Com. v. Delvalles-Vincente, R.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
RUBEN DELVALLES-VINCENTE
Appellant No. 880 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 26, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001780-2014
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 29, 2016
Ruben Delvalles-Vincente appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed on January 26, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of York County,
following his conviction by jury on the charges of first and third-degree
murder1 regarding the shooting death of Carlos Ramos-Diaz. He received a
sentence of life imprisonment. In this timely appeal, Delvalles-Vincente
raises three claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the
conviction for first-degree murder and to disprove Delvalles-Vincente’s claim
of self-defense, (2) the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and
(3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a) and (c).
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intoxication, as it relates to first-degree murder. After a thorough review of
the submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we
affirm.
We first address the issue of sufficiency of the evidence.
The standard of review for claims of insufficient evidence is well-
settled. With respect to such claims, we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner.
In that light, we decide if the evidence and all reasonable
inferences from that evidence are sufficient to establish the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We keep in
mind that it was for the trier of fact to determine the weight of
the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. The jury was free
to believe all, part or none of the evidence. This Court may not
weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment or that of the
factfinder.
Commonwealth v. Devries, 112 A.3d 663, 667 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations omitted).
Regarding a claim of self-defense,
a claim of self-defense (or justification, to use the term
employed in the Crimes Code) requires evidence establishing
three elements: “(a) [that the defendant] reasonably believed
that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury
and that it was necessary to use deadly force against the victim
to prevent such harm; (b) that the defendant was free from fault
in provoking the difficulty which culminated in the slaying; and
(c) that the [defendant] did not violate any duty to retreat.”
Commonwealth v. Samuel, 527 Pa. 298, 590 A.2d 1245,
1247, 48 (1991). See also Commonwealth v. Harris, 550 Pa.
92, 703 A.2d 441, 449 (1997); 18 Pa.C.S. § 505. Although the
defendant has no burden to prove self-defense, see discussion
below, before the defense is properly in issue, “there must be
some evidence, from whatever source, to justify such a finding.”
Once the question is properly raised, “the burden is upon the
Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not acting in self-defense.” Commonwealth v.
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Black, 474 Pa. 47, 376 A.2d 627, 630 (1977). The
Commonwealth sustains that burden of negation “if it proves any
of the following: that the slayer was not free from fault in
provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the
slaying; that the slayer did not reasonably believe that [he] was
in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that it
was necessary to kill in order to save [him]self therefrom; or
that the slayer violated a duty to retreat or avoid the danger.”
Commonwealth v. Burns, 490 Pa. 352, 416 A.2d 506, 507
(1980).
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 53 A.3d 738, 740-41 (Pa. 2012) (footnote
omitted). Further,
To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the
Commonwealth must prove that the defendant acted with the
specific intent to kill, that a human being was unlawfully killed,
that the accused did the killing and that the killing was done with
deliberation. It is the specific intent to kill which distinguishes
murder in the first degree from lesser grades of murder. This
Court has held repeatedly that the use of a deadly weapon on a
vital part of a human body is sufficient to establish the specific
intent to kill. Additionally, the Commonwealth can prove the
specific intent to kill from circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Simpson, 754 A.2d 1264, 1269 (Pa. 2000) (citations
omitted).
The evidence here, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, was that on the night at issue and prior to
the shooting, Delvalles-Vincente attended a party where he was soundly
beaten in two fistfights by the victim. The fight began after Delvalles-
Vincente and others repeatedly made fun of Ramos-Diaz for being a kept
man. N.T. 1/20/2015, pp. 92-93; 2/21/2015, pp. 128, 203, 258. When
Ramos-Diaz first approached Delvalles-Vincente in the house where the
party was being held, Delvalles-Vincente pulled a gun on Ramos-Diaz. N.T.
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1/21/2015, pp. 130, 203, 205. Ramos-Diaz pushed the gun away and
began punching Delvalles-Vincente. N.T. 1/20/2015, pp. 94, 109;
1/21/2015, pp. 130, 180, 205-06.
After the fight in the kitchen ended, Delvalles-Vincente and his friend,
Victor Martinez-Raices, were ejected from the house. N.T. 1/20/2015, pp.
95, 110; 1/21/2015, pp. 132, 193, 206-07, 260, 1/23/2015, p. 385.
However, they did not leave; Delvalles-Vincente sought a rematch,
threatening the house with gunfire if Ramos-Diaz did not come outside to
fight again. N.T. 1/20/2015, p. 96; 1/21/2015, pp. 132-33, 181, 207, 260-
66. Eventually, Ramos-Diaz and others went outside. N.T. 1/20/2015, p.
98; 1/21/2015, pp. 135, 194, 209; 1/23/2015, p. 385. The two men agreed
to fight again, by street rules – meaning fistfight only. N.T. 1/20/2015, p.
