Com. v. Tucker, C.

J-S28032-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
CHRISTOPHER RYAN TUCKER :
:
Appellant : No. 1297 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 14, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0006044-2017
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: MARCH 8, 2023
Appellant, Christopher Ryan Tucker, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, following his
jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, third-degree murder, two counts
of aggravated assault, and two counts of possessing instruments of crime.1
We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as
follows:
The Commonwealth presented evidence at trial that the
victim, Tara Marie Serino, was last seen shortly after 12:30
A.M. on October 30, 2017, when she left her residence in
Lehigh County, Pennsylvania with [Appellant]. The next
day, the victim’s father, Fred Serino, contacted the
Pennsylvania State Police Hamburg Barracks (“PSP–
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 2502(c), 2072(a)(1), 2072(a)(4), and 907(a),
respectively.
J-S28032-22
Hamburg”), after she failed to contact him as previously
arranged. Mr. Serino requested they perform a welfare
check on the victim at [Appellant’s] residence at 282 Roth
Road, Albany Township, Berks County, Pennsylvania.
Troopers Jordan Hoffman and Ryan Zimmerman of PSP–
Hamburg, responded to [Appellant’s] residence [and] were
unable to contact anyone inside the residence.
The following day, on November 1, 2017, [Appellant’s]
father appeared at [the] victim’s father’s house with the
victim’s purse, identification, medication, and wallet, which
he indicated he retrieved from [Appellant’s] residence.
[Appellant’s] father provided the victim’s father with the
victim’s personal items. While at the Serino residence,
[Appellant’s] father indicated that his son had been
committed to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation in the
Urbana, Illinois area.
That same day, [the] victim’s father reported her missing to
his local police department, the Upper Macungie Police
Department, and provided them with the victim’s personal
items. At that time, Detective Adam Miller of the Upper
Macungie Police Department performed a presumptive blood
test on what appeared to be a bloodstain on the victim’s
purse, receiving a positive indication for blood. Detective
Miller confirmed that [Appellant] had been encountered
attempting to break into a piece of farm equipment near a
truck stop in Illinois and that the Iroquois County Sheriff’s
Department transported him to Presence Hospital in
Urbana, Illinois. The victim was not located in the area.
Detective Miller requested the Urbana, Illinois Police
Department to respond to Presence Hospital to speak with
[Appellant] to obtain information as to the victim’s
whereabouts. Detective Miller briefed Investigator Doug
Pipkins of the Urbana Police Department as to the reason
for his request.
Dr. Timothy Roberts was [Appellant’s] treating psychiatrist
and met with [Appellant] the morning of November 1. Dr.
Roberts testified that while [Appellant] was a [l]ittle sleepy
at times, he was not “out of it” and he was cooperative and
capable of answering questions. Dr. Roberts indicated that
[Appellant] had slept the night prior to his interaction with
police. Dr. Roberts stated that [Appellant] was capable of
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giving him a medical history and information about his
medication, as well as answering questions regarding that
history.
While [Appellant] raised that his medication was such that
he could not understand what was happening, Dr. Roberts
indicated that he was not prescribed any medication that
would have precluded him from understanding what was
going on, and that he was able to consent to the
administration of medication. Dr. Roberts indicated that
none of the dosages of the medications prescribed or given
to [Appellant] would have sedated him to the point of an
inability to communicate with others, including law
enforcement officers. Dr. Roberts stated that [Appellant]
had the ability to consent to medication. Dr. Roberts stated
that [Appellant] signed a voluntary admission form,
admitting himself to Presence Hospital.
Officer Darin McCartney, Officer Collin Dedecker and his
Field Training Officer Ingram of the Urbana Police
Department responded to Presence Hospital [to] assist with
the missing person investigation involving the victim. They
arrived at the hospital at 2:18 P.M., Central Time, November
1, 2017. There, they located [Appellant]. Officers
Dedecker, Ingram and McCartney met with [Appellant] in a
conference room on the fifth floor of the hospital.
The conference room contained a round table, chairs, and
windows. [Appellant] was present with his social worker,
Cymi Nappy, who left only once while Officers Dedecker,
Ingram and McCartney met with him. Officer Dedecker
informed [Appellant] that they had been referred an
investigation to search for a missing person from a
Pennsylvania police department. [Appellant] indicated to
Officer Dedecker that he knew the victim, that they
previously dated, but that he did not know her whereabouts
and hadn’t seen her for three weeks. Officer Dedecker also
asked [Appellant] about some marks on his hands, and
[Appellant] indicated he received these marks at work.
During the time Officer Dedecker spent with him,
[Appellant] was not in handcuffs, was never told he was
under arrest, and was informed that the police were simply
investigating an individual’s disappearance. [Appellant] was
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willing to speak with Officer Dedecker, he never indicated
that he did not wish to answer questions, he appeared to
understand Officer Dedecker’s questions, and he never
indicated that he did not understand something.
Before entering the conference room, Officer McCartney was
told a woman was reported missing by her father, she was
possibly last seen with [Appellant], and that some of her
personal belongings may have been found at [Appellant’s]
residence. At this point, Officer McCartney had no
information that the woman may have been harmed. Upon
entering the conference room, Officer McCartney spoke to
[Appellant]. He asked for his biographical information,
which [Appellant] provided. [Appellant] was willing to speak
with Officer McCartney and did not appear to have any
difficulty understanding his questions. Officer McCartney
informed [Appellant] they were meeting because an
individual who may have been [Appellant’s] acquaintance or
girlfriend was reported missing. Officer McCartney asked
[Appellant] if he knew the victim. [Appellant] indicated that
he did and that they had been dating approximately three
months. Officer McCartney asked [Appellant] if he knew the
victim’s location. [Appellant] responded that he had an
argument with her several days earlier and that after the
argument, he left in his truck and drove toward Illinois.
[Appellant] had originally indicated that he last saw the
victim three weeks prior, but upon stating such, his social
worker interjected that [Appellant] had indicated previously
to her it may have only been several days prior. [Appellant]
acknowledged this as true.
Officer McCartney also asked about the injuries to his hands,
which [Appellant] first indicated he sustained from doing
“sneak attacks” near a rest stop in Illinois, but later
indicated he sustained doing martial arts. Officer McCartney
inquired as to whether [Appellant] was concerned regarding
the victim’s whereabouts, and he indicated he was not.
Detective McCartney inquired as to whether [Appellant]
harmed the victim, and he indicated he did not. Officer
McCartney met with [Appellant] for a total of approximately
twenty minutes. During this time, [Appellant] did not
indicate that he was unwilling to talk to the police. He never
exhibited any signs of discomfort. He never requested to
use the restroom. He was provided with water to drink. The
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conference room in which they met was not locked and
[Appellant] was free to get up and walk away.
Officer McCartney testified that, in his eleven years with the
Urbana Police Department, he has been involved in multiple
missing person investigations. He indicated that many of
these investigations result in a finding of no harm or foul
play, especially when it involves college aged individuals.
However, he also indicated that, in missing person
investigations, “time is of the essence,” because the sooner
a person can be located, the sooner they may be spared
harm, or their life may be saved. At the time he spoke with
[Appellant], he testified that he had no reason to believe the
victim had been harmed or killed or that there was anything
criminal to investigate. After meeting with [Appellant],
Officer McCartney spoke with a sergeant at the Urbana
Police [D]epartment to request assistance in the
investigation.
