Com. v. Morales, R.

J-A29014-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RAMON M. MORALES :
:
Appellant : No. 3084 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 25, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0005264-2016
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2019
Ramon M. Morales appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on
July 25, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following
his conviction by jury on the charges of Accidents Involving Death or Personal
Injury – Leaving the Scene, Homicide by Vehicle, and Involuntary
Manslaughter.1 Morales received an aggregate sentence of five to 17 years’
incarceration. In this timely appeal,2 Morales claims there was insufficient
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 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
175 Pa.C.S. §§ 3742(a), 3732(a), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a), respectively.
The jury acquitted Morales of 3rd Degree Murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502.
2 After being granted several extensions of time to file the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement, counsel for Morales filed the document five days late. However,
the trial court addressed the merits of the issues in its Trial Court Opinion.
Accordingly, we may address the merits of the appeal. Commonwealth v.
Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 433 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) ([I]f there has been
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evidence to support his convictions on Homicide by Vehicle and Involuntary
Manslaughter, and those convictions were also against the weight of the
evidence.3 After a thorough review of the submissions by the parties, relevant
law, and the certified record, we affirm.
We rely upon the trial court’s extensive factual recitation found at
pages 4-14 of the January 30, 2018, Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. However, for
context, we highlight the following facts.
The victim, Thomas Dunbar, was killed in a hit and run incident on April
13, 2016, at the intersection of Aramingo and Lehigh Avenues in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania. Dunbar was driving a Vespa scooter at the time of the incident.
He was stopped on Aramingo Avenue, waiting to make a right hand turn onto
Lehigh Avenue. His lights were on.
Ramon Morales was driving a Pontiac Aztek when he attempted to make
a right hand turn from Aramingo Avenue onto Lehigh Avenue. The front
passenger side bumper of the Aztek struck the scooter, knocking Dunbar to
the ground. Because of the positioning of the vehicles, no witness actually
saw the impact between the Aztek and the scooter, although witnesses
testified at trial they heard the impact between the Aztek and the scooter.
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an untimely filing [of a 1925(b) statement], this Court may decide the appeal
on the merits if the trial court had adequate opportunity to prepare an opinion
addressing the issues being raised on appeal.)
3Morales does not challenge his conviction on Accidents Involving Death or
Personal Injury.
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Dunbar became trapped under the Aztek as it continued through the turn onto
Lehigh Avenue. Dunbar was dragged under the vehicle for at least 239 feet.
A number of witnesses attempted to catch Morales’ attention as he
dragged Dunbar. Morales stopped his car, put it into reverse, dislodging
Dunbar and backing over him in the process. Morales then left the scene
travelling at approximately 40-50 miles per hour. One witness to the incident
followed Morales, finally confronting him. The witness told Morales he had to
return to the scene because he had hit someone. Morales replied he would
turn himself in the next day.
The witness who followed Morales returned to the scene of the accident
and gave the police the license tag number of the Aztek. Police found the car
shortly thereafter and attempted to contact the people who lived at the
address where the car was parked and registered. The police noticed the
curtains moving when they knocked on the door, but no one responded. The
police obtained an arrest warrant for Morales and served it the following day.
Morales’ suitcases were on his bed and packed when the police arrived. The
police later learned that Morales had asked someone to watch his dogs
because he was going to be away.
Morales’ first claim is that there was insufficient evidence to support his
convictions on homicide by vehicle and involuntary manslaughter.
Specifically, both crimes require a mens rea of recklessness or gross
negligence. Morales argues the evidence produced at trial demonstrates
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nothing more than mere negligence. Accordingly, Morales contends Thomas
Dunbar’s death was a tragic accident, but was not criminal.
In relevant part, the statute addressing homicide by vehicle states:
(a) Offense.--Any person who recklessly or with gross
negligence causes the death of another person while engaged in
the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal
ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the
regulation of traffic except section 3802 (relating to driving under
influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide
by vehicle, a felony of the third degree, when the violation is the
cause of death.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3732(a).
The statute addressing involuntary manslaughter states:
(a) General rule.--A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter
when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless
or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a
reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of
another person.
18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a).
The scope and standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence is well-settled.
“Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a
question of law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope
of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Giron, 155 A.3d 635,
638 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). In assessing Appellant's
sufficiency challenge, we must determine “whether viewing all the
evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
[Commonwealth], there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact–
finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 153 A.3d 372, 375 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (citation omitted). “The evidence need not preclude
every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe
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all, part, or none of the evidence presented.” Commonwealth v.
Kennedy, 151 A.3d 1117, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 164 A.3d 494, 497 (Pa. Super. 2017).
The trial court accurately analyzed Morales’ claims:
18 Pa.C.S. § 2504(a) defines “Involuntary Manslaughter” as
follows: “a person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as
a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or
grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless
or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another
person.”
