In the Int. of: J.C., II., Appeal of: J.C.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
APPEAL OF J.C., FATHER PENNSYLVANIA
: No. 3656 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000248-2018,
CP-51-DP-0002422-2017
IN THE INTEREST OF: R.C., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF J.C., FATHER
: No. 3658 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000249-2018,
CP-51-DP-0002421-2017
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2019
J.C. ("Father") appeals from the decrees dated and entered on
November 14, 2018, granting the petitions filed by the Philadelphia
Department of Human Services ("DHS" or the "Agency"), seeking to
involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his minor children, R.C., a female
born in September of 2012, and J.C. a/k/a J.C., II, a male born in March of
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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2014 (collectively, "the Children"), pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b),1 and the orders changing the permanency
goals for the Children to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6351.2, 3 Father's counsel, Attorney Joshua Weil ("Counsel"), has filed with
1 The trial court noted that its termination decrees incorrectly provided that
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(4) was a basis for the termination of Father's parental
rights, but the court later amended the termination decrees on March 5, 2019.
See Trial Court Opinions, J.C. and R.C., 3/15/19, at 1 n. 2.
2 The trial court explained that A.M.G. a/k/a A.C.-S. ("Mother") voluntarily
relinquished her parental rights to the Children, and that she has not filed a
notice of appeal with regard to those voluntary termination decrees, nor is she
a party to the present appeals.
3 Here, Father filed his two notices of appeal on December 14, 2018. Father
filed one notice of appeal with regard to each child, and each notice of appeal
challenged both the termination decree and the goal change order with respect
to that child. On January 10, 2019, this Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated
Father's two appeals. On January 11, 2019, this Court issued rules to show
cause to Father with regard to whether he violated the mandate of Pa.R.A.P.
341, as expressed in Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018),
because he did not file a separate notice of appeal from each decree and each
order as to each child. On January 21, 2019, Father filed his response to the
rule to show cause. We discharged the rule on January 22, 2019. We will not
penalize Father for his procedural misstep. See In the Matter of M.P., 204
A.3d 976 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that Walker compels quashal when an
appellant files a single notice of appeal from orders entered on two separate
trial court dockets; however, to the extent decisional law may have been
unclear to this point the Court did not quash the appeal). The Walker decision
applies to appeals filed after June 1, 2018. The notice of appeal In the Matter
of M.P. was filed August 17, 2018. The facts herein are analogous to In the
Matter of M.P. Specifically, Father has filed one notice of appeal as to each
child, and each appeal is from a termination decree and a goal change order,
two separate trial court matters with separate docket numbers. Indeed, for
both children, the decree terminated Father's parental rights to the child and
was entered on the child's adoption trial court docket, and the order changed
the child's goal and was entered on the child's dependency trial court docket.
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this Court a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel and a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant Counsel leave to
withdraw and affirm.
The trial court fully and accurately set forth the procedural history and
factual background of this appeal, based on the testimony at the evidentiary
hearing on the termination petitions held on November 14, 2018, in its
separate opinions entered with regard to each child, which we incorporate in
full herein. See Trial Court Opinions, J.C. and R.C., 3/15/19, at 1-4. Notably,
the trial court stated:
Children have been in DHS care since September 7, 2017. Father
has failed to comply with his objectives and comply with court
orders throughout the life of the case. DHS filed petitions to
involuntarily terminate Father's parental rights and change
Children's permanency goal to adoption on March 27, 2018.
* * *
On November 14, 2018, the trial court held the termination and
goal change trial for [Children]. Father arrived late for this trial.
Marilyn Rigmaiden-Deleon, Esq., was appointed as legal counsel
("Legal Counsel") to Children.
Trial Court Opinions, J.C. and R.C., 3/15/19, at 3.
In M.P., filed on February 22, 2019, this Court directed that, all parties
seeking review with this Court shall file notices of appeal as mandated by
Pa.R.A.P. 341 and Walker, and that failure to comply would result in quashal
of the appeal. As Father's appeals in this matter were filed prior to the filing
of M.P. on February 22, 2019, however, we will not quash his appeals.
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In addition to Attorney Rigmaiden-Deleon, Attorney Janice Sulman was
present at the hearing as guardian ad /item ("GAL") for the Children. Also
present at the hearing were: Attorney Weil, Father's counsel; Attorney
Deborah Fegan, Mother's counsel; and Attorney Bennette Harrison, DHS
counsel. DHS presented the testimony of Caitlyn King from Children's Crisis
Treatment Center, ("CCTC"), who provides trauma -focused therapy for R.C.
N.T., 11/14/18, at 16. DHS next presented the testimony of Danielle LaClaire
from CCTC, who is a trauma clinician providing services to J.C. in the
therapeutic nursery at CCTC. Id. at 42-44. DHS then presented the
testimony of Giovanni Antoine, who is the Community Umbrella Agency
("CUA") Catholic Social Services worker assigned to the Children. Id. at
58-59. DHS finally presented the testimony of Father as on cross-
examination. Id. at 87-88. Father testified on his own behalf. Id. at 99.