A short time thereafter, Investigators Doug Pipkins and
Richard Coleman arrived at the hospital. [Appellant] was
still in the conference room with his social worker. Officer
McCartney was also still present, but Officers Dedecker and
Ingram had left. Officer McCartney briefly spoke with
Investigator Pipkins to explain what [Appellant] had stated,
and then Officer McCartney, Investigator Pipkins and
Investigator Coleman entered the conference room. As
before, at the time Officer McCartney and Investigators
Pipkins and Coleman entered the conference room,
[Appellant] was not under arrest, was not physically
detained in any way and indicated he was willing to speak
with investigators. Prior to entering the conference room,
Investigators Pipkins and Coleman spoke with a nurse at the
hospital who advised that [Appellant] would be “fine” to
speak with the police. Officer McCartney was in police
uniform, while Investigators Pipkins and Coleman were not.
Upon entering the conference room, Investigator Pipkins
spoke with [Appellant]. He introduced himself and
described [Appellant’s] initial demeanor as “sleepy.”
Investigator Pipkins asked [Appellant] some initial questions
regarding the victim’s whereabouts. [Appellant] was
responsive to Investigator Pipkins’ questions. [Appellant’s]
answers correlated to the questions being asked.
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[Appellant] never asked Investigator Pipkins to repeat
questions or [state] that he did [not] understand what
Investigator Pipkins was saying. Further, at the time he
entered the conference room, Investigator Pipkins had no
information as to where [the] victim might be or whether
she had been harmed. Upon asking about the victim’s
whereabouts, [Appellant] initially told Investigator Pipkins
that he had [not] seen her for about three weeks, but he
eventually said it was about five to seven days. [Appellant]
initially said he did [not] know where she was located.
Investigator Pipkins stepped out of the conference room to
call Detective Miller of the Upper Macungie Police
Department. Detective Miller informed Investigator Pipkins
that he believed the information provided by [Appellant]
probably was [not] accurate and the Upper Macungie Police
Department had information that [Appellant] had seen the
victim more recently. Investigator Pipkins re-entered the
conference room and told [Appellant] that he had just
spoken with Pennsylvania police and that the time frame
[Appellant] provided did not match up with the information
that Pennsylvania authorities had. Investigator Pipkins did
not ask [Appellant] a question at this point; however,
[Appellant] just began talking. [Appellant] asked
Investigator Pipkins if he wanted to know what really
happened. Investigator Pipkins responded “sure.”
[Appellant] then stated, “I will tell you what happened. I
fucking killed her.” While Investigator Pipkins had described
[Appellant’s] demeanor up to this point as “sleepy,” when
[Appellant] made the statement about killing the victim,
[Appellant] is described as having “bolted up in his chair and
was looking directly at us and was very engaged with what
he was telling us and just very into the conversation.[”]
Initially, Investigator Pipkins thought [Appellant] “was
messing with us,” but as [Appellant] continued to speak,
Investigator Pipkins realized that [Appellant] might be
serious. Investigator Pipkins stepped back out of the
conference room and called Detective Miller to advise him of
[Appellant’s] statements and that the victim might be in
[Appellant’s] trailer. Investigator Pipkins called his sergeant
to advise him of the same and then re-entered the
conference room. Detective Miller subsequently called PSP-
Hamburg to inform them of the situation. Upon re-entering
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the conference room, [Appellant] was still in the middle of
talking about the incident. Investigator Pipkins advised
[Appellant] he was now being recorded. He then proceeded
to read [Appellant] his Miranda[2] rights. [Appellant]
indicated he did not want a lawyer and agreed to keep
speaking with the investigators.
The audio recording was admitted into evidence at
the…pretrial hearing…for the [c]ourt’s review. The audio
recording began at approximately 4:30 P.M., Central Time.
The audio recording lasted about an hour. Prior to
[Appellant] stating he killed the victim, Investigator Pipkins
had been speaking with him for about ten to fifteen minutes.
During the audio-recorded conversation, [Appellant] was
provided food and drink. [Appellant] provided specific
details as to how he killed the victim, even correcting
Investigator Pipkins at one point regarding a detail. He also
provided specific details regarding the crime scene.
[Appellant] was free to move around the conference room,
getting up out of his chair several times while speaking with
Investigators Pipkins and Coleman. At the end of his
conversation with Investigators Pipkins and Coleman,
[Appellant] left the conference room. [Appellant] remained
at Presence Hospital for the evening of November 1. The
next day, November 2, 2017, Officer McCartney responded
back to the hospital. At that time, he placed [Appellant]
under arrest and, along with Officer Dedecker, transported
[Appellant] to the county jail.
(Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/21, at 1-8).
After receiving information that the victim may be inside Appellant’s
home, officers with the Upper Macungie Police Department and the
Pennsylvania State Police searched the Appellant’s home. There, they saw
dried blood and an odor consistent with decomposition. They found the
victim’s body under a rug, wrapped in a comforter. Her face was smashed,
____________________________________________
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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and she had no signs of life. (N.T. Trial, 5/10/21-5/20/21, at 459-63). A later
search of Appellant’s residence revealed a marijuana joint, several earrings, a
tooth, broken glass from a mirror, a bloody 25lb weight, and a bloody hatchet.
(Id. at 484, 490-91, 500, 503, 505, 513-15, 535). During their search,
officers found a dictionary at the crime scene which was open to the page
containing a definition for the word “insane.” (Id. at 525-27).
The Commonwealth subsequently charged Appellant with first-degree
murder and related offenses. A jury trial commenced on May 10, 2021.
Detective Pipkins testified at trial, explaining that Appellant admitted to
strangling the victim, gouging her eyes out, shoving his fingers into her eye
sockets, and then hitting her on the head with a weight. (Id. at 375).
Appellant gave several reasons for having killed the victim including that she
needed him to kill her, it was necessary for God, and he was attempting to
liberate her soul. (Id. at 403). Appellant told Detective Pipkins that he was
an agent for the government. (Id. at 409).
Dr. Supriya Kuruvilla, an expert in forensic pathology, testified that the
victim received both blunt force and chop injuries to her head and neck and
strangulation injuries. (Id. at 565). She stated that both of the victim’s eyes
were severely displaced. (Id. at 580). Dr. Kuruvilla determined that the
victim was alive when her face and sternum were struck, and the injuries were
consistent with being struck by the 25lb weight and hatchet. (Id. at 569-70,
581). Dr. Kuruvilla was unable to determine which injury actually killed the
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victim, but she determined that the cause of death was massive blunt force
and chop injuries of the head and neck and manual strangulation; the manner
of death was homicide. (Id. at 586).
After the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, the defense presented a
defense of legal insanity. The defense first called several individuals who
testified as lay witnesses concerning Appellant’s character and reputation in
the community. The defense also introduced the testimony of two expert
witnesses, Stephen Mechanick, M.D., and Gerald Cooke, Ph.D.
Dr. Mechanick was certified as an expert in the field of forensic
psychiatry. (Id. at 2919). He testified that Appellant had a long history of
mental illness and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in 2006, which causes
bipolar manic episodes including delusions and hallucinations. (Id. at 2922-
24). During these delusions, Dr. Mechanick opined that Appellant becomes
psychotic and believes that he is on a secret mission for the government. (Id.
at 2927-30). Appellant has been hospitalized for these psychotic episodes
several times since 2006. Dr. Mechanick testified that he evaluated Appellant
shortly after his arrest and would diagnose him with schizoaffective disorder.
