In the Interest of: P.S., a Minor, Appeal of: P.S.

J-A01018-17
2017 Pa. Super. 70
IN THE INTEREST OF: P.S., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF P.S., A MINOR
No. 577 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Orders of March 28, 2016 and April 11, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-02-JV-000183-2015,
CP-02-JV-0001963-2015, FID 02-FN-034554-2010 and SID 429-53-30-0
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 17, 2017
Appellant, P.S., a juvenile, appeals from the order entered on March
28, 2016 adjudicating him delinquent of three offenses1 without further
disposition, as well as a subsequent dispositional order, following the
revocation of his probation, entered on April 11, 2016. Upon careful
consideration, we affirm Appellant’s adjudications for receiving stolen
property and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, but vacate his
adjudication for flight to avoid apprehension. Further, we affirm the
dispositional order entered on April 11, 2016.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
Officer Steven Kester[,] a police officer with the North
Braddock Police Department[,] stated that on Sunday,
January 17, 2016 at approximately [8:10 p.m.], he and a
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1
The trial court adjudicated Appellant delinquent of receiving stolen
property, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925, flight to avoid apprehension, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5126, and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3733.
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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fellow officer were on patrol when they came into contact
with a Jeep SUV. According to Officer Kester, he ran the
license plate number of the Jeep SUV because moments
before, he had learned from the East Pittsburgh Police
Department that a Jeep SUV had been reported stolen.
Upon confirmation that the license plate on the vehicle
matched that of the Jeep SUV that was reported stolen,
Officer Kester testified that they activated their lights and
siren on the police vehicle and attempted to stop the Jeep
SUV. Officer Kester testified that instead of stopping, the
Jeep SUV ‘took off, went down a couple [of] streets, turned
down a back alley along the train tracks, lost control on a
dirt road and smashed into a tree.’ Officer Kester added
that once the vehicle took off, it traveled at a rate above
the speed limit for approximately one-half mile before the
driver lost control of the Jeep SUV on an icy, dirt road,
which caused the vehicle to slide sideways and impact a
tree head-on. The collision with the tree then caused the
Jeep SUV to be knocked down onto the railroad tracks.
Officer Kester testified that when the Jeep SUV crashed, the
police car was approximately twenty feet behind the Jeep
forcing them to slam on their brakes.
Once the vehicle stopped, Officer Kester was able to
determine the number of occupants in the Jeep SUV vehicle
because both the headlights of the police vehicle and the
‘overhead take down lights’ were extremely bright and
illuminated the interior of the Jeep SUV. Officer Kester saw
three occupants ‘bail’ out of the Jeep SUV from the
passenger side of the vehicle and flee the scene. Officer
Kester stated he was pretty sure that the individual behind
the steering wheel was wearing a puffy, blue coat. This
person was also the last one to exit the vehicle. The other
two occupants were wearing black hoodies.
Officer Kester pursued the person wearing the blue jacket.
He followed him down a hill, at times tripping and falling.
Officer Kester stated that during the foot chase, the person
in the blue jacket was never more than twenty to thirty feet
ahead of him.
Once they reached Corey Street, Officer Kester stated he
began yelling ‘Taser’ as he was running close behind the
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individual. Shortly afterwards, the individual ‘put his hands
up and turned around.’ He then surrendered himself to the
officer. This person was later determined to be P.S.,
[Appellant] in this case.
In court, Officer Kester testified that Appellant was ‘wearing
basically the same thing’ in court that day that he was
wearing the night of his arrest: a blue jacket similar to the
one hanging from [A]ppellant’s chair and a headband he
observed [A]ppellant wearing in the hallway. Officer Kester
identified [Appellant] as the person who ‘was driving the car
that night.’
Continuing in his testimony, Officer Kester explained that
[A]ppellant told him that he had been at a friend’s home
earlier that evening, that the friend had called a ‘jitney’ for
him, and that this jitney was the same vehicle in which he
was riding when the police pulled up behind them.
Appellant also denied knowing the other two passengers in
the vehicle.
The Commonwealth called [R.C.2] as its second witness.
[R.C.] testified that she had been the owner of a green,
2003 Jeep Liberty that was stolen from her residence
located in the Regent Square neighborhood of the City of
Pittsburgh. While [R.C.] could not remember the exact date
her 2003 Jeep was stolen, [R.C.] testified it was taken on a
Friday because when she went out on Saturday morning to
use the vehicle, her car was missing. The police were called
and a report was made. [R.C.] testified that she was
notified on Monday or Tuesday by the police that her vehicle
had been found abandoned and damaged in North
Braddock. She testified that she had not left the keys in her
vehicle, that she did not know Appellant and that she had
not given him permission to operate or drive her vehicle.