The GAL presented the testimony of Genard Whitman, who was the CUA
caseworker assigned to the Children's case prior to Giovanni Antoine. Id. at
126-127. Legal Counsel for Children presented the testimony of Tiesha
Cooper, from Catch, Incorporated, who is the case manager for J.C. Id. at
143.
The trial court summarized its decision as follows:
Legal Counsel reported to the trial court that Children indicated
that they wanted [to] remain with their current foster parent and
did not want to return to Father. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 144-145).
The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to change the
permanency goal to adoption and to involuntarily terminate
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Father's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
(8), and (b).
Trial Court Opinion, J.C. and R.C., 3/15/19, at 3-4.
On December 14, 2018, Counsel filed this appeal on behalf of Father,
including a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal with each
notice of appeal. Thereafter, on April 29, 2019, Counsel filed in this Court an
Anders brief on behalf of Father, along with a motion to withdraw as counsel.
Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and
wishes to withdraw representation, he or she must do the following:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
making a conscientious examination of the record ., counsel
. .
has determined the appeal would be frivolous;
(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably support
the appeal. .; and
.
(3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and advise him of his
right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any
additional points he deems worthy of the court's attention.
In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1274-75 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court
extended the Anders principles to appeals involving the termination of
parental rights. "When considering an Anders brief, this Court may not
review the merits of the underlying issues until we address counsel's request
to withdraw." In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237.
In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), our
Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders, i.e., the
contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief:
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(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and
(4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. "After an appellate court receives an Anders
brief and is satisfied that counsel has complied with the aforementioned
requirements, the Court then must undertake an independent examination of
the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous." In re S.M.B.,
856 A.2d at 1237.
With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform
the defendant of his or her rights in light of counsel's withdrawal, this Court
has held that counsel must "attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the
letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights." Commonwealth
v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Counsel has complied with each of the requirements of Anders.
Counsel indicates that he conscientiously examined the record and determined
that Father's appeal is wholly frivolous. Further, Counsel's Anders brief
comports with the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Santiago. Finally, we observe that Counsel did not attach
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to his motion to withdraw a copy of any letter from Counsel to Father in
compliance with Millisock. Counsel was required to state in the letter
Counsel's intention to seek permission to withdraw, and advise Father of his
right to retain private counsel to represent him on appeal or to file a pro se
brief on his own behalf to raise any additional issues he deems worthy of
appellate review. In his motion to withdraw, however, Counsel stated:
Counsel has already informed [Father] in person and
telephonically that [C]ounsel believes that the appeal has no merit
and that [C]ounsel is moving to withdraw[,] and that whether or
not the Court grants the [Motion] to [Withdraw], [Father] has the
right to represent himself and to participate in the appeal or to
hire [a] private counsel.
[Motion] to Withdraw, at 1 ¶ 4.
In its opinion, the trial court stated:
Father has indicated to the CUA case worker [sic] [Mr. Antoine]
that he resides in Pennypack Park, a public city park in
Philadelphia. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 59-60, 86). At the bar of the
court, Father indicated that he does not live in Pennypack Park,
but that he lives on a "concrete slab" with no mailing address.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 88). Father has indicated to the CUA case
manager that he had no intention of presenting to the ARC
[Achieving Reunification Center] for housing because he claimed
that he did not need this program. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 63). CUA
has attempted to assist Father with obtaining housing throughout
the life of the case. [Id. at 84.] The CUA case manager offered
to provide Father with a referral to a shelter program, but Father
voiced his distaste for shelters. [Id. at 90-91.] Father indicated
that the CUA case manager offered to refer him to a shelter, but
Father chose not to follow up on that referral. (N.T. 11/14/18,
pgs. 90-91, 111-112). Father is aware that housing is one of his
objectives. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 65-66, 110). Father has been
offered appropriate resources to assist him in obtaining
appropriate housing but, [sic] Father has not completed his
housing objective because he has been unwilling to comply with
his objective. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 67, 69).
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Trial Court Opinions, J.C. and R.C., 3/15/19, at 7.
On cross-examination by DHS counsel, Father testified that he does
not have a mailing address but he has a working telephone number on which
he has received calls related to the Children's case. Id. at 85-86. When
questioned by the trial court concerning his lack of an address, Father stated
to the court that, if anyone has anything related to the Children's case to give
him, the person could call him on the telephone, and he would meet the person
at a Burger King near Bustleton Pike and Street Road. Id. at 106-107. Mr.
Antoine testified that Father never provided a valid mailing address to the
CUA. Id. at 59. He stated that the CUA had been using Father's working
cellular telephone number throughout the duration of the case. Id. at 59, 62.
Additionally, Ms. Cooper testified that Father never provided an address to
Catch. Id. at 142.