He explained that Appellant told him that he killed the victim because she had
been possessed by a dark spirit and he was freeing her. (Id. at 2947).
Appellant told Dr. Mechanick that he left the state after the killing not because
he was fleeing, but rather because he had other missions to complete, and he
climbed into a farm combine (where he was finally captured) as part of training
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for the government. (Id. at 2948-52).
Dr. Mechanick testified that he reviewed the report of the
Commonwealth’s expert, John S. O’Brien, M.D., J.D., and disagreed with Dr.
O’Brien’s conclusions. He emphasized that Appellant had a severe psychotic
illness, which was present even when he was in prison, and was not on
marijuana or bath salts, and opined that Appellant’s mental illness was the
cause of his behavior. (Id. at 2973-75).
Dr. Mechanick testified that Appellant’s behavior was not a result of
polysubstance abuse, but rather Appellant’s psychosis led him to kill the
victim. (Id. at 2952). Ultimately, he opined that Appellant’s psychiatric
condition at the time of the incident meets the legal definition of not guilty by
reason of legal insanity. (Id. at 2962).
Appellant also called Gerald Cooke, Ph.D., as an expert in forensic
psychology. (Id. at 3046). Dr. Cooke testified that Appellant was one of the
two most psychotic persons he had ever encountered in his career as a
forensic psychologist. (Id. at 3058). Dr. Cooke explained that Appellant knew
the nature and quality of his act in killing the victim, but because of psychosis,
he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. Rather, Appellant thought
that what he was doing was right and good. (Id. at 3050, 3065). Dr. Cooke
concluded that Appellant suffered from severe schizoaffective disorder with
paranoid features. Schizoaffective disorder causes hallucinations and
delusions. In addition, an individual with this disorder would have severe
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depressive episodes and severe manic episodes where the individual would be
most psychotic, delusional, and hallucinatory. (Id. at 3060-61).
Dr. Cooke explained that Appellant tends to recover from his psychosis
when he is medicated, well rested, fed, and given water. In those instances,
he begins to question whether some of the delusions and the things that he
experiences are real. (Id. at 3073). Dr. Cooke explained that when the
Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. O’Brien, evaluated Appellant, he was no longer
overtly psychotic and his symptoms were controlled by medication; therefore,
he had much better insight as to whether his past experiences were delusions.
(Id. at 3074, 3078). Dr. Cooke stated that he reviewed the expert report of
Dr. O’Brien and questioned some of the findings and conclusions that were
contained therein.
With respect to Appellant’s drug use, Dr. Cooke noted that Appellant
only tested positive for marijuana. He explained that although marijuana can
cause psychosis, in this case, Appellant’s psychosis was caused by either
bipolar or schizoaffective disorder, as documented through many years of
health professionals’ diagnoses. (Id. at 3089).
Following the presentation of these witnesses, the Commonwealth
offered the expert testimony of Dr. O’Brien to rebut the insanity defense. The
court found that Dr. O’Brien was an expert in general psychiatry and forensic
psychiatry. (Id. at 3192). Dr. O’Brien explained that marijuana can cause
substance abuse psychosis and noted that its psychoactive component
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increases when the drug is vaped. (Id. at 3201).3 Dr. O’Brien then explained
that although most people regard marijuana as harmless, it can cause
psychosis and aggressive behavior at high doses or in susceptible individuals.
(Id. at 3204). Dr. O’Brien explained that he saw evidence of both the mental
health condition and the substance use disorder in Appellant. He then stated
that he
cannot determine the relative contributions of each and so
I’m not able to say with medical certainty whether it’s
primarily a bipolar disorder or schizoaffective disorder with
sort of a sideline diagnosis of cannabis use disorder or
primarily cannabis use disorder that is making or causing
[Appellant] to experience psychotic symptoms.
(Id. at 3206).
The defense moved to strike, arguing that the testimony was
inadmissible because Dr. O’Brien’s opinion lacked reasonable professional
certainty. The court overruled the objection. (Id.) Defense counsel then
moved for a mistrial or to strike Dr. O’Brien’s entire testimony. The court
denied the motion explaining that Dr. O’Brien was qualified to testify about
the interaction of drugs and psychosis. (Id. at 3209).
Dr. O’Brien testified that Appellant’s actions after the killing indicate an
awareness that what he did was wrong. He noted that Appellant hid the body
in a comforter under a rug, fled from the scene, and, when police eventually
____________________________________________
3 The trial court overruled the defense objection to this testimony, explaining
that there was a foundation for testimony concerning whether Appellant’s
psychosis was caused by drugs rather than a mental disorder. (Id. at 3203).
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found him in the corn field, he told them that he was attempting to fix the
combine. Then, when Appellant was later questioned about the victim’s
whereabouts, he minimized his involvement in the killing until he was pressed,
at which point he eventually confessed. Based on this, Dr. O’Brien opined that
Appellant knew the difference between right and wrong and knew that what
he had done was wrong and he was in trouble. (Id. at 3214-15).
On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to question Dr.
O’Brien about his testimony in the case of Commonwealth v. Henry, 524
Pa. 135, 569 A.2d 929 (1990), which involved a murder that occurred in 1986,
and during the trial of which Dr. O’Brien had allegedly concluded the defendant
was legally insane notwithstanding his drug and alcohol use. (N.T. Trial at
3249-51). The trial court denied counsel’s request to take judicial notice of
the facts of the case as set forth in our Supreme Court’s opinion when the
case was later appealed, but permitted defense counsel to question Dr.
O’Brien about the case. The Commonwealth objected and the court explained
that there is no meaningful comparison between the two cases and suggested
that it would be misleading to the jury; however, the court allowed the
questioning. (Id. at 3255). The Commonwealth objected to defense counsel’s
manner of refreshing Dr. O’Brien’s recollection through the notes of testimony
from Henry. (Id. at 3262). The court explained that the line of questioning
had turned into relitigating what happened in that trial and would mislead the
jury and so therefore did not allow the questioning to continue. (Id. at 3263).
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Following Dr. O’Brien’s testimony, defense counsel called Frank Dattilio,
Ph.D., as a rebuttal witness and expert in forensic psychology. Dr. Dattilio
opined that Appellant did not know right from wrong when he killed the victim,
and therefore met the standard for legal insanity. (Id. at 3363).
After the parties conducted their closing arguments to the jury, the court
began its charge to the jury, explaining the presumption of innocence, and
the Commonwealth’s burden of proving Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Id. at 3480). The court described the offenses charged and the
elements of each offense, noting the Commonwealth’s burden to prove each
element beyond a reasonable doubt. The court used the Pennsylvania
Suggested Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) 5.01A to explain the
difference between not guilty by reason of legal insanity and guilty but
mentally ill; however, the court denied Appellant’s request to read the
bracketed portion of the instruction.
During deliberations, the jury returned with questions concerning the
distinctions between the verdicts of guilty, guilty but mentally ill, and not
guilty by reason of legal insanity. The court advised the jury that it could find
Appellant guilty if it unanimously agreed that the defense failed to prove the
affirmative defense of legal insanity. (Id. at 3530-33). Following
deliberations, the jury found Appellant guilty of all charges.