99; 1/21/2015, p. 194. Martinez-Raices had picked up Delvalles-Vincente’s
gun at some point during the first fistfight. N.T. 1/21/2015, pp. 131, 206;
1/23/2015, p. 385. The result of the second fight was the same as the first.
When the fight ended, Ramos-Diaz walked away. N.T. 1/20/2015, p. 102;
1/21/2015, p. 212. Delvalles-Vincente retrieved his gun from Martinez-
Raices and ran up behind Ramos-Diaz, shooting at him at least four times.
N.T. 1/20/2015, pp. 104, 119. Ramos-Diaz was struck three times, twice in
the leg and once in the back. The gunshot wound to his back proved fatal.
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There was a perforation of the skin[,] following that[,] soft
tissues underneath the skin was issued [sic2] as the bullet
continued, it injures muscles of the left side of the body, part of
the lumbar vertebral column which is your backbone in your
abdomen, muscles along the backbone, and then the aorta which
is the largest blood vessel in the body as it branches into the
thoracic arteries which are vessels that go into your leg. So at
that level this large vessel was perforated. That caused
extensive bleeding.
Then the bullet continued as it entered soft tissues associated
with the intestines and the intestines themselves and ultimately
soft [t]issues, muscles along side of the abdomen as the bullet
exited through the right side of the abdomen.
N.T. 1/21/2015, p. 232. The fatal bullet path “directed from Mr. Ramon-
Diaz’ back to his front, from left to right and slightly upward.” N.T.
1/21/2015, p. 234.
The evidence demonstrated that after being beaten in a fistfight,
Delvalles-Vicente obtained the murder weapon from another person,
approached the victim from behind, and shot him multiple times, one of
those shots causing extreme damage to the victim’s internal abdominal
organs, killing him. There is no question that a gun is a deadly weapon and
the abdomen is a vital part of the human body. See Commonwealth v.
Sepulveda, 855 A.2d 783, 788 (Pa. 2004) (abdomen is a vital part of the
human body). Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict
of first-degree murder.
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2
We believe this is a typographical error; the word was more likely
“injured.”
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Delvalles-Vincente testified it was Ramos-Diaz who introduced the gun
into the fight and that he fired at Ramos-Diaz believing Ramos-Diaz was
attempting to kill him, but the jury was entitled to disbelieve his version of
the events. The testimony of other witnesses was that Delvalles-Vincente
continued the fight by staying outside after being ejected and threatening
the home with gunfire if Ramos-Diaz did not come outside to continue the
fight. Not only could Delvalles-Vincente have safely retreated after the
outside fistfight ended, but Delvalles-Vincente intentionally continued the
violence by obtaining a gun, following Ramos-Diaz, who was leaving the
fight scene, and shooting Ramos-Diaz in the back. All of these facts are
sufficient to defeat Delvalles-Vincente’s claim of self-defense.
Next, Delvalles-Vincente argues the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence. Specifically, he claims the jury improperly ignored evidence
that Delvalles-Vincente was intoxicated at the time he shot Ramos-Diaz and
therefore was incapable of forming the specific intent to kill. The argument
is unavailing.
Initially, we note, “The trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Benito, 133 A.3d 333, 335
(Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Also,
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be
granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or
because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at
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a different conclusion. Rather, “the role of the trial judge is
to determine that ‘notwithstanding all the facts, certain
facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or
to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
justice.’ ” It has often been stated that “a new trial should
be awarded when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award
of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given
another opportunity to prevail.”
An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a
weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
review applied by the trial court:
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of
whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear
and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will
give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons
advanced by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court's
determination that the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. One of the least assailable reasons for granting
or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction that
the verdict was or was not against the weight of the
evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the
interest of justice.
Commonwealth v. Horne, 89 A.3d 277, 285 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
Here, the trial court heard the evidence presented at trial and
determined the jury’s verdict was not against the weight of the evidence.
Our review of the certified record finds no abuse of discretion in that
determination. Accordingly, Delvalles-Vincente is not entitled to relief on
this issue.
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In his final claim, Delvalles-Vincente argues the trial court erred in not
charging the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication.3 “A defense of
diminished capacity negates the element of specific intent, and thus
mitigates first-degree murder to third-degree murder.” Commonwealth v.
Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1263 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
In reviewing a challenge to the trial court's refusal to give a
specific jury instruction, it is the function of this Court to
determine whether the record supports the trial court's decision.
