Com. v. Champney, R.

J-E03005-16
2017 PA Super 128COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
RONALD GRANT CHAMPNEY
Appellee No. 714 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order April 20, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0001243-1998
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., OTT, J.,
STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.
OPINION BY MOULTON, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2017
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the April 20, 2015
order entered by the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas granting
Ronald Grant Champney’s motion to suppress statements made to police on
May 13, 1998. The trial court concluded that Champney unambiguously
invoked his right to counsel during an interview with police on December 23,
1997 and that, as a result, the statements he made the next May were
obtained in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). While we agree
that Champney successfully invoked his right to counsel, we conclude that,
pursuant to Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), there was a
sufficient break in custody between the invocation and the later questioning
to permit the police to question Champney again after obtaining a proper
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waiver of his Miranda rights. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s
suppression of the May 13, 1998 statements.
This case arises from the 1992 shooting death of Roy Bensinger. A
jury convicted Champney of first-degree murder in 1999 and sentenced him
to death. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his judgment of
sentence in 2003. Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403 (Pa.
2003), cert. denied, Champney v. Pennsylvania, 542 U.S. 939 (2004).
In 2005, Champney filed a timely Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)
petition. On June 3, 2008, the PCRA court granted Champney a new trial,
finding that trial counsel was ineffective for, among other things, failing to
seek suppression of statements Champney made to police on May 13, 1998,
and October 8, 1998.1 On April 24, 2013, an evenly divided Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court’s grant of a new trial.
Commonwealth v. Champney, 65 A.3d 386 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied,
Pennsylvania v. Champney, 134 S.Ct. 1276 (2014).
Following remand, on February 6, 2015, Champney filed a motion to
suppress statements he gave to Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) Sergeant
(“Sgt.”) David Shinskie on November 25, 1997, December 23, 1997, May
13, 1998, and October 8, 1998. On March 13, 2015, the trial court held a
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1
For a discussion of the other grounds on which the PCRA court
granted Champney post-conviction relief, see Commonwealth v.
Champney, 65 A.3d 386, 395-96 (Pa. 2013) (Eakin, J.) (opinion in support
of reversal).
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suppression hearing, after which it set forth the following factual history
regarding these statements:
On October 23, 1997, Champney was arrested and
placed in Schuylkill County Prison in lieu of bail on
unrelated arson charges.[2] Between then and October 8,
1998, Champney had four conversations regarding the
Bensinger case with [Sgt.] Shinskie of the [PSP].
...
On November 25, [1997], Sgt. Shinskie accompanied
[Trooper (“Tpr.”) Denny] Grimm in transporting Champney
from the county prison to his preliminary arraignment [on
the unrelated charges at the Magisterial District Judge’s
(“MDJ”) office.] Tpr. Grimm drove, and Sgt. Shinskie rode
in the backseat with a cuffed Champney.
At the hearing [on Champney’s motion to suppress],
Sgt. Shinskie testified that he was seizing upon every
opportunity to talk with Champney about the Bensinger
case. Sgt. Shinskie allowed Champney to read the arson
complaint[3] and then advised him of his Miranda rights.
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2
In his brief, Champney states that he was first detained in the
Schuylkill County Prison on October 23, 1997 pursuant to charges unrelated
to the Bensinger homicide. A review of the relevant docket – CP-54-CR-
0001206-1997 – shows that on October 23, 1997, Champney was
preliminarily arraigned on a number of charges, including burglary, robbery,
criminal attempt (theft by unlawful taking – moveable property), simple
assault, terroristic threats, recklessly endangering another person, and
criminal conspiracy, but not arson. The magisterial district judge set bail at
$100,000 cash, and based on the docket it does not appear that Champney
made bail on those charges.
3
While Champney was charged with additional offenses on November
25, 1997, those charges do not appear to have included arson. The docket
at CP-54-CR-0001277-1997 reveals that Champney was charged with theft
by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, and conspiracy. He was not
charged with arson until June of 1998. See CP-54-CR-0000980-1998 and
CP-54-CR-0000981-1998. However, this discrepancy does not change our
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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[Sgt. Shinskie]’s approach to Champney was to engage in
low key conversation, giving Champney information that
he had received during the investigation, and inviting
Champney to comment. On the way back from the MDJ
office, Champney was asked to return with the officers to
the police station to make a statement. Champney
responded that he would have to speak to an attorney
before doing so. Instead of taking him to the police
station, he was returned to the prison. The Commonwealth
has referenced . . . no incriminating statements during this
conversation.
Champney’s preliminary hearing on the arson charges
occurred on December 23, 1997. He was again transported
there by [Sgt.] Shinskie and [Tpr.] Grimm in the same
manner as before. Sgt. Shinskie again advised Champney
of his Miranda rights. After some light conversation,
Champney said, “I see you caught David Blickley.” Sgt.
Shinskie testified that Blickley was an associate of
Champney and was suspected of committing burglaries
and home invasions in the Philadelphia area. Blickley’s ex-
girlfriend was married to Bensinger at the time he was
shot.
Sgt. Shinskie responded to Champney by
acknowledging that Blickley had been caught and telling
Champney that Blickley was giving information regarding
the homicide and Champney’s possible involvement.
Champney said that he knew someone would have to take
the blame. Shinskie asked if Beth Bensinger was involved,
and Champney responded that there was no reason for her
to be involved.
On the return trip to the prison, about one hour later,
Sgt. Shinskie asked Champney if he shot Bensinger.
Champney responded, “Before I make any kind of
statement, I think I should talk to Frank Cori.” Sgt.
Shinskie knew that Frank Cori was an attorney who had
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
analysis, as the timeline relevant to Champney’s statements remains the
same. While the charges may be different, Champney was still charged on
November 25, 1997, preliminarily arraigned that same day, and had a
preliminary hearing on December 23, 1997.
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represented Champney. He was returned to the prison with
no more conversation of note.
The next contact by [Sgt.] Shinskie with Champney
occurred on May 13, 1998. Sgt. Shinskie accompanied
Detective Pummer of the Lehigh County District Attorney’s
Office to see Champney at the prison. Detective Pummer
wanted to question Champney about an arson in
Allentown. They met with Champney in a prison
conference room. Champney was advised of his Miranda
rights and signed a waiver form.