On September 14, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life
imprisonment for first-degree murder and imposed consecutive sentences of
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two and a half to five years’ imprisonment for each count of possessing an
instrument of crime. The remaining counts merged with first-degree murder
for the purposes of sentencing. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 8, 2021. On October 14,
2021, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely filed his Rule
1925(b) statement on November 1, 2021.4
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
A. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
permitting the Commonwealth’s sole expert witness to
rebut the insanity defense, John S. O’Brien, MD, JD, to
opine that [Appellant’s] behavior at the time of the
offense was not caused by mental illness, but by
voluntary drugged condition, to wit, the “vaping” of
marijuana, despite not holding said opinion to within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty and not disclosing
the grounds for his “vaping” testimony in his expert
report?
B. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
unfairly and unreasonably impeding the defense’s cross-
examination, impeachment, and surrebuttal of the
Commonwealth’s only rebuttal witness to the insanity
defense, John S. O’Brien, MD, JD, by: (i) failing to take
judicial notice of the adjudicative facts contained in the
official opinions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Commonwealth v. Henry on the grounds that said
opinions do not contain “trustworthy evidence and
information” and were “an erroneous summary” by some
“law clerk”; (ii) failing to allow defense counsel to use the
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4 Appellant’s eight-page statement of errors, containing ten errors with sub
parts does not comply with Rule 1925(b)’s requirement that the statement
“concisely identify each error” and that the statement not “provide lengthy
explanations as to any error.” See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4).
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official transcripts from O’Brien’s prior testimony in
Commonwealth v. Henry to impeach his credibility and
testimony concerning the insanity defense in [Appellant’s
case]; and (iii) unduly restricting the qualification and
direct-examination testimony of forensic psychologist
Frank M. Dattilio, Ph.D, the defense’s only surrebuttal
witness to O’Brien’s testimony, to 10 minutes or less,
while allotting to the Commonwealth an unrestricted
amount of time for cross-examination, and less than 5
minutes to the defense for redirect examination?
C. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
refusing to read the full content of paragraph 1 of
Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury
Instruction 5.01A (Insanity) requested by defense
counsel—which differentiates the [not guilty by reason of
insanity] and [guilty but mentally ill] special verdicts in
understandable layman’s language and in accordance
with prevailing caselaw—when the jury interrupted its
deliberations and returned with two questions indicating
that it did not understand the trial court’s insanity
instruction and the differences between the verdicts of
“Guilty,” “Guilty but Mentally Ill,” and “[Guilty] by Reason
of Legal Insanity?”
D. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
overruling defense counsel’s objections to the
prosecutor’s closing argument, to wit, that if the jury
returns a [not guilty by reason of insanity] verdict
[Appellant] can be released immediately into the
community, and that despite an involuntary commitment
hearing conducted by the court immediately after the
[not guilty by reason of insanity] verdict for the
community’s safety, the defense counsel can secure his
immediate release into the community through expert
witnesses— “hired guns”—who will say that he does not
need to be committed, and by justifying said argument
as “oratorical flair?”
E. Whether the jury’s “Guilty” verdict is contrary to the law
and to the weight of the evidence in that it: (i) was
predicated upon an erroneous jury instruction from the
trial court authorizing the jury to return a verdict of
“Guilty” if it rejected the affirmative defense of insanity,
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in violation of this Court’s pronouncement in
Commonwealth v. Andre, [17 A.3d 951 (Pa.Super.
2011),] which requires the jury, after it finds that the
defendant was not legally insane, to next determine
whether the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the
offense; and (ii) ignored substantial and irrefutable
evidence of the accused’s chronic mental illness,
including at the time of the offense, introduced by both
the Commonwealth and the defense?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5-6).
Appellant’s first issue on appeal concerns the testimony of the
Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. O’Brien, and raises four sub-issues: whether Dr.
O’Brien’s opinion was given to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
whether Dr. O’Brien’s opinion concerning the effects of vaping was contained
within his expert report, whether Dr. O’Brien’s opinion was supported by the
record, and whether Dr. O’Brien misstated the law with respect to the defense
of legal insanity. We will address each sub-issue separately.
This Court’s standard of review for issues regarding the admissibility of
evidence is well settled:
Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are
within the sound discretion of the trial court...[and] we will
not reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility
of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment,
but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or
the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or
the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown
by the evidence of record. [I]f in reaching a conclusion the
trial court [overrides] or misapplies the law, discretion is
then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to
correct the error.
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Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 9-10 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 632 Pa. 667, 117 A.3d 294 (2015) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
With respect to expert witness testimony, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
702 provides:
Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of
an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average
layperson;
(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and
(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the
relevant field.
Pa.R.E. 702. Rule 703 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provides:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case
that the expert has been made aware of or personally
observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably
rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on
the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to
be admitted.
Pa.R.E. 703.
Furthermore, we recognize that for an evidentiary ruling concerning the
admission of expert testimony to constitute reversible error, “it must have
been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party. A party suffers prejudice
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when the trial court’s error could have affected the verdict.” Commonwealth
v. Taylor, 209 A.3d 444, 449 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
Initially, by way of background, a defense of legal insanity is described
in Section 315 of the Crimes Code, as follows:
§ 315. Insanity
(a) General rule.—The mental soundness of an actor
engaged in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall
only be a defense to the charged offense when the actor
proves by a preponderance of evidence that the actor was
legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
(b) Definition.—For purposes of this section, the phrase
“legally insane” means that, at the time of the commission
of the offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if the actor
did know the quality of the act, that he did not know that
what he was doing was wrong.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315.
As authorized by Section 314 of the Crimes Code, a verdict of guilty but
mentally ill is proper where the defendant has pursued an insanity defense
and the trier of fact finds that the defendant is guilty and was mentally ill at
the time of the offense, but not legally insane. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314(a).
It has long been accepted that criminal defendants may be
presumed sane for purposes of determining their criminal
liability. Commonwealth v. Rabold, 597 Pa. 344, [364],
951 A.2d 329, 341 (2008). Thus, under the clear language
of section 315(a), the burden of proving insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence is upon the defendant.
Commonwealth v. Heidnik, 526 Pa. 458, 466, 587 A.2d
687, 690–691 (1991); see also Commonwealth v. Reilly,
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519 Pa. 550, 564, 549 A.2d 503, 509–510 (1988)
(summarizing the history of the defense of insanity in this
Commonwealth). Moreover, we have long stated that “[t]he
Commonwealth can prove an accused’s sanity not only by
psychiatric testimony but also by lay testimony which shows
that he or she knew the nature and quality of the act
committed and knew that what had been done was wrong.”
Commonwealth v. Frisoli, [ 419 A.2d 1204, 1206
(Pa.Super. 1980)] (citing Commonwealth v. Demmitt,
456 Pa. 475, 321 A.2d 627 (1974)). Furthermore, it is
within the factfinder’s right to disbelieve an insanity defense
and credit the testimony of the eyewitnesses.
Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 249 (Pa.Super.
2008) (holding that the jury was within their rights to
disbelieve the defendant’s insanity defense and credit the
testimony of the eyewitnesses).
Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734, 738–39 (Pa.Super. 2008),
appeal denied, 602 Pa. 658, 980 A.2d 111 (2009).