In examining the propriety of the instructions a trial court
presents to a jury, our scope of review is to determine whether
the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error
of law which controlled the outcome of the case. A jury charge
will be deemed erroneous only if the charge as a whole is
inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse,
rather than clarify, a material issue. A charge is considered
adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what the trial
judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to
fundamental error. Consequently, the trial court has wide
discretion in fashioning jury instructions. The trial court is not
required to give every charge that is requested by the parties
and its refusal to give a requested charge does not require
reversal unless the Appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.
Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 77 A.3d 663, 667 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted).
Here, Delvalles-Vincente argues he presented evidence demonstrating
he was intoxicated and had sniffed cocaine. One witness testified he
appeared “drugged out.” N.T. 1/21/2015, p. 216. Another witness claimed
when Delvalles-Vincente called her after the shooting, he sounded
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3
This defense is also known as “diminished capacity.”
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intoxicated because he was not speaking clearly and did not seem to know
where he was. N.T. 1/22/2015, p. 318.
The mere fact of voluntary intoxication does not give rise to a
diminished capacity defense. Rather, to prove diminished
capacity due to voluntary intoxication, a defendant must show
that he was overwhelmed to the point of losing his faculties and
sensibilities. Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 596 Pa. 510, 946
A.2d 645, 653 (2008); Commonwealth v. Spotz, 587 Pa. 1,
896 A.2d 1191, 1218 (2006). Evidence that the defendant
lacked the ability to control his or her actions or acted
impulsively is irrelevant to specific intent to kill, and thus is not
admissible to support a diminished capacity defense.
Commonwealth v. Vandivner, 599 Pa. 617, 962 A.2d 1170,
1183 (2009).
This Court has previously made clear that a jury instruction
regarding diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication is
justified only when the record contains evidence that the
accused was intoxicated to the point of losing his or her faculties
or sensibilities. Commonwealth v. Reiff, 489 Pa. 12, 413 A.2d
672, 674 (1980). Evidence that the accused ingested alcohol or
other intoxicating drug—without more—does not warrant a
voluntary intoxication instruction.
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d at 1263 (emphasis in original).
Delvalles-Vincente provides no further support for his contention that
his appearing “drugged out” and not knowing where he was equates to
intoxication “to the point of losing his facilities and sensibilities.” Padilla,
supra. Additionally, the Commonwealth argues that Delvalles-Vincente’s
own testimony belies his claim of diminished capacity.
At trial, Delvalles-Vincente claimed he clearly remembered the facts
regarding his claim of self-defense and the circumstances that led to his
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shooting Ramos-Diaz. Specifically, Delvalles-Vincente testified on cross-
examination as follows:
Q: …[D]o you remember where you went after the fight?
A: Marybeth’s.
Q: You went to her house; correct?
A: Yes, with my cousin [Martinez-Raices].
Q: And you were with your cousin and you walked there;
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Once you got there – well, first of all, how long did it take to
get to her house from the fight?
A: I don’t know.
Q: You don’t know? So you remember who attacked you;
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: You remember why they attacked you; correct?
A: Yes, I remember. I imagine it was because of – yes. Yes. I
remember. I remember.
Q: And you remember that Alex[4] made you jump over a fence;
correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you remember that Carlos [Ramos-Diaz] came out of the
house; correct?
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4
Alex Resto-Montalvo and his wife, Loruama Pacheco-Morales, were the co-
owners of the house.
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A: Yes.
Q: And you knew everyone at the party; correct?
A: Yes.
Q: And you even remember what you had to drink at the party,
didn’t you?
A: Yes.
Q: And you remember exactly how that fight went down;
correct?
A: The first fight?
Q: The second fight.
A: The second fight I was forced to fight.
Q: But you remember exactly what happened; correct?
A: Yes. That Alex Resto forced me to fight.
Q: Okay. And you remember – in fact you testified as to what
you were thinking at the time you shot Carlos; correct? You
shot Carlos, you remember why you did it; correct?
A: Because I was afraid for my life.
Q: Because you were afraid for your life?
A: I didn’t want him to get close to me to take the gun away
from me.
Q: Okay. So you had the gun; correct?
A: I took it away from Carlos.
Q: You took –
A: From his hands.
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Q: You took the gun from Carlos’ hands?
A: Yes.
N.T. 1/22/2015, pp. 358-60.
Clearly, Delvalles-Vincente’s own testimony demonstrated that he was
not intoxicated to the point of losing his faculties. Accordingly, the trial
court correctly denied his request for a jury instruction regarding diminished
capacity.
In light of the foregoing, Delvalles-Vincente is not entitled to relief on
any of his claims.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/29/2016
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