Com. v. Albright, D.

J-A30018-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID L. ALBRIGHT JR.,
Appellant No. 360 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of October 14, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0003573-2014
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2017
Appellant, David L. Albright, Jr., appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on October 14, 2015, as made final by the denial of
Appellant’s post-sentence motion on February 4, 2016. We affirm.
The trial court provided us with an able and well-written summary of
the underlying facts of this case. As the trial court explained:
[Appellant] was originally charged with aggravated assault,
criminal solicitation to commit aggravated assault,
terroristic threats, ethnic intimidation, stalking, simple
assault, recklessly endangering another person, disorderly
conduct[,] and public drunkenness for an incident that
occurred in June 2014. The aggravated assault charge was
dropped, and [the trial] court dismissed the stalking and
recklessly endangering another person charges. A [jury]
trial was held [in August] 2015 [and, during this trial, the
following evidence was presented]. . . .
From 2007 to December 2013, [Appellant] was employed by
Vistar[,] where he was supervised by [K.L.]
J-A30018-16
[Appellant] was terminated in December 2013 following a
dispute with another employee and in March of 2014
[Appellant] made a few unsuccessful attempts via text
message to [K.L.] to get his job back. At some point, [K.L.]
received notice that [Appellant] may have a weapon [and]
intended to harm him.
In June of 2014, [K.L.] was at his home late [Father’s Day]
night with his fiancée and son. At approximately 9:00
p.m.[, K.L.] heard pounding on his front door. As he
approached the door, he turned on the light and saw the
person at the door move off to the side of the door, but
continue knocking with the back of his fist. [K.L.] then went
to the front door and saw [Appellant] there. [Appellant]
indicated he was there to discuss the job he had lost, but
[K.L.] said “David, I have nothing to say to you. Just
leave.” [Appellant] demanded that [K.L.] come out and talk
to him man to man but [K.L.] refused as he was afraid
[Appellant] had a weapon and was there to hurt him.
[Appellant] did not attempt to break into the apartment or
enter it. . . .
After [K.L.] told [Appellant] several times to leave,
[Appellant] said “that was seven years of my life” in
reference to his time at Vistar. [K.L.] replied “you dug your
own grave over at work.” [Appellant] then replied “what
about your grave[, K.L.], let’s talk about your grave.”
[K.L.] interpreted this as a threat and told his fiancée to call
the police. Ultimately, [K.L.] himself called the police and
[Appellant] left. [K.L.] believe[d Appellant] must have
heard him on the phone with the police.
Officer Wade Bloom arrived at [K.L.’s] apartment to speak
to [K.L.]. He left the house to try to find [Appellant], but
was unable to do so and returned. He then received a call
from the dispatcher that there was a man a couple of blocks
away at a different apartment building “wielding a knife and
causing a disturbance.”
At Willow Garden apartments, Dwayne Davis was sitting in
the courtyard outside of his apartment [with] his fiancée
and their friend. Davis noticed [Appellant] approaching
straight toward their group. [Appellant] introduced himself,
asked if he could sit down and engaged in small talk. After
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J-A30018-16
a bit of talk, [Appellant] told the group he was “on a
mission to kill” and when asked who, he replied “my boss.”
[Appellant] then pulled a knife out of his pants, and asked
Davis if he would do it. [Davis] took this seriously and
believed that [Appellant] had just asked him to use the
knife to kill his boss. Apparently not everyone at the table
heard this comment. Davis said no and then walked over to
his neighbor, Tracey Strickland, to ask her to call the police
because he thought they needed to be involved. Tracey
called the police and Officer Bloom arrived.
Officer Bloom drew his weapon and slowly entered the
courtyard as he was uncertain of the suspect’s location.
Davis pointed Bloom toward [Appellant] and Bloom
approached with his firearm drawn[. He] identified
[Appellant] and aimed his gun. Officer Bloom ordered
[Appellant] to drop to his knees and asked where the
weapon was. [Appellant] refused to drop to his knees and
denied having a weapon. Bloom got closer, holstered his
firearm and switched to his [TASER]. [Appellant] then
cooperated by dropping to his knees, though he still denied
having a knife. Bloom handcuffed [Appellant] and then
found the knife approximately [six to eight] feet away.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/4/16, at 1-4 (internal citations omitted) (some internal
capitalization omitted).
