Com. v. Bernal, G.

J-A27021-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
GABINO BERNAL, :
:
Appellant : No. 1922 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 19, 2013,
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Criminal Division, at No. CP-02-CR-0002976-2013.
BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 08, 2014
Appellant, Gabino Bernal, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. For the reasons
that follow, we vacate and remand for resentencing.
The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history of this
case as follows:
[Appellant] was charged with Rape of a Child,1 Unlawful
Contact with a Minor,2 Indecent Assault of a Person Under 133
and Corruption of Minors4 in relation to a series of incidents with
his girlfriend’s 8-year-old daughter. Following a jury trial,
[Appellant] was found not guilty of Rape of a Child and guilty at
the remaining charges. On November 19, 2013, [Appellant]
appeared before this Court and was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of nine (9) to eighteen (18) years at the Unlawful
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Contact with a Minor charge. No Post-Sentence Motions were
filed. This appeal followed.[1]
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §3121(c)
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §6318[(a)(1)]
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. §3126(a)(7)
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. §6301(a)(1)[(i)]
Briefly, the evidence presented established that in the fall
of 2003, [Appellant] lived with his girlfriend [E. C.], her eight (8)
year old daughter, [(“the Victim”)] and her 11 year old son, [J.],
who has cerebral palsy and is confined to a wheelchair. It was
customary for [Appellant] to pick up [the Victim] from school
and walk her home when her mother was not able to do so.
Sometime that fall, [the Victim] got in trouble at school, and her
teacher told [Appellant] when he arrived to pick her up.
[Appellant] became angry and pulled [the Victim’s] hair during
the walk home. Upon arriving at their house, [Appellant] took
[the Victim] to the bedroom he shared with her mother, forcibly
undressed her and raped her. [The Victim] testified that the
rapes occurred numerous times over the course of the next
several months. [Appellant] threatened to hurt [the Victim’s
brother], with whom [the Victim] was very close, if she told
anyone.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/14, at 1-2.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial judge abuse her discretion by permitting
Mary Carrasco, M.D. to testify as a Commonwealth rebuttal
witness when her testimony did not constitute rebuttal?
2. Did the trial judge abuse her discretion by permitting
the Commonwealth to cross-examine all character witnesses as
to whether they were aware that [Appellant] was an illegal alien
1
Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the dictates of Pa.R.A.P.
1925.
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without limiting the ruling as to whether the character witnesses
should testify that [Appellant] was law-abiding?
3. Did the trial judge commit an error of law sentencing
[Appellant] at Count 2 to nine to eighteen years in prison when
at that count he was only convicted of a felony of the third
degree, and not a felony of the first degree?
Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.
Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting Mary Carrasco, M.D., to testify as a Commonwealth rebuttal
witness because, as Appellant contends, her testimony did not constitute
rebuttal. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Appellant maintains that Appellant’s expert
witness, Dr. Breck, was precluded from answering questions, due to
sustained objections, and thus, there was no testimony provided by Dr.
Breck that Dr. Carrasco could rebut. Id. at 14-15. Appellant further
contends that because Dr. Breck responded that she had no knowledge
regarding a statistic related to child assault victims not showing signs of
being sexually assaulted, subsequent testimony from Dr. Carrasco regarding
the statistic was not rebuttal testimony. Id. at 15, 20.
We have stated the following when reviewing a trial court’s evidentiary
ruling:
The standard of review for a trial court’s evidentiary
rulings is narrow. The admissibility of evidence is solely within
the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only if the
trial court has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is
not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is
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manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will
or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.
Commonwealth v. Mendez, 74 A.3d 256, 260 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Furthermore, in addressing the admissibility of rebuttal evidence, our
Supreme Court has stated the following:
[T]he admission of rebuttal testimony is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the appropriate scope of rebuttal
evidence is defined by the evidence that it is intended to rebut.
[W]here the evidence proposed goes to the impeachment of the
testimony of his opponent’s witnesses, it is admissible as a
matter of right. Rebuttal is proper where facts discrediting the
proponent’s witnesses have been offered.
Commonwealth v. Ballard, 80 A.3d 380, 401-402 (Pa. 2013).
Despite Appellant’s claims that Dr. Breck’s testimony was limited in
various ways, the record established that Dr. Breck indeed provided
testimony regarding her conclusions as to whether the Victim had been
subjected to sexual abuse. Specifically, Dr. Breck testified that during her
examination of the Victim on December 1, 2003, she found no abnormalities
and stated that the Victim’s vagina and hymen were normal. N.T., 8/27/13,
at 101-102. Dr. Breck also stated that following her examination of the
Victim on December 29, 2003, she had again concluded that the Victim’s
pubic area was “normal.” Id. at 102-103.
On cross-examination, Dr. Breck’s testimony reflected that the
December 1, 2003, examination was for a urinary tract infection. N.T.,
8/27/13, at 104. After acknowledging that having sex can be a cause of a
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urinary tract infection, Dr. Breck was asked by the Assistant District Attorney
whether it was possible that the Victim’s infection was the result of having
had sexual intercourse. Id. at 104-105. Dr. Breck answered: “My
examination does not show any signs of her having penetration sex.” Id. at
105. Dr. Breck conceded that she had not used a colposcope, an instrument
often used in sexual assault cases to examine the vagina, when she
conducted her examination of the Victim in this matter. Id. at 105-106.
When questioned regarding a statistic that indicated that ninety-five percent
of female children known to have been sexually assaulted do not exhibit any
physical signs of such an assault