Com. v. Gilson, D.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DAVID MICHAEL GILSON : No. 1491 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 9, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-CR-0001112-2017
BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and COLINS*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2019
The Commonwealth appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on
October 9, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County, after the
trial court granted the motion of appellee, David Michael Gilson, to modify his
sentence, and resentenced him to a term below the mitigated range of the
sentencing guidelines. On appeal, the Commonwealth argues: (1) the trial
court abused its discretion by ignoring the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)
and failing to consider the guidelines when choosing from its available
sentencing options; and (2) the court relied on impermissible factors in
imposing a sentence that was outside the guidelines and below the mitigated
range. Based on the following, we affirm.
Gilson’s conviction stems from a domestic violence incident that
occurred on October 9, 2017. Neither the probable cause affidavit nor the
transcript from the guilty plea colloquy are included in the certified record.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Therefore, the facts underlying Gilson’s guilty plea are not readily available.1
What we can discern from the testimony and discussion at the sentencing
hearings is the victim, Shalesha Labow, was Gilson’s former girlfriend and
mother of his three-year old daughter. On the day in question, Gilson and
Labow got into an argument after Labow discovered Gilson had been
unfaithful. The argument escalated, during which time Gilson cornered
Labow, pulled her hair, put her in a headlock, and threatened to kill her unless
she unlocked her cell phone. See N.T., 9/5/2018, at 18. He then hit her in
her head with the phone. See id. During the incident, which lasted only
about eight minutes, Labow received a cut on her hand, which she believed
she obtained from wood trim or a nail sticking out of her door.2 See N.T.,
10/2/2018, at 14. After police arrived and arrested Gilson, they found a knife,
as well as three firearms (two rifles and a shotgun) stored in the bedroom
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1 The victim’s handwritten statement to police is included in the Presentence
Investigation Report. However, as will be explained infra, the victim clarified
and changed some of the details surrounding the incident when testifying at
Gilson’s sentencing hearings.
2 In her statement to police, Labow claimed Gilson cut the palm of her hand
with a knife. See Victim/Witness Statement Form, Shalesha Labow,
10/10/2017, at unnumbered 2. However, at the initial sentencing hearing,
Labow testified she cut her hand on a door, and there was “still blood” on the
door to corroborate that fact. See N.T., 9/5/2018, at 21. When asked about
the discrepancy, she explained: “At first, I didn’t know what cut me and the
cops said that [the knife] cut me. The cop took the knife. My blood was not
found on the knife.” Id.
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closet.3 See id. at 11. Gilson is not permitted to possess a firearm because
of a prior felony conviction.4
Gilson was subsequently charged with persons not to possess firearms
(a first-degree felony), aggravated assault, terroristic threats, simple assault,
recklessly endangering another person, and harassment. 5 On May 3, 2018,
Gilson entered a guilty plea to one count each of persons not to possess
firearms and terroristic threats. As per the plea agreement, the firearms
offense was modified to substitute Subsection 6105(c)(2) for Subsection (b)
as the underlying offense, and the terroristic threats offense was modified to
delete reference to a weapon. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/2018, at 1 n.2.
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3 In her statement to police, Labow claimed Gilson “grabbed a gun out of the
closet and said I will blow a hole in the door and blow your head off.”
Victim/Witness Statement Form, Shalesha Labow, 10/10/2017, at
unnumbered 1. However, at the sentencing modification hearing, Labow
clarified she never saw Gilson retrieve a gun during the incident because she
was inside the bathroom with the door closed. See N.T., 10/2/2018, at 11.
She only surmised he did so because she knew there were guns stored in the
closet, and she heard a door shut when he threatened to shoot her. See id.
at 11-12. Furthermore, while defense counsel told the trial court it was his
understanding the guns “were found in a closet[,]” the prosecutor noted the
file did not “state specifically where they were found.” N.T., 10/2/2018, at 6-
7.
4In his presentence investigation report, Gilson stated that although he knew
he was not permitted to possess a firearm, he was storing them for a friend
and he believed “they would be safer with him.” Pre-Sentence Report,
9/5/2018, at 3.
5See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105(a)(1), 2702(a)(4), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), 2705,
and 2709(a)(1), respectively.
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Therefore, both offenses were graded as first-degree misdemeanors, and the
Commonwealth agreed to recommend concurrent sentences. See 18 Pa.C.S.
§§ 6106(c)(2) and 2706(a)(1); Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/2018, at 2. At the
September 5, 2018, sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Gilson to a
term of 21 to 60 months’ imprisonment on the firearms charge, and a
concurrent 18 to 60 months’ imprisonment on the terroristic threats charge.