The Commonwealth rested its case after the conclusion of
the testimony of [R.C.]. Appellant presented no witnesses.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/2016, at 5–8 (record citations omitted).
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2
We use the victim’s initials to protect her identity.
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Procedurally, the case progressed as follows. On January 25, 2016,
the Commonwealth filed a delinquency petition against Appellant charging
him with the aforementioned charges, as well as possession of a controlled
substance,3 a charge the Commonwealth eventually withdrew. Because
Appellant was on probation as the result of a prior adjudication of
delinquency for retail theft, the trial court scheduled a joint hearing on
February 22, 2016, to address the alleged probation violations and the new
offenses. The trial court, however, continued the hearing because the
alleged victim was unavailable.
On March 28, 2016, the trial court found Appellant delinquent of the
aforementioned charges. The trial court, however, did not impose a
disposition on the new adjudications. Instead, it entered an order on March
28, 2016 stating, “[Appellant] is ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT and no further
disposition is ordered because [Appellant] is currently under the court’s
supervision” on his previous adjudication for retail theft. Order, 5/28/2016,
at 1. Immediately after the adjudication hearing, the trial court proceeded
to a review hearing on the alleged probation violations. The trial court found
that Appellant was not meeting the terms and conditions of his probation
and that probation was no longer appropriate. Accordingly, the trial court
revoked Appellant’s probation on the underlying retail theft adjudication and
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3
35 P.S. § 780–113(a)(16).
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ordered that Appellant be committed to the Penn Hills Community Intensive
Supervision Program (CISP). When the trial court ordered the commitment
to CISP, Appellant became agitated. Thus, the trial court continued the
dispositional hearing on the probation violation until the following day to
reconsider whether CISP was an appropriate placement for Appellant and to
explain his post-dispositional rights. On March 29, 2016, the trial court
deferred further disposition on the probation violation until April 11, 2016.
On April 11, 2016, the trial court entered a probation violation dispositional
order, directing placement with the Outside-In Residential Program. On
April 22, 2016, Appellant filed a single notice of appeal from the March 28,
2016 order adjudicating him delinquent and imposing no further disposition
on the new delinquency adjudications. Appellant’s April 22, 2016 notice also
appealed from the dispositional order entered on April 11, 2016 for violating
the terms of probation following the prior adjudication for retail theft.
Before we turn to the merits of this case, we must address several
procedural irregularities. Initially, we note that the trial court recommends
in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that “because the [A]ppellant has not filed an
appeal as to the April 11, 2016 order entered, that his appeal should be
quashed for failing to timely file his appeal.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/2016,
at 4. However, upon review of the record, Appellant filed a single notice of
appeal captioned with the docket numbers from both the underlying retail
theft adjudication and new adjudications, purporting to appeal “from the
March 28, 2016, March 29, 2016, and April 11, 2016 dispositional orders.”
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Notice of Appeal, 4/22/2016. Thus, we reject the trial court’s suggestion
that we quash the appeal for failing to file a notice of appeal from the April
11, 2016 order.
We recognize however, that “[w]here [] one or more orders resolves
issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one
judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed.” Note to Pa.R.A.P. 341,
citing Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111, 113 n.3 (Pa. Super.
2007). In C.M.K., this Court quashed a single appeal from two judgments of
sentence imposed on codefendants who were convicted and sentenced
individually on different charges. C.M.K., 932 A.2d at 112. We noted that
the filing of the joint appeal in that instance was unworkable because the
appeals required individualized arguments, separate appellate analyses of
the evidence, and distinct examination of the different sentences imposed.
Id. This case is distinguishable from C.M.K.
While our Supreme Court recognized that the practice of appealing
multiple orders in a single appeal is discouraged under Pa.R.A.P. 512 (joint
appeals), it previously determined that “appellate courts have not generally
quashed [such] appeals, provided that the issues involved are nearly
identical, no objection to the appeal has been raised, and the period for
appeal has expired.” K.H. v. J.R., 826 A.2d 863, 870 (Pa. 2003) (citation
omitted). Here, Appellant presents intertwined issues related to his new
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adjudications and revocation disposition, the Commonwealth has not
objected,4 and the appeal period has expired. Hence, we decline to quash
the appeals because Appellant filed a single appeal from the two orders at
issue.
