Adoption of: G.F., Appeal of: P.P.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: G.F. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: P.P., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 889 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered August 4, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 17 Adopt 2022
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 27, 2023
Appellant, P.P. (“Mother”), appeals from the orphans’ court decree dated
July 21, 2022, and entered August 4, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Fayette County, involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her daughter,
G.F. (“Child”), born in October 2020.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The Fayette County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the Agency”)
became involved with this family on November 16, 2020, after receiving a
report alleging that Child, who was discharged from the hospital on November
4, 2020, lost two pounds in ten days, and after Child stopped breathing, the
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1 The orphans’ court terminated the parental rights of putative father, D.M.
(“Father”), and any unknown father. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22,
at 1. Neither Father nor any unknown father has filed a separate appeal, and
they are not participants in the instant appeal.
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family had to perform CPR on her but failed to seek medical attention.2 N.T.,
6/2/22, at 15-16. Upon investigation, CYS validated the allegations of
inadequate health care, inadequate basic needs, and inadequate housing
because Child had not been seen by a pediatrician since she was discharged
from the hospital, Mother failed to seek medical treatment for Child for the
initially reported incident, and Mother did not have necessities for Child,
including diapers, wipes, bottles, and formula. Id. at 16-17. Additionally, on
November 19, 2020, Mother, who had been residing with a cousin, was evicted
from the home and unwilling to stay in a shelter apart from her paramour.
Id. at 8, 16-17.
Pursuant to an emergency order, on November 19, 2020, CYS obtained
custody of Child and placed Child with foster parents, E.S. and R.S. Id. at
5-6. The court adjudicated Child dependent on December 3, 2020. Id. at 6.
CYS established the following family service plan objectives for Mother in
furtherance of reunification, including: (1) obtaining a mental health
evaluation and following recommendations; (2) attending all mental health
appointments; (3) attending all scheduled visits with Child; (4) attending
parenting classes; (5) obtaining and maintaining appropriate housing;
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2 According to CYS caseworker, Jessica Roberts, “[t]he allegations were later
unfounded by the medical records that show that [Child] had . . .
cardiopulmonary abnormalities and [Child]’s weight had been initially logged
incorrectly.” N.T., 6/2/22, at 16. However, CYS ultimately validated
allegations of inadequate health care, inadequate basic needs, and inadequate
housing. Id.
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(6) signing releases; (7) meeting with the caseworker and notifying her of any
address change; and (8) providing for Child’s basic needs. Id. at 7-8.
Mother was offered in-person visits twice a week, supervised by Justice
Works Youth Care. Id. at 20-21, 23, 33-34. Between November 2020 and
March 2021, Mother resided in various motels and hotels in West Virginia. Id.
at 9. During that time span, Mother attended a total of six in-person visits
with Child. Id. at 20-21.
In March 2021, Mother obtained housing in Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania. Id. at 9. However, before CYS could assess the home, Mother
was arrested on March 31, 2021, due to a “domestic situation” and was held
at the Westmoreland County Jail. Id. at 9-10. On an unspecified date after
her arrest, Mother was extradited to Virginia because of an outstanding
warrant, and she remained incarcerated until she was released on bail on May
28, 2021. Id. at 10-11. Upon her release, Mother was prohibited from leaving
Virginia for another “couple [of] months” until her case came to a close. Id.
at 11, 52.
During Mother’s period of incarceration, visits did not occur as CYS was
unsuccessful in contacting Mother when she was in Westmoreland County Jail,
and they did not know her whereabouts after she was extradited to Virginia.
Id. at 22. Visits resumed on June 14, 2021, at which time Mother was offered
supervised virtual visits, twice a week. Id. At the time of the subject
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proceeding, Mother was residing in a hotel in Virginia with a paramour. Id.
at 45, 57, 60, 64.
On March 11, 2022, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
Mother’s parental rights, alleging grounds for termination pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court held a
hearing on the petition on June 2, 2022, at which time Child was one year and
seven months old. Child was represented by Kim Kovach, Esquire.3 CYS
presented testimony of its caseworker, Jessica Roberts, and Justice Works
Youth Care family resource specialist, Brittany Johnston. Mother testified on
her own behalf.
CYS caseworker, Ms. Roberts, testified that Mother was previously
involved with the Family Services Agency in Virginia in relation to another
child. Id. at 17. Ms. Roberts testified CYS contacted Virginia’s Family Services
Agency to inquire about its involvement with the family, and CYS received
records which revealed that Mother “had some significant mental health
issues.” Id. at 15, 17. Ms. Roberts stated that Mother denied having any
mental health or anger management issues. Id. at 18.
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3 Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to
her young age, the court did not appoint separate counsel for Child. See In
re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-1093 (Pa. 2018) (holding that “if the preferred
outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very
young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal
interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section
2313(a) of the Adoption Act” is satisfied.).