Generally, “[n]either voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged
condition is a defense to a criminal charge.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308. As our
Supreme Court has explained, “an actor should not be insulated from criminal
liability for acts which result from a mental state that is voluntarily self-
induced.” Henry, supra at 148, 569 A.2d at 935 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Hicks, 483 Pa. 305, 311, 396 A.2d 1183, 1186 (1979)). Hence, where the
Commonwealth introduces evidence that a defendant was voluntarily
intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, such evidence precludes a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty but mentally ill. Id. at 149, 569
A.2d at 935-36.
Appellant first claims that the trial court erred when it permitted the
Commonwealth’s expert, Dr. O’Brien, to opine, in response to Appellant’s
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assertion of the defense of legal insanity, that Appellant’s psychotic behavior
was proximately caused by voluntary drug use rather than mental illness.
(Appellant’s Brief at 29). Specifically, Appellant contends that Dr. O’Brien’s
statements that he “can’t be sure what [Appellant’s] diagnosis is” and that the
“issue is more likely to be largely drug related, if not entirely, but I can’t tell,”
demonstrate the lack of medical certainty which would have been required for
the expert to form such opinion. (Id. at 29-30). We disagree.
It is well-settled that in Pennsylvania, “our Supreme Court has
emphasized [that an] expert must base the substance of [his] opinion on a
reasonable degree of certainty instead of mere speculation.”
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 727 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal
denied, 633 Pa. 763, 125 A.3d 1198 (2015) (citation omitted). To determine
whether an expert’s opinion is rendered to the requisite degree of certainty,
we must examine the expert’s testimony in its entirety. Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 562 Pa. 498, 537, 756 A.2d 1139, 1160 (2000).
Here, Dr. O’Brien explained:
In my instance looking at this case and evaluating
[Appellant], I saw evidence of the two conditions, the
mental health condition and the substance use disorder
condition. I cannot determine the relative contributions of
each and so I’m not able to state with medical certainty
whether it’s primarily a bipolar disorder or schizoaffective
disorder with some sort of a sideline diagnosis of cannabis
use disorder or primarily cannabis use disorder that is
making or causing [Appellant] to experience psychotic
symptoms. It could be either, but…
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(N.T. Trial at 3206). The court overruled defense counsel’s objection to this
testimony, and denied counsel’s motion for a mistrial based on this testimony,
explaining that Dr. O’Brien is qualified to testify about the interaction of drugs
and psychosis. (Id. at 3208-09).
Reviewing the totality of Dr. O’Brien’s testimony, the record supports
the trial court’s conclusion. Dr. O’Brien’s statement that he was not able to
render an opinion to a reasonable degree of certainty was limited solely to a
mental health diagnosis for Appellant. Dr. O’Brien explained that Appellant’s
drug abuse was both self-reported and evidenced through positive drug tests.
Because this drug use was ongoing at the time of all relevant medical
evaluations, Dr. O’Brien explained that he was unable to provide a specific
mental health diagnosis to a reasonable degree of certainty.
Appellant’s attempt to enlarge Dr. O’Brien’s lack of certainty to
encompass all opinions rendered is unavailing. As the court explained, Dr.
O’Brien’s other opinions concerning the interaction of drugs and psychosis,
were all made to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Significantly, Dr.
O’Brien’s opinion that Appellant was not legally insane when he murdered the
victim, was given to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it permitted Dr. O’Brien’s testimony, despite Dr. O’Brien’s statement
that he could not render an opinion on Appellant’s precise diagnosis to the
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Appellant next claims the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
Dr. O’Brien’s testimony concerning the effects of vaping marijuana, where
such opinion was not mentioned in Dr. O’Brien’s expert report. (Appellant’s
Brief at 30). Appellant complains that the defense was surprised and
prejudiced at trial by this testimony, and the trial court should have either
granted his motion to strike the testimony or granted a mistrial. We disagree.
Generally, in civil cases, an expert’s testimony on direct examination is
limited to the fair scope of the expert’s report. See Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(c).
However, in criminal law, there is no rule of procedure similarly limiting expert
testimony. Commonwealth v. Roles, 116 A.3d 122, 131 (Pa.Super. 2015),
appeal denied, 633 Pa. 786, 128 A.3d 220 (2015) (stating: “[T]here are no
specific procedural rules governing expert reports in criminal cases aside from
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573, which relates to discovery”). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 573
(requiring Commonwealth to disclose to defense results of any expert
opinions, and providing that both parties have continuing duty to disclose
evidence that is requested prior to trial and subject to disclosure).
Nevertheless, this Court has explained that neither the Commonwealth
nor defendant has “carte blanche to allow an expert to testify beyond the
information contained in his or her report.” Roles, supra at 131-32. See
also Commonwealth v. Stith, 644 A.2d 193, 198 (Pa.Super. 1994) (holding
that where report contained language sufficient to notify defendant of expert’s
intent to testify in certain area, such testimony did not exceed fair scope of
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expert’s report).
Here, a review of Dr. O’Brien’s expert report reveals several instances
where Dr. O’Brien refers to Appellant’s recorded medical history of substance
abuse and describes instances where Appellant admits to using various drugs
including marijuana. (See Commonwealth’s Exhibit No. 130, at 2-11, 17, 22-
23, 25-26). Although he does not specifically discuss “vaping” of marijuana,
we conclude that the language in Dr. O’Brien’s expert report sufficiently
notified Appellant about Dr. O’Brien’s intent to testify concerning the effects
of marijuana use. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
permitting Dr. O’Brien to testify concerning the psychotic effects of marijuana
use, including the effects of vaping marijuana. See Stith, supra; Roles,
supra; Belknap, supra.Further, Appellant argues that Dr. O’Brien’s opinion concerning
Appellant’s voluntarily drugged condition was not supported by the record.
(Appellant’s Brief at 31). Appellant contends that the toxicology tests
performed after his arrest were negative for alcohol and all controlled
substances other than marijuana. Therefore, Appellant argues the “corpus
delecti rule” was violated because there was no real evidence that he was
using drugs. (Id.) Accordingly, Appellant insists that Dr. O’Brien should not
have been able to render an opinion as to Appellant’s voluntarily drugged
condition, because although he confessed to having done so, there was no
evidence that Appellant used drugs. (Id. at 31-35). We disagree.
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The corpus delecti rule is an evidentiary rule designed to guard against
the danger of conviction based on a confession or admission where no crime
was in fact committed. Specifically, “[t]he corpus delicti rule places the
burden on the prosecution to establish that a crime has actually occurred
before a confession or admission of the accused connecting him to the crime
can be admitted.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410
(Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 619 Pa. 700, 63 A.3d 1244 (2013) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 956 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 591 Pa. 664, 916 A.2d 633 (2006)). “The historical purpose of the
rule is to prevent a conviction based solely upon a confession or admission,
where in fact no crime has been committed.” Id.As the Commonwealth has noted, Appellant does not cite any authority
applying the corpus delecti rule to evidence that experts may consider in
forming their opinions. Traditionally, the rule is used to emphasize the
Commonwealth’s burden in a criminal proceeding to prove that a crime had
been committed. In this case, there is no question that a crime has been
committed, in that Appellant killed the victim. The question of whether
Appellant used drugs and was therefore suffering from a voluntary drugged
condition is not an element of the offense itself; rather, it is a component of
the Commonwealth’s attempt to disprove Appellant’s asserted insanity
defense. Appellant identifies no legal precedent applying the corpus delecti
rule in such circumstances.