After some questions regarding arsons in Allentown and
Tremont, Sgt. Shinskie told Champney that he believed he
could put together probable cause for homicide charges
against Champney. In response, Champney asked what he
was looking at. When [Sgt.] Shinskie replied that he did
not know, because he could not make deals, Champney
told him to go get Cal Shields, who was then the
[Schuylkill County] District Attorney. After an unsuccessful
attempt to locate Mr. Shields, [Sgt.] Shinskie returned to
the conversation with Champney.
When Sgt. Shinskie noted that a .30 caliber firearm was
used to kill Bensinger, Champney said “Yeah. The guns are
kept in a locker in the basement of the home.” [Sgt.]
Shinskie told Champney that he understood the gun was
destroyed. Champney responded, “That’s a lie. The gun is
not destroyed. I know who has the gun. And they might
have sold it or have it somewhere. But that’s a lie. It was
not destroyed.” When [Sgt.] Shinskie told Champney that
Chris Reber was involved, Champney replied, “No he’s not
involved. He only dropped me off.”
The last conversation between Sgt. Shinskie and
Champney occurred on October 8, 1998. On that date,
Champney was arrested in the instant case. [Sgt.]
Shinskie and [Tpr.] Grimm transported Champney from
the county prison to their barracks. Along the way, [Sgt.]
Shinskie commented that Beth Bensinger had made some
interesting statements concerning Champney’s
involvement in the Roy Bensinger shooting. [Sgt.] Shinskie
testified that his goal was to get Champney to comment.
Champney replied that she probably got immunity.
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Also on the way, [Champney] was given the affidavit of
probable cause to read and thereafter stated that it did not
matter because he was going to die anyway. When [Sgt.]
Shinskie asked what Champney meant, he said he had
tuberculosis and was going to tell his attorney not to
appeal so his death would come sooner. Once they arrived
at the barracks, Champney was read his Miranda rights
and signed the waiver form.
Trial Ct. Op., 4/20/15, at 1-5.
On April 20, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting the motion
to suppress in part. It suppressed the statements made on May 13 and
October 8, 1998,4 but denied the motion with respect to the statements
made on December 23, 1997. On April 21, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a
timely notice of appeal, certifying that the suppression order “will terminate
or substantially handicap the prosecution.”5 See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). On June
23, 2016, a panel of this Court affirmed the trial court. The Commonwealth
filed a petition for reargument en banc, which this Court granted on
September 2, 2016.
The Commonwealth raises two6 issues on appeal:
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4
The trial court found that neither the Commonwealth nor Champney
identified a statement from the November 25, 1997 conversation that the
Commonwealth would want to offer as evidence. Trial Ct. Op. at 6.
5
In its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion, the
trial court adopted in full its April 20, 2015 opinion. See Opinion of Court
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925, 5/28/15.
6
In its Rule 1925(b) statement, the Commonwealth also challenged
the suppression of Champney’s October 8, 1998 statements. However, the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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1. Did the lower court err in granting the motion to
suppress statements made to law enforcement
authorities on May 13, 1998 where Champney failed
to make a clear and unambiguous invocation of his
right to counsel?
2. Did the lower court err in granting the motion to
suppress statements made to law enforcement
authorities on May 13, 1998 when there was a
sufficient break in Champney’s custody to end the
presumption of involuntariness established in
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)?
Cmwlth.’s Br. at 4 (trial court answers omitted). Both issues address the
suppression of Champney’s statements on May 13, 1998. Our standard of
review on such matters is well-settled:
When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression
order, this Court follows a clearly defined scope and
standard of review. We consider only the evidence from
the defendant’s witnesses together with the evidence of
the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
entire record, remains uncontradicted. This Court must
first determine whether the record supports the factual
findings of the suppression court and then determine the
reasonableness of the inferences and legal conclusions
drawn from those findings. In appeals where there is no
meaningful dispute of fact, as in the case sub judice, our
duty is to determine whether the suppression court
properly applied the law to the facts of the case.
Commonwealth v. Arthur, 62 A.3d 424, 427 (Pa.Super. 2013) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
Commonwealth has voluntarily abandoned this issue. See Cmwlth.’s Br. at
4 n.1.
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Invocation of the Right to Counsel
In its first issue, the Commonwealth argues that Champney did not
effectively invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel on December 23,
1997 and, therefore, the May 13, 1998 statements are admissible.
According to the Commonwealth, Champney’s statement, “Before I make
any kind of statement, I think I should talk to Frank Cori,” was equivocal and
ambiguous. Cmwlth.’s Br. at 23-24. The Commonwealth relies on Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994), in which the United States Supreme
Court upheld the decision of lower courts that the suspect’s use of the
phrase, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was not sufficiently clear to
constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.7 Cmwlth.’s Br. at 23. The
Commonwealth asserts that Champney’s use of the words “think” and
“should” indicated that Champney was considering whether he should
discuss the matter with his attorney before making a statement, rather than
actually requesting to speak with his attorney. Id. Further, the
Commonwealth states “Champney’s words must be considered along with
the description of his body language, demeanor, and voice intonation,” id. at
25, suggesting implicitly that the trial court failed to do so.
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7
The issue before us concerns Champney’s Fifth Amendment right to
counsel under Miranda, as opposed to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel that attaches when the Commonwealth initiates adversary judicial
proceedings. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Romine, 682 A.2d 1296, 1298-
99 (Pa.Super. 1996) (discussing differences between right to counsel under
Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
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In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court established that an
accused has the right to have counsel present during custodial interrogations
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. 384 U.S. at 474. This right to counsel is part of “a set of
prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the constitutional guarantee
against self-incrimination.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269
(2011).
In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court addressed the
consequences of a suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel. The
Edwards court held that “when an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation,” police may not conduct
further interrogations “until counsel has been made available to him, unless
the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or
conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 484-85. If police conduct
further interrogations outside the presence of counsel, “the suspect’s
statements are presumed involuntary and therefore inadmissible as
substantive evidence at trial, even where the suspect executes a waiver and
his statements would be considered voluntary under traditional standards.”
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991).