The firearms sentence fell within the mitigated range of the sentencing
guidelines, and the terroristic threats sentence was in the standard range.6
Gilson’s prior record score reflected he was a repeat felony offender (RFEL)
because of three felony convictions that occurred between 1995 and 1998.
Gilson filed a timely motion to modify his sentence, and the trial court
held a modification hearing on October 2, 2018. At that time, Labow
requested the court reduce Gilson’s prison term. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the trial court granted Gilson’s motion, and amended his sentence as
follows:
a. As to Court 1, Persons Not to Possess, Use, Manufacture, etc.
Firearms, a misdemeanor of the first degree, [Gilson] shall serve
an Intermediate Punishment Sentence of 60 months with the first
8 months to be served in the Crawford County Correctional Facility
with full credit for all time served prior to now, with work release,
to be followed by 4 months of House Arrest/Electronic Monitoring.
The balance of the Intermediate Punishment sentence will be
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6 The guidelines range for Gilson’s convictions were as follows: (1) for the
firearms offense, 27 to 30 months’ imprisonment in the standard range, and
21 months in the mitigated range; and (2) for terroristic threats, 12 to 18
months’ imprisonment in the standard range, and nine months in the
mitigated range. See Guideline Sentence Form, 9/5/2018.
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served under the supervision of the Adult Probation/Parole
Department.
b. As to Count 3, Terroristic Threats, a misdemeanor of the first
degree, the sentence of the Court is for [Gilson] to serve an
Intermediate Punishment Sentence of 60 months with the first 8
months to be served in the Crawford County Correctional Facility
with full credit for all time served prior to now, with work release,
to be followed by 4 months of House Arrest/Electronic Monitoring.
The balance of the Intermediate Punishment sentence will be
served under the supervision of the Adult Probation/Parole
Department.
This sentence will run concurrent with the sentence imposed at
Count 1.
Memorandum and Order, 10/8/2018, at 3-4. The court also specified
additional conditions of Gilson’s Intermediate Punishment sentence, including
treatment for his mental health issues and drug and alcohol addiction. See
id. at 4. This timely Commonwealth appeal followed.7
Both of the issues raised by the Commonwealth on appeal challenge the
discretionary aspects of Gilson’s sentence. Such a claim is not appealable as
of right, but “must be considered a petition for permission to appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Best, 120 A.3d 329, 348 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation
omitted). In order to obtain review of a discretionary sentencing claim, the
Commonwealth must include in its brief a concise statement of the reasons
relied upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 2119(f). See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). The concise statement “must
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7 On October 19, 2018, the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b). The Commonwealth filed a concise statement on October 26, 2018.
The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on October 30,
2018.
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demonstrate that a substantial question exists as to whether the sentence
imposed is inappropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v.
Hock, 936 A.2d 515 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question exists when
an appellant sets forth “a colorable argument that the sentence imposed is
either inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or is
contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process.”
Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal
denied, 987 A.2d 161 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
Here, the Commonwealth contends in its Rule 2119(f) statement the
trial court imposed an “excessively lenient sentence that was an unreasonable
downward deviation below the mitigated range of the sentencing
guidelines[.]” Commonwealth’s Brief at unnumbered 13. Further, it asserts,
in doing so, the court “impermissibly ignored the requirements of 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9721(b), and additionally relied on impermissible factors[.]” Id. at
unnumbered 14. We conclude the Commonwealth has raised a substantial
question justifying our review. See Commonwealth v. Ball, 166 A.3d 367,
369-370 (Pa. Super. 2017) (allegation that sentence constituted unreasonable
deviation from sentencing guidelines raised substantial question);
Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 911 A.2d 513, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(allegation that court relied on impermissible factors in imposing lenient
sentence raised substantial question), aff’d in part, rev’d in part (on other
grounds), 922 A.2d 873 (Pa. 2007).
Preliminarily, we note:
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We review the trial court’s sentencing scheme for abuse of
discretion. “[A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised
was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will.”
Ball, supra, 166 A.3d at 370 (citation omitted).
Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code instructs that, in determining the
proper sentence for a defendant,
the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence
imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the
protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to
the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and
the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Section 9781 sets forth the paramaters of appellate
review of a sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781. Subsection (d) provides that
when reviewing a sentence on appeal, the appellate court should consider:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the
defendant, including any presentence investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d). Furthermore, when, as here, the trial court imposes a
sentence that falls outside the sentencing guidelines, Subsection 9781(c)(3)
instructs the appellate court to vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing only if it determines the sentence is “unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9781(c)(3).