Finally, we must address whether we have jurisdiction to hear
Appellant’s appeal as it pertains to the March 28, 2016 order imposing no
further disposition on the new delinquency adjudications. More specifically,
we must determine whether that order constitutes a final order. Appellant
addresses this subject in his first issue presented on appeal, wherein he
avers:
1. Should Appellant’s appeal be permitted to proceed as is,
inasmuch as (A) with respect to his appeal from the
delinquency-without-disposition judgment order that was
entered in CP-02-JV-0000183-2016, that order was the
juvenile equivalent of a judgment of conviction without
further punishment in an adult case, and was thus an
appealable final order; and, furthermore (B) with respect
to his error in taking a single appeal from the March 28,
2016 delinquency-without-disposition judgment order
entered in CP-02-JV-0000183-2016 and from the
resultant April 11, 2016 probation violation disposition
order that was entered (by the same judge) in CP-02-JV-
0001963-2015, that error should be excused since it did
not deprive this Court of jurisdiction, since the
Commonwealth has indicated that it does not object to
the taking of a single appeal rather than of two separate
appeals, and since the error was de minimus given the
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4
See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 15 n.7 (“The Commonwealth does not
believe that the instant appeal should be defeated simply because of this
procedural error on [] [A]ppellant’s part but would [] leave the decision to
this Court.”).
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great likelihood that two separate appeals would have
been consolidated into a single appeal anyway given the
interrelation of the two cases?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
“In juvenile proceedings, the final [o]rder from which a direct appeal
may be taken is the [o]rder of [d]isposition, entered after the juvenile is
adjudicated delinquent.” Commonwealth v. S.F., 912 A.2d 887, 888–889
(Pa. Super. 2006). “The order of disposition in a juvenile matter is akin to
the judgment of sentence in a criminal matter in that both are final orders
subject to appeal.” In re M.D., 839 A.2d 1116, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Here, there is no dispute that the April 11, 2016 order is a final order.
In this case, however, in its March 28, 2016 order the trial court
adjudicated Appellant delinquent of the three new offenses without further
disposition. If we were to read the trial court’s declarations solely as
adjudications, and not a disposition, Appellant’s new adjudications would be
essentially unreviewable. However, the record reveals that the trial court
never intended to impose penalty on those new offenses, recognizing that
Appellant was already under the court’s supervision and he had violated
probation. Thus, the order entered on March 28, 2016, imposing no further
penalty on the new adjudications was the disposition of that matter.
Compare Commonwealth v. Rubright, 414 A.2d 106, 109 (Pa. 1980) (in
criminal court, a “determination of guilt without further penalty … constitutes
a final, appealable order.”)
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Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that both orders are properly
before us. Here, Appellant’s notice of appeal filed on April 22, 2016
specifically raised challenges to two final orders, entered on March 28, 2016
and April 11, 2016, within the 30-day appeal period pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
903(a). Hence, we may exercise appellate jurisdiction and we decline
quashal in this case. Accordingly, we turn now to address the merits of
Appellant’s appellate claims.
Appellant presents the following, additional issues for our review:
2. Was the Commonwealth’s evidence at Appellant’s March
28, 2016 adjudicatory hearing insufficient to permit
deeming him, a 15-year-old youth, to be a juvenile
delinquent on CP-02-JV-0000183-2016 due to his
commission of the delinquent act of 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 3925[,] [r]eceiving [s]tolen [p]roperty ([a]utomobile) on
January 17, 2016 since it failed to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, three things that it had to prove given
the allegations that it made – namely, (A) that the Jeep
SUV that Appellant occupied on that date, not further
described, was the same green 2003 Jeep Liberty SUV, not
further described, that was taken on an unspecified date
from outside the residence of the woman that the
Commonwealth asserted was ‘the victim;’ (B) that
Appellant drove that Jeep SUV on the evening in question
rather than being a mere passenger of that vehicle; and
(C) that Appellant knew or suspected that the vehicle that
he occupied was a stolen vehicle?
3. Was the Commonwealth’s evidence at Appellant’s March
28, 2016 adjudicatory hearing also insufficient to permit
deeming him to be a juvenile delinquent on CP-02-JV-
0000183-2016 due to his commission of the delinquent
acts, on January 17, 2016, of 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3733
[f]leeing or [e]luding a police officer and of 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 5126 [f]light to [a]void [a]pprehension since it also failed
to prove (A) that Appellant drove the Jeep SUV that he
occupied, as required by 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3733, and (B)
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that he faced, when he fled from the police after the Jeep
SUV that he occupied had crashed, a scheduled trial in an
adult criminal case or, alternatively, a scheduled sentencing
hearing in such a case, as is required by 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 5126?