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Ms. Roberts testified that Child has an umbilical hernia, but it did not
require any additional appointments outside of her routine appointments. Id.
at 19-20. Ms. Roberts testified that Child does not have any developmental
or emotional issues at this time. Id. at 25-26. She further testified that Child
is “doing fine” physically and that Child’s “bile issue has been improving[,] and
she has no issues from her umbilical hernia at this time.” Id. at 26.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the orphans’ court involuntarily
terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child by decree dated July 21,
2022, and entered August 4, 2022. On August 5, 2022, Mother timely filed a
notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On October 11, 2022, the
orphans’ court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Mother sets forth the following issue for our consideration:
1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion in terminating
the parental rights of the natural [M]other, P.P., as Fayette
County [CYS] failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain
its burden of proof?
Mother’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
“In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the
termination court is supported by competent evidence.” In re Adoption of
C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021). When applying this standard, the
appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest of S.K.L.R.,
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256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual findings are
supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s
ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re
Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).
“[A]n abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion” or “the facts could support
an opposite result.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill-will.” Id. at 826. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to
trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
Interest of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d at 1123-24.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court must
balance the parent’s fundamental “right to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control” of his or her child with the “child’s essential needs
for a parent’s care, protection, and support.” C.M., 255 A.3d at 358.
Termination of parental rights has “significant and permanent consequences
for both the parent and child.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591. As such, the law of
this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory
grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear,
direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” C.M.,
255 A.3d at 359 (citation omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds
describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary
termination.” Id.; see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). In evaluating
whether the petitioner proved grounds under Section 2511(a), the trial court
must focus on the parent’s conduct and avoid using a “balancing or best
interest approach.” Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 n.6 (Pa. Super.
2021). If the trial court determines the petitioner established grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court
then must assess the petition under Section 2511(b), which focuses on the
child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Here, we review the orphans’ court’s decree pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:4
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
...
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4 We need only agree with any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with
Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re Adoption
of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In this case, we analyze the court’s decree pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
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(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not
be remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we have indicated:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
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duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa. Super. 2021), quoting In re
Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal citation
omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of
Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa. Super. 2017), quoting In re
N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 (Pa. Super. 2011). As such, “[a] parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d at 1105, quoting In re Z.P., 994 A.2d
1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In S.P., our Supreme Court addressed the relevance of incarceration in
termination decisions under Section 2511(a)(2). The S.P. Court held that
“incarceration is a factor, and indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court’s
conclusion that grounds for termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the
repeated and continued incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused
the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence and that
the causes of the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.” S.P., 47 A.3d at
828. Further, the Court explained,
[I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be
determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of
providing “essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the
length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly
relevant to whether “the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent,” sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2).
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Id. at 830.
On appeal, Mother asserts that CYS failed to present clear and
convincing evidence to establish grounds for termination under Section
2511(a)(2). Mother’s Brief at 16. She claims that despite the obstacles
imposed by her incarcerations in Pennsylvania and Virginia, she “exercised
reasonable firmness by continuing to make progress on her goal plan and by
managing to stay in contact with the [C]hild.” Id.
Instantly, the orphans’ court found:
Mother has shown a repeated and continued incapacity [and]
neglect starting at the very beginning of [Child]’s life in failing to
attend to a very serious condition wherein the [C]hild had to have
CPR. She failed to seek immediate medical attention.
Mother has been transient and/or homeless throughout the course
of the case. She has lived for a few months here and there with
friends, public housing, incarceration, and various hotel/motel
rooms. There is a pattern of instability in living arrangements and
in changing paramours. . . .
Mother has no verifiable history of evaluation or treatment of any
mental health disorder as she has not complied with the Agency’s
request for an evaluation and treatment nor has she provided
proof of any such treatment to the [c]ourt. In addition, Mother
has not provided signed releases for treatment to be verified by
using the flimsy excuse that she has no access to the mail.
Throughout the hearing, Mother would use profanity directed to
the caseworker testifying and interrupted the proceedings. At the
conclusion of testimony, Mother left the courtroom. Mother has
been non-compliant in communicating regularly with the Agency
and with her [C]hild. She has missed the majority of scheduled
visits.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 9-10.
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The record provides ample evidence in support of the orphans’ court’s
decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother’s permanency goal
objectives to reunify with Child included, inter alia: completing a mental health
evaluation; attending all mental health appointments; attending all scheduled
visits with Child; attending parenting classes; obtaining and maintaining
appropriate housing; and signing releases. N.T., 6/2/22, at 7-8, 19.