To trigger these protections, a defendant’s request for counsel must be
sufficiently clear “that a reasonable police officer would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. In
Davis, police officers were investigating a murder that occurred after the
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victim lost a pool-game bet and refused to pay. Id. at 454. Naval criminal
investigators focused on Davis when they discovered that he had been at the
bar on the evening in question and owned a pool cue that was stained with
blood. Id. Davis was brought in for questioning, provided his rights, 8 and
waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel. Id. at 454-55. During the
interview, Davis said, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Id. at 455. In
response, the criminal investigator reminded him of his right to counsel and
asked Davis to clarify whether he wanted a lawyer. Id. Davis responded
that he was not asking for a lawyer and did not want one. Id. However,
one hour later, Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything
else,” at which point investigators ended the interrogation. Id.The Davis Court declined to disturb the conclusion of the lower courts
that Davis’s “maybe” statement was insufficiently clear to invoke his right to
counsel. Id. at 462. The Court rejected the argument that an equivocal or
ambiguous reference to counsel requires the police to stop questioning a
suspect:
We decline petitioner’s invitation to extend Edwards
and require law enforcement officers to cease questioning
immediately upon the making of an ambiguous or
equivocal reference to an attorney. The rationale
underlying Edwards is that the police must respect a
suspect’s wishes regarding his right to have an attorney
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8
Because Davis was an active military service member and the killing
took place on a naval base, Davis was given his rights under Article 31 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. See 10 U.S.C. § 831.
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present during custodial interrogation. But when the
officers conducting the questioning reasonably do not know
whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring
the immediate cessation of questioning “would transform
the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to
legitimate police investigative activity,” Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 . . . (1975), because it would
needlessly prevent the police from questioning a suspect in
the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not wish to
have a lawyer present. Nothing in Edwards requires the
provision of counsel to a suspect who consents to answer
questions without the assistance of a lawyer.
Id. at 459-60 (some internal citations omitted). The Court went on to
conclude that while “it will often be good police practice for the interviewing
officers to clarify whether or not [a suspect] actually wants an attorney,” the
officers need not do so; instead, they “may continue questioning until and
unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461.
The inquiry into whether or not a suspect has invoked the right to
counsel is an objective one. Id. at 459. The Davis Court explained that a
suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement be a request for an attorney.” Id.
(emphasis added). However, if the statement is “ambiguous or equivocal in
that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood
only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel,” police are not
required to cease questioning. Id. (emphasis in original).
Our task, then, is to determine whether Champney “articulate[d] his
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police
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officer in [Sgt. Shinskie’s] circumstances would understand the statement be
a request for an attorney.” Id. In undertaking that task, we look not only
to the specific words used by Champney, but also at the surrounding
circumstances.9
The first interaction between Champney and Sgt. Shinskie took place
on November 25, 1997, while Champney was detained in county prison on
unrelated charges. N.T., 3/13/15, at 3-4 (“N.T.”); see also note 2, supra.
In an effort to gain information about the Bensinger homicide, Sgt. Shinskie
went with another state trooper to the prison to serve Champney with a
warrant on other unrelated charges and then rode with Champney in a police
cruiser to his preliminary arraignment on those charges.10 N.T. at 4-5. Sgt.
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9
Because context matters, various federal and state appellate courts
have reached different results when analyzing language similar to that used
in Davis and here. Compare United States v. Mohr, 772 F.3d 1143, 1146
(8th Cir. 2014) (defendant’s statement “I think I should get [a lawyer]” was
not an unequivocal invocation of right to counsel) and State v. Carter, 172
So.3d 538, 539-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (defendant’s statement that “I
think I should wait to talk with my public defender,” followed by statement
that he wanted to tell “the whole truth” was not unambiguous invocation of
right to counsel) with People v. Romero, 953 P.2d 550, 557 (Colo. 1998)
(defendant’s statement that “I think I should talk to a lawyer” in response to
question about self-defense rationale was sufficient invocation) and Wood
v. Ercole, 644 F.3d 83, 87, 90-92 (2d Cir. 2011) (defendant’s statement “I
think I should get a lawyer,” made before giving videotaped statement was
sufficient to invoke right to counsel).
10
The Commonwealth does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that
Champney was subject to custodial interrogation on November 25, 1997
during the rides from prison to the arraignment and back, as Champney was
questioned by Sgt. Shinskie while “[hand]cuffed, riding in a moving police
vehicle, and in the company of two armed officers.” Trial Ct. Op. at 7.
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Shinskie wanted Champney to confirm some statements that he had
received from other witnesses. Id. at 5-6. Eventually, Sgt. Shinskie asked
Champney if he would be willing to come to the PSP barracks and give a
statement, to which Champney responded that he would have to speak to an
attorney before going to the barracks. At that point the interrogation ended
and Champney was returned to prison. Id. at 6-7.
On December 23, 1997, Tpr. Grimm and Sgt. Shinskie transported
Champney from the prison to his preliminary hearing on the charges filed in
November. Id. at 7-8. Sgt. Shinskie again sat in the backseat of the PSP
cruiser with Champney while Tpr. Grimm drove. Id. at 8. After Sgt.
Shinskie gave Champney his Miranda warnings, Sgt. Shinskie and
Champney engaged in small talk until Champney said, “I see you caught
Dave Blickley.” Id. at 9. Because Blickley was loosely connected to the
Bensinger investigation,11 Shinskie responded by acknowledging that Blickley
was in custody and that “he was giving information concerning the Roy
Bensinger homicide and also Mr. Champney’s possible involvement.” Id. at
9-10. Champney then said that “he knew somebody was going to have to
take the blame for this.” Id. at 10. When Sgt. Shinskie then asked whether
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11
Sgt. Shinskie testified that Blickley was a “friend or associate of . . .
Champney” who had prior contacts with law enforcement and whose “ex-
wife was married to . . . Bensinger, prior to his demise.” N.T. at 9.
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Beth Bensinger was involved, Champney said “that’s ridiculous” and/or
“there’s no reason for her to be involved in it.” Id.
After reviewing the history of Champney’s relationship with Beth
Bensinger, Sgt. Shinskie told Champney that Dave Blickley appeared to be
“clearing . . . his slate by offering information concerning the Bensinger
homicide” and urged Champney to “step up” and discuss his involvement.
