRA petition invoking one of these statutory
“exceptions must be filed within sixty days of the date the claims could have
been presented.” Hernandez, 79 A.3d at 652 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(2)).
Wheeler’s fifth petition is clearly facially untimely, as his third petition
was dismissed on timeliness grounds. See Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 468
EDA 2010 (Pa. Super., filed 3/21/11) (unpublished memorandum). He does
not argue otherwise in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief, at 12.
The argument section of Wheeler’s brief verges on incoherent. To the
best of our ability to decipher his claims, we recognize three arguable bases
for the application of a timeliness exception. To the extent Wheeler sought to
raise any issue not addressed here, we conclude such issue is waived for
failure to coherently raise it on appeal.
First, Wheeler argues that Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012),
recognized a new Constitutional right and therefore qualifies for the newly-
recognized right exception set forth in § 9545(b)(1)(iii). However, neither
Lafler, nor the related opinion in Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 133 (2012), are
capable of supporting the application of the newly-recognized right exception
to the time bar. See Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1277 (Pa.
Super. 2013). Thus, the PCRA court did not err in refusing to apply this
exception.
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Next, Wheeler argues that he recently discovered the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to convict him. Wheeler’s claim is based upon his belief that he
was never given notice of the charges against him before he went to trial.
However, even accepting Wheeler’s legal arguments at face value, his own
petition defeats this assertion. Attached as exhibit A to his petition is the
criminal complaint for this action. At the bottom of the complaint is Wheeler’s
signature, acknowledging that the complaint had been read and explained to
him, and consenting to be bound over to the Court of Common Pleas. Thus,
Wheeler was provided with notice of the charges against him prior to trial.
Furthermore, Wheeler claims he is entitled to re-sentencing pursuant to
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (ruling imposition of mandatory life
without parole sentences on juvenile offenders is unconstitutional). However,
he concedes he was 22 years old at the time of the crime. See Appellant’s
Brief, at 1. Our Court has held that because the decision in Miller is limited
to juvenile offenders, a petitioner who was not a juvenile at the time of his
crime cannot invoke the case to meet an exception to the PCRA time-bar. See,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016);
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013). It is also
worth noting that the sentences at issue here were not life sentences, and
thus Miller is simply inapplicable in any event. Therefore, the PCRA court did
not err in concluding this claim did not establish a timeliness exception.
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As we conclude none of Wheeler’s issues on appeal merit relief, we
affirm the order dismissing his petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/18/18
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