The jury found Appellant guilty of criminal solicitation to commit
aggravated assault, terroristic threats, and disorderly conduct1 and, on
October 14, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate
term of six-and-a-half to 13 years in prison for his convictions.
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902, 2706(a)(1), and 5503(a)(4), respectively.
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J-A30018-16
The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on February 4,
2016 and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant raises three
claims on appeal:
[1.] Was not the evidence insufficient to establish the
offense of solicitation to commit aggravated assault when
the Commonwealth did not prove that [Appellant] requested
another person to “engage in specific conduct” within the
meaning of 18 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 902?
[2.] Did not the [trial] court err in overruling [Appellant’s]
objection to the admission of certain out-of-court
statements during the testimony of the complainant when
such statements constituted hearsay not subject to any
exception and when there was no relevant non-hearsay
basis for their admission?
[3.] Did not the [trial] court err in denying [Appellant’s]
objection to presentation of anti-character evidence during
rebuttal from a professional investigative witness hired by
the corporate employer of the complainant when [Appellant]
did not open the door to such evidence and when such
evidence exceeded the bounds of proper anti-character
evidence under Pa.R.E. 404(a)(2)(A) and 405?
Appellant’s Brief at 6 (some internal capitalization omitted).
We have reviewed the briefs of the parties, the relevant law, the
certified record, the notes of testimony, and the opinions of the able trial
court judge, the Honorable Deborah E. Curcillo. We conclude that there has
been no error in this case and that Judge Curcillo’s opinions, entered on
February 4, 2016 and April 18, 2016, meticulously and accurately dispose of
Appellant’s issues on appeal. Therefore, we affirm on the basis of Judge
Curcillo’s opinions and adopt them as our own. In any future filings with this
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J-A30018-16
or any other court addressing this ruling, the filing party shall attach a copy
of the trial court opinions with the victim’s name redacted.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Bowes, J. joins this memorandum.
Stabile, J. concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/14/2017
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Circulated 01/17/2017 02:30 PM
APR 19 2016
C.OMM.ONWEt\.L TH OF PENNSYLV A.NIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,
: DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANlJ\
v. .: 360.M.DA 2016
: 3573 CR 201.4
DA VlDA£BRIGHT
. . : CRtMINAL MATTER
TRIAL COURT MEMORANDUM OPINION PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA RULE
.. OF APPELLATE PROCEUURE 1925(a}
Presently before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is the appeal of'David Albright
(hereinafter "Appellant") from.thejudgment ofsentence entered by this Court following ajury
trial.
Procedural History
Appellant was originally charged with aggravated assault, criminal.solicitation. to commit
aggravated assault, terroristic
.
threats,
. .
ethnic; intimidation,
.. stalking,
. .
simple
.
assault, recklessly.
endangering another person, disorderly conduct and public drunkenness for an incidentthat:
occurredin Juiie.2014. The agzj-avated assault charge was dr~Ypped, and-thisCourt dismissed the
stalking and recklessly endangering another person charges, A trial was held August 19, 2015.
Appe.llantwas found guilty ofcriminal solicitation, terroristic threats and disorderly conduct, He
was found not guilty.ofethnic intimidation. and simple assault. The Court found him not guilty of
public drunkenness; Sentencing was deferred to October 14, 2015, at which time he was,
. sentenced to S. ~ toll years in... a state correctional Institute
: . for the solicitation
. to commit
aggravated assault charge and.a consecutiveI-z yearsin
·,: astate correctional institutefor th~
terroristicthreats charge.
A post sentence motion.was filed on October 23, 2015; and this Court ordered briefs on
the matter. Th~ parties filed H111ely briefs. Thi& Court denied the post sentence motior, on
l
February 4, .2016. On March .1, 20.16, we received a Notice ofAppeal from the appellant and on
March 2, 2016, we ordered a statement of matters complained of on appeal. The appellant
provided a timely statement on March 21, .2016.
Factual Background
The factual background was add!essed in our order and opinion denying the Post
Sentence Motion filed February 4, 2016; We adopt. it in full
. here.