Id. at 12. Sgt. Shinskie then asked Champney, “Did you shoot Roy
Bensinger?” Id. at 14. Champney “mumbled or stammered, hesitated a
little bit, and then said, ‘Before I make any kind of statement, I think I
should talk to Frank Cori.’” Id. Sgt. Shinskie, who knew Cori was an
attorney, then stopped the interrogation. Id. at 55.12
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12
Before the trial court, Champney argued that his statements on
December 23, 1997 should be suppressed because he invoked his right to
counsel on November 25, 1997, and, therefore, the Edwards presumption
applied to his December statements. The trial court rejected this argument,
finding that while Champney may have invoked his right to counsel on
November 25, 1997, on December 23, 1997 Champney initiated the
conversation about the homicide, thus eliminating, albeit temporarily, the
Edwards presumption. Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9. Because Champney re-initiated
the discussion of the homicide on December 23, any earlier invocation of his
right to counsel on November 25 no longer barred Sgt. Shinskie from further
interrogation. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (after the right to counsel
had been asserted by an accused, further interrogation of the accused
should not take place “unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 712 (Pa. 2015) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Hubble, 504 A.2d 168, 175 (Pa. 1986)) (“[A]
confession given after a defendant invokes his right to counsel need not be
suppressed where the defendant: ‘(1) initiated further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police, and (2) knowingly and
intelligently waived the right to counsel.’”). As a result, the admissibility of
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The trial court, noting that Sgt. Shinskie knew “Frank Cori was an
attorney,” concluded that “[t]his request by Champney for counsel before
giving any further statements was clear and unambiguous.” Trial Ct. Op. at
12.13 We agree with the trial court and conclude that Champney’s statement
was “sufficiently clear[] that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S.
at 459. In other words, Champney’s request to speak to Frank Cori, in
context, was sufficiently “unequivocal” and “unambiguous” to satisfy Davis
and secure the protections of Edwards.14
At the time of Champney’s request, Sgt. Shinskie knew that Frank Cori
was an attorney.15 N.T. at 28, 38, 55. Sgt. Shinskie also knew that when
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(Footnote Continued)
Champney’s statements on May 13, 1998 turns first on whether Champney
effectively invoked his right to counsel later on December 23, 1997, after he
re-initiated his discussion with Sgt. Shinskie.
13
The court further observed that Champney’s statement was similar
to the defendant’s second reference to counsel in Davis, and “in both
instances, the agents in Davis and Sgt. Shinskie had no trouble construing
the suspect’s statement that he ‘thinks’ he wants to see an attorney as a
request for counsel.” Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12. We note that the Davis Court
did not discuss the second statement made by the defendant except to note
that it ended the interrogation. Rather, its analysis focused on Davis’s
equivocal “maybe” statement. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 462.
14
We agree with Champney and the Commonwealth that Sgt.
Shinskie’s questioning on December 23, 1997 was a “custodial interrogation”
under Miranda.
15
In its suppression ruling, the trial court found that “Sgt. Shinskie
was aware that Frank Cori was an attorney who was associated with
Champney.” Trial Ct. Op. at 12. However, Sgt. Shinskie only testified that
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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he had earlier asked Champney to give a statement about the Bensinger
homicide on November 25, 1997, Champney stated that he would have to
speak to an attorney before going to the police barracks to do so. Id. at 6-
7. Under these circumstances, where Champney was in custody, was asked
directly whether he had committed a murder,16 and identified a particular
lawyer known to his interrogator, a reasonable officer would conclude that
Champney “actually invoked his right to counsel,” Davis at 458 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984)), rather than
merely making what “might be a request for an attorney,” id. at 461
(emphasis in original).
The Commonwealth emphasizes Champney’s use of the words “think”
and “should,” arguing that his statement was, as a result, “a communication
fraught with indetermination.” Cmwlth.’s Br. at 24. This focus is too
narrow. Rather, the question is whether, under these specific
circumstances, including his prior request for counsel and his reference to a
particular attorney with whom Sgt. Shinskie was familiar, Champney’s
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
he knew that Frank Cori was an attorney. When asked by the
Commonwealth if he knew “whether or not Mr. Cori was representing Mr.
Champney,” he said “No, I did not.” N.T. at 55. Nevertheless, our
conclusion that Champney sufficiently invoked his right to counsel depends
only on Sgt. Shinskie’s knowledge that Cori was a lawyer, not on whether he
knew Cori’s relationship to Champney.
16
The Commonwealth does not dispute that Champney was subject to
custodial interrogation at the time he made the statement.
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statement “can reasonably be construed to be an expression of desire for
the assistance of an attorney.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (quoting McNeil,
501 U.S. at 178.) Underscoring that “a suspect need not speak with the
discrimination of an Oxford don,” id. at 459 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted), we have little trouble concluding that Champney, despite
his use of arguably qualifying language, “actually request[ed] an attorney.”
Id. at 462; see also id. at 459 (“a statement either is such an assertion of
the right to counsel or it is not”) (quotation omitted).17
The Commonwealth’s suggestion that the trial court did not adequately
consider Champney’s “body language, demeanor and voice intonation,”
Cmwlth.’s Br. at 25, is unavailing. The trial court heard testimony about the
circumstances surrounding Champney’s statement, including body language,
demeanor, and tone. See N.T. at 14-15, 29-30. While the trial court may
not have mentioned these facts in its opinion, it was undoubtedly aware of
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17
The Commonwealth also asks us to consider Champney’s
statements in light of Commonwealth v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173 (Pa.Super.
2013), in which a panel of this Court concluded that a defendant’s phone call
to her attorney’s office (her attorney was unavailable), made with the
assistance of her interrogator, was not a “sufficient articulation of her desire
to have counsel present for the interview such that her statements require
suppression.” Id. at 1185. Kunkle, however, is inapposite. There, when
the defendant was brought to the police barracks, “she asked if she could
contact an attorney” prior to being given her Miranda warnings. Id. at
1184. We concluded that the appellant’s statement was equivocal because it
was not a “sufficient articulation of her desire to have counsel present for
the interview such that her statements require suppression.” Id. at 1185(emphasis added). In contrast, Champney’s request was to speak with an
attorney before answering any further questions.
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their possible relevance,18 and nothing in the record or the opinion suggests
that the trial court disregarded them in rendering its decision. We decline
the Commonwealth’s invitation to give more weight to these factors than did
the trial court.
Alternatively, the Commonwealth contends that the trial court
impermissibly relied on Sgt. Shinskie’s “elect[ion] to cease his questioning of
Champney,” arguing that “that fact is irrelevant to the analysis.” Cmwlth.’s
Br. at 28. The Commonwealth argues that Sgt. “Shinskie’s personal belief
as to the meaning of Champney’s ambiguous statement does not dictate the
outcome” and, were we to affirm the trial court, such a ruling would “operate
to punish those law enforcement officers who take a conservative approach
by ceasing further questioning when faced with an equivocal request for
counsel.” Id. at 30.