Here, Father has no address and is resistant to residing in a shelter, but
has a working cellular telephone number that has been used in relation to the
Children's case, and he has requested to be contacted in that manner.
Accordingly, under the unique circumstances of this case, we find that Counsel
has complied with the procedural requirements set forth in Millisock by
communicating in person and over the telephone the required information set
forth in Millisock. Moreover, Counsel has complied with the requirements set
forth in Anders/Santiago for withdrawing from representation. We will grant
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Counsel's motion to withdraw, and proceed with our review of the merits of
Father's appeal.
In the Anders brief on appeal, Counsel raises the following issue:
THE GLOBAL QUESTION
Whether there is anything in the record that might arguably
support the appeal that obviates a conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous[?]
SPECIFIC AREAS OF INQUIRY
Whether under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A § 6351, and 55
Pa.Code § 3130.74, in accordance with the provisions of the
federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671, et seq.,
reasonable efforts were made to reunite the father with his
children[,] whether termination of his parental rights were the
dispositions best suited to the safety[,] protection[,] and physical,
mental, and moral welfare of the Children [?]
Whether it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that
Father's parental rights should be terminated under § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b).
Whether the trial court committed reversible error when:
(a) it misheard and misinterpreted bonding evidence;
(b) it concluded there was anexus between Father's
transience/financial instability and an inability to parent;
and
(c) it determined that with further assistance, Father would
not have been able to remedy the dependent issues[?]
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Anders Brief, at 5.4
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)
(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel
Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);
Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
4 Father potentially waived any challenge to the goal change by his failure to
directly raise the issue in his concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal and in his statement of issues involved in his brief. See Krebs v.
United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super.
2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the statement of
questions involved in his brief on appeal); see also M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d
462, 466, n. 3 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding that an appellant waives issues that
are not raised in both his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
and the statement of questions involved in his brief on appeal). However, this
Court has stated, "[o]nce counsel has satisfied the above requirements [for a
motion to withdraw and Anders brief], it is then this Court's duty to conduct
its own review of the trial court's proceedings and render an independent
judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous."
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en
banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730, 736 (Pa. Super.
2004); see also Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1250 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (following Goodwin). Thus, as part of our independent review
we may address whether DHS established the grounds for a change in the
permanency goal of the Children to adoption under section 6351 of the
Juvenile Act.
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demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill -will. Id.As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an
abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact -specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.
Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,
as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an
appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;
instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual
findings are supported by the record and the court's legal
conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066
(Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained: "[t]he standard of clear and convincing
evidence is defined as testimony that is so 'clear, direct, weighty and
convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.' Id., quoting In re .7.L.C.,
837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).
This Court may affirm the trial court's decision regarding the termination
of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will
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consider section 2511(a)(2) and (b). Section 2511 provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule. --The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(b) Other considerations. --The court interminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as
follows.
As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for
termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that "[t]he repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
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necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent." . . .
This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for termination
under § 2511(a)(2):
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made
lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can
seldom be more difficult than when termination is based
upon parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in
enacting the 1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent
who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as
parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of .7.1., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986), quoting
In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa. 1978).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.
This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent
efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A
parent's vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding
the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely
or disingenuous. Id. at 340.
With regard to section 2511(a)(2), the trial court stated as follows:
Throughout the time that Children have been in the custody of
DHS, Father's SCP objectives were to attend the CEU for drug
screens and an evaluation, mental health, housing, employment,
and supervised visitation. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 61, 63, 68, 137).
Father's objectives have remained the same and Father has
attended most hearings. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 65, 89, 100).
Father had a scheduled assessment at the CEU on October 31,
2017, but Father failed to attend. Father's drug and alcohol screen
was negative on October 10, 2017. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 13; DHS
Exhibit 3). Father has not completed any random drug screens
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throughout the case. The CUA case manager testified that during
the life of the case, Father was asked to complete random drug
screens, but he never complied. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 141). When
the CUA case manager spoke with Father about completing
random drug screens, Father indicated that he did not want to
travel to Center City Philadelphia to complete the drug screens.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 68-69). Father admitted that he did not
attend the random drug screens, citing lack of funds and stating
that he has never used drugs. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 89, 100-101,
111). Father admitted that he never asked for transportation
assistance to attend the random drug screens. (N.T. 11/14/18,
pg. 101). Father acknowledged that he knew that the trial court
ordered him to complete random drug screens. (N.T. 11/14/18,
pgs. 100, 110). Father has not provided any verification that he
has complied with any mental health assessment or treatment.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 68). Father was aware that the trial court
ordered him to complete a mental health evaluation. (N.T.
11/14/18, pgs. 93, 110). Even though CUA and DHS discussed
the mental health evaluation with Father on multiple occasions,
Father admitted that he never received an evaluation. (N.T.