4. Should the decision of the juvenile court below deeming
Appellant to have violated his probation on CP-02-JV-
0001963-2015 be vacated since it was predicated entirely
upon Appellant having committed the delinquent acts
referred to in CP-02-JV-0000183-2016?
Appellant’s Brief at 5-7.
Appellant’s second and third claims challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his adjudications and revocation of his probation. When
examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an
adjudication of delinquency, this Court employs a well-settled standard of
review:
When a juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute
a crime if committed by an adult, the Commonwealth must
establish the elements of the crime by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. When considering a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence following an adjudication of
delinquency, we must review the entire record and view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
In determining whether the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the test to
be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all
reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient evidence
to find every element of the crime charged. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by wholly
circumstantial evidence.
The facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not be absolutely incompatible with a
defendant's innocence. Questions of doubt are for the
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hearing judge, unless the evidence is so weak that, as a
matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the
combined circumstances established by the Commonwealth.
The finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the
evidence presented.
In Interest of J.G., 145 A.3d 1179, 1188 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal
citations omitted).
In his second issue presented, Appellant argues that the
Commonwealth failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his
adjudication for receiving stolen property in three respects:
first, that the Jeep SUV that he occupied on January 17,
2016 was the same Jeep Liberty SUV that was owned by the
putative victim; second, that he drove or otherwise
controlled that car on January 17, 2016; and third, that he
knew or suspected that it was a stolen car.
Appellant’s Brief at 31. More specifically, with regard to the first allegation,
Appellant claims that, “instead of proving that Appellant had [R.C.’s] car, all
the Commonwealth showed was that he occupied a car and that her [car]
had been stolen. It never connected the two cars.” Id. at 36 (emphasis
in original). Appellant argues that the victim did not provide identifying
information including her license plate or vehicle identification number,
characteristics of the vehicle, or a precise date she reported the car stolen or
the police recovered it. Id. at 36-28. Appellant claims Officer Kester’s
testimony that he learned that the car was stolen from a dispatch over the
police radio was limited on hearsay grounds and could not be used as
substantive, corroborative evidence that the car Appellant was riding in was,
in fact, stolen. Id. at 38 n.23. Appellant next claims the Commonwealth
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failed to prove he controlled the automobile because Officer Kester
equivocated and offered a vague description of Appellant in the driver’s seat
and then speculated that Appellant was the driver because he was the last
occupant to exit the passenger side of the vehicle due to damage to vehicle.
Id. at 42-50. Appellant further claims that there was no evidence that he
had cause to know that the car had been stolen (because there was no
damage to the steering column or ignition), he believed he was riding in a
jitney, and his flight should not be evaluated as indicia of guilt of receiving
stolen property. Id. at 51-56.
Our legislature has defined receiving stolen property as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of theft if he
intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable
property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it has probably been stolen, unless the
property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to
restore it to the owner.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section the word
“receiving” means acquiring possession, control or title, or
lending on the security of the property.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925.
“Based upon this definition, this Court has identified the elements of
the crime [] to be: (1) intentionally acquiring possession of the movable
property of another; (2) with knowledge or belief that it was probably
stolen; and (3) the intent to deprive permanently.” Commonwealth v.
Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 265 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). A
fact-finder may infer guilty knowledge that property was stolen based upon
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the recency of the theft, the place or manner of possession, alterations to
the property indicative of theft, the defendant's conduct or statements at the
time of arrest (including attempts to flee apprehension), a false explanation
for the possession, the location of the theft in comparison to where the
defendant gained possession, the value of the property compared to the
price paid for it, or any other evidence connecting the defendant to the
crime. Id. at 268 (citations omitted).
Here, the trial court found the Commonwealth’s witnesses credible.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/2016, at 9. We will not usurp that determination.
While the victim could not remember her license plate number or the exact
date she contacted police, she confirmed that she had reported her car
stolen. Id. Officer Kester testified that he “confirm[ed] that the license
plate on the Jeep matched the license plate on the car reported stolen.” Id.
When police activated their overhead lights and sirens, the vehicle sped off.
Id. at 11. Officer Kester recognized Appellant as the driver based upon his
“blue puffy jacket” which Appellant also wore to court as identified by Officer
Kester. Id. at 9-10 and n.4. Moreover, the trial court found “[t]he fact that
the person wearing the blue jacket (later identified a[s] Appellant) was the
last to exit the car [on the passenger side of the vehicle] was significant in
establishing the identity of the driver” because “it would take the driver
more time to exit on the passenger side, because the front passenger [had]
to exit first and the driver [had] to climb over the console.” Id. Appellant
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fled, a foot chase ensued, and police eventually apprehended Appellant. Id.
at 10.