With respect to Mother’s mental health and parenting objectives, CYS
caseworker, Ms. Roberts, testified that while Mother denied having any mental
health issues, Mother informed Ms. Roberts that she was on “mental health
medication” but did not provide any further information. Id. at 14, 18. Ms.
Roberts testified that she e-mailed Mother a letter and a dependency court
order, requesting verification of Mother’s medication. Id. at 14. However,
Mother did not provide any verification. Id. at 14, 18. Ms. Roberts testified
that Mother did not complete a mental health evaluation, did not sign any
releases for CYS, has not enrolled in parenting classes in Pennsylvania or
Virginia, and has not provided any documentation showing she completed a
parenting class. Id. at 11-12, 14.
Significantly, on cross-examination, Mother testified she believed she
had depression in 2014 or 2015 and, at the time, she had taken Depakote,
Seroquel, Abilify, Zoloft, and Prozac. Id. at 62. Mother also testified that she
was voluntarily hospitalized for mental health reasons twice, in 2014 and
2015. Id. at 63. Mother explained that she presently attends therapy to cope
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with the loss of her family members, but she is not taking any medications.
Id. at 63-64. Mother testified that she began therapy three months before
the subject proceeding and attends sessions every two or three weeks. Id.
at 47, 64. Mother also testified that she underwent a mental health evaluation
in January 2022 but denied having been diagnosed with any conditions. Id.
at 46, 48. Mother further testified that she began attending a virtual parenting
class in February 2021, but she has attended only nine classes thus far and
has not yet completed the program. Id. at 49-50
In asserting that she made progress on the family service plan, Mother
relies on her own testimony that she underwent a mental health evaluation in
2022 and has been attending therapy. Mother’s Brief at 15-16; N.T., 6/2/22,
at 46-47. However, as the orphans’ court found, Mother failed to sign any
releases for CYS to verify the evaluation or her participation in therapy.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 9; N.T., 6/2/22, at 45. Mother testified
that she could not provide CYS with a release because she was unable to send
the release by mail. N.T., 6/2/22, at 45-46. Mother explained that the
mailman refused to send out her mail because her name was not on the lease
of her residence. Id. at 46, 54. When asked why she did not simply drop her
mail in a mailbox, Mother testified, “Transportation.” Id. at 55. Notably,
despite claiming transportation posed an obstacle for her, Mother testified that
she takes a bus twice a week to donate plasma. Id. at 66.
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Ultimately, the orphans’ court found that Mother was not credible.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 6. The court was well within its
discretion to find Mother’s testimony not credible. See In the Interest of
D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 966 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The [o]rphans’ [c]ourt is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”)
(citation omitted). By relying on her own self-serving testimony to bolster her
claim, Mother essentially asks this Court to reweigh the evidence, and this we
cannot do.
In addition, the orphans’ court noted that Mother has not found a stable
living arrangement. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/11/22, at 9. The record
reveals that, after her eviction in November 2020, Mother had stayed in
various motels and hotels, was incarcerated for two months, and was living in
a hotel in Virginia at the time of the subject proceeding. N.T., 6/2/22, at 9-10,
57, 60. On cross-examination, when asked if she has ever had a stable
residence while in Virginia, Mother testified:
Q. Alright, is it fair to say that you have not really had stable
residence since you have been in Virginia, the
[Commonwealth] of Virginia?
A. I have been stable maybe once. That was my choice to
leave due to the person I was staying with. So I never got
kicked out of a spot since I’ve been in Virginia.
Id. at 57-58.
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Further, Mother has failed to maintain consistent contact with Child.
Family resource specialist, Ms. Johnston, testified that Mother attended only
six in-person supervised visits between November 2020 and March 2021. Id.
at 35. After Mother’s release from prison in May of 2021, Mother was afforded
supervised virtual visits with Child beginning on June 14, 2021. Id. at 22.
Between June 14, 2021, and August 18, 2021, Mother attended only five out
of eighteen virtual visits. Id. at 36-37. Mother was removed from the
visitation schedule between August 18, 2021, and September 15, 2021, due
to her failure to confirm four consecutive visits. Id. at 37. From September
15, 2021, to November 25, 2021, Mother participated in nine out of nineteen
virtual visits. Id. Mother was removed from the schedule again on November
25, 2021, due to missing four consecutive visits. Id. Her virtual visits
resumed on January 27, 2022, and since that time, she attended twenty out
of approximately thirty-two virtual visits offered. Id. Ms. Johnston further
testified that she ended one of Mother’s virtual visits early because Mother
was not paying attention to Child. Id. Rather, during that visit, Mother was
yelling while reportedly babysitting her friend’s children. Id. Ms. Johnston
also testified that when Justice Works scheduled a special visit for Child’s
birthday in October 2021, Mother canceled at the last minute because she
reported she was at a “church function.” Id. at 38-39.