Appeliant's Statement of Matters Complnined of on Appeal
• The evidence was insufficient
to.sustain a conviction for the.offense ofcriminal
solicitation to commit aggravated assault.
• The Court erred in overruling Defendant's objection to admission of certain out-of ..co~111
statements during the direct examination of' ·k:. L · .,, the complaining witness.
• The Court erred indenying Defendant's objection to the Co1timonwealth's introduction
of rebuttal testimony though a witness named Andrew Katerman.
Uiscussion
The insufficiency of the evidence claim was addressed in our Post Sentence Motion
Order and Memorandmn Opinion. We adopt that reasoning in full here.
Appellant also contends that this Court erred in overruling his objection to "certaln out-
of-court statements during the direct examinetionofLr, .l.. :.:i·. ." Specifically, appellant
indicates that l'=,1.l.J testified on direct examination that he "had knowledge [that App.ellant] may
1
have a weapon and that he may intend to do harm to me.'; (Notes of Testimony, Jury Trial, p.
, r. .
33).
The term "hearsay" is defined as ~h out .. of-court statement, which is·
offered iii evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
Commonwealth V; Ramtaha], - Pa.·-·-, 33 A..3d 602, 610
(2011); Pa.R.E; 80l(c). Hearsay statements are generally
inadmissible unless· they fall under an enumerated exception,
Pa.R.E. 802. An out-of-court statement is not hearsay when.it has. a
i
purpose. . .othet than to convince the fact finder of the truth of the
statement.
Com'. v. Busanet,.618 Pa.I, 56, 54 A.3d 35, 68(2012)~
However, where the statement Js being offered to show its .effect 011
. a listener; it is not befog offered for the truth of the matter. and is
non-hearsay, See Commonwealth l( DeHart, 512 Pa. 235, 516 A.2d
656, 666 _(l986) ("an out-of.. court· statement offered to explain a
course of eonductisnot hearsay."); Commonwealth. v, Smith, 523
Pa.: 577, 568 A.2d 600, 609 (J989); Gunter v, Constitution State
&i-v.ice c« 432 Pa.Super. 295, 638 k2d 233, 235 (1994):
Commonwealth .v. Blough; 369 Pa.Super, 230, 535 A.2d.134, 138·n.·
1 t (1987) (citing McCorm.ick, Bvidence § 249, which provides that
statements· introduced to show the effect oh a listener are not
hearsay).
Schmalz V; Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.,2013 PA Super 52, 67 AJd 800, 803 (2013) (n.
3) .
. Defense counsel Immediately objected and at the time the obj ectionwas made, the
Commonwealth argued thatthe statement regarding r:..L..;,'s knowledge was merely to show its
effect 011 t. ~;..( and why he acted as he did iii notletting appellant in the house and. calling the
police and not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. We agreed With that argument and the
statement that he.had knowledge that regarding Appellant's possible acquisition of a.weapon was
permitted. Defense counsel asked for a limiting instruction which would limit any information
regarding what. · · ·\t .1.... J knew tram a third party to only go towards his state ofmind and riot
the terroristic threats charge. The Court agreed to this.
The next day however, the matter of how tl.,l.3 acquired this knowledge was brought ou_t
on. cross-examiuatiouby defense couns~l. In particular, defense counsel specifically asked ~.,._.
ifhe had received an email conveying that information, Defense counsel went onto ask whether
the author of that emailheard it him or herselfor.iftheyheerd it from another person. l il.~·
answered that he had received an email and that the author of the emailhad heard it from
someone else. (N.T. 72-43).
Quite fran~ly, we have a hard time accepting this as.error when (1) the objection was
made at the time· the Commonwealth introduced evidence that ne:._t.:..J had.knowledge o.f a __possible
threat.and used .it merely to show its effect on him and why he reacted .as hedid that .evening (1)'
the Court.agreed to a Iimiting instruction and, most importantly, {3) defense'. counsel questioned.
thewitnesson how he.acquired thatknowledge.Defense.eounsel opened the doortothat
. . . .
testimony and neither this Court 'nor the Commonwealth have. any duty to do defense 'counsel' s
job.
