In Re: E.W.C., Appeal of: G.L.C., Jr.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: E.W.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: G.L.C., JR., FATHER : No. 1866 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 23, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-4305
IN RE: T.M.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: G.L.C., JR., FATHER : No. 1867 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 23, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-4303
IN RE: S.M.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: G.L.C., JR., FATHER : No. 1868 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 23, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-4304
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IN RE: E.W.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.O., MOTHER : No. 1909 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 23, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-4305 A
IN RE: T.M.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.O., MOTHER : No. 1910 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 23, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-4303
IN RE: S.M.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.O., MOTHER : No. 1911 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 23, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 2018-4304
BEFORE: OTT, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED MAY 10, 2019
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In these consolidated appeals, E.O. (“Mother”) and G.L.C., Jr. (“Father”)
appeal from the Decrees entered on October 23, 2018, granting the Petitions
filed by Centre County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) seeking to
involuntarily terminate their parental rights to their minor female children,
T.M.C. (born December 2007) and S.M.C. (born December 2008), and to their
minor male child, E.W.C. (born March 2015) (collectively, the “Children”),
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 Additionally,
Mother’s counsel, Justin Paul Miller, Esquire (“Attorney Miller”), has filed a
Petition to Withdraw as counsel and a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant Attorney Miller’s Petition to Withdraw
and affirm the trial court’s Decrees.
CYS became involved with the family in 2007, after receiving several
referrals citing general parenting concerns. CYS received additional referrals
between 2007 and 2015, when E.W.C. was born, but Mother and Father
refused to cooperate with CYS. In 2015, E.W.C. was born addicted to opiates.
Following E.W.C.’s birth, Mother and Father maintained that they did not wish
to cooperate with CYS and refused to receive early childhood intervention
services, despite recommendations by CYS and hospital staff. In 2016, T.M.C.
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1 On December 12, 2018, and December 14, 2018, respectively, this Court,
sua sponte, consolidated Father’s and Mother’s separate Notices of Appeal as
to each of the Children. We address both consolidated appeals in a single
Memorandum for ease of disposition, as the appeals arise out of the same
Decrees and the questions raised in each appeal are identical. We further
note that the trial court filed six nearly identical Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinions,
which addressed both parents’ appeals.
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and S.M.C. were identified as victims of sexual abuse, perpetrated by friends
of Mother and Father, prompting CYS to become more involved with the
family. CYS recommended, and made available, trauma services for T.M.C.
and S.M.C. related to their sexual abuse, but Mother and Father did not
facilitate participation, resulting in termination of the services. Moreover,
Mother and Father demanded that CYS procure a court order for continued
services of any kind. After additional sexual allegations were made against
Father, who was registered under Megan’s Law, CYS instituted a Safety Plan
for the Children. In October of 2016, Mother was arrested for driving under
the influence while E.W.C. was in the vehicle. When police arrived at the
scene, Mother was incoherent and unresponsive.
On November 18, 2016, following a hearing, the Children were
adjudicated dependent based on the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of the
family home and the general neglect and mistreatment of the Children.
Initially, the Children remained in the home after the dependency hearing.
However, in December 2016, a caseworker observed T.M.C. banging her head
on the wall while saying “go back, go back” after being discharged from a
psychiatric facility that day. When questioned by the caseworker, T.M.C.
stated that she wanted to return to the facility because the “big people” at her
home were mean. During that timeframe, Mother and Father transferred
T.M.C. and S.M.C. from a school that provided individualized education plan
(“IEP”) services to one without such services, despite knowledge that the
services were needed for the growth and development of T.M.C. and S.M.C.
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T.M.C. and S.M.C. were often truant, and, when they did attend school,
teachers and school officials voiced concerns about their overall hygiene.