11/14/18, pg. 93). Father indicated that he received a mental
health evaluation when he lived in Kentucky before this case
began, but stated that he lost all of his paperwork reflecting that
information. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 94). As part of Father's
objective to receive mental health treatment, Father was ordered
to engage in public assistance and receive a state identification
card. Father never visited the public assistance office and does
not have a state identification card. When asked if Father had any
plans on visiting the public assistance office or obtaining a state
identification card, Father stated that he would do so "later on
down the road." (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 92-93). Father's failure to
engage with public assistance is a barrier to Father's ability to
receive mental health services. There are still concerns regarding
Father's significant mental health issues. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 55).
Father has not completed his drug and alcohol or mental health
objective. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 69). Father has indicated to the
CUA case worker [sic] that he resides in Pennypack Park, a public
city park in Philadelphia. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 59-60, 86). At the
bar of the court, Father indicated that he does not live in
Pennypack Park, but that he lives on a "concrete slab" with no
mailing address. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 88). Father has indicated
to the CUA case manager that he had no intention of presenting
to the ARC for housing because he claimed that he did not need
this program. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 63). CUA has attempted to
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assist Father with obtaining housing throughout the life of the
case. [(Id. at 84.)] The CUA case manager offered to provide
Father with a referral to a shelter program, but Father voiced his
distaste for shelters. [(N.T., 11/14/18, at 90-91).] Father
indicated that the CUA case manager offered to refer him to a
shelter, but Father chose not to follow up on that referral. (N.T.
11/14/18, pgs. 90-91, 111-112). Father is aware that housing is
one of his objectives. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 65-66, 110). Father
has been offered appropriate resources to assist him in obtaining
appropriate housing, but Father has not completed his housing
objective because he has been unwilling to comply with his
objective. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 67, 69). Father was referred to
the ARC for employment, but Father indicated that he would not
present to this program because he believed it would not benefit
him. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 63). Father admitted that he has not
been employed for the past year and that his only income comes
from disability. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 101, 115). Father's visits
with Children were suspended from the time that Children entered
into DHS care until June 2018. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 38,
137-138). Father only had two visits with Children before the
visits were suspended for a second time on or about August 2018.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 128, 134, 138). Although the visits
appeared appropriate between Father and Children, there were
significant concerns regarding Children's behavior after they
attended visits. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 19-20, 51, 138). Children's
progress in their individualized trauma therapy regressed when
visits with Father began, but began progressing again after the
visits were suspended. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 19-21, 51-52, 133).
[R.C.'s] therapist cites the change in [R.C.'s] behaviors and
Father's non-compliance with the SCP goals as the basis of not
increasing visits between Children and Father. (N.T. 11/14/18,
pg. 33). [J.C.'s] therapist also does not recommend any changes
to be made to the suspension of visitation between Children and
Father due to [J.C.'s] change in behavior when visitation was
resumed in June 2018. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 51-52, 133). [J.C.'s]
behavior began to improve after the visitation was suspended in
August 2018. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 51-52, 133). Father has never
participated in caregiver sessions with therapists prior to starting
supervised visits again with Children. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 26,
49). Father has been unable to participate in caregiver sessions
due to his active significant mental health and substance use
issues. Father would have to actively engage in his objectives
before he could participate in caregiver sessions. (N.T. 11/14/18,
pg. 26). Father has previously indicated that the Family Court,
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CUA, and Children's therapists would have to "pay for their acts."
Father also once stated, "I would give my life for my children,"
and "I will also take a life for my children," which indicates a lack
of desire of Father to comply with his objectives and presents a
safety concern for all parties. Father lacks the emotional stability
to parent Children. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 63-64). Father has been
non -compliant with his objectives throughout the life of the case.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 74). Father has acknowledged that, except
for the two visits, he has not complied with the trial court's orders
throughout the life of the case. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 110-111).
Father admitted that at the time of the termination trial, Father
was not ready, willing, and able to care for Children. (N.T.
11/14/18, pgs. 113-114). Father has demonstrated that he is
unwilling to provide Children with essential parental care, control,
or subsistence necessary for their physical and mental wellbeing.
Father has refused to remedy the conditions and causes of
Father's incapacity. Father has attended almost all of the court
hearings and is aware of his SCP objectives. Father had ample
opportunity to put himself in a position to parent. Father's
repeated and continued incapacity has not been mitigated. Father
refuses to participate in caregiver sessions with therapists to seek
the insight to ensure Children's emotional well-being and needs
are met. Both children have significant mental health and
emotional needs that need to be stabilized. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs.
25, 28-29. 45-47). Termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)
was also proper.
Trial Court Opinions, J.C. and R.C., 3/15/19, at 8-11.
Although Father claims that he is devoted to the Children and wishes to
protect them, see N.T., 11/14/18, at 102, 109, this Court has held that a
parent's love of his child, alone, does not preclude a termination. See In re
L.M. , 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that a parent's own
feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination
of parental rights). It is well -settled that "we will not toll the well-being and
permanency of [a child] indefinitely." In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d at
1007, citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008) (noting that
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a child's life "simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will
summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.").
