Com. v. O'Neill, J.

J-S70016-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JASON O’NEILL
Appellant No. 597 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 19, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0903901-1996
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2014
Appellant, Jason O’Neill, appeals pro se from the August 19, 2013
order, dismissing his second petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful
review, we affirm.
On October 3, 2001, a jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of
first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another
person, as well as one count each of arson and criminal mischief. 1 On
October 5, 2001, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of life
imprisonment. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 2702, 2705, 3301, and 3304, respectively.
J-S70016-14
June 9, 2003, and our Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of
appeal on February 27, 2004. Commonwealth v. O’Neill, 830 A.2d 1050
(Pa. Super. 2003) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 845 A.2d
817 (Pa. 2004). Appellant did not file a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. As a result, his judgment of sentence
became final on May 27, 2004, when the filing period for such a petition
expired. See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. S. Ct. R. 13(1).
Thereafter, Appellant filed an unsuccessful PCRA petition in 2004. On June
21, 2010, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition. On August 19, 2013, the
PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely. On September 11, 2013,
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
As noted above, Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition until
June 21, 2010. Therefore, it was patently untimely because it was not filed
within one year of his judgment of sentence becoming final. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Furthermore, Appellant’s brief does not allege that
any of the three exceptions to the PCRA time-bar applies. See
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(stating, “[t]he PCRA specifically provides that a petitioner raising one of the
statutory exceptions to the timeliness requirements must affirmatively plead
and prove the exception[]”) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 951 A.2d
1163 (Pa. 2008). We note Appellant’s brief cites to the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
-2-
J-S70016-14
Appellant’s Brief at 2, 7. To the extent this could be construed as seeking a
time-bar exception, this Court has held that Martinez does not create such
an exception. Commonwealth v. Saunders, 60 A.3d 162, 165 (Pa. Super.
2013), appeal denied, 72 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, Saunders v.
Pennsylvania, 134 S. Ct. 944 (2014).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court correctly
dismissed Appellant’s third PCRA petition as untimely. Accordingly, the
PCRA court’s August 19, 2013 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum.
Judge Strassburger files a concurring statement.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/5/2014
-3-