Com. v. Loper, S.

J-A26003-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
SHAWN MAURICE LOPER
Appellant No. 368 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 30, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0004335-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, AND RANSOM, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 29, 2017
Shawn Maurice Loper appeals from the judgment of sentence of
twenty-four months probation imposed after the trial court found him guilty
of impersonating a public servant. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the pertinent facts as follows:
On April 15, 2015, at approximately noon, Trooper Michael
Vaccaro of the Pennsylvania State Police was running radar on
Interstate 83 in the vicinity of mile marker 11 in York County,
Pennsylvania, when he clocked [Appellant], who was operating a
white Chevy Impala traveling north, at 78 miles per hour in a
properly posted 55 mile per hour zone. A traffic stop was
initiated by the Trooper. Trooper Vaccaro testified that the
Chevy Impala had heavily tinted windows and removable
emergency lighting in the rear window and front windshield.
Upon approaching the driver’s side, Trooper Vaccaro observed
[Appellant] wearing a silver “Special Police” badge. The Trooper
advised [Appellant] of the reason for the stop and [Appellant]
apologized indicating that he needed to get to his dentist
appointment.
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During the stop, Trooper Vaccaro asked [Appellant] for
identification and [Appellant] supplied an identification card that
indicated: Security Officers Management Branch, Special Police,
Shawn M. Loper, District of Columbia Police Department;
expiration date 1/2/15, with [Appellant’s] photo. When asked
about the expired identification card, [Appellant] responded[,]
“That’s fine, it’s actually still good.” [Appellant] was given a
verbal warning and went on his way.
Subsequent to the stop, Trooper Vaccaro contacted
[Washington D.C.] Metropolitan Police and was advised that
[Appellant] was no longer a member of the Special Police and
should have returned his badge. Sergeant Edward Gibson,
Director of Security Officers [M]anagement Branch, Metropolitan
Police Department testified that [Appellant’s] license as a special
police officer expired on October 31, 2014.
On April 15, 2015, at approximately 1:38 p.m., Trooper
Patrick Kelly, of the Pennsylvania State Police, observed
[Appellant] traveling south on Interstate 83, in the area of
Shrewsbury, York County, in the left lane in violation of the law.
A traffic stop ensued and upon approach to the driver’s side of
the vehicle, [Appellant] appeared agitated, stated to the Trooper
that he did not understand why he was stopped, and indicated
he performed the “same job” as Trooper. [Appellant] again
provided Trooper [Kelly] with his identification from the Security
Officers Management Branch. Throughout the exchange on the
second stop . . . [Appellant] repeatedly stated “I’m legit, man –
100 percent. I am completely legit . . . I respect all officers –
we’re all doing the same thing.” The Troopers confirmed by
phone call that [Appellant] did not have a valid identification as a
Special Police Officer and confiscated [Appellant’s] identification
card. [Appellant] was given a verbal warning for left lane
violation and left the scene of the stop.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/17, at 1-4.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant was charged with impersonating a
public servant. Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Appellant of
that crime. On January 30, 2017, Appellant was sentenced to twenty-four
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months probation. He filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial
court denied on February 16, 2017. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
and complied with the court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal. The court authored a Rule 1925(a)
opinion, and this matter is now ready for our review.
Appellant presents a single question for our review: "Was the
evidence insufficient to support [Appellant’s] conviction of impersonating a
public servant where there was no evidence that [Appellant] ever asked
anyone to do anything?” Appellant’s brief at 3.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
conviction for impersonating a public servant. We are guided by the
following principles:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
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the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 540-541 (Pa.Super. 2017)
(citation omitted).
The Crimes Codes defines the offense of impersonating a public
servant as follows: “A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree
if he falsely pretends to hold a position in the public service with the intent
to induce another to submit to such pretended authority or otherwise to act
in reliance upon that pretense to his prejudice.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4912.
Further, a “public servant,” is defined as: “[a]ny officer or employee of
government, including members of the General Assembly and judges, and
any person participating as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in
performing a governmental function; but the term does not include
witnesses.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4501.
Appellant confines his challenge to the Commonwealth’s purported
failure to offer evidence that established the intent element of the offense.
He maintains that “the Commonwealth adduced literally no evidence that
[Appellant] evinced ‘intent to induce another to submit to such pretended
official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense to his
prejudice.’” Appellant’s brief at 7. He maintains that he did not initiate any
conversation regarding the special police badge that he brandished around
his neck, but merely responded to the trooper’s questions regarding his
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identification and credentials. Further, he maintains that he did not ask for
special treatment, or in any way intend to obtain special treatment.