After a careful review of the record, this Court finds the trial court's
decision to terminate the parental rights of Father under section 2511(a)(2)
is supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record. In
re Adoption of S.P. , 47 A.3d at 826-827.
This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under
section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section
2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under
section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]fthe grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court "shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child." 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include "[i]ntangibles such as love,
comfort, security, and stability." In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791
(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M. , 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993),
th[e Supreme] Court held that the determination of the child's
"needs and welfare" requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The "utmost attention" should be
paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing
the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
When evaluating a parental bond, "the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
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citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and
make it part of the certified record, "[t]here are some instances . . . where
direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not
necessary and may even be detrimental to the child." In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).
A parent's abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis:
concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child's feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent Nor . . .
are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child's feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Our Supreme Court has stated that the mere existence of a bond or
attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a
termination petition, and that "[e]ven the most abused of children will often
harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive parent." See In re T.S.M.,
71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013), quoting In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535
(Pa. Super. 2008). The Supreme Court stated: "[t]he continued attachment
to the natural parents, despite serious parental rejection through abuse and
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neglect, and failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are
harming the children cannot be misconstrued as bonding." See In re T.S.M.,
71 A.3d at 267, quoting In re Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M., 839
A.2d 410, 418 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Tamilia, J. dissenting).
Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs of the child. See In
re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary termination of parental
rights, despite existence of some bond, where placement with mother would
be contrary to child's best interests). "[A] parent's basic constitutional right
to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the failure to
fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child's right to have proper parenting and
fulfillment of [the child's] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment." In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations omitted).
With regard to section 2511(b), the trial court stated as follows:
Father's visits with Children were suspended from the time that
Children entered into DHS care until June 2018. (N.T. 11/14/18,
pgs. 38, 137-138). However, in late May 2018, the trial court
reinstated Father's visits on a bi-weekly, supervised, line of sight
and hearing basis. Father only had two visits with Children before
the visits were suspended for a second time on or about August
2018. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 128, 134, 138). Although the visits
appeared appropriate between Father and Children, there were
significant concerns regarding Children's behavior after they
attended visits. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 19-20, 51, 138). Children's
progress in their individualized trauma therapy regressed when
visits with Father began, but began progressing again after the
visits were suspended. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 19-21, 51-52, 133).
[R.C.'s] therapist cites the change in [R.C.'s] behaviors and
Father's non-compliance with the SCP goals as the basis of not
increasing visits between Children and Father. (N.T. 11/14/18,
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pg. 33). [J.C.'s] therapist also does not recommend any changes
to be made to the suspension of visitation between Children and
Father due to [J.C.'s] change in behavior when visitation was
resumed in June 2018. [J.C.'s] behavior began to improve after
the visitation was suspended in August 2018. (N.T. 11/14/18,
pgs. 51-52, 133). Father has never participated in caregiver
sessions with Children. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 26, 49). Father has
been unable to participate in caregiver sessions with the therapists
prior to starting supervised visits with Children due to his active
significant mental health and substance use issues. Father would
have to actively engage in his objectives before he could
participate in caregiver sessions. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 26). Father
has previously indicated that the Family Court, CUA, and
Children's therapists would have to "pay for their acts." Father
also once stated, "I would give my life for my children," and "I will
also take a life for my children," which indicates a lack of desire
of Father to comply with his objectives and presents a safety
concern for all parties. Father lacks the emotional and mental
health stability to be providing for Children's many needs. (N.T.
11/14/18, pgs. 63-64). Father has been non -compliant with his
objectives throughout the life of the case. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg.
74). Father has acknowledged that, except for the two visits, he
has not complied with the trial court's orders throughout the life
of the case. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 110-111). Children are
currently placed together in a foster home. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg.
58). The current foster parent ("Foster Parent") participates in
one-on-one caregiver sessions, family therapy, and dyadic work
for Children on a weekly basis with Children's respective
therapists. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 25, 46). Foster Parent's
participation has allowed [J.C.] to work through his interpersonal
trauma and allow him to develop a sense of safety and security.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 45-46). Foster Parent has been dedicated
to [J.C.'s] care[,] and [J.C.] has been able to utilize her for
support. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 47). Although Foster Parent has not
indicated that she is an adoptive resource, Foster Parent has not
provided any timeframe that would limit her ability to provide care
to Children and is willing to be a resource for Children for the
foreseeable future. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 29-30, 47). [R.C.'s]
therapist has observed that [R.C.] and Foster Parent have
developed an attachment[,] and [R.C.] feels safe in Foster
Parent's care. During some of [R.C.'s] sessions with therapist,
Child would appear visibly anxious when Foster Parent left the
room and would calm down when Foster Parent returned. (N.T.