We conclude that the Commonwealth introduced sufficient evidence to
support Appellant’s adjudication for receiving stolen property. The vehicle
was reported stolen, police confirmed it, and Appellant was in possession of
it. While Appellant claims he believed he was in a jitney, the trial court was
free to infer that was a false explanation for the possession, because
Appellant was in fact driving. Moreover, Appellant fled from police twice,
initially in the vehicle during the traffic stop and then later on foot when the
car crashed. Based upon all evidence, Appellant was in possession of a
stolen car and the trial court properly inferred Appellant’s guilty knowledge.
Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s adjudication for receiving stolen property.
In his third issue presented, Appellant contends that the
Commonwealth failed to prove sufficiently his adjudications for fleeing or
eluding police and flight to avoid apprehension. Pertaining to fleeing or
eluding police, Appellant reiterates his argument that the Commonwealth
failed to prove that he was driving.5 Appellant’s Brief at 60. Regarding
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5
“Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to bring his
vehicle to a stop, or who otherwise flees or attempts to elude a pursuing
police officer, when given a visual and audible signal to bring the vehicle to a
stop” commits the offense of fleeing or attempting to elude police officer. 75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3733. Appellant only challenges his role as the driver. Having
already determined that there was sufficient evidence to support the
determination that Appellant was driving, we need not address this claim
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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flight to avoid apprehension, Appellant argues that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126
criminalizes the conduct of individuals who flee to avoid standing trial, after
they have already been charged, or to avoid sentencing after conviction and
that neither of those conditions were present herein. Id. at 61-63.
Section 5126, flight to avoid apprehension provides, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person who willfully conceals
himself or moves or travels within or outside this
Commonwealth with the intent to avoid apprehension, trial
or punishment commits a felony of the third degree when
the crime which he has been charged with or has been
convicted of is a felony and commits a misdemeanor of the
second degree when the crime which he has been charged
with or has been convicted of is a misdemeanor.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5126(a).
Recognizing that criminal statutes are strictly construed and analyzing
the plain language of the statute, this Court has previously determined that
Section 5126 “requires that a person has been charged with a crime” at the
time he or she flees from law enforcement. Commonwealth v. Phillips,
129 A.3d 513, 518 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Since the flight to avoid
apprehension statute is plain on its face, and the Commonwealth did not
prove that Appellant had been charged with a crime when he fled,
insufficient evidence existed to find him guilty of the aforementioned
offense.”).
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
further. Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s adjudication for fleeing and
eluding police.
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Here, at the time Appellant fled he was on the juvenile equivalency of
probation. However, he had not been charged with a crime nor adjudicated
delinquent and awaiting sentencing. The plain language of the statute says
nothing about fleeing to avoid apprehension for potential probation
violations. Hence, there was insufficient evidence to support Appellant’s
adjudication of delinquency for flight to avoid apprehension and we vacate
that adjudication. Because Appellant received no penalty on that
disposition, however, we need not remand this case for resentencing. See
Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“if our
decision does not alter the overall [sentencing] scheme, there is no need for
a remand.”).
Finally, Appellant argues that if we vacated his adjudications for
receiving stolen property, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and
flight to avoid apprehension, then “the probation violation order and the
dispositional order of commitment that followed should be vacated[.]”
Appellant’s Brief at 65.
“The Juvenile Act expressly provides that placement of a juvenile on
probation subjects the juvenile to ongoing court supervision and conditions.”
In Interest of M.M., 690 A.2d 175, 177 (Pa. 1997), citing 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6352(a)(2) (providing for placement of a delinquent child on probation
under court supervision, subject to conditions). The Juvenile Act grants
broad discretion to the trial court in entering a dispositional order that finds
a juvenile in violation of his probation; this Court will not disturb such a
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disposition absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See In re D.S., 37 A.3d
1202, 1203 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal case citations and quotations
omitted). Here, upon the finding of new delinquent acts, the trial court
“found that [Appellant] was not meeting the terms of his supervision of
probation and that his prior disposition of probation was no longer
appropriate and revoked probation.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/2016, at 13.
We discern no abuse of discretion. As discussed above, there was
sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s new adjudications for receiving
stolen property and fleeing or attempting to elude police. Having been
found delinquent of new offenses, we agree that probation was no longer
effective and revocation was warranted. Hence, we affirm the dispositional
order entered on April 11, 2016.
Adjudications for receiving stolen property and fleeing or attempting to
elude police affirmed. Adjudication for flight to avoid apprehension vacated.
Dispositional order entered on April 11, 2016 affirmed in its entirety.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/17/2017
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