T.M.C.’s hair was knotted to the point that it was impossible to comb, while
S.M.C.’s backpack was covered in cat urine and contained cat feces inside the
zipper compartment. Caseworkers observed that the family’s house was kept
in an unsanitary and unsafe condition and that E.W.C. was often dirty and
unsupervised. On February 10, 2017, Father was arrested and jailed on
criminal charges related to aggravated indecent assault of a minor. Father
was ultimately convicted on the charges and sentenced to 180 ½ to 361 years
in prison. Upon Father’s detention, Mother would disappear for days at a time,
leaving the Children to fend for themselves.
On February 24, 2017, the Children were placed in foster care as a result
of CYS’s filing for Emergency Protective Custody of the Children. The filing
was made after a caseworker observed that the floor of the home was covered
in glass, food, broken eggshells and litter; a cat litter box that was overflowing
with waste; and E.W.C. was completely unsupervised. Additionally, a
neighbor reported that E.W.C. was left naked outside of the home. In the
same timeframe, Mother was charged with, and pled guilty to, various
offenses, including driving under the influence, with T.M.C. in the vehicle.
At the time of placement, it was noted that E.W.C. had several physical
needs that were unmet, including correction of a lazy eye that was causing
him to fall. It was also noted that T.M.C. had mental health issues as well as
incontinence, defecation problems, bowel impaction, and endocrine problems.
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Further, it was noted that S.M.C. had severe mental health issues that made
continued placement with her siblings unsafe. At times, S.M.C. would defecate
to communicate. S.M.C. also exhibited injurious tendencies, including
threatening to kill herself, swallow sharp metal objects, jump out of a moving
vehicle, and harm CYS workers. On one occasion, S.M.C. head-butted and
kicked a caseworker before proceeding to defecate all over herself. S.M.C.
was taken to a hospital, where it was determined that psychiatric
institutionalization was medically necessary to prevent harm to herself and
others. S.M.C. eventually returned to school but was expelled after
threatening her teacher and classmates with scissors. Around the same time,
S.M.C. threatened to kill other children in her foster home. Thereafter, S.M.C.
was readmitted to a psychiatric facility.
While in the care of their foster parents, T.M.C. joined the cheerleading
squad at school, and E.W.C. received proper eye care and became toilet-
trained. While the Children were in placement, CYS scheduled visits for
Mother with the Children. However, Mother skipped many visits, even those
confirmed in advance, and would abscond for weeks at a time, all of which
upset the Children. Eventually, CYS and the foster parents would only
transport the Children to visit Mother when Mother was already present at the
visitation site. When visits did occur, Mother did not interact well with the
Children and was often drunk and high on marijuana, suboxone, and opiates.
In July 2017, Mother was evicted from her housing in accordance with a
protection from abuse order. Mother could not be located throughout the
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entire month of July and was unavailable by telephone. CYS nonetheless
engaged Family Intervention Crisis Services for reunification purposes.
Mother failed to appear for scheduled meetings with CYS and was often under
the influence when she did appear. Mother verbally abused and berated
numerous caseworkers in front of the Children. Following these outbursts, the
Children suffered significant emotional and behavioral setbacks in the
progress made since being removed from Mother and Father’s care. At one
point, Mother’s behavior escalated to the point that the Children’s Guardian
ad litem (“GAL”) filed a Motion to suspend Mother’s visits. After an evidentiary
hearing was held, the Motion was granted based on a finding that Mother
posed a grave threat to the Children. Mother was thereafter jailed for various
outstanding criminal charges, and she did not seek to reinstate visitation
privileges.
During this time, Father remained incarcerated. The Children had
several non-contact visits with Father, but it was noted that S.M.C. only visited
Father once and cried the entire time; E.W.C. was too young to understand
the concept of talking into the phone; and T.M.C. wavered in her decision to
visit Father. Ultimately, T.M.C. was unable to hold a conversation with Father
unless continually prompted by CYS caseworkers. After these visits, T.M.C.
and E.W.C. displayed negative moods and behaviors at school and in their
foster home. CYS urged Father to attend parenting classes at the jail.
However, Father did not complete the classes, claiming that they were
unnecessary because he was an adequate parent.