Notably, the testimonial evidence shows that even after her release from
prison in May 2021, Mother has not returned to Pennsylvania to participate in
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any in-person visits with Child. Id. at 11, 52-53. Specifically, Mother
testified:
Q. After you got bonded out, were you allowed to return to
Pennsylvania?
A. Yes. I was allowed after a couple of months with pre-trials
and made sure that the charges were dropped and I didn’t
have to continue to go to [c]ourt. I am allowed to leave. . .
...
Q. Why did you not return to Pennsylvania after you were able
to?
A. Because I have everything down here. I have a job, I have
a home. I think everything was doing great down her[e]
now. So I decided I did not want to go back and it wasn’t
because I don’t want to get my daughter, it wasn’t because
I don’t want to see her. I’ve always wanted to get her back
and I always want to see her. It’s just, Pennsylvania was
too much for me and I have no family there but her and I
didn’t want to be there by myself so I just stayed in Virginia.
But, I will always care about getting my daughter back and
seeing her. I just didn’t want to go back to Pennsylvania
because there was nothing there for me.
Id. at 52-53. Mother later clarified that she “just started” her employment at
7-11 the “Tuesday after Memorial Day.” Id. at 67.
Accordingly, the record reveals that Mother’s repeated and continued
incapacity, neglect or refusal has caused Child to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for her physical or mental well-being,
and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent. During the eighteen months that Child
was in CYS custody, Mother saw then one-year-old Child in-person only six
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times, and she sporadically attended virtual visits. Mother failed to obtain
stable or suitable housing. Despite Mother’s self-serving testimony that she
underwent a mental health evaluation that rendered no diagnoses and that
she is attending therapy sessions, Mother failed to provide CYS with a release
to verify her claims, and the orphans’ court found Mother not fully credible.
The testimony further reveals that, despite claiming that she wants her
daughter back, Mother has not returned to Pennsylvania to see Child in-person
after her release from prison in May 2021. Thus, we find no error or abuse of
discretion by the trial court in terminating Mother’s parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2).
Proceeding to Section 2511(b), Mother has waived any claim that the
orphans’ court erred by concluding that termination of her parental rights
would best serve Child’s needs and welfare because she fails to develop this
claim. In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is
well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the
argument section of an appellant’s brief, and supported by citations to
relevant authority”). Mother cites no relevant authority and does not provide
any argument challenging the termination of her parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
Even if this claim were not waived, we conclude that the record provides
competent evidence in support of the court’s decision to terminate Mother’s
parental rights under Section 2511(b). With respect to Section 2511(b), this
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Court has stated that the trial court “must . . . discern the nature and status
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of
permanently severing that bond.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further,
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent.
In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010). Our Supreme Court
explained, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering termination must
also consider whether the [child is] in a pre-adoptive home and whether [the
child has] a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.
The Court directed that, in weighing the bond considerations pursuant to
Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in
mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court observed, “[c]hildren are young for a
scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy
development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is
catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
The record here shows no evidence of a meaningful bond between
Mother and Child. The family resource specialist, Ms. Johnston, testified that
during the virtual visits, Mother communicates more with Ms. Johnston or the
caregiver than with Child. N.T., 6/2/22, at 39. Ms. Johnston testified that
even though Mother tries to get Child’s attention by calling her name, Child
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does not go to Mother on the phone. Id. at 39. When asked how Child refers
to Mother during the virtual visits, Ms. Johnston testified:
Q. How does [Child] refer to the [M]other during these zoom
visits?
A. In my opinion, [Child] does not look at the phone, does not
call her mother, does not interact with her. She interacts
with the caregiver more, and call[s] her mom during the
visits.
Id. at 40. While visits are scheduled for an hour, Ms. Johnston testified that
the visits “rarely” last the full hour. Id. She testified Mother would be “staring
at [Child] playing or talking to us, . . . the caregiver or myself.” Id. Ms.
Johnston testified that she tries to reengage Child into the visit, but
“sometimes, it just doesn’t work out that way” and Mother will end the visit
early. Id. at 40-41. On cross-examination, Ms. Johnson testified that Mother
has not shown improvement with interacting with Child during the visits. Id.
at 42.
Moreover, the evidence demonstrates that Child is bonded with her
foster parents. Ms. Roberts testified that Child is doing “very well” with foster
parents, appears to be “very bonded” with the foster parents, and “appears
to be thriving.” Id. at 25. Ms. Roberts noted that Child does not have any
development or emotional issues and that Child is physically “doing fine.” Id.
at 25-26. She testified that foster parents are willing to “offer permanency”
for Child. Id. at 26. Similarly, Ms. Johnston testified that during Mother’s
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virtual visits, Child interacted more with the caregiver and called the caregiver
“mom.” Id. at 40.
Accordingly, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its
discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/27/2023
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