Com. v. Ivey, S.

J-S75023-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STARKSY IVEY
Appellant No. 715 EDA 2014
Appeal from the PCRA Order January 17, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1204871-1998
BEFORE: ALLEN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUNDY, J.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY MUNDY, J.: FILED DECEMBER 05, 2014
Appellant, Starksy Ivey, appeals pro se from the January 17, 2014
order dismissing as untimely his petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful
review, we affirm.
On February 22, 2000, Appellant pled guilty to one count each of
murder and possession of an instrument of a crime (PIC).1 After a degree-
of-guilt hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty of first-degree murder2
and PIC. On April 28, 2000, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501 and 907, respectively.
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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of life imprisonment. On February 15, 2002, this Court affirmed Appellant’s
judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Ivey, 797 A.2d 1023 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant did not file a petition
for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. As a result, his judgment
of sentence became final on March 18, 2002, when the filing period for such
a petition expired.3 See generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P.
1113(a). Thereafter, Appellant filed unsuccessful PCRA petitions in 2003
and 2009. Appellant filed the instant petition on April 4, 2012. On January
17, 2014, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. On February
6, 2014, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
As noted above, Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on April 4,
2012. Therefore, it was patently untimely because it was not filed within
one year of Appellant’s judgment of sentence becoming final. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). However, Appellant argues that the United States
Supreme Court’s decisions in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), and
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), satisfy the new constitutional
right exception to the PCRA time-bar. Appellant’s Brief at 11; see also 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). This Court has recently concluded that Frye and
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3
We observe that the 30th day fell on Sunday, March 17, 2002. When
computing the 30-day filing period “[if] the last day of any such period shall
fall on Saturday or Sunday … such day shall be omitted from the
computation.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908. Therefore, the 30th day for Appellant to
file a timely allocatur petition was Monday, March 18, 2002.
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Lafler do not satisfy Section 9545(b)(1)(iii). Commonwealth v.
Feliciano, 69 A.3d 1270, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the PCRA court properly
dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. Accordingly, the PCRA court’s
January 17, 2014 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judge Lazarus did not participate in the consideration or decision of
this case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/5/2014
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