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Finding no improvement in the abovementioned circumstances, on
March 21, 2018, CYS filed Petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to the Children. On July 5, 2018, the trial court held
an evidentiary hearing on the Petitions (hereinafter, the “termination
hearing”). Mother and Father were both present and represented by separate
counsel. The Children were not present, but their legal interests were
represented by Charles Kroboth, Esquire (“Attorney Kroboth”).2
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2 At the hearing, Attorney Kroboth acknowledged that he was appearing as
legal counsel for the Children, and not as their GAL, having previously served
as GAL in the dependency proceedings. See generally In re Adoption of
L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 179-80 (Pa. 2017) (plurality) (requiring the
appointment of separate legal counsel, in addition to a GAL in contested
involuntary termination proceedings). In L.B.M., a majority of the Court
concluded that counsel may serve both as the GAL, representing the child’s
best interests, and as the child’s counsel, representing the child’s legal
interests, so long as there is no conflict between the child’s legal and best
interests. Id. at 183-93; see also In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 329 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (stating that “separate representation would be required only if
the child’s best interest and legal interests were somehow in conflict.”). Here,
E.W.C. was three years old at the time of the hearing, and therefore unable
to express his preferred outcome. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1030, 1092 (Pa.
2018) (concluding that “if the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of
ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be
no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests.”).
Additionally, S.M.C.’s preferred outcome could not be ascertained because,
although seemingly able to understand the need for a permanent home,
S.M.C.’s mental state was such that she was unable to meaningfully discuss
the subject. See In re Adoption of D.M.C., 192 A.3d 1207, 1212 n.10 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (stating that a “legal-interest attorney, separate from a best-
interest attorney, need not be appointed for a child who is unable to articulate
a position to legal counsel because, in that situation, there is no conflict
between the child’s legal and best interests.”). Finally, T.M.C.’s preferred
outcome, i.e., that she be adopted, did not conflict with her best interests.
Accordingly, we conclude that there is no conflict between the Children’s legal
interests and best interests, and the dictates of L.B.M. are satisfied.
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By Decrees entered on October 23, 2018, the trial court granted CYS’s
Petitions and involuntarily terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to
the Children. Thereafter, Mother and Father filed timely, individual Notices of
Appeal and Concise Statements, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i), and (b).
Attorney Miller then filed a Petition to Withdraw as counsel and an
accompanying Anders Brief. Mother did not file a pro se brief or retain
alternate counsel for this appeal.
Mother and Father raise identical questions on appeal:
I. Did the trial court commit an error of law and/or abuse of
discretion in concluding that clear and convincing evidence
was presented to justify involuntary termination of
[Mother’s and Father’s] parental rights pursuant to either
23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2)[,] (5)[,] or (8)[?]
Anders Brief at 6; Father’s Brief at 9 (footnote omitted).3
Before reaching the merits of [an] appeal, we must first
address the propriety of counsel’s petition to withdraw and
Anders brief. The Anders procedure, whereby [] counsel may
withdraw if he or she concludes that an appeal is wholly frivolous,
initially applied to direct appeals in criminal matters….
In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 905 (Pa. Super. 2017). The Anders principles
have been extended to a first appeal by an indigent parent from a decree
involuntarily terminating his or her parental rights. See In re V.E., 611 A.2d
1267, 1275 (Pa. Super. 1992).
To withdraw from representation, counsel must
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3Neither Mother nor Father addressed 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) in their briefs,
which could result in waiver of the issue. Nonetheless, we will address the
matter of the Children’s best interests as part of our review.
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(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
making a conscientious examination of the record ... counsel
has determined the appeal would be frivolous;
(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably support
the appeal ... ; and
(3) furnish a copy of the brief to [the client] and advise him of
his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any
additional points he deems worthy of the court’s attention.
In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
We further review an Anders brief for compliance with the requirements
set forth in Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009):
In the Anders brief that accompanies [] counsel’s petition to
withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural
history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything
in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id. at 361. “After an appellate court receives an Anders brief and is satisfied
that counsel has complied with the aforementioned requirements, the Court
then must undertake an independent examination of the record to determine
whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237.