“Recklessness and gross negligence are no longer treated as
disparate mental states for the crimes charged; but, rather, gross
negligence is encompassed by recklessness.” Com. v. Martinez,
2017 WL 1163045, citing Com. v. Grimes, 842 A.2d 432, 434
(Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Commonwealth v. Higgins, 575 Pa.
395, 836 A.2d 862 (2003)). Section 302, which pertains to the
“General requirements of culpability,” states that:
[]A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the
standard of conduct that a reasonable person would
observe in the actor’s situation.[]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3).
To be convicted of ‘Homicide by Vehicle,’ the Defendant must be
engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or
municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle
or the regulation of traffic when recklessly or with gross
negligence causing the death of another. The Defendant in the
instant matter was in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323(c) and 75
Pa.C.S. § 3736(a) of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3323(c) states the following:
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“The driver of a vehicle approaching a yield sign shall
in obedience to the sign slow down to a speed
reasonable for the existing conditions and, if
required for safety to stop, shall stop before entering
a crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or, if
none, then at the point nearest the intersecting
roadway where the driver has a view of approaching
traffic on the intersecting roadway before entering.
After slowing down or stopping, the driver shall yield
the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or
approaching on another roadway so closely as to
constitute a hazard during the time the driver is
moving across or within the intersection of
roadways. If a driver is involved in a collision with a
vehicle in the intersection or junction of roadways
after driving past a yield sign, the collision shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of failure of the driver
to yield the right-of-way.”
75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a) states the following:
“Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
property is guilty of reckless driving.”
The jury found that there was sufficient evidence to support the
charge of ‘Homicide by Vehicle.’ Police Officer Hughes, from the
Accident Investigation Division, testified that he is an expert in
accident reconstruction and investigated the scene of this
incident. He opined that the front-right bumper of the Defendant’s
vehicle struck the decedent’s scooter from behind as the scooter
was stopped at a yield sign. The impact ejected the decedent off
of the scooter and under the Defendant’s vehicle. Thereafter, the
Defendant continued driving with the decedent’s body lodged
under his vehicle for two-hundred-and-thirty-nine (239) feet.
Other witnesses testified that the Defendant continued driving
with the decedent’s body lodged under his vehicle despite multiple
horns blaring and witnesses screaming for the Defendant to stop.
When the Defendant finally stopped his vehicle, it was only to
reverse it to dislodge the decedent’s body and then proceed
forward, crushing the decedent as he fled the scene. Dr. Brown
testified that virtually all of the decedent’s ribs had been broken,
which is indicative of being crushed. The broken ribs lacerated
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the decedent’s liver and lungs, which would have resulted in his
death. The skin on the decedent’s arm and hand was worn
through to the bone as a result of being dragged such a distance.
It strains credulity that one could find that the Defendant was
unaware of the presence of the body of a five (5) foot, ten (10)
inch man, weighing one-hundred-and eighty-eight (188) pounds,
underneath his vehicle for two-hundred-and-thirty-nine (239)
feet. Furthermore, the Defendant can no longer feign ignorance
once he is approached by Efrain Diaz and told that he had hit
someone, yet flees again. Such conduct by the Defendant was
clearly a violation of both 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323(c) and 75 Pa.C.S. §
3736(a) and constituted the mens rea of recklessness sufficient to
sustain the conviction of ‘Homicide by Vehicle.’
As to the conviction for ‘Involuntary Manslaughter,’ the same
analysis applies. The defendant’s conduct was the direct cause of
the decedent’s death and was most certainly reckless, showing a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor’s situation.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/30/2018, at 16-18 (bold in original).
Additionally, while arresting Morales the next day, officers observed, at
his residence, a suitcase, passport and a notation regarding a flight on JetBlue.
A friend testified that Morales asked her to take care of his dog as he was
going on a trip. It is well-settled that “flight can constitute circumstantial
evidence of consciousness of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Housman, 986 A.2d
822, 931 (Pa. 2009) (distinguished on other grounds).
In light of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court there was
sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Morales
possessed the requisite mens rea to have committed both involuntary
manslaughter and homicide by vehicle and that his actions constituted more
than mere negligence.
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Morales’ next claim is that the guilty verdicts on the charges of
involuntary manslaughter and homicide by vehicle were against the weight of
the evidence. A challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised either
orally, any time prior to sentencing; by written motion, prior to sentencing;
or in a post-sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3). See also
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 57 A.3d 191, 196 (Pa. Super. 2012) (Failure to
challenge the weight of the evidence presented at trial in an oral or written
motion prior to sentencing or in a post-sentence motion will result in waiver
of the claim.). Morales did not abide by Rule 607; therefore, he has waived
this issue.
Accordingly, Morales is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Morales’ Application for Leave to
Present the within Post-Submission Argument is granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/26/19
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