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Moreover, the record contains evidence of Appellant’s drug use other
than simply his admission to using marijuana. Appellant’s toxicology screen
when he was apprehended was positive for cannabis and Appellant’s medical
records, as referenced by experts for both defense and prosecution, detail a
history of substance abuse. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth’s
expert to testify concerning Appellant’s drug use. See Belknap, supra.Finally, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when
it permitted Dr. O’Brien to give an erroneous standard for determining legal
insanity. Appellant asserts that Dr. O’Brien’s testimony that no single mental
health condition makes an individual incapable of knowing right from wrong,
was based on an incorrect legal standard of legal insanity. Specifically,
Appellant contends that legal insanity must be the product of defect of reason
from disease of the mind. (Appellant’s Brief at 38). Therefore, Appellant
asserts that Dr. O’Brien’s testimony was a misstatement of the law, and the
court abused its discretion in permitting this testimony. We disagree.
As this Court has explained, a defendant may successfully assert a legal
insanity defense when he shows that “at the time of the commission of the
offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or,
if…what he was doing was wrong.” Rabold, supra at 347–48, 951 A.2d at
331 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 315).
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At trial, during the Commonwealth’s direct examination of Dr. O’Brien,
the prosecutor asked the following:
Q: Doctor, you’ve mentioned the different diagnosis
[Appellant has] received over time. We have bipolar
disorder, we have schizoaffective disorder, cannabis use
disorder. In your medical opinion, does bipolar disorder
make a person incapable of knowing the difference between
right and wrong?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Does the schizoaffective disorder make a person
incapable of knowing the difference between right and
wrong?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. How about psychosis?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Schizophrenia?
A. No.
Q. Delusions?
A. No.
Q. Hallucinations?
A. No.
Q. Does any – cannabis use disorder?
A. No.
Q. Does any diagnosis this defendant has ever received
make a person incapable of knowing the difference between
right or wrong?
A. No. The—what I already said is that there is no automatic
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connection between any diagnosis and a person meeting the
legal criteria of insanity, including an inability to know the
difference between right and wrong….
(N.T. Trial at 3210-11).
Upon review, we conclude that Dr. O’Brien’s answers did not misstate
the law. Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, Dr. O’Brien did not state that no
disease of the mind would ever prevent a person from knowing right from
wrong. Rather, he opined that there is no automatic connection between
any diagnosis and a person knowing the difference between right and wrong.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in permitting this testimony. See
Belknap, supra. Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.
In his second issue presented on appeal, Appellant claims the court
erred in limiting the defense response to Dr. O’Brien’s testimony. Again,
Appellant’s question has two distinct sub parts. First, he complains that the
court did not take judicial notice of the facts set forth in Henry, and that the
court erred in limiting defense counsel’s attempt to impeach Dr. O’Brien with
his testimony in that case. Second, Appellant argues the court erred by
imposing time limits on the testimony of the defense surrebuttal witness, Dr.
Dattilio. We discuss each sub-issue separately.
Regarding his judicial notice claim, Appellant contends the trial court
was mandated by Rule of Evidence 201(c) to take judicial notice of the facts
of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Henry, and pursuant to Rule of Evidence
201(f) was mandated to instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to,
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accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. (Appellant’s Brief at 41-42).
We disagree.
Rule 201 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence concerns a court’s taking
judicial notice of adjudicative facts. It states:
Rule 201. Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts
(a) Scope. This rule governs judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact only, not a legislative fact.
(b) Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed. The
court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it:
(1) is generally known within the trial court’s
territorial jurisdiction; or
(2) can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
(c) Taking Notice. The court:
(1) may take judicial notice on its own; or
(2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and
the court is supplied with the necessary information.
(d) Timing. The court may take judicial notice at any stage
of the proceeding.
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. On timely request, a party
is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial
notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed. If the court
takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on
request, is still entitled to be heard.
(f) Instructing the Jury. The court must instruct the jury
that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any
fact judicially noticed.
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Pa.R.E. 201.
Here, defense counsel requested that the court take judicial notice of
the facts set forth in our Supreme Court’s decision in Henry, supra. (N.T.
Trial at 3246). The trial court noted that it was “not going to try that case in
this case,” observing that laying out the facts of both cases together would be
misleading to the jury. (Id. at 3248). The court explained that bringing in
the facts of the Henry case would “take us off into tangents that are out of
[the court’s] control” and would be asking the jury to “make a comparison
from a 1986 case, the fact pattern there and all the rest of that and what this
doctor said.” (Id. at 3250). Defense counsel then explained that if the court
was not going to let him use transcripts or get into the history of the case, the
trial court should at least take judicial notice of one sentence from the
Supreme Court decision in that matter. The trial court refused to do so.
Upon review, we see no abuse of discretion with the trial court’s refusal
to take judicial notice of the facts in Henry, a case completely unrelated to
the one at hand, simply so that defense counsel could refresh the recollection
of Dr. O’Brien after Dr. O’Brien testified that he did not recall certain portions
of his testimony in that matter. See generally Commonwealth v.
Anderson, 448 A.2d 1131 (Pa.Super. 1982) (holding court properly refused
to take judicial notice of facts that were irrelevant to charges at issue).
Appellant further complains it was manifestly unreasonable for the trial
court to prohibit the defense from using the official notes of testimony from
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Henry to impeach Dr. O’Brien’s testimony and credibility. (Appellant’s Brief
at 42). Appellant describes the notes of testimony as “a veritable treasure
trove of O’Brien’s contradictory and inconsistent statements concerning the
defense of legal insanity, when compared to his testimony in [the instant
case.]” (Id. at 43). Appellant argues that O’Brien’s prior testimony in Henry
was relevant to his testimony in the instant case and should have been
permitted as either extrinsic or intrinsic evidence to impeach O’Brien’s
credibility. (Id. at 44). We disagree.
“Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence[,] and the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.” Pa.R.E. 401. “All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by law. Evidence
that is not relevant is not admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. “The
court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
outweighed by a danger of...unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, [or] misleading the jury[.]” Pa.R.E. 403.
Commonwealth v. Kane, 188 A.3d 1217, 1228 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal
denied, 649 Pa. 652, 197 A.3d 1180 (2018) (brackets in original).
Here, after the court denied counsel’s request to take judicial notice of
the facts summarized in the Henry decision, the court stated:
I think there is no comparison in a meaningful way between
the facts you’re going to lay out here and the case that is in
that courtroom. So I think it has to be misleading. It, I
think, is a mistake on your part to go down that. I think it’s
prejudicial for the purposes that you’re using it. And so I
just wanted to let you know I’m going to let you do it. I’m
going to be listening, though….
(N.T. Trial at 3255).