Our review confirms that Attorney Miller complied with each of the
requirements of Anders and Santiago. Attorney Miller asserts that he made
a conscientious review of the record and determined that Mother’s appeal
would be wholly frivolous. Attached to Attorney Miller’s Petition to Withdraw
is a copy of the letter sent to Mother, dated January 22, 2019, containing the
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requisite advisements and enclosing a copy of the Anders Brief. Having
concluded that Attorney Miller satisfied the procedural requirements for
withdrawing from representation, we next examine the record and make an
independent determination of whether Mother’s appeal is, in fact, wholly
frivolous. Because the question raised in Mother’s appeal is identical to that
in Father’s appeal, we will address the merits of each simultaneously.
In the Anders Brief, Attorney Miller questioned whether CYS presented
sufficient evidence to support the involuntary termination of Mother’s rights
under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a). Anders Brief at 6. Specifically, Mother claims
that her parental rights should not be terminated because she is trying to
“better herself” in order to alleviate the problems that led to the Children’s
placement, is working towards obtaining a GED, and achieved sobriety while
in jail. Id. at 19-21.
Father likewise challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
involuntary termination of his rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a). Father’s
Brief at 9. In particular, Father claims that his parental rights should not have
been terminated because the Children were not removed from the home while
he resided there, which he poses as evidence that the conditions leading to
placement would be remedied through his presence at the home. Father
further emphasizes his insistence to secure visits with the Children despite
being incarcerated. Id. at 18-19. Father also asserts that the trial court erred
by considering the length of his sentence in its decision to terminate his
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parental rights, as he has not yet exhausted his direct appeal rights.
Id. at 19.
In reviewing an order terminating parental rights, we adhere to the
following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion
standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a
petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency
cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept
the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court
if they are supported by the record. As has been often stated, an
abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a
decision may be reversed … only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
“Parental rights may be involuntarily terminated where any one
subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along with consideration of the
subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super.
2010). Thus, we will confine our review to the termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(2) and 2511(b).
Section 2511 directs the Court to engage in a bifurcated process:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of
parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the
analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child.
In re L.M., 924 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
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Pursuant to subsection (a)(2), parental rights may be terminated, after
the filing of a petition, when
[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). If the court finds subsection (a)(2) is satisfied, it
must then consider “the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child” to determine if termination of parental rights is in the
child’s best interest. Id. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and welfare of the
child have been [] interpreted to include [i]ntangibles such as love, comfort,
security, and stability. … The utmost attention should be paid to discerning
the effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.” In re
T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
We further note that
incarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be
determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of
providing essential parental care, control or subsistence[,] and the
length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly
relevant to whether the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the
parent, sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(a)(2). … If a court finds grounds for
termination under subsection (a)(2), a court must determine
whether termination is in the best interests of the child,
considering the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of the child pursuant to § 2511(b). In this regard, trial
courts must carefully review the individual circumstances for
every child to determine, inter alia, how a parent’s incarceration
will factor into an assessment of the child’s best interest.
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In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 830–31 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Here, the trial court determined that clear and convincing evidence
existed to support the involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights to the Children under subsection (a)(2). Specifically, the trial
court determined that Mother and Father repeatedly and continually deprived
the Children of essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
the Children’s physical or mental well-being, and that the conditions and
causes of such deprivation could not or would not be remedied:
The evidence demonstrated that Mother was wholly neglecting
T.M.C.’s emotional, physical, and overall needs even before T.M.C.
was declared dependent and before her removal from the home….
In that regard[,] Mother failed to follow through with much-
needed trauma services for T.M.C. to help her in coping with the
sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of Mother[’s] and Father’s
friends who had lived in the family home. Mother, [] along with
Father[,] had moved T.M.C. from a school where [an] IEP was
provided to her to a school without IEP services, despite knowing
that T.M.C. needed the services. T.M.C. was truant from school,
and when she did attend school, there were concerns about her
hygiene. Mother was at times unable to be found altogether, and
the home was found to be unsanitary and unsafe during CYS visits.