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Yet, what makes a sentence “unreasonable” is not defined in the
statute. Generally speaking, “unreasonable” commonly connotes
a decision that is “irrational” or “not guided by sound judgment.”
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 2084 (2nd
ed.1987); see 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903 (words to be construed according
to their common and approved usage). While a general
understanding of unreasonableness is helpful, in this context, it is
apparent that the General Assembly has intended the concept of
unreasonableness to be a fluid one, as exemplified by the four
factors set forth in Section 9781(d) to be considered in making
this determination. Indeed, based upon the very factors set out
in Section 9781(d), it is clear that the General Assembly intended
the concept of unreasonableness to be inherently a circumstance-
dependent concept that is flexible in understanding and lacking
precise definition. Cf. United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103,
115 (2nd Cir. 2005)(explaining concept or reasonableness in
context of sentencing matters).
Thus, given its nature, we decline to fashion any concrete rules as
to the unreasonableness inquiry for a sentence that falls outside
of applicable guidelines under Section 9781(c)(3). We are of the
view, however, that the Legislature intended that considerations
found in Section 9721 inform appellate review for
unreasonableness. That is, while a sentence may be found to be
unreasonable after review of Section 9781(d)’s four statutory
factors, in addition a sentence may also be unreasonable if the
appellate court finds that the sentence was imposed without
express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the
general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721,
i.e., the protection of the public; the gravity of the offense in
relation to the impact on the victim and the community; and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).
Moreover, even though the unreasonableness inquiry lacks precise
boundaries, we are confident that rejection of a sentencing court’s
imposition of sentence on unreasonableness grounds would occur
infrequently, whether the sentence is above or below the guideline
ranges, especially when the unreasonableness inquiry is
conducted using the proper standard of review.
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 963–964 (Pa. 2007). With this
background in mind, we consider the allegations raised by the Commonwealth
on appeal.
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First, the Commonwealth argues the trial court failed to consider the
factors listed in Subsection 9721(b) before resentencing Gilson to a term of
county intermediate punishment (“CIP”). See Commonwealth’s Brief at
unnumbered 16. According to the Commonwealth, the trial court determined
that “so long as an offender is CIP eligible, then CIP is within the discretion of
the sentencing court regardless of the guidelines.” Id. at unnumbered 17. It
maintains, however, a court must consider the factors in Subsection 9721(b)
“to determine if the offender should be placed on CIP, in other words eligibility
is the starting point.” Id. at unnumbered 18. Here, the Commonwealth
emphasizes Gilson’s prior record included two older burglaries and a drug
delivery felony, plus “several other misdemeanors with two of those being
assaults in the years 2001 and 2007.” Id. Because the record displayed an
“ongoing pattern of violence and the bottom of the mitigated range [was]
almost two years in prison,” the Commonwealth insists “the imposition of CIP
is an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 19.
To the extent the Commonwealth implies Gilson was ineligible to receive
a CIP sentence based upon his prior record, we find that claim waived because
it was not included in the Commonwealth’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement. Rather, the Commonwealth framed its sole issue in the concise
statement as follows:
The court erred when it abused its discretion in sentencing the
defendant to a sentence outside the guidelines well below the
bottom of the mitigated range in violation of the sentencing code
and the fundamental norms concerning the sentencing process.
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Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 10/26/2018. The
Commonwealth did not challenge Gilson’s eligibility to receive a CIP sentence,
and therefore, that issue is waived. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 874
A.2d 1192, 1195-1196 (Pa. Super. 2005) (Commonwealth’s failure to
challenge reasonableness of defendant’s expectation of privacy in Rule
1925(b) statement waived issue on appeal).
Furthermore, the record demonstrates the trial court properly
considered the Section 9721(b) factors before determining a CIP sentence was
appropriate. At the original sentencing hearing on September 5, 2018, the
trial court had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation report, which
detailed Gilson’s troubled upbringing, history of untreated mental illness, and
drug and alcohol addiction. The report also included a victim impact statement
in which Labow requested the court impose “a longer parole sentence” with
“very little jail time” so that Gilson could continue to parent her children. See
Pre-Sentence Report, 9/5/2018, at 7-8, Victim Impact Statement, 7/6/2018.
At that time, the court imposed a mitigated range sentence for the firearms
offense, and a standard range sentence for the terroristic threats charge.