11/14/18, pg. 28). [R.C.'s] therapist has also observed that Child
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appears to feel safe and secure with Foster Parent. [R.C.] has
never shared information about any other adults in her past or
present, including Father, that have made her feel safe and
secure. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 28-29). Foster Parent has been
involved in the educational decision -making for Children. (N.T.
11/14/18, pg. 23). Children have a close bond with Foster Parent.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 53, 79). [J.C.] does not have any type of
bond with Father. [(N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 128).] [R.C.] does appear
to have some type of relationship with Father, but it is not a
child -parent bond that needs to be preserved. [(N.T. 11/14/18,
pg. 129-130).] Father's parental bond with Children is very
attenuated[,] since Father's visits have been suspended. When
the trial court allowed Father to have supervised visits, Children's
emotional stability became deregulated, as per the testimony of
Children's therapists. Children would not suffer any harm if
Father's parental rights were terminated. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs.
73-74, 128-130). It is in Children's best interest to be freed for
adoption. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 74). Legal Counsel, along with the
Catch agency case worker, [sic] met with Children and had the
chance to observe them. Child 1 was four -years -old [sic] and
Child 2 was six -years -old [sic] at the time of the termination trial.
When Legal Counsel and the Catch agency case worker visited
Children, Children indicated that they wanted to remain with
Foster Parent and never expressed a desire to return to Father's
care. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 143-145). Legal Counsel
recommended that [Children] remain with Foster Parent for as
long as they can. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 153). The record
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that termination
would not sever an existing and beneficial relationship with Father.
The DHS witnesses were credible. The trial court's termination of
Father's parental rights to Children under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(b)
was proper and there was no error of law or an abuse of discretion.
Trial Court Opinions, J.C. and R.C., 3/15/19, at 19-21.
We find no merit to the arguments in the Anders brief that the trial
court misheard and misinterpreted bonding evidence; improperly concluded
there was a nexus between Father's transience/financial instability and any
inability to parent; and erroneously determined that despite further
assistance, Father would not have been able to remedy the dependent issues.
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After a careful review of the record, this Court finds the trial court's decision
to terminate the parental rights of Father under section 2511(a)(2) and (b) is
supported by competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record. In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.
Next, with regard to the "reasonable efforts" issue raised in the Anders
brief, our Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the provision of
reasonable efforts by the county children's services agency is a factor in
termination of the parental rights of a parent to a child. See In the Interest
of: D.C.D., a Minor, 105 A.3d 662, 672-674, 676 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting the
suggestion that an agency must provide reasonable efforts to enable a parent
to reunify with a child prior to the termination of parental rights, and rejecting
the suggestion that section 2511 of the Adoption Act should be read in
conjunction with section 6351 of the Juvenile Act, particularly section
6351(f)(9)(iii)). Thus, based on our Supreme Court's holding in In the
Interest of: D.C.D., a Minor, we find no merit to the argument that DHS
failed to use reasonable efforts before seeking the termination of Father's
parental rights to the Children in this matter.
Next, we address whether the trial court committed an abuse of
discretion in changing the Children's permanency goal to adoption.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth our standard of review in a
dependency case as follows.
"The standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate
court to accept findings of fact and credibility determinations of
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the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not
require the appellate court to accept the lower court's inferences
or conclusions of law." In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010). We review for abuse of discretion[.]
In Interest of: L.Z., A Minor Child, 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015).
With regard to a dependent child, in In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614 (Pa.
Super. 2002) (en banc), this Court explained:
[A] court is empowered by 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(a) and (c) to make
a finding that a child is dependent if the child meets the statutory
definition by clear and convincing evidence. If the court finds that
the child is dependent, then the court may make an appropriate
disposition of the child to protect the child's physical, mental and
moral welfare, including allowing the child to remain with the
parents subject to supervision, transferring temporary legal
custody to a relative or public agency, or transferring custody to
the juvenile court of another state. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a).
Id. at 617.
Regarding the disposition of a dependent child, section 6351(e), (f),
(f.1), and (g) of the Juvenile Act provides the trial court with the criteria for
its permanency plan for the subject child. Pursuant to those subsections of
the Juvenile Act, the trial court is to determine the disposition that is best
suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the
child.
Section 6351(e) of the Juvenile Act provides in pertinent part:
(e) Permanency hearings.-
(1) [t]he court shall conduct a permanency hearing for the
purpose of determining or reviewing the permanency plan of the
child, the date by which the goal of permanency for the child might
be achieved and whether placement continues to be best suited
to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare
of the child. In any permanency hearing held with respect to the
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child, the court shall consult with the child regarding the child's
permanency plan in a manner appropriate to the child's age and
maturity. . . .
* * *
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(e).
Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act prescribes the pertinent inquiry for
the reviewing court:
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing. -
At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of
the following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness
of the placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
compliance with the permanency plan developed for the
child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating
the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the
child might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize
the permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
(7) If the child has been placed outside the
Commonwealth, whether the placement continues to be
best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child.