In this same timeframe, Mother was arrested and charged with
various crimes in relation to driving under the influence of
prescription medications with T.M.C. and E.W.C. in the car.
Following placement [of the Children,] Mother’s conduct and her
neglect of the Children, including T.M.C., worsened. When Mother
would appear for visits [(having skipped many)] at CYS, she would
arrive unprepared, and she was not able to keep the Children’s
attention or direct them. … She could not be located at all for
much of July. She did not attend any scheduled visits with T.M.C.
in June, July, August, or September of 2017. Mother was
untruthful with [CYS] at times, and failed to follow through with
any [CYS] recommendations or directives. She expressed a desire
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to have the Children returned to her, but she refused to cooperate
with reunification services, and she failed to otherwise take steps
to make needed changes to ensure the safety and well-being of
[the] Children.
…
The evidence demonstrated that Mother was wholly
neglecting S.M.C.’s emotional, physical, and overall needs even
before S.M.C. was declared dependent and before her removal
from the home…. In that regard[,] Mother failed to follow through
with much-needed trauma services for S.M.C. to help her in coping
with the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of Mother[’s] and
Father’s friends who had lived in the family home. Mother, []
along with Father[,] had moved S.M.C. from a school where [an]
IEP was provided to her to a school without IEP services, despite
knowing that S.M.C. needed the services. S.M.C. was truant from
school, and when she did attend school, there were concerns
about her hygiene. Mother was at times unable to be found
altogether, and the home was found to be unsanitary and unsafe
during CYS visits. In this same timeframe, Mother was arrested
and charged with various crimes in relation to driving under the
influence of prescription medications with T.M.C. and E.W.C in the
car. Following placement [of the Children,] Mother’s conduct and
her neglect of the Children, including S.M.C., worsened. When
Mother would appear for visits [(having skipped many)] at CYS,
she would arrive unprepared, and she was not able to keep the
Children’s attention or direct them. … She could not be located at
all for much of July. She did not attend any scheduled visits with
S.M.C. in June, July, August, or September of 2017. Mother was
untruthful with [CYS] at times, and failed to follow through with
any [CYS] recommendations or directives. She expressed a desire
to have the Children returned to her, but she refused to cooperate
with reunification services, and she failed to otherwise take steps
to make needed changes to ensure the safety and well-being of
[the] Children. … During much of this time, Father was also
unavailable to S.M.C. due to his incarceration while awaiting trial
for serious criminal charges, a fact known to Mother.
Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that S.M.C. had
significant special needs, both [sic] physically, psychologically,
and emotionally. In addition to failing to take any steps
whatsoever to assist S.M.C. in addressing those needs, Mother
was aggravating the situation by virtue of her refusal to participate
in reunification efforts, her sporadic, inconsistent, visits with
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S.M.C. and her inappropriate behavior on the rare occasions she
did.
…
The evidence demonstrated that Mother was wholly
neglecting E.W.C.’s overall needs, as well as the needs of her
other two children, even before E.W.C. was declared dependent
and before his removal from the home…. E.W.C. had been born
addicted to pain medications, exhibiting signs of withdrawal at
birth. Mother and Father failed to assure that E.W.C. received
early childhood intervention services despite having been advised
that he needed them. Mother was arrested, and later convicted,
for driving under the influence of controlled substances with
E.W.C. in the vehicle. Mother was at times unable to be found
altogether, and the home was found to be unsanitary and unsafe
for E.W.C. during CYS visits. Following placement [of the
Children,] Mother’s conduct and her neglect of the Children,
including E.W.C., worsened. When Mother would appear for visits
[(having skipped many)] at CYS, she would arrive unprepared,
and she was not able to keep the Children’s attention or direct
them. … She could not be located at all for much of July. She did
not attend any scheduled visits with E.W.C. in June, July, August,
or September of 2017. Mother was untruthful with [CYS] at times,
and failed to follow through with any [CYS] recommendations or
directives. Trial Court Opinion Mother, 12/20/18, at 17-19.