Following Gilson’s request for a further reduction, the trial court held a
modification hearing, and ultimately determined a CIP sentence was
appropriate. In its October 9, 2018, memorandum and order, the trial court
emphasized the victim “unequivocally expressed her dissatisfaction” with the
original sentence imposed, and implored the court not to allow the “roughly
eight minute encounter that gave rise to the charges … [to] overshadow all of
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the efforts made by [Gilson] in materially changing the course of his life from
when he was a juvenile and a young man.” Memorandum and Order,
10/9/2018, at 1. Moreover, the victim clarified she did not observe Gilson use
any weapons during the incident, and she believed Gilson’s conduct was “likely
the result of an untreated mental illness.” Id. at 1-2. The court noted Gilson’s
“early childhood, childhood, adolescent years and early adulthood were
marked by significant adverse experiences[,]” including a mother who was a
prostitute and eventually died from an overdose, and an absentee father who
was murdered the day before Gilson was going to be reunited with him. Id.
at 2. The trial court further emphasized Gilson’s felony convictions occurred
during his late adolescence and early adulthood, 20 years before the incident
that gave rise to the charges herein. The court noted:
[Gilson’s] remorse for his conduct is extraordinarily profound.
One of the reasons the Court denied bail pending the filing of a
post sentence motion or an appeal was because of the Court’s
concern over [Gilson’s] distraught nature. Before this incident,
[Gilson] had achieved a relatively high level of stability when
compared to his past. He was clean and sober. He was financially
successful, with a good reputation and he is reported to have been
a very good father. All of this evaporated after the filing of these
charges, sending him into a tail spin.
Id.
With regard to the firearms offense, the court observed: (1) the
firearms were rifles, not handguns; (2) Gilson only constructively possessed
the firearms because he was storing them for a friend; and (3) “there was no
evidence that the rifles were used in connection with the terroristic threats
conviction.” Id. With respect to the terroristic threats conviction, the court
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stated Labow “convinced the Court that the punishment for [Gilson’s] conduct
should not deprive him of an opportunity to restore his previous good
reputation, improve his life and actively parent their child.” Id. at 3. Lastly,
the trial court explained that it could “more closely monitor[]” Gilson’s
rehabilitation by imposing a county sentence, including supervisory conditions
regarding drug, alcohol and mental health treatment. Id.
The factors cited by the trial court in support of its sentence track those
listed in Section 9721(b). Although the court recognized Gilson’s convictions
were serious offenses, it also acknowledged Gilson did not physically possess
a firearm during the incident, and Gilson’s threat to his ex-girlfriend appeared
to be out of character and driven, in part, by untreated mental illness. The
court specifically asked Labow if she feared Gilson, to which she replied, “No,
I don’t.” N.T., 10/2/2018, at 17. The trial court acted well within its discretion
when it found Labow’s testimony credible. See Commonwealth v. Derry,
150 A.3d 987, 998 (Pa. Super. 2016). It is evident from the record that the
court did not believe Gilson posed a threat to the public, and both his
rehabilitative needs as well as the needs of the victim, would be better served
by a CIP sentence. Indeed, our review of the factors listed in both Sections
9721(b) and 9781(d) does not lead to the conclusion that the court imposed
an “unreasonable” sentence. Rather, the court carefully weighed the
testimony of Labow, Gilson’s background, and his credible demonstration of
remorse, against the circumstances surrounding the incident, and sentencing
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guideline ranges. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court,
we conclude the Commonwealth’s first issue fails.
Next, the Commonwealth contends the trial court abused its discretion
when it reduced Gilson’s sentence based upon improper factors, namely the
three reasons listed in the court’s October 8, 2018, memorandum and order:
“the firearms in question were long guns, [] the victim of the terroristic threats
desires this outcome, and [] the court can better supervise [Gilson’s]
rehabilitation.” Commonwealth’s Brief at unnumbered 19.
The Commonwealth first argues “guns are guns,” so that the type of
firearm Gilson constructively possessed was irrelevant because he was not
permitted to possess any firearm. Id. at unnumbered 20. Further, the fact
Gilson claimed he was holding the guns for a friend who was “prohibited from
possessing firearms” should have been an aggravating factor, rather than a
mitigating factor. Id. With respect to Labow’s plea for a reduced sentence,
the Commonwealth emphasizes Labow was only the victim of the terroristic
threats charge, whereas the victim of the firearms charge was “society/the
Commonwealth.” Id. at unnumbered 22. It cites to Commonwealth v.
Sims, 728 A.2d 357 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 743 A.2d 918 (Pa.
1999), for the proposition that one victim’s statement cannot be used to
mitigate a sentence relating to a different victim. Lastly, while the
Commonwealth recognizes a court may be able to more closely monitor a
defendant housed locally, the advantages of “county level supervision” should
not alone be sufficient to justify a CIP sentence. Commonwealth’s Brief at
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unnumbered 23. Indeed, the Commonwealth insists the trial court’s “focus
on rehabilitation has completely forced out any other factors which makes the
sentence in this case unreasonable.” Id.