Appellant concedes that he expressed to the officers that he did the “same
job” as them, but contends that he made that statement out of “sheer
frustration” because he “did not know why he was being pulled over and
interrogated again[.]” Appellant’s brief at 5. Thus, Appellant concludes, the
evidence fails to support his conviction. We disagree.
The Commonwealth presented the following evidence at trial on
December 9, 2016. On April 15, 2015, Trooper Vaccaro initiated a traffic
stop of a white Chevy Impala, driven by Appellant, for traveling seventy-
eight miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour zone. N.T. Bench Trial,
12/9/16, at 6-8. The vehicle had heavily tinted windows and detachable
emergency lights. Id. at 7. Trooper Vaccaro observed Appellant wearing a
silver special police badge around his neck. Id. at 8. The trooper requested
identification, including the special identification card issued with the badge.
Id. 10-11. After Appellant produced the special identification card, the
trooper noted that it expired on January 2, 2015.1 Id. at 13-15. When
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1 Sergeant Edward Paul Gibson, Jr., Director of the Security Officers
Management Branch of the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department
corroborated Trooper Vaccaro’s testimony, and clarified that, despite the
expiration date shown on Appellant’s special police identification card, that
card became invalid on October 31, 2014. N.T. Bench Trial, 12/9/16, at 43.
He also noted that a database of current security license holders showed
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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questioned about the expiration date, Appellant responded, “Oh, no that’s
still good.” Id. at 15. Trooper Vaccaro then issued a verbal warning. Id. at
19. Following the traffic stop, Trooper Vaccaro contacted the Washington
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department who informed him that Appellant was
no longer an active member of the department, and that his special
identification card was expired. Id. at 21-23.
Trooper Patrick Kelly also offered testimony on behalf of the
Commonwealth. Trooper Kelly indicated that, while patrolling Interstate 83
at approximately 1:38 p.m. on April 15, 2015, he received information from
Trooper Vaccaro that a vehicle was traveling southbound, which Trooper
Vaccaro had previously pulled over. Id. at 53-55. Shortly thereafter, the
trooper observed the vehicle. Id. at 55. Trooper Kelly stated that the
vehicle appeared to be a law enforcement vehicle since its windows were
blacked-out, and it was equipped with an emergency light kit. Id. at 55-56.
The trooper noted that the car was being operated in the left lane, despite
the right lane being clear, and initiated a traffic stop. Id. at 56. Upon being
stopped, Appellant appeared agitated, but was not wearing the special police
badge at that time. Id. 57, 60. Trooper Kelly questioned Appellant about
the special police badge, and requested to see his identification. Id. at 60.
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
there was no record found regarding Appellant at the time of his traffic stop.
Id. at 44.
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Trooper Vaccaro, who was also present at the second traffic stop, indicated
that Appellant expressed that he worked for the Federal government, but
the trooper was unfamiliar with the acronyms of many of the agencies
Appellant named. Id. at 28. Ultimately, Appellant was issued a warning.
We find that, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth as verdict winner, the Commonwealth offered sufficient
evidence to support Appellant’s conviction for impersonating a public
servant. Instantly, we note that the trial court credited the testimony of the
Commonwealth’s witnesses. In any case, Appellant does not dispute the
trial court’s findings with regard to his statements or conduct during the two
traffic stops, or the troopers’ recounting of those events. Rather, he merely
maintains that his conduct on April 15, 2015, was not intended to induce the
troopers to give him special treatment. We are not convinced that, merely
because Appellant did not expressly request special treatment, his conduct
and behavior was not directed to that end.
Appellant, while traveling to a dentist appointment, openly displayed a
special police badge to an officer after being stopped for a traffic infraction.
This behavior evidenced an attempt to curry favor with the state police
during the traffic stop. Appellant’s conduct in this regard is especially
suspect given his presumed awareness that his special police badge and
identification card were expired. Moreover, Appellant made statements
indicating that the expired license was “still good,” and that he performed
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the “same job” as the troopers. The reasonable inference from these
statements, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
established beyond a reasonable doubt that he wanted to ensure that the
troopers were aware of his status as a fellow law enforcement officer, and
that he was entitled to favorable treatment. As such, we find that the
circumstantial evidence herein supports the inference that Appellant
presented himself to Troopers Vacarro and Kelly as a public servant with the
intent to induce them to act favorably on his behalf in reliance on that
knowledge. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4912.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/29/17
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