[As to Father, CYS] presented clear and convincing evidence
that Father’s repeated and continued incapacity, neglect and
refusal has caused [the Children] to be without essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for her physical and mental
well-being, and further, that the conditions and causes of that
incapacity, neglect and refusal cannot or will not be remedied by
Father.
…
As [CYS] points out, even before Father’s most recent
conviction and lengthy prison sentence, Father failed to take very
basic steps that had been identified by [CYS] as necessary to
assure the physical safety and emotional well-being of the
Children, and Father, like Mother, was largely uncooperative with
[CYS] and hostile to the caseworkers who attempted to assist the
family. Father refused to acknowledge the significant drug and
alcohol problems that prevented Mother from safely caring for the
Children, leaving the Children vulnerable in Mother’s care. Even
when Mother herself admitted to conduct such as driving with
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E.W.C. while under the influence, … Father continued to deny that
Mother had done so. Father was demonstrated to be combative
with [CYS] workers at times before the Children were placed in
care and uncooperative in terms of providing releases to permit
[CYS] to ensure that the Children and parents were receiving
required services. Father did not have the sexual offender’s
assessment that was required after the allegations of his most
recent sexual abuse of a minor came about, and before he was
criminally charged for that conduct.
…
[Father] did not follow through to make sure T.M.C. [or]
S.M.C. received the trauma therapy [] desperately needed to cope
with the sexual abuse [] experienced at the hands of family friends
who lived in [the] home. Both [T.M.C. and S.M.C.] were often
truant from school, and when they did attend, there were serious
hygiene concerns. S.M.C. clearly has significant mental health
problems that were not identified, let alone addressed, while in
Mother and Father’s care. E.W.C. was not receiving needed early
intervention services.
…
Despite the Children being adjudicated dependent, and
[CYS] identifying those things the parents needed to address for
the safety and well-being of the Children, Father did not take steps
to address these issues, thus demonstrating a refusal or inability
to provide the basic care [the] Children fundamentally needed. …
He refused to participate in [CYS’s] efforts to provide support in
that regard. He continued to deny responsibility for the lack of
follow[-]through with services for the Children.
…
Although Father is correct that the fact of incarceration,
alone, is an insufficient reason to terminate parental rights, that
does not mean a court should ignore a parent’s inmate status in
analyzing allegations of parental incapacity. To the contrary, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clarified that incarceration is a
factor to be considered…. Given Father’s sentence of 180[]½ to
360 years in state prison, it seems fairly evident that Father
cannot remedy the incapacity and neglect that lead to the Children
being adjudicated dependent even if he were to have a change of
heart regarding his role in the underlying condition leading to
dependency and placement. Trial Court Opinion Father,
12/12/18, at 17-19.
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In addition, the trial court determined that termination of Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests, pursuant to
subsection 2511(b):
Although [there was] some evidence of a once[-]existing natural
bond between T.M.C. and Mother, the clear and convincing
evidence showed a significant deterioration of that bond had
occurred. … [As to S.M.C., the c]ourt did not find evidence of an
existing bond between Mother and S.M.C. … The evidence
overwhelmingly established that termination of Mother’s parental
rights would not destroy an existing relationship that is necessary
or beneficial for [T.M.C. or S.M.C.]
…
[With regard to E.W.C.,] [t]he clear and convincing evidence
established that E.W.C. has bonded with his foster parents and
thrived while in their home. It appears doubtful that E.W.C.
understands that the foster parents are not his natural parents.
The [c]ourt did not find evidence of an existing bond between
Mother and E.W.C. Moreover, as with the other children, the
[c]ourt concluded that the evidence overwhelmingly established
that termination of Mother’s parental rights as to E.W.C. would
not destroy an existing relationship that is beneficial or necessary
his well-being and overall welfare.
…
To the contrary, evidence established that visits with Mother
while reunification efforts were underway resulted in setbacks
from the significant progress [T.M.C. and S.M.C.] had made after
being removed from her parents’ care [and] resulted in emotional
outbursts and setbacks for E.W.C.