While we agree with the Commonwealth that the Davis inquiry is
objective, see Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, the Commonwealth’s argument
appears to conflate Sgt. Shinskie’s knowledge of relevant facts with Sgt.
Shinskie’s subjective belief as to what Champney meant by his statement.
Davis requires us to make an objective determination as to whether a
____________________________________________
18
In a 2013 opinion in support of reversal of the grant of a new trial in
this case, three Justices suggested that examination of tone, demeanor,
emphasis, and body language would assist in assessing the ambiguity or
equivocality of Champney’s statements. See Champney, 65 A.3d at 404
(Eakin, J., joined by Castille, C.J., and McCaffery, J.).
- 18 -
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reasonable police officer, under the circumstances, would construe
Champney’s statement as a request for counsel. While Sgt. Shinskie’s
subjective belief as to whether Champney’s statement was sufficiently clear
to invoke his right to counsel may not be relevant to that inquiry, his
knowledge of relevant facts, such as that Frank Cori was a lawyer possibly
associated with Champney, and that Champney had earlier invoked his right
to counsel, plainly is relevant. Those facts are part of the circumstances
under which Champney gave his statement. The trial court’s observation
that Sgt. Shinskie “had no trouble construing [Champney’s] statement . . .
as a request for counsel,” Trial Ct. Op. at 12, was no more than a
confirmation of its appropriately objective analysis.
Break in Custody
In its second issue, the Commonwealth argues that, even if Champney
had invoked his Fifth Amendment protection on December 23, 1997, by May
13, 1998 he had experienced a sufficient “break in custody” under
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (2010), that the police were permitted
to approach him again despite that earlier invocation. In other words, the
Commonwealth contends that because Edwards operates as a bar to further
interrogation only so long as the suspect remains in Miranda custody, and
because Shatzer holds that ordinary incarceration is not the same as
Miranda custody, there was no constitutional bar to the May 13, 1997
interrogation.
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The trial court rejected this argument and concluded that because
Champney was a pre-trial detainee and not serving a sentence for a prior
conviction, the rationale of Shatzer does not apply. Surprisingly,
Champney’s brief does not address the Shatzer break-in-custody analysis,
or discuss or even cite Shatzer.19 Champney instead contends, in apparent
conflict with the time limit adopted in Shatzer, that “[t]here is no proper
length of time permitted to allow an officer to keep using tactics to elicit a
confession.” Champney’s Br. at 21. Champney concludes that the Edwards
presumption therefore applies to his May 13, 1998 statements. Id. at 18-
21. Proper evaluation of these arguments requires a discussion of the
rationale for the rule in Edwards, the meaning of Miranda custody, and the
distinction between Miranda custody and ordinary incarceration.
As noted above, the Edwards Court held that “when an accused has
invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation,”
police may not conduct further interrogations “until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police.” 451 U.S. at 484-85. The
purpose of the Edwards rule is to prevent police from “tak[ing] advantage
____________________________________________
19
Champney’s lack of a response to the Commonwealth’s Shatzer
argument is particularly perplexing given the discussion of the issue by the
trial court and the emphasis placed on the case by the Commonwealth in its
initial brief as the appellant in this matter.
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of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody . . . by
repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested
counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Shatzer, 559 U.S.
at 105 (internal quotations omitted). In other words, Edwards and its
progeny are designed to protect against “the continued pressure that begins
when the individual is taken into custody as a suspect and sought to be
interrogated—pressure likely to ‘increase as custody is prolonged.’” Id.(quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990)). In cases
following Edwards, the Court concluded that a police officer could not
question a suspect who had invoked his right to counsel and been held in
interrogative custody for three days, even though the re-interrogation
concerned a separate incident, see Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675(1988), and could not re-interrogate a custodial suspect without counsel two
days after the suspect had invoked his right to counsel, even though he had
consulted with counsel in the interim, see Minnick, 498 U.S. at 153. In
both Roberson and Minnick, the Court concluded that the defendants were
still in Miranda custody because they were unable to “regain a sense of
control or normalcy after they were initially taken into custody for the crime
under investigation.” Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 107.
In Shatzer, the Supreme Court directly addressed both the meaning
of “custody” for Miranda purposes and how long it would take a defendant
to “regain[] a sense of control or normalcy” after his initial custody. Id.Acting on allegations that Shatzer had sexually abused his three-year-old
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son, a police detective went to interview Shatzer at the prison where he was
serving a sentence on unrelated charges. Id. at 100-01. Shatzer waived
his Miranda rights and the detective began to question him about the
allegations. Id. at 101. Once Shatzer understood that the detective was
asking about the sexual-abuse allegations, not the crime for which he was
already serving time, Shatzer invoked his right to counsel. Id. The
detective then ended the interview and Shatzer returned to general prison
population. Id.Two years and six months later, the police received more specific
allegations about the same sexual-abuse allegations and a different
detective went to re-interrogate Shatzer. Id. Shatzer waived his Miranda
rights and eventually made incriminating statements. Id. at 101-02. After
being charged with various sexual offenses, Shatzer filed a pre-trial motion
to suppress his statements to the police. Id. at 102. The trial court denied
Shatzer’s motion, reasoning that he “had experienced a break in custody for
Miranda purposes” between interrogations. Id. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed and remanded, holding that there was no break-in-
custody exception to Edwards and, even if such an exception existed,
“Shatzer’s release back into the general prison population did not constitute
a break in custody.” Id. at 103.
The Supreme Court reversed. Id. The Court first examined the
circumstances in the “paradigm Edwards case[,]” where a suspect is
“coerced or badgered into abandoning his earlier refusal to be questioned
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without counsel[,]” and “he remains cut off from his normal life and
companions, thrust into and isolated in an unfamiliar, police-dominated
atmosphere, . . . where his captors appear to control his fate.” Id. at 106(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Then the Court considered
a scenario where a suspect is released from pretrial custody and is “returned
to his normal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation.”
