DocketNumber: Appeal, 253
Judges: Rhodes, Hirt, Reno, Dithrich, Ross, Arnold, Fine
Filed Date: 11/9/1948
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Argued November 9, 1948. Admittedly the claimant is entitled to occupational disease compensation, and the only question is which of three insurance carriers is liable for its payment. The referee and the board awarded compensation against the employer, Richmond Radiator Company, the Commonwealth, and the Travelers Insurance Company (hereafter called "Travelers"). Upon appeal the court below affirmed the board, and entered judgment. The case is here upon the appeal of the employer and Travelers in which the Commonwealth did not join. Appellees are Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association Casualty Insurance Company, and the claimant. *Page 156
Gaydosh was employed by Richmond Radiator Company from May 7, 1927, to January 31, 1947, and during that period was exposed to a silica hazard. On February 1, 1947, his physician informed claimant that he had silicosis of both lungs which had developed to an acute stage and that he must immediately quit his work. The doctor testified that the disease had been contracted sometime prior to January 1, 1947, but that the exact or even approximate date of its inception could not be ascertained. In any event total disability occurred on January 31, 1947, and that was also the date of claimant's last exposure to the hazard.
Travelers covered the risk after January 1, 1947. In 1945 and 1946 it was covered by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and in previous years by Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association Casualty Insurance Company.
Travelers contends that, since the disease had its inception prior to the effective date of its policy, the award should not have been made against it, but against that insurer whose policy was in force at the date when the disease was contracted. It builds its whole argument upon a few sentences in Anderson v.Schroeder,
When the statement is read in its factual context it becomes crystal clear that it refers to the last exposure. Anderson worked for Schroeder from 1936 to 1942 in a silica-laden atmosphere. During 1943 he was engaged in other employment where he was not subjected to the silica hazard. He became totally disabled by silicosis on January 16, 1944, and death resulted from it on November 7, 1944. The carrier had insured Schroeder's *Page 157 liability from July, 1939, to July, 1943, and consequently covered the risk during part of Anderson's exposure, including of course his last exposure in 1942. The carrier sought exoneration from liability because its policy was not in effect in 1944 when Anderson became disabled and died. This contention was rejected, and naturally the phrase "afflicted with silicosis" refers to the exposure which has definite significance, that is, the last exposure. The citations of and references to applicable statutory provisions, particularly those on pages 622 and 624, lucidly demonstrate that only the last exposure was contemplated as the time when liability became fixed.
The Occupational Disease Act of June 21, 1939, P.L. 566, as amended, § 301 (g),
The Act fixes definitely the time when liability attaches, and expository discussion is unnecessary. It is the last exposure which imposes liability, and employe's *Page 158
right to compensation is complete when total disability occurs.Agostin v. Pittsburgh Steel Foundry Corp.,
Travelers insured the liability of "the employer in whose employment the employe was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease claimed." A copy of its policy is not in evidence, but Travelers admitted that by its terms it had agreed "to assume the whole liability of this employer under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act of 1939. . . ." One month after Travelers issued its policy the claimant was last exposed to the hazard and that exposure established liability of the employer and his carrier.
Judgment affirmed.