Appellant's third 'issueis.m regard to th~.te.stimoJiy ofAndrew Katerman, S.pedfically,
appellant contends thathe did not.put.liiscbaracter in issue and theactual testfmonyKaterman
provided was not confined to statements ofreputationas required.ibut rather contained sped fie
Instances of conduct in violation df-Pa;R)~. 404.
However, .Pa.R.E. 404(2)(A) reads: "Exceptions for a Defendant cr-Vicfim in a Criminal
Gase: The following exceptions apply in a criminal case: a defendant may offer..evidence.of.the
·defend~nt1s pertinent trait, -and if the evidence fa admitted, 'the prosecutor may 'offer.evidence to
rebut.it],']"
Katerman · is a private mvestigator who was: hired by Vistac' to investigate into def endant' s
'reputation at work foil owing his .separation from. employment, .(N .T.. 26.9).. 0n direej examination
of Katerman, the following exchange between Katerman and the prosecutor rook place:
Q Now did you also ask about his reputation for « he's accused of
violence in this case. Ha:ve you asked abouthrsreputatlon for violent
· behavior? ·
AYes, :I did,
Q And what did you learn about that?
A Tharh,e had threatened some employeespreviously.
Mr. Roberts: Objection, Your Honor. It's got to be limited ro
reputation. ·· ·
The WitnessrOkay.
Mr. Roberts: That;s a speclficoccurrence. He can't testify to that:
The Court: WeH, he opened.the door as to not ·having a violent.
nature, so 1 will-allow it.
·(N.T. 27l~i72).. .
Appellant had- taken the sta~d i11 his owa defense, On.direct examination, app~Ilan,t
t:``ti:6.ed "I don't tty to threatenpeople.J
. have.no history
. of violence with people."
. (N .T, .249).
By making that statement, appellant opened the door as to .his character with regards to violence
'and the prosecutor is·pehnit``dto offerevidence to rebut it. In this case, the prosecutor djcl call a
rebuttal witness.
for jhese.reasons, we askthe-Superior Courtto uphold and affirm our judgment of
sentence entered by thisCourt following a jury trial,
Respectfully submitted:
. Deborah E. ·eurcillo, Judge
. ..
v-.
'"
D istributlon: . . '•
"':) ~,.
The Superior-Court of Pennsylvania . ;-;-., ;:;·.:
;,t:.;'":'
Jack Canavan, Esquire, Dauphin County District ;\.ttom~y' s Office ~-.
IamesKarl, .Bsquire, Dauphin CoUi;i.ty Pupli.c Defender's Office~- :;;:.~.::.- ···~.~:-:;· .
. · ~)
. . . . ...
,. . :
..
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·I
t Circulated 01/17/2017 02:30 PM
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.. '
COMMON\VEALTli OF :PE1\1NSYL VANIA : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,
: DAUPHIN COUNTY, PE:i'i'NSYLVANIA
v .. : NO. 3573 CR.2014
. DAVID ALBRIGHT : CRIMINAL
. .
MATTER
.
POST SENTENCE MOTION ORDER A.~'1)MEMORA.1'tDUM OPINION
~D NOW, this 4th day of February, 2016, upon consideration of the Post
Sentence Motion - filed. by: Dav.id Albright (hereinafter "Defendant") it is HEREBY
ORDERED that the Motion is DENlED.
Defendant is hereby notified of the right to appeal this order within 30 days ofthe
date of this order, Defendant is 'entitled to the assistance of counsel.in preparation of the
appeal. If Defendant cannot afford counsel, Defendant has the right to proceed informa
pauperis and proceed withassigned counsel. Pa:R.CJ:iin.P. 720.
Defendant was originally charged with aggravated assault, criminal solicitation to.
commit aggravated assault, terroristic threats, ethnic intimidation, stalking, simple
assault, recklessly endangering another person, disorderly conduct arid public
drunkenness for an incident that. occurred in June 20}4; The aggravated assault charge
was dropped, and this ~ourt dismissed the stalking and recklessly endangering another
person charges. A trial was held.August 19, 2014. Defendant was found guilty of
criminal solicitation, terroristic threats and disorderly conduct. He was found nof guilty of
ethnicintimidation.and simple assault The.Court found.him not guilty ofpublic
drunkenness. He was sentenced to 5 .Yi to 11 years in a state correctional institute forthe
"'
solicitation Jo commit aggravated assault charge and a consecutive 1-2. years in a state
correctional institute· for the terroristip threats charge.
