Com. v. Madison, R.

J-S53015-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT L. MADISON :
:
Appellant : No. 220 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 13, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0100662-1977
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 05, 2019
Appellant, Robert L. Madison, appeals pro se from an order entered
December 13, 2018, which dismissed his petition for collateral relief filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
We previously summarized the facts of this case as follows:
On December 8, 1976, Appellant was in a luncheonette in
Philadelphia[, Pennsylvania] when he and the owner had an
altercation. Appellant left the establishment and returned with
Tyrone Smith and a shotgun and killed the owner. On October
25, 1977, he was found guilty of first[-]degree murder at a
non[-]jury trial and subsequently was sentenced to life
imprisonment. We affirmed [Appellant’s judgment of sentence]
on October 26, 1979. Our Supreme Court denied further review
on November 11, 1979. Appellant filed his first [collateral relief]
petition on February 19, 1986; relief was denied, and [thereafter,]
we dismissed the appeal [] due to counsel’s failure to file a brief.
In 1996, Appellant filed a second [collateral relief] petition and
again[,] was denied relief. On September 12, 2002, Appellant
filed [his third collateral relief] petition claiming the existence of
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[a newly-discovered fact]. [On September 20, 2004, this Court
affirmed the PCRA court’s dismissal order, holding that Appellant’s
petition was untimely and failed to meet the newly-discovered fact
exception to the PCRA’s time-bar].
Commonwealth v. Madison, __A.2d__, 2267 PHL 2003 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(unpublished memorandum), at 1-4 (citation omitted).
Appellant filed his fourth PCRA petition on August 23, 2012. Appellant’s
Fourth PCRA Petition, 8/23/12, at 1-20. He subsequently amended his
petition on March 25, 2016. Appellant’s Amended PCRA Petition, 3/25/16, at
1-10. On September 17, 2018, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice
that it intended to dismiss his PCRA petition in 20 days without holding a
hearing, as the petition was untimely. PCRA Court Order, 9/17/18, at 1; see
also Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition on
December 13, 2018, and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.1
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
[Whether Appellant satisfied the new rule of constitutional law
exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement?]
See generally Appellant’s Brief.
The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions “is mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248
(Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “The question of whether a petition is timely
raises a question of law. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our
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1The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
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standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 156 A.3d 1194, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal
denied, 170 A.3d 1007 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).
A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the
judgment [of sentence] becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(1). “[A]
judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9545(b)(3). Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on February 9, 1980, 90 days after the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied allocatur and the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court elapsed. See U.S.Sup.Ct. Rule 13. Hence,
Appellant’s petition is manifestly untimely. Therefore, unless one of the
statutory exceptions to the time-bar applies, no court may exercise
jurisdiction to consider this petition.
Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b), there are three statutory exceptions
to the timeliness provision that allow for very limited circumstances under
which the late filing of a PCRA petition will be excused. To invoke an
exception, a petition must allege and prove one of the following:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). If an exception applies, a PCRA petition
may be considered if it is filed “within 60 days of the date the claim could have
been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).2 “The petitioner bears the
burden to plead and prove an applicable statutory exception.” Hudson, 156
A.3d at 1197.
Herein, Appellant attempts to invoke the new constitutional right
exception by arguing that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), which made the holding
in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) retroactive, warrants relief.
Specifically, he argues that, even though he was 20-years-old at the time he
committed the murder, per Miller, his “brain was not fully formed” and
therefore, his sentence of life-without-parole violates the Eighth and
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2 Effective December 24, 2018, the legislature amended Section 9545(b)(2)
to read: “Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall
be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” See
42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b)(2) (effective December 24, 2018). However, the
amendment to Section 9545(b)(2) only applies to “claims arising on
[December] 24, 2017 or thereafter.” See id. at Comment. Appellant filed his
current petition on March 25, 2016; thus, the amended Section 9545(b)(2)
does not apply to Appellant’s claim.
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Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Article
1, § 13 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution. Appellant’s Brief at 6-17. We disagree.
Previously, this Court explained that “Montgomery merely made Miller
retroactive for juvenile offenders whose judgments of sentence had already
became final. It did not extend Miller's holding to those individuals who
committed homicides after they reached the age of 18.” Commonwealth v.
Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 366 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (citation
omitted). Thus, pursuant to this rationale, we have consistently held that
“age is the sole factor in determining whether Miller applies to overcome the
PCRA time-bar” and have “decline[d] to extend its categorical holding.”
Commonwealth v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc); see
Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 91-94 (Pa. Super. 2016);
Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. Super. 2013) abrogation
on other grounds recognized in Furgess, supra at 94. In this case, Appellant
admits that he was 20 years old at the time of the murder. Appellant’s Brief
at 10. Hence, Appellant failed to plead and prove the applicability of a new
rule of constitutional law in this case. Because no exception to the PCRA's
one-year time-bar applies, the PCRA court properly held that it lacked
jurisdiction over the petition.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/5/19
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