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When defense counsel then asked Dr. O’Brien about the Henry case,
Dr. O’Brien stated that he did not recall the specifics of the case but
remembered that it was a brutal random killing. After defense counsel
refreshed Dr. O’Brien’s recollection showing him the transcripts from the trial
in that case, Dr. O’Brien was able to answer several of defense counsel’s
questions. However, Dr. O’Brien could not recall specifically whether he
testified in Henry in support of establishing an insanity defense, or in an
attempt to reduce the verdict from first-degree murder to a lesser crime based
on a lack of the requisite mens rea. (Id. at 3262). The court then met with
counsel at sidebar and stated:
This is exactly what I was afraid was going to happen. We’re
going to fight over what actually happened in that trial and
you’re going to try and use the transcript and … an opinion
by the what, Supreme Court, maybe whose clerk
summarized what they thought maybe they saw in the
transcript that were facts to try and probe the premise that’s
going to get you – and I can already predict it. It’s probably
going to get you probably nowhere. But we’re not going to
do that. If he says he doesn’t recall and you’re going to try
and refresh his recollection through various summaries of
other people from 1986 [by way of the facts set forth in the
Henry decision], nope. And if I am wrong, I’ll live with it.
But this is exactly what I was afraid was going to happen.
(Id. at 3262-63).
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it limited defense counsel from cross-examining Dr. O’Brien using the
notes of testimony from Henry or the factual summary set forth in the Henry
decision. See Belknap, supra. Even if such evidence was relevant, the trial
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court was permitted to exclude otherwise relevant evidence when its
admission would have misled the jury. See Kane, supra. This issue merits
no relief.
Next, Appellant claims that it was unreasonable for the trial court to
limit the time available for the surrebuttal testimony of Dr. Dattilio. Appellant
insists the court was aware that Dr. Dattilio was only available to testify on
May 19, 2021, and therefore unreasonably compelled defense counsel to
conduct the direct examination of Dr. Dattilio “at a frenetic pace, and in a
piecemeal manner” and then permitted the Commonwealth “to conduct a
leisurely cross-examination of [Dr.] Dattilio without time restriction.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 46) (emphasis omitted). Appellant claims the court
compounded this error by limiting the redirect examination to under five
minutes so that the court could adjourn for the end of the day at 4:30 p.m.
Appellant submits that these time restrictions irreparably damaged his
insanity defense. (Id. at 48). We disagree.
Generally, trial courts have broad discretion in controlling trial conduct.
Commonwealth v. Purnell, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 259 A.3d 974, 980 (2021).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 611(a) states:
The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to:
(1) make those procedures effective for determining the
truth;
(2) avoid wasting time; and
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(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.
Pa.R.E. 611(a). This Court reviews applications of Rule 611 for an abuse of
discretion. Purnell, supra.
Here, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
The record demonstrates that when Dr. O’Brien’s testimony went late into the
afternoon, the court expressed its intent to break for the afternoon at that
point and save Dr. Dattilio’s testimony for the next day. Defense counsel
explained that Dr. Dattilio was not available the next day and stated: “I’m on
for 10 minutes and I’m done,” “and set the clock for 10 minutes. I’ll be done
with my side.” (N.T. Trial at 3359). Thus, the record shows that any time
restrictions on the direct examination of Dr. Dattilio were self-imposed by
Appellant because his expert was not available the following day. It was not
an abuse of discretion for the court to break for the day at 4:30 p.m., and it
was Appellant, not the court, who was responsible for making sure his witness
was available to testify. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue on appeal
merits no relief.
In his third issue on appeal, Appellant argues the court erred in omitting
bracketed language from the Suggested Standard Jury Instruction, which was
intended to assist jurors in distinguishing between the verdicts of not guilty
by reason of legal insanity and guilty but mentally ill. Appellant asserts that
he specifically requested that the entire suggested instruction be read and
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referenced the bracketed portion of the instruction when crafting both his
opening and closing arguments. Appellant insists the court abused its
discretion by excluding the bracketed portion. (Appellant’s Brief at 50-52).
We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has set forth the relevant standard for jury
instructions as follows:
A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing jury instructions.
When reviewing an allegation of an incorrect jury
instruction, the appellate court must view the entire charge
to determine whether the trial court clearly and accurately
presented the concepts of the legal issue to the jury and
should not reverse, as a result of the instruction, unless the
trial court committed an abuse of its discretion. We will not
examine a phrase or sentence of an instruction in a vacuum.
Rather, when we evaluate a challenge to a charge, we must
consider how each part fits together to convey a complete
legal principle.
Commonwealth v. Ragan, 560 Pa. 106, 120-21, 743 A.2d 390, 397-398
(1999). See also Commonwealth v. Lesko, 609 Pa. 128, 216, 15 A.3d 345,
397 (2008) (reiterating that charge, “as a whole,” must be considered; court
has broad discretion in phrasing instructions, so long as directions given
“clearly, adequately, and accurately” reflect law). “The trial court commits an
abuse of discretion only when there is an inaccurate statement of the law.”
Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 507 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal
denied, 606 Pa. 644, 992 A.2d 885 (2010).
Additionally, “[t]he Suggested Standard Jury Instructions themselves
are not binding and do not alter the discretion afforded trial courts in crafting
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jury instructions; rather, as their title suggests, the instructions are guides
only.” Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 631 Pa. 138, 178, 108 A.3d 821, 845
(2014).
In the instant case, the court instructed the jury as to the following:
Because the defendant has asserted an insanity defense,
you will have to consider four possible verdicts. You will
have to think about the special verdict of not guilty by
reason of legal insanity and of guilty but mentally ill in
addition to the ordinary verdicts of guilty and not guilty.
Legal insanity excuses any crime including murder. A
defendant has a complete defense to an otherwise criminal
act if he was legally insane at the time he committed the
act.
The test for insanity is legal, not medical. A person is legally
insane if at the time of committing an alleged crime that
person is laboring under such a defective reason from
disease of the mind as to not to know the nature and quality
of the act he is doing or if the person does know the nature
and quality of the act, he does not know that what he is
doing is wrong.
Stated more simply, a person is legally insane if at the time
of committing an alleged crime that person is as a result of
mental disease or defect either incapable of knowing what
he is doing or if that person does know what he is doing is
incapable of judging that it is wrong. The defendant has the
burden of proving an insanity defense by a preponderance
of the evidence. By preponderance, we mean it is a greater
weight of the evidence…
The term mental disease or defect means a disease or
infirmity of the mind as distinguished from a mere fault of
character, personality, temperament, or social adjustment.
Incapable of knowing what he was doing refers to the
defendant’s ability to know the physical aspects of his act.
Ask yourselves, was the defendant aware of his physical
act? Was he aware of the harmful consequences of his act?
Incapable of judging that what he was doing was wrong
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refers to the defendant’s ability to judge the legal and moral
aspects of his act. Ask yourselves, was the defendant aware
that he should not do the act because it was either legally
or morally wrong? Even though a person believes that an
act is right under his or her own individual moral code, the
person is not insane if he or she…knows that the act is wrong
under society’s generally accepted moral standards.
Guilty but mentally ill becomes a possible verdict when a
defendant offered but fails to prove a legal insanity defense.
You may return this verdict if you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
alleged and you are also satisfied by a preponderance of the
evidence, that is by the greater weight of the evidence, that
the defendant, although not legally insane, was mentally ill
at the time of the crime.
(N.T. Trial at 3488-90). The court went on to describe the legal meaning of
the term mentally ill, and then explained that the jury should consider all
relevant evidence when determining the questions of legal insanity and
mentally ill. (Id. at 3490-91).