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* * *
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of
the last 22 months or the court has determined that
aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts
to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from
the child's parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve and
reunify the family need not be made or continue to be
made, whether the county agency has filed or sought to
join a petition to terminate parental rights and to identify,
recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the
child unless:
(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best
suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of
the child;
(ii) the county agency has documented a
compelling reason for determining that filing a
petition to terminate parental rights would not
serve the needs and welfare of the child; or
(iii) the child's family has not been provided with
necessary services to achieve the safe return to the
child's parent, guardian or custodian within the time
frames set forth in the permanency plan.
* * *
(f.1) Additional determination.
determinations made under
- Based
subsection (f) and
upon the
all relevant
evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one
of the following:
(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child's
parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the return of
the child is best suited to the safety, protection and
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and
the county agency will file for termination of parental rights
in cases where return to the child's parent, guardian or
custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.
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(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal
custodian in cases where return to the child's parent,
guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption is not
best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child.
(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and willing
relative in cases where return to the child's parent,
guardian or custodian, being placed for adoption or being
placed with a legal custodian is not best suited to the
safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare
of the child.
(5) If and when the child will be placed in another living
arrangement intended to be permanent in nature which is
approved by the court in cases where the county agency
has documented a compelling reason that it would not be
best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child to be returned to the child's
parent, guardian or custodian, to be placed for adoption,
to be placed with a legal custodian or to be placed with a
fit and wiling relative.
(f.2) Evidence. - Evidence of conduct by the parent that places
the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including evidence
of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places the
health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be presented to
the court by the county agency or any other party at any
disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the conduct was
the basis for the determination of dependency.
(g) Court order.- On the basis of the determination made
under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the
continuation, modification or termination of placement or
other disposition which is best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the
child.
* * *
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351 (some emphasis added).
With regard to the goal change, the trial court stated as follows:
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Father's SCP [Single Case Plan] objectives were to attend the CEU
[Clinical Evaluation Unit] for drug screens and an evaluation,
mental health, housing, employment, and supervised visitation.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 61, 63, 68, 137). Father's objectives have
remained the same[,] and Father has attended most hearings.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 65, 89, 100). Father had a scheduled
assessment at the CEU on October 31, 2017, but Father failed to
attend. Father's drug and alcohol screen was negative on October
10, 2017. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 13; DHS Exhibit 3). Father has
not completed any random drug screens throughout the case. The
CUA case manager testified that during the life of the case, Father
was asked to complete random drug screens, but he never
complied. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 141). When the CUA case manager
spoke with Father about completing random drug screens, Father
indicated that he did not want to travel to Center City Philadelphia
to complete the drug screens. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 68-69).
Father admitted that he did not attend the random drug screens,
citing lack of funds and stating that he has never used drugs.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 89, 100-101, 111). Father admitted that he
never asked for transportation assistance to attend the random
drug screens. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 101). Father acknowledged
that he knew that the trial court ordered him to complete random
drug screens. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 100, 110). Father has not
provided any verification that he has complied with any mental
health assessment or treatment. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 68). Father
was aware that the trial court ordered him to complete a mental
health evaluation. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 93, 110). Even though
CUA and DHS discussed the mental health evaluation with Father
on multiple occasions, Father admitted that he never received an
evaluation. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 93). Father indicated that he
received a mental health evaluation when he lived in Kentucky
before this case began, but stated that he lost all of his paperwork
reflecting that information. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 94). As part of
Father's objective to receive mental health treatment, Father was
ordered to engage in public assistance and receive a state
identification card. Father never visited the public assistance office
and does not have a state identification card. When asked if
Father had any plans on visiting the public assistance office or
obtaining a state identification card, Father stated that he would
do so "later on down the road." (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 92-93).
Father's failure to engage with public assistance is a barrier to
Father's ability to receive mental health services. There are still
concerns regarding Father's significant mental health issues.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 55). Father has not completed his drug and
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alcohol or mental health objective. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 69).
Father has indicated to the CUA case worker [sic] that he resides
in Pennypack Park, a public city park in Philadelphia. (N.T.
11/14/18, pgs. 59-60, 86). At the bar of the court, Father
indicated that he does not live in Pennypack Park, but that he lives
on a "concrete slab" with no mailing address. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg.
88). Father has indicated to the CUA case manager that he had
no intention of presenting to the ARC for housing because he
claimed that he did not need this program. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg.
63). CUA has attempted to assist Father with obtaining housing
throughout the life of the case. [(Id. at 84.)] The CUA case
manager offered to provide Father with a referral to a shelter
program, but Father voiced his distaste for shelters. [(Id. at 90-
91.)] Father indicated that the CUA case manager offered to refer
him to a shelter, but Father chose not to follow up on that referral.