Id. at 107. In contrast to the situations presented by Edwards, Roberson,
and Minnick, where the suspects did not “regain[] a sense of control of
normalcy after they were initially taken into custody for the crime under
investigation,” id. at 107, the Court found that its hypothetical scenario did
not require the extension of the protections afforded by Edwards. The
Court reasoned:
When, unlike what happened in [Edwards, Roberson,
and Minnick], a suspect has been released from his
pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for
some time before the later attempted interrogation, there
is little reason to think that his change of heart regarding
interrogation without counsel has been coerced. He has no
longer been isolated. He has likely been able to seek
advice from an attorney, family members, and friends. And
he knows from his earlier experience that he need only
demand counsel to bring the interrogation to a halt; and
that investigative custody does not last indefinitely. In
these circumstances, it is far fetched to think that a police
officer’s asking the suspect whether he would like to waive
his Miranda rights will any more “wear down the
accused,” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 . . . (1984)
(per curiam), than did the first such request at the original
attempted interrogation—which is of course not deemed
coercive. His change of heart is less likely attributable to
“badgering” than it is to the fact that further deliberation in
familiar surroundings has caused him to believe (rightly or
- 23 -
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wrongly) that cooperating with the investigation is in his
interest. Uncritical extension of Edwards to this situation
would not significantly increase the number of genuinely
coerced confessions excluded. The “justification for a
conclusive presumption disappears when application of the
presumption will not reach the correct result most of the
time.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 . . .
(1991).
Id. at 107-08 (footnote omitted). Therefore, the Court determined that the
Miranda protections alone, without the conclusive Edwards presumption,
adequately protected the rights of a suspect who requested counsel but was
“reinterrogated after a break in custody . . . of sufficient duration to
dissipate its coercive effects.” Id. at 109.
The Court then addressed the question of what constitutes a break in
custody of “sufficient duration” to permit the police to approach the suspect
again for further questioning. Recognizing the risk of police abuse if
Edwards could be evaded by a brief release and prompt re-arrest, the Court
concluded that “14 days . . . provides plenty of time for the suspect to get
reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to
shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.” Id. at 110.
The Court next examined whether Shatzer’s break between
interrogations constituted a break in Miranda custody. Shatzer was
incarcerated for the entire time between interrogations, so in one sense he
was plainly in “custody.” Id. at 112. The Court made clear, however, that
incarceration and Miranda custody are not one and the same:
Interrogated suspects who have previously been
convicted of crime live in prison. When they are released
- 24 -
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back into the general prison population, they return to
their accustomed surroundings and daily routine—they
regain the degree of control they had over their lives prior
to the interrogation. Sentenced prisoners, in contrast to
the Miranda paradigm, are not isolated with their
accusers. They live among other inmates, guards, and
workers, and often can receive visitors and communicate
with people on the outside by mail or telephone.
Their detention, moreover, is relatively disconnected
from their prior unwillingness to cooperate in an
investigation. The former interrogator has no power to
increase the duration of incarceration, which was
determined at sentencing. And even where the possibility
of parole exists, the former interrogator has no apparent
power to decrease the time served. This is in stark
contrast to the circumstances faced by the defendants in
Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick, whose continued
detention as suspects rested with those controlling their
interrogation, and who confronted the uncertainties of
what final charges they would face, whether they would be
convicted, and what sentence they would receive.
Id. at 113-14 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to
distinguish the duration of incarceration from the duration
of what might be termed interrogative custody. When a
prisoner is removed from the general prison population
and taken to a separate location for questioning, the
duration of that separation is assuredly dependent upon
his interrogators. For which reason once he has asserted a
refusal to speak without assistance of counsel Edwards
prevents any efforts to get him to change his mind during
that interrogative custody.
Id. at 113 n.8 (emphasis in original).
Based on the foregoing, the Court found that although Shatzer was
incarcerated for the entire period between his invocation of the right to
counsel and the later re-interrogation on the same subject, he nonetheless
experienced a sufficient break in Miranda (or interrogative) custody that the
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Edwards presumption no longer applied. Id. at 112-14. His later
incriminating statements, obtained after fresh Miranda warnings and an
appropriate waiver, were therefore admissible. Id. at 116-17.
Two years after Shatzer, the Supreme Court provided more guidance
on the differences between incarceration on the one hand and Miranda or
interrogative custody on the other. In Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499(2012), the Court addressed the question whether a prisoner, taken out of
the general prison population for questioning, was in Miranda custody while
being questioned. Id. at 517.20 The Court explained that “[a]s used in our
Miranda case law, ‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances
that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion,” id. at
508-09, and that “[n]ot all restraints on freedom of movement amount to
custody for purposes of Miranda,” id. at 509. The Court further observed
that “[w]e have decline[d] to accord talismanic power to the freedom-of-
movement inquiry and have instead asked the additional question whether
the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures
as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). After concluding, based in part on
____________________________________________
20
The Supreme Court uses the term “custody” in conjunction with
Miranda to “specif[y] circumstances that are thought generally to present a
serious danger of coercion.” Fields, 565 U.S. at 508-09. It has also used
the term “interrogative custody” as a synonym for Miranda custody. See,
e.g., Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113 n.8.
- 26 -
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Shatzer, that a “prisoner is [not] always in custody for purposes of
Miranda whenever [he] is isolated from the general prison population and
questioned about conduct outside the prison,” id. at 508, the Court
examined “all of the circumstances of the questioning” of Fields and held
that he was “not in custody within the meaning of Miranda,” id. at 517.
Along the way, the Court further explained why “imprisonment alone is
not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda.”
Id. at 511.
First, questioning a person who is already serving a prison
term does not generally involve the shock that very often
accompanies arrest. In the paradigmatic Miranda
situation—a person is arrested in his home or on the street
and whisked to a police station for questioning—detention
represents a sharp and ominous change, and the shock
may give rise to coercive pressures. A person who is “cut
off from his normal life and companions,” Shatzer, [559
U.S. at 106], and abruptly transported from the street into
a “police-dominated atmosphere,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at
456, may feel coerced into answering questions.
By contrast, when a person who is already serving a
term of imprisonment is questioned, there is usually no
such change. “Interrogated suspects who have previously
been convicted of crime live in prison.” Shatzer, [559 U.S.
at 113]. For a person serving a term of incarceration, we
reasoned in Shatzer, the ordinary restrictions of prison
life, while no doubt unpleasant, are expected and familiar
and thus do not involve the same “inherently compelling
pressures” that are often present when a suspect is
yanked from familiar surroundings in the outside world and
subjected to interrogation in a police station. Id. [at 103].
Second, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been
sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured
into speaking by a longing for prompt release. When a
person is arrested and taken to a station house for
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interrogation, the person who is questioned may be
pressured to speak by the hope that, after doing so, he will
be allowed to leave and go home. On the other hand,
when a prisoner is questioned, he knows that when the
questioning ceases, he will remain under confinement. Id.[at 113 n.8].