The court did not read the bracketed portion of the instruction, which
provides:
[It may help you understand my subsequent instructions if
you keep in mind why the law permits these two special
verdicts. The verdict of not guilty by reason of legal insanity
labels a defendant as sick rather than bad. It signifies that
in the eyes of the law the person, because of mental
abnormality at the time of the crime, does not deserve to
be blamed and treated as a criminal for what he or she did.
The verdict of guilty but mentally ill labels a defendant as
both bad and sick. It means that in the law’s eyes that
person, at the time of the crime, was not so mentally
abnormal as to be relieved from blame and criminal
punishment for what he or she did, but that the defendant
was abnormal enough to make him or her a likely candidate
for special therapeutic treatment.]
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Pa. SSJI (Crim), § 5.01A.
In its opinion, the trial court explained that the subcommittee note to
Suggested Standard Jury Instruction 5.01A explains that the instruction will
likely require tailoring to the facts of the particular case, and that the
bracketed portion is “a summing up that may be omitted if the court wants a
brief instruction.” (Trial Court Opinion at 25) (quoting Pa. SSJI (Crim), §
5.01A, Subcommittee Note). The court suggests that excluding the optional
commentary was at the discretion of the court and did not manifestly alter the
presentation of law to the jury.
Our review of the record shows that the jury instruction, viewed as a
whole, was sufficient to instruct the jury regarding the verdicts of guilty, guilty
but mentally ill, not guilty by reason of legal insanity, and not guilty. See
Ragan, supra. The trial court was not required to read the optional bracketed
portion of the Suggested Standard Jury Instruction, and indeed was not
required to use any portion of the Suggested Standard Jury Instruction to
instruct the jury. See Eichinger, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the
court did not abuse its discretion, and Appellant’s third issue merits no relief.
In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred when it denied
his request for a mistrial based on a statement made by the prosecution during
closing arguments. Specifically, Appellant claims that the prosecutor aimed
to inflame the jury when he stated that if it rendered a verdict of not guilty by
reason of legal insanity “[t]here is no criminal consequence. There is nothing
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hanging over his head. There is no guarantee he goes anywhere.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 55) (quoting N.T. Trial at 3460). Appellant further
contends that the prosecutor’s suggestion—that if the jury found Appellant not
guilty by reason of legal insanity, Appellant would find an expert to testify that
he did not need to be involuntarily committed—was not oratorical flair but was
calculated to fan the flames of the jury’s fear and prejudice. (Id. at 58-59).
Appellant insists that the trial court erred in permitting such statement, and a
mistrial was warranted. We disagree.
Our standard of review of a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during
closing arguments to the jury is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 191 A.3d 830, 835 (Pa.Super. 2018).
[W]ith specific reference to a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct in a closing statement, it is well settled that any
challenged prosecutorial comment must not be viewed in
isolation, but rather must be considered in the context in
which it was offered. Our review of a prosecutor’s comment
and an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct requires us to
evaluate whether a defendant received a fair trial, not a
perfect trial. Thus, it is well settled that statements made
by the prosecutor to the jury during closing argument will
not form the basis for granting a new trial unless the
unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice
the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility
toward the defendant so they could not weigh the evidence
objectively and render a true verdict. The appellate courts
have recognized that not every unwise remark by an
attorney amounts to misconduct or warrants the grant of a
new trial. Additionally, like the defense, the prosecution is
accorded reasonable latitude, may employ oratorical flair in
arguing its version of the case to the jury, and may advance
arguments supported by the evidence or use inferences that
can reasonably be derived therefrom. Moreover, the
prosecutor is permitted to fairly respond to points made in
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the defense’s closing, and therefore, a proper examination
of a prosecutor’s comments in closing requires review of the
arguments advanced by the defense in summation.
Id. at 835-36 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615
(Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 636 Pa. 672, 145 A.3d 724 (2016)). See
also Commonwealth v. Bryant, 620 Pa. 218, 237, 67 A.3d 716, 728 (2013)
(stating: “In addition, the prosecutor must be allowed to respond to defense
counsel’s arguments, and any challenged statement must be viewed not in
isolation, but in the context in which it was offered”) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, “prosecutorial misconduct will not be found where comments
were based on the evidence or proper inferences therefrom or were only
oratorical flair.” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 585 Pa. 547, 619, 889 A.2d
501, 544 (2005) (citations omitted).
Here, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “[I]f you find the
defendant insane, there is no criminal consequence. There is nothing hanging
over his head. There is no guarantee he goes anywhere.” (N.T. Trial at 3460).
Defense counsel objected, and the court overruled the objection. The
prosecutor then continued its argument explaining:
When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity,
he is subject to an immediate court proceeding to decide
whether he should be committed to a mental treatment
facility. If committed, his commitment should continue until
he is no longer dangerous to others or to himself. That’s
the law.
Now, defense found three experts he retained to tell you
that despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary,
[Appellant] didn’t know that killing Tara Serino was wrong.
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You think they’re not going to find an expert to say he
doesn’t need to be in a treatment facility[?]
(Id.) Defense counsel objected again, and the court overruled the objection.
After the prosecutor’s closing argument, Appellant requested a mistrial
based on the prosecutor’s statements. (Id. at 3474-75). The prosecutor
responded that he brought up the criminal consequences and the commitment
hearing because of defense counsel’s statement that Appellant would either
go to prison or an insane asylum. (Id.)
A review of the notes of testimony reveals that, during both his opening
and closing statement, defense counsel explained that if Appellant was found
not guilty by reason of legal insanity, he would be placed in a mental health
facility, where “the walls of the prison and the walls of the asylum…they’re the
same.” (N.T. Trial at 3451). Counsel then qualified this statement explaining
that they do not have walls like a prison, “[b]ut they do have locked doors
and it serves the same purpose.” (Id.)
In this context, the prosecutor’s comment represented a fair and
permissible response to the defense. During his argument, defense counsel
reassured the jury of Appellant’s likely commitment if the verdict rendered
were not guilty by reason of legal insanity. The prosecutor’s statement that
such commitment was not a guarantee, was made in response to these
contentions. See Bryant, supra; Jones, supra. Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by overruling Appellant’s objections and denying
a mistrial. Appellant’s claim does not merit relief.
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In his final issue, Appellant argues that given the overwhelming
evidence of Appellant’s mental illness, the jury’s verdict of guilty, rather than
either not guilty by reason of legal insanity or guilty but mentally ill, is a finding
that shocks one’s conscience and sense of justice. Appellant insists that no
legal or factual basis existed for the jury to render a guilty verdict. Therefore,
he claims he is entitled to a new trial because the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. (Appellant’s Brief at 60-66).
Preliminarily, we must consider whether Appellant’s challenge is
properly before us. A defendant must raise a weight claim with the trial court
in the first instance. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Specifically, “a weight
challenge must be preserved either in a post-sentence motion, a written
motion before sentencing, or orally prior to sentencing.” Commonwealth v.
Cox, 231 A.3d 1011, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2020). “An appellant’s failure to avail
himself of any of the prescribed methods for presenting a weight of the
evidence issue to the trial court constitutes waiver of that claim.” Id.Instantly, Appellant failed to raise any objection to the weight of the
evidence in the trial court. Therefore, Appellant’s claim is waived. See id.;
Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). As such, Appellant’s final issue merits no relief.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/8/2023
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