(N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 90-91, 111-112). Father is aware that
housing is one of his objectives. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 65-66,
110). Father has been offered appropriate resources to assist him
in obtaining appropriate housing. Father has not completed his
housing objective because he has been unwilling to comply with
this objective. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 67, 69). Father was referred
to the ARC for employment, but Father indicated that he would
not present to this program because he believed it would not
benefit him. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 63). Father admitted that he
has not been employed for the past year and that his only income
comes from disability. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 101, 115). Father's
visits with Children were suspended from the time that Children
entered into DHS care until June 2018. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 38,
137-138). However, in late May 2018, the trial court reinstated
bi-weekly supervised line of sight and hearing visits. Father only
had two visits with Children before the visits were suspended for
a second time on or about August 2018. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs.
128, 134, 138). Although the visits appeared appropriate
between Father and Children, there were significant concerns
regarding Children's behavior after they attended visits. (N.T.
11/14/18, pgs. 19-20, 51, 138). Children's progress in their
individualized trauma therapy regressed when visits with Father
began, but began progressing again after the visits were
suspended. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 19-21, 51-52, 133). [R.C.'s]
therapist cites the change in [R.C.'s] behaviors and Father's
noncompliance with the SCP goals as the basis of not increasing
visits between Children and Father. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 33).
[J.C.'s] therapist also does not recommend any changes to be
made to the suspension of visitation between Children and Father
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due to [J.C.'s] change in behavior when visitation was resumed in
June 2018. [J.C.'s] behavior began to improve after the visitation
was suspended in August 2018. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 51-52,
133). Father has never participated in caregiver sessions with
Children. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 26, 49). Father has been unable
to participate in caregiver sessions with the therapists prior to
starting supervised visits with Children due to his active significant
mental health and substance use issues. Father would have to
actively engage in his objectives before he could participate in
caregiver sessions. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 26). Father has
previously indicated that the Family Court, CUA, and Children's
therapists would have to "pay for their acts." Father also once
stated, "I would give my life for my children," and "I will also take
a life for my children," which indicates a lack of desire of Father
to comply with his objectives and presents a safety concern for all
parties. Father lacks the emotional and mental health stability to
provide for Children's many needs. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 63-64).
Father has been non -compliant with his objectives throughout the
life of the case. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 74). Father has
acknowledged that, except for visitation, he has not complied with
the trial court's orders throughout the life of the case. (N.T.
11/14/18, pgs. 110-111). Children are currently placed together
in a foster home. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 58). The current foster
parent ("Foster Parent") participates in one-on-one caregiver
sessions, family therapy, and dyadic work for Children on a weekly
basis with Children's respective therapists. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs.
25, 46). Foster Parent's participation has allowed [J.C.] to work
through his interpersonal trauma and allow him to develop a sense
of safety and security. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 45-46). Foster Parent
has been dedicated to [J.C.'s] care and [J.C.] has been able to
utilize her for support. (N.T. 11/14/18, pg. 47). Although Foster
Parent has not indicated that she is an adoptive resource, Foster
Parent has not provided any timeframe that would limit her ability
to provide care to Children and is willing to be a resource for
Children for the foreseeable future. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 29-30,
47). [R.C.'s] therapist has observed that [R.C.] and Foster Parent
have developed an attachment and Child [1] feels safe in Foster
Parent's care. During some of [R.C.'s] sessions with therapist,
[R.C.] would appear visibly anxious when Foster Parent left the
room and would calm down when Foster Parent returned. (N.T.
11/14/18. pg. 28). [R.C.'s] therapist has also observed that
[R.C.] appears to feel safe and secure with Foster Parent. [R.C.]
has never shared information about any other adults in her past
or present, including Father, that have made her feel safe and
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secure. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 28-29). Foster Parent has been
involved in the educational decision -making for Children. (N.T.
11/14/18, pg. 23). Children have indicated that they want to
continue living with Foster Parent and neither child has ever asked
to be reunified with Father. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 144-145). Any
bond or relationship of Father with Children is attenuated since
Father's visits have been suspended. When the trial court allowed
Father to have supervised visits, Children's emotional stability
became deregulated, as per the testimony of Children's therapists.
The DHS witnesses were credible. The record established by clear
and convincing evidence that the court's change of Children's
permanency goal from reunification to adoption was proper.
Children need permanency, and Father admitted that at the time
of the termination trial, Father was not ready, willing, and able to
care for Children. (N.T. 11/14/18, pgs. 113-114). Children need
to be stable emotionally and consistently attend their many
therapeutic services. Consequently, it is in their best interests to
remain with Foster Parent in the same home. The trial court did
not err or abuse its discretion when it changed Children's
permanency goal from reunification to adoption.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/15/19, at 21-26.
Our review of the record demonstrates that there is sufficient,
competent evidence in the record that supports the trial court's factual and
credibility determinations. Thus, we will not disturb the trial court's decision.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court's decrees terminating Father's parental rights to the Children pursuant
to section 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act, as well as the orders
changing the Children's permanency goal to adoption.
Decrees and orders affirmed. Motion to withdraw granted.
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Judgment Entered.
Jseph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/19
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