Com. v. Williams, D.

J-S32011-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DIA WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1973 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 21, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0007810-2014
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2019
Appellant Dia Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
after he was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of an instrument of
crime, terroristic threats, and simple assault.1 Appellant argues that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault
because the Commonwealth failed to disprove his self-defense claim. He also
challenges the weight of the evidence. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of this matter as follows:
On the evening of June 20, 2014, at 5711 Master Street in West
Philadelphia, a verbal and physical altercation occurred between
[Appellant], and the [victim], landlord Demond Gallman[,] in the
basement of that rental property. [The victim] responded to
another tenant’s complaint regarding loss of electricity in her unit
by inspecting the fuse box in the basement of the property and
observed that the wires in the fuse box had been pulled out and
disconnected. [Appellant] then approached [the victim] for
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a), 907(a), 2706(a), 2701(a).
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shutting off his electricity due to unpaid rent and asked [the
victim] if he would be turning [Appellant]’s electricity back on.
When [the victim] refused to do so, the [Appellant] responded:
“Well nobody’s electric is getting cut back on.” [Appellant] then
reached for [the victim]’s wire cutters and refused to return them
to [the victim]. [Appellant] pushed [the victim] away using one
hand with force, causing [the victim] to respond by striking the
[Appellant]’s face with his fist. [Appellant] responded to [the
victim]’s strike by continuously swinging directly in a stabbing
motion at [the victim]’s left temple with his right fist—with the
wire cutters in [Appellant]’s right hand. [The victim]’s chin was
cut during the altercation, which resulted in significant blood loss
and ten stitches. [Appellant] attempted to flee by running to his
room in the rental property. [The victim] followed [Appellant] to
his room and observed the window screen missing. Police officers
found [Appellant] at the stoop of the back door of the rental
property, unable to move due to injury from jumping out of his
room’s window.
Police officers recovered the wire cutters used by [Appellant], and
traces of blood on the basement door and floor at the scene of the
altercation. Medical records for [the victim]’s treatment and
images of facial injuries to [the victim]’s chin were produced for
trial. Police officers also recovered audio recordings of a third
party tenant, Ms. Roberts.
Trial Ct. Op., 7/20/18, at 1-2 (record citations and some capitalization
omitted).
On December 5, 2016, the matter proceeded to a bench trial, at which
both the victim and Appellant testified. At the conclusion of trial, the trial
court found Appellant guilty of the foregoing crimes. On February 24, 2017,
Appellant filed a post-verdict motion arguing that he “had a right to defend
himself and this was a mutual combat situation caused by the alleged victim.”
See Post-Verdict Mot., 2/24/17. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion on
April 13, 2017.
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On July 21, 2017, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Appellant
moved for extraordinary relief under Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(b) on the basis that he
acted in self-defense. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 7/21/17 at 6. The trial court
denied Appellant’s motion and sentenced him to five to ten years’
incarceration. On July 31, 2017, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion
preserving a challenge to the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied
Appellant’s motion on August 2, 2017.
On August 30, 2017, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On
November 9, 2017, this Court dismissed Appellant’s appeal for failure to file a
docketing statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 3517. On February 20, 2018, Appellant
filed a petition to reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc, which the trial
court granted on February 22, 2018. On March 23, 2018, Appellant filed a
petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act2 (PCRA), again seeking a
reinstatement of his appellate rights.
On June 1, 2018, the trial court reinstated Appellant’s right to file a
direct appeal nunc pro tunc. That same day, Appellant filed a timely notice of
appeal. Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
on June 27, 2018, and raised the following claims:
1. Th[e trial] court erred, abused its discretion, and unfairly
prejudiced [Appellant], because the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence.
2. Th[e trial] court erred, abused its discretion, and unfairly
prejudiced [Appellant], because the evidence was insufficient to
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2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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convict [Appellant] of aggravated assault. There was insufficient
evidence to prove [Appellant] attempted “to cause serious bodily
injury to another, or cause[d] such injury intentionally, knowingly
or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.” Moreover, there was
insufficient evidence to prove [Appellant] attempted “to cause or
intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to another with a
deadly weapon.”
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 6/27/18, at 1-2 (citations and some
capitalization omitted). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion asserting
that Appellant’s claims were meritless.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal:
[1.] Whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to
convict [Appellant] of aggravated assault[.]
[2.] Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Appellant’s Brief at 8 (full capitalization omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to
present sufficient evidence to rebut his claim of self-defense. Id. at 15. In
support, Appellant refers to his own trial testimony, and concludes that (1)
the victim “caused, and then escalated, the physical altercation[;]” (2) the
victim prevented Appellant from retreating; and (3) there was no evidence to
show that Appellant did not reasonably believe he was in danger of death or
serious bodily injury. Id. at 18.