From 2007 to December 2013, Defendant was employed by Vistarwhere he was
supervised by I, ~- i,... (the victim.). (Notes of Testimony, 8/19-8120~2015, p. 23~24);
He was terminated mDecernber 2013 following a dispute with another employee
and.in March of2014 he·rri~de a few unsuccessful attempts via text message to ``l::;_ to
get his job back. (N:T. 25-31 ). At some point, f'.I;.~ received notice, that Defendant may
have had a weapon ad intended to harm him. (N .T. 33),
In June of2014)J K:.qWas at.his home Iatefather's Day night with his fiancee
and son. At approximately 9:00 p.rn. he heard pounding on his front door. (N.T. 34). As
he approached the door, heturned on the light and saw the person at the door moveoffto
the side of the door, but continue knocking with the back.ofhis fist (N.T. 37) He then
went to the front door and sawDefendant there .. (N.T. 38). Defendant Indicated he was
there to discuss the job he had lost, but l lCi:: said "David, I have nothing to.say to you ..
Justleave," (N.T. 38} Defendant demanded that I 1(.t., come out and talk to him man. to
man but .le·involv.eq .
.(N.T, 87) .. Tracey called thepolice and Officer 'f?looin arrived .. (N.T. 16:6-167).
Officer Bl90~ -drew his weapon and slowly entered the.courtyard as he was.
uncertain of thesuspect's location . (N.T. 203). Da,vis pointed BloomtowardsDefendant
'and Bloom approached with his firearm, drawn law ..... he identified Defendant, arid ..aimed
'his gun; (N.T; 205,.206).. Officer Bloom ordered Defendant to drop.to hi$· knees and asked
where the weapon was. (N.T. 206). Defendant refused to drop to his knees and denied
having a weapon: Id. Bloom got closer, holstered bis.firearm and switchedto his taser.
(N:T. 207-209). Defendant then cooperated by dropping to his knees, though ht: siill
denied having a knife. (N'T, 209). Bloom handcuffed Defendant and then found theknife
approximately 6-8 feet away. (N.T. 210).
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for
criminal solicitation.
In an. insufficiency of the-evidence claim, the standard applied is, whether viewing ·
all theevidence admi tted at trial in the.light.most favorable to the. verdict Winner; there is
sufficient.evidence to enable the fact finder to.find every element of the crime, beyond a
reasonable doubt, ''µ1 applying the above test, wemay not weigh.the evidence and.
substitute our judgment for the fact finder. In addition, we note that.tlre facts.and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth
. need not.
. preclude very. possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant' s guilt may be-resolved by the. fact finder
unless the evidence is so Weak arid inconclusive that as· a matter oflaw no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances .. The. Commonwealth may sustain
its burden ofproofby proving everyelernerit of the crimebeyond a.reasonable doubt by
means of wholly ci'rcmmstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying.the above test, the entire
. .
record m:ust be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered; Finally,
the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight ofthe
evidence produced> is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence." Commonwealth
v. DiStefaho, 782 A.2d $74, 582 (Pa. Super. ,200..1).
According to 18 Pa.C.S.A. · § 902(a}, a person is guilty of solicitation to commit a
crime if, with the intent of'promoting or facilitating its commission, he commands,
encourages, or requests another person to enga&e in specific conduct which. would
constitute the crime or ari attempt to commit the crime, or which would establish his
complicity in its. commission or attempted commission.
Defendant contends that he provided 11:0 specific details, requested no specific
conduct; nor offered any money or factors in exchange for acquiescing ln his request He
merely made a comment without any details. He never specified who he wanted to kill or
who he wanted Davis. to kill- he merely said "boss" and Davis had no knowledge of who
his boss was or where.he lived or how he was supposed to .kill him.
However, a.t trial, the evidence produced and apparently believed bythe jury
based upon their verdict; was that Defendant hadjust left his former boss's home and
Went to anotherlocation where he pulled 01,1t a knife and asked a stranger to ltj,11 his boss.