Again, our review of the record reveals no abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court. First, the trial court appropriately considered the fact
that there was “no evidence [] the rifles [Gilson constructively possessed]
were used in connection with the terroristic threats conviction.” Trial Court
Memorandum and Order, 10/9/2018, at 2. Although we recognize the offense
of persons not to possess does not require the defendant to have used the
firearm in connection with a crime, the court could consider Gilson’s
explanation for his constructive possession of the rifles as a mitigating factor.8
While the fact the firearms were not handguns does not itself mitigate the
crime, the court scrutinized this fact in conjunction with Gilson’s background
and explanation for his constructive possession.
Further, the Commonwealth correctly states that Labow is not the
“victim” of the firearms offense. Nevertheless, because the seizure of the
firearms stemmed from the incident involving Labow, we find the trial court
could consider Labow’s plea for a sentence reduction in determining the
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8 Gilson told the Pre-Sentence Investigator that “he was storing the firearms
for a friend, and although he knew he couldn’t possess them, they would be
safer with him.” Pre-Sentence Report, 9/5/2018, at 3. Counsel further
explained during the sentence modification hearing that Gilson “had a friend
who apparently was on supervision … [and since] Gilson was not on
supervision [] he agreed to take possession of those while the person was …
disabled from possessing [the] firearms.” N.T., 10/2/2018, at 6.
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appropriate overall sentencing scheme. Moreover, the Commonwealth’s
reliance on Sims, supra, is misplaced. In that case, the defendant was
convicted of two counts of simple assault based upon a domestic abuse
incident involving his girlfriend and one of her daughters, a nine-year old
whom he threw down the steps and punched in the head. See Sims, supra,
728 A.2d at 358. In imposing a sentence below the mitigated range of the
guidelines, the court relied upon the following facts: the defendant’s girlfriend
did not want to see the prosecution pursued, the victims did not require
medical attention, the defendant was in need of mental health treatment, the
defendant’s prior record contained only one crime of violence that occurred 13
years prior, and the defendant pled guilty so that the victim would not have
to testify. See id.
On appeal by the Commonwealth, a panel of this Court concluded the
trial court abused its discretion in imposing such a lenient sentence. The panel
emphasized the victim’s request for leniency was precipitated by threats from
the defendant. She specifically informed the court she was reluctant to testify
because she was “afraid that [the defendant] would get mad and maybe hurt
[her] or [her] family.” Id. at 359 (record citation omitted). The panel
commented: “This uncontroverted evidence shows [the defendant]
intimidated [the victim] in an attempt to avoid being tried and sentenced; that
she succumbed is not mitigation.” Id. Additionally, the panel concluded the
defendant’s “success in coercing the mother was certainly not a reason to
impose a lesser sentence for the crime against the child, assaulted for trying
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to save her mother from [the defendant] in the first place.” Id. The panel
opined: “A sentence only one-third the mitigated minimum guideline sentence
for assaulting this courageous girl is hard to understand, and certainly may
not be based upon the word of her still frightened mother.” 9 Id. at 359-360.
Accordingly, the Sims panel’s focus on different victims of different crimes
involved facts clearly distinguishable from those before us. Indeed, here,
there was no specified second victim, and Labow’s request for leniency was
not prompted by her fear of Gilson. Rather, when the court specifically asked
Labow if she was afraid of Gilson, she unequivocally stated she did not fear
him. See N.T., 10/2/2018, at 17.
Additionally, while the Commonwealth concedes it is a “truism” that local
supervision of Gilson would allow the court to more closely monitor his
rehabilitation, nevertheless, it argues Gilson’s rehabilitative needs should not
take priority over all other factors. Commonwealth’s Brief at unnumbered 22-
23. However, as explained supra, the trial court considered a number of
factors before reducing Gilson’s sentence to a term of CIP, including: the
victim’s genuine request for leniency; the age of Gilson’s prior felony
convictions; Gilson’s untreated mental health issues; the tumultuous
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9 The panel also found the trial court’s determination that the defendant was
remorseful contradicted the pre-sentence investigator’s opinion that the
defendant “lacked sincerity and honesty.” See Sims, supra, 728 A.2d at
360. Overall, based upon the full record, the panel determined the court’s
stated reasons for the sentence imposed did “not mitigate the offense or
offender” and did not justify a sentence below the mitigated range of the
guidelines. Id.
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circumstances involving Gilson’s upbringing; Gilson’s sincere remorse for
these crimes; and the circumstances surrounding Gilson’s possession of the
firearms. Accordingly, upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/15/2019
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