…
[T]he [c]ourt accepted credible testimony by S.M.C.’s most
recent caseworker that S.M.C. needs a stable[,] loving family, as
well as [CYS] testimony that S.M.C. needs a consistent, structured
environment. Mother has not provided stability, structure or
consistency for S.M.C., nor has she undertaken any effort to do
so since S.M.C.’s placement. Trial Court Opinion Mother,
12/20/18, at 19.
Although there was evidence that T.M.C. still cared for []
Father, the evidence overwhelmingly established that there was
no beneficial bond between them. [As to S.M.C., the court found
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no evidence] of a bond existing between Father and S.M.C., let
alone a bond that was beneficial to S.M.C.
…
[With regard to E.W.C.,] [t]he clear and convincing evidence
established that E.W.C. has bonded with his foster parents and
thrived while in their home. It appears doubtful that E.W.C.
understands that the foster parents are not his natural parents.
There was no evidence to establish an existing bond with []
Father.
…
Visits with [] Father while reunification efforts were
underway resulted in setbacks from the significant progress []
made.
…
[T]he [c]ourt accepted credible testimony by S.M.C.’s most
recent caseworker that S.M.C. needs a stable[,] loving family, as
well as [CYS] testimony that S.M.C. needs a consistent, structured
environment. Father did not provide stability, structure, or
consistency for S.M.C. before he was incarcerated, and certainly
will not be able to provide this for her while he serves out his
lengthy prison sentence. … [T]he conditions leading to placement
[were the same as those leading to dependency and] continued to
exist [before Father was incarcerated] and Father had done
nothing to remedy the conditions. Trial Court Opinion Father,
12/12/18, at 18-19.
***
[Moreover,] the evidence showed that T.M.C. was doing
very well in her foster home. She lives with her brother, E.W.C.,
and has bonded with her foster parents. T.M.C. [is] enrolled in a
school with an IEP. She [is] engaging in extracurricular activities
such as cheerleading and gymnastics, and learning [to have]
confidence in herself. Her emotional needs [are] being addressed
through consistent trauma therapy, and her medical needs [are]
also being addressed. There was much improvement with the
incontinence and defecation issues she had been experiencing. As
to the bond [between T.M.C. and her] foster parents, testimony
established that T.M.C. had developed a loving bond with her
foster parents, and that she relied on them for her physical and
emotional needs, as well as her day to day needs for her general
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welfare and well-being. She expressed wanting to be adopted into
the foster family.
…
Although S.M.C.’s mental health disorders have made
sustainable progress difficult, the evidence established that she
has made progress since removal from Mother and Father’s home.
She is currently receiving medical and counseling services she
needs, both of which were lacking [previously].
…
[As to E.W.C.,] the foster parents have made sure that
E.W.C. has the early intervention services he needed, and they
have taken him for medical appointments. He was prescribed
eyeglasses to remedy the lazy eye condition that was interfering
with his walking and stability. Evidence established that he is safe
and secure in the foster parents’ home, presently with T.M.C. as
well, and that they have created a loving, stable environment for
him and consistently attended to all of his needs. Trial Court
Opinion, 12/20/18, at 18; Trial Court Opinion, 12/12/18, at 18.
Upon review, we conclude that the trial court’s decision to terminate
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights under subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b) is
supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record.
Although Father and Mother claim that they love the Children, see N.T.,
7/5/18, at 203, 214-15, 218, this Court has held that a parent’s love for a
child, alone, does not preclude termination of parental rights. See In re L.M.,
923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). It is well-settled that a child’s life
“simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d
726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008).
We discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in concluding that the
Children’s needs were being irreparably neglected and that their best interests
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are served through the underlying termination of parental rights. Further,
because our independent examination of the record indicates that there are
no other non-frivolous claims that can be raised by Mother, we conclude that
Mother’s appeal is frivolous, and grant Attorney Miller permission to withdraw
as counsel. Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s termination
of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to
subsections 2511(a) and (b).
Petition to Withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 05/10/2019
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