Initially, we note that Appellant did not preserve this issue in his Rule
1925(b) statement. Likewise, the trial court did not address it. Appellant’s
claim is therefore waived. See Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775,
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780 (Pa. 2005); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that “[i]ssues not
included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provision
of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”).
Even if Appellant properly preserved his claim, we would find it
meritless. Our standard of review in this context is as follows:
Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a
question of law, our standard or review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient
to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the
province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded
to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
finder.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305-06 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 187 A.3d
908 (Pa. 2018).
Under the Crimes Code, self-defense is included under the defense of
justification, which is a complete defense to criminal liability. See 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 502. We have explained that
[t]he use of force against a person is justified when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose
of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by the other
person. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 505(a). When a defendant raises the
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issue of self-defense, the Commonwealth bears the burden to
disprove such a defense beyond a reasonable doubt. While there
is no burden on a defendant to prove the claim, before the defense
is properly at issue at trial, there must be some evidence, from
whatever source, to justify a finding of self-defense.
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted).
To disprove a defendant’s claim of self-defense, the Commonwealth
must establish at least one of the following:
1) the accused did not reasonably believe that he was in danger
of death or serious bodily injury; or 2) the accused provoked or
continued the use of force; or 3) the accused had a duty to retreat
and the retreat was possible with complete safety. It remains the
province of the jury to determine whether the accused’s belief was
reasonable, whether he was free of provocation, and whether he
had no duty to retreat.
Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
“When the defendant’s own testimony is the only evidence of self-
defense, the Commonwealth must still disprove the asserted justification and
cannot simply rely on the [fact-finder’s] disbelief of the defendant’s
testimony[.]” Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa. Super.
2014). “If there are other witnesses, however, who provide accounts of the
material facts, it is up to the fact finder to ‘reject or accept all, part or none of
the testimony of any witness.’ The complainant can serve as a witness to the
incident to refute a self-defense claim.” Id. (citations omitted).
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Here, the victim testified that Appellant took the victim’s wire cutters
and then shoved the victim when he attempted to grab them. In response,
the victim punched Appellant, who retaliated by swinging the wire cutters
toward the victim’s head in a stabbing motion and eventually striking him.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, there was sufficient evidence to show that Appellant provoked
or continued the use of force. See Smith, 97 A.3d at 788 (stating that a
defendant “must be free from fault in provoking or escalating the altercation
that led to the offense” (emphasis and citation omitted)); McClendon, 874
A.2d at 1230. Therefore, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.
In his next claim, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 21. Specifically, he asserts that
the victim’s testimony was “vague, tenuous, and uncertain.” Id. at 23. He
also claims that the victim displayed “malevolence” towards Appellant, which
“compels the determination that the [t]rial [c]ourt should not have believed
the witness.” Id. at 24. Appellant concludes that because the victim was not
credible, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and the trial court
should have granted him a new trial. Id.
Our standard of review regarding challenges to the weight of the
evidence is well settled:
A claim alleging the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, an
appellate court reviews the exercise of the trial court’s discretion;
it does not answer for itself whether the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. It is well settled that the [fact-finder] is
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free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine
the credibility of the witnesses, and a new trial based on a weight
of the evidence claim is only warranted where the [fact-finder’s]
verdict is so contrary to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of
justice. In determining whether this standard has been met,
appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge’s discretion
was properly exercised, and relief will only be granted where the
facts and inferences of record disclose a palpable abuse of
discretion.
Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
We have explained that
[a] new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in
the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have
arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial court
is to determine that notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts
are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give
them equal weight with all the facts, is to deny justice. A motion
for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to the
weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence
to sustain the verdict; thus the trial court is under no obligation
to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner.
Id. (citation omitted). Further, “[b]ecause the trial judge has had the
opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will
give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). “One of the least
assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence
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and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Here, the trial court explained that it
rendered its verdict with ample record of credible evidence. The
Commonwealth produced audio records of the separate 911 calls
on behalf of a third-party resident, medical records and
documentation of head injury to the [victim], testimony from [the
victim], [Appellant], and law enforcement personnel—all
corroborating the attack on [the victim] on June 20, 2014. This
[c]ourt, in its proper discretion, placed higher evidentiary weight
on the testimony of the complaining witness than that of
[Appellant], whose testimony lacked credibility.
Trial Ct. Op. at 5.
Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s ruling. See Landis, 89 A.3d at 699. The trial court found the victim’s
testimony more credible than that of Appellant. Therefore, the trial court
appropriately concluded that its verdict was not so contrary to the evidence
as to require a new trial. See id. Further, we decline to reassess the
credibility of the Commonwealth’s witnesses and to reweigh the testimony and
evidence presented at trial. See Commonwealth v. West, 937 A.2d 516,
523 (Pa. Super. 2007) (emphasizing that the trier of fact is “free to believe
all, part or none of the evidence,” and “[t]his Court may not [re]weigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment [f]or that of the fact finder” (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence
merits no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/19/19
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