Third, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been
convicted and sentenced, knows that the law enforcement
officers who question him probably lack the authority to
affect the duration of his sentence. Id. [at 113-114]. And
“where the possibility of parole exists,” the interrogating
officers probably also lack the power to bring about an
early release. [Id.] “When the suspect has no reason to
think that the listeners have official power over him, it
should not be assumed that his words are motivated by
the reaction he expects from his listeners.” [Illinois v.]
Perkins, 496 U.S. [292, 297 (1990)]. Under such
circumstances, there is little “basis for the assumption that
a suspect . . . will feel compelled to speak by the fear of
reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of [a] more
lenient treatment should he confess.” Id. at [296-97].
In short, standard conditions of confinement and
associated restrictions on freedom will not necessarily
implicate the same interests that the Court sought to
protect when it afforded special safeguards to persons
subjected to custodial interrogation. Thus, service of a
term of imprisonment, without more, is not enough to
constitute Miranda custody.
Id. at 511-12.
Both Shatzer and Fields were serving prison sentences at the time
they were questioned. Champney was not serving a sentence but instead
was being held in county prison while awaiting trial on a host of separate
charges. The question for us is whether this factual distinction makes a
legal difference. We conclude that, under the circumstances before us, it
does not.
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In 2012, our Supreme Court observed that, in light of Fields, the
question whether an unsentenced county prisoner may experience a
Shatzer break in custody is an open one. Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45
A.3d 1050, 1068 n.9 (2012). Our research has uncovered very little
decisional law on point. One notable exception is United States v. Ellison,
632 F.3d 727 (1st Cir. 2010), which like Fields involved the issue whether
an inmate questioned in prison was in Miranda custody at the time. Unlike
Fields and Shatzer, however, and like the case before us, the inmate in
Ellison was not a sentenced convict but rather was awaiting trial on
unrelated charges. Writing for a unanimous panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit, retired Justice Souter concluded that the
Shatzer analysis applied and the inmate in question, though not serving a
sentence, was not in Miranda custody. Id. at 730.
Here, in contrast, the trial court concluded that Shatzer was
inapplicable, reasoning that because Champney was a pre-trial detainee, he
was continuously in Miranda custody and the conclusive Edwards
presumption applied. Trial Ct. Op. at 15-16. The trial court stated that
“Champney’s situation was akin to that of the defendant in Roberson,” in
that “Champney was not a sentenced felon serving time[,] . . . was in jail
only because he was awaiting trial on [unrelated] charges, and it was Sgt.
Shinskie to whom Champney had invoked his right to have counsel present.”
Id. According to the trial court, because “Champney had no opportunity to
return to the normalcy of the life he had before being arrested on the
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[unrelated] charges,” the Edwards presumption still applied when Sgt.
Shinskie interrogated Champney on May 13, 1998. Id. at 15-16. The trial
court’s position, embraced by the panel decision in this case, is that the
Shatzer break-in-custody analysis applies only to prisoners who are serving
a sentence upon conviction, and never to prisoners not serving a sentence.
We disagree.
Preliminarily, we note that the question required by Shatzer is not, as
the trial court suggested, whether Champney had the chance to return to
the normalcy of his pre-arrest life outside of prison. Rather, we must ask
whether Champney’s return to prison following the initial interrogation on
December 23, 1997 represented the same sort of “return to normalcy”
experienced by Shatzer after his initial interrogation, when he too was
returned to the general prison population. In other words, when Champney
was in county prison from December 23, 1997 until his re-interrogation on
May 13, 1998, was he continuously subject to the same “inherently
compelling pressures” contemplated by Miranda, or was he instead subject
simply to “the ordinary restrictions of prison life.” If the former, then Sgt.
Shinskie was barred from re-approaching Champney until such time as he
was either released from prison or convicted and sentenced on the pending
charges. If the latter, then Champney experienced the sort of break in
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Miranda custody, well longer than the 14-day minimum, that made the May
13, 1998 re-interrogation entirely lawful.21
After a careful review of Shatzer and Fields, we find no material
difference for purposes of the break-in-custody analysis between the
incarceration described in those cases and that experienced by Champney.
Champney was not detained on the murder charge, but rather on separate
offenses for which he had been held in the Schuylkill County Prison for
failure to post bond or in lieu of bail. Champney’s daily life in county prison
between December 23, 1997 and May 13, 1998, so far as the record reveals,
did not include the sort of coercive pressures inherent in “interrogative
custody,” Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113 n.8, that Miranda and Edwards are
meant to deflect.
First, Champney had been held in the prison since at least October 23,
1997. Thus, on May 13, 1998, Champney was not “abruptly transported
from the street into a police-dominated atmosphere.” Fields, 565 U.S. at
511 (internal quotation omitted). Rather, Champney had already been in
the county prison for nearly six months, “liv[ing] among other inmates,
____________________________________________
21
One longstanding criticism of an expansive reading of Edwards,
addressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Shatzer, was that it created
the “question-proof inmate,” meaning that suspects who remained
incarcerated after invoking their Miranda rights would be permanently
immune from re-interrogation by authorities as long as they remained
incarcerated. See, e.g., Laurie Magid, Questioning the Question-Proof
Inmate: Defining Miranda Custody for Incarcerated Suspects, 58 Ohio. St.
L.J. 883, 895 (1997).
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guards, and workers,” and presumably provided the opportunity to “receive
visitors and communicate with people on the outside by mail or telephone.”
Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 113. Although we recognize that the “harsh realities”
of prison life may be unpleasant, id. at 113, Champney, much like the
prisoners in Shatzer and Fields, had ample opportunity to adjust to “the
ordinary restrictions of prison life, [which] are expected and familiar.”
Fields, 565 U.S. at 511.22
____________________________________________
22
In concluding that Champney was in interrogative custody from
December 23, 1997 through May 13, 1998, the trial court relied principally
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675(1988). There, the Court addressed the applicability of Edwards to
statements made by a burglary suspect who invoked his right to counsel on
arrest and then, after being held in police custody for three days, was
approached by another police officer about a different burglary. Id. at 687-
88. The Roberson court suppressed the resulting statements, declining the
state’s request that it create an exception to Edwards when officers
question a suspect about a crime other than that of arrest. Here, the trial
court found that because Champney was, like the suspect in Roberson, in
custody but not serving a sentence upon conviction, Shatzer was
distinguishable and the Edwards presumption applied to Champney’s May
13, 1998 statements. Trial Ct. Op. at 12-16. We disagree.