Davis, a stranger, testifiedthat he-interpreted the Interaction as a request to kill the boss
using the 'knife.Davis cut the interaction.short bysaying no, thus no other information
regarding the boss's name or whereabouts was exchanged. We acknowledge that no
name was given, but common sense tells us that Defendant's. identifying o_fl,1is boss was
identifying a specific person that Defendant was asking to be killed.
A claim that a verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidei1ce concedes that there
is sufficient evidence to. sustain the verdict. Commonwealthv. Widmer, 744A.2d 745, ·
751 (Pa.. Super. 2000).. A verdictis against.the weight.of the evidence only when it is so
contrary to the evidence as to. s}i.ock:onets sense of justice. Commonwea:l!h v .. Cousar,
9i8 A.2c::I "i:0.2~, 1:o:{6·(11a. Super. 2007). A new trial should not be granted-merely
because of a: conflict in testimony or because the court on the same facts. would have
arrived ara.different conclusion,:Widmer, at:752.
. . In this claim, the trial
. Courtmust
"assess the credibility <"if the testimonyofferedby the Commonwealth." Corninonwealth
v. Marks, 704 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Pa. Super. 1997).
Defendant contendsthat the verdict of guilty oh the criminal solicitation charge.
was against the weight of the evidence, Again, his contention is. th a the did. hot request
anyspecific conductatthetime be spoke about his boss- no specific nanre, place.time, or
favors were-. asked, We.reiterate our analysis under sufficiency of'the 'evidehce-
Defendant identified his boss as someone he. wanted killed while he pulled out a knifeas
.hespoke to a small
. grQU.P of people.
. Our sense of justice.is not shocked that he was .
convicted of criminal solicitationunder these circumstances. He clearly intended to
Defendant contends· that the verdict \va~ .agairist the weight· of the -evidence .OH the.
.·.
terroristicthreats.charge. per 18 Pa.c.s:A. § 270.6(a)(l), a person commitsthe crime of
terroristic threats i:t'the person communicates, either directly or- indirectly, a threat to.
commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another.
The purpose .of a law against terroristic threats "is to impose criminal.liability on
persons who make threats which seriouslyimpair personal security .. .itisnot intendedby
tlii~ section to penalizemere spur-of-the-moment threats which result from anger."
Commonwealthv:.Anneski,525 AZd ~7~.,.374 (Pa. Super, 19:87). However a situation.
which give the defendant time for reflection about what.he intends to saycan be
Co,mmomvealth v. Gotckm, Nd. 1452:WDkZ014, 201~ wt, 6954:3'79, at "'4.(P:a:. Super.
Ct. Nov: 9, 2015). However; being angry doesnot render a person incapable of forming
the intent to terrorize. Inte J.H., 797 A.2d:260 (Pa. Super. 2002). We must look etthe
circumstances surrounding f_he statement to _detemune whether.it is a terroristic threat.
Commonwealthv. Griffii1,456A.2d 171, T74 (Pa. Super. 1983.)..
ThE> circumstances surrounding th~·threat made 'toy __ E,·C.... .:,· are as follows.
About· six. months after being terminated by Vi star, Defendant.appeared at K i( .t;. .../s
home ~t about 9~00 pm, He knocked or pounded on · it,'.c...:./s door in order· to get · fl,~ to
'talk to him about his. termination. .. Defendant refused to 'leave even though I 'le·'-~ would
not open the.door and-refused to discuss it with him. After :.i:'..L.,:. fina!1y said "you dug
your own grave over at' work" Defendantthen said "what about-your grave ··.1c0,, let"s
talk about your grave.''. ~1..; immediately felt threatened and instructed his fianceeto call
the police.
Unlike the Anneski casecited by Defendant, there was not UI{T;
;J0w._, t"- -``
·Deborah E~_Cur<;Ulo, .r;
Di``ributi~n: . J-_L\ ~:ll_p``@; ~rr\
Hon. Deborah E. Curc11lo~
Jack Canavan, Esq., Dauphin County District Attorney's Offi:ce·--:Il.5
Richard Roberts.Esq., ssoi VartanWay, 211d floor,. Harrisburg, PA 17110 l'\f\~