While Champney was not serving a sentence, his custody in the county
prison was fundamentally different from the interrogative detention of the
burglary suspect in Roberson, who was in the continuous custody of his
interrogators for three days. Indeed, in Roberson no one argued that the
suspect was not in Miranda custody; instead, the government was asking
for an exception to Edwards that would have permitted re-interrogation of a
suspect still subject to such custody. Champney, in contrast, was awaiting
trial in the county prison for over four months between interrogations, far
removed from Sgt. Shinskie. Roberson, read in light of Shatzer and
Fields, plainly does not cloak every incarcerated suspect with immunity
from questioning simply because the suspect was not serving a sentence
upon conviction.
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Second, nothing in the record suggests that Sgt. Shinskie had the
ability to free Champney from his incarceration on unrelated charges if he
were to talk about the Bensinger homicide, or that Champney believed Sgt.
Shinskie had that ability. Champney was awaiting prosecution on multiple
charges from multiple incidents unrelated to Bensinger’s death, which were
proceeding through the court system. There was little risk that Champney,
unlike a suspect in interrogative custody, felt “pressured to speak by the
hope that, after doing so, he [would] be allowed to leave and go home.”
Fields, 559 U.S. at 511.23 Champney could not rationally expect that
answering questions or giving a statement about Bensinger’s death would
secure his freedom from the multitude of charges pending against him. Like
the sentenced prisoners in Shatzer and Fields, Champney must have
known “that when the questioning cease[d], he [would] remain under
confinement.” Fields, 559 U.S. at 511; see also Ellison, 632 F.3d at 730.
____________________________________________
23
Justice Souter’s analysis for the First Circuit in Ellison applies with
equal force here:
It is true that the condition of someone being held awaiting
trial, like Ellison, is not exactly the same as the convict’s
position, since the suspect might reasonably perceive that
the authorities have a degree of discretion over pretrial
conditions, at least from the point of making
recommendations to a court. But we see nothing in the
facts of this case that would be likely to create the
atmosphere of coercion subject to Miranda concern.
Ellison, 632 F.3d at 730.
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Third, the duration of Champney’s pre-trial detention was based on the
unrelated charges pending against him, for which he either failed to make
bail or was held in lieu of bail. Each time Champney ended a conversation
with Sgt. Shinskie, he returned to the general prison population; nothing in
the record suggests that police possessed the ability to reward Champney
for cooperating in the Bensinger investigation or punish him for exercising
his rights. Because Champney could not rationally believe that Sgt. Shinskie
had power over his detention on the pending charges, he could not be
“motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners” and thus compelled
to avoid “reprisal from remaining silent” or, conversely, “hope [for] more
lenient treatment should he confess.” Fields, 559 U.S. at 512. Under these
circumstances, we conclude that Champney’s incarceration was not the
equivalent of Miranda custody and, therefore, that he experienced a break
in such custody between December 23, 1997 and May 13, 1998.24
Finally, pursuant to Shatzer, we conclude that the nearly five-month
break between Champney’s invocation of his right to counsel and the prison
interrogation removed the Edwards presumption of involuntariness and
permitted Sgt. Shinskie to re-approach Champney, re-read him his rights,
____________________________________________
24
We do not intend to suggest that pre-conviction incarceration can
never be the functional equivalent of Miranda custody. Rather, trial courts
should examine, in light of Shatzer and Fields, the circumstances under
which an unsentenced inmate is being held to determine whether that
detainee is under Miranda custody.
- 34 -
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and secure a valid waiver of those rights. Nothing in the record suggests
that, between December 23, 1997 and May 13, 1998, police attempted to
interrogate or even contact Champney about the Bensinger homicide or any
other crime. This break between interrogations clearly exceeds the 14-day
time bar established in Shatzer. Thus, Champney had ample time “to get
reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to
shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior [Miranda] custody.”
Shatzer, 559 U.S. at 110.
As noted above, in his brief Champney does not address the
applicability of Shatzer. He does, however, argue that his May 13, 1998
Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.25 As the
____________________________________________
25
In addition to this general assertion, Champney contends in his brief
to this Court that his May 13, 1998 Miranda waiver was not knowing,
intelligent or voluntary because he waived his Miranda rights only in
relation to the arson investigations in Lehigh and Schuylkill counties and not
with respect to the Bensinger homicide investigation. Champney’s Br. at 15-
18. However, we conclude that Champney has waived this argument, as he
failed to develop it by discussion or analysis of relevant legal authority. See
Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa.Super. 2006) (“[A]rguments
which are not appropriately developed are waived . . . includ[ing] those
where the party has failed to cite any authority in support of a contention”).
Further, Champney did not raise this specific argument either in his
suppression motion or before the trial court at the suppression hearing, and
elected not to file a brief in support of his suppression motion.
Even had Champney preserved this argument, we would conclude that
it does not merit relief. First, “a suspect’s awareness of all the possible
subjects of questioning in advance of interrogation is not relevant to
determining whether the suspect voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his Fifth Amendment privilege.” Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564,
577 (1987). Second, Champney cites neither relevant legal authority in
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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J-E03005-16
Commonwealth accurately observes, however, “the record is devoid of any
evidence that Champney’s will was overborne, that Shinskie was acting
aggressively or relentlessly in order to secure a Miranda waiver, or, that
Champney was threatened in any fashion.” Cmwlth.’s Reply Br. at 7-8. We
agree with the Commonwealth that this alternative argument for affirmance
is without merit.
In sum, we conclude that while Champney invoked his right to counsel
on December 23, 1997, there was a sufficient break in custody between then
and May 13, 1998 that Champney’s May 13, 1998 statements are not
subject to the Edwards presumption, and his Miranda waiver was valid.
Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in suppressing
Champney’s May 13, 1998 statements.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/26/2017
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
support of this argument nor evidence of record that his waiver was in fact
so limited. We note that the standard waiver form signed by Champney and
Sgt. Shinskie referenced no particular offense. Moreover, given that Sgt.
Shinskie had questioned Champney about the Bensinger homicide during
each of their two previous interactions, Champney could hardly have been
surprised that he would raise the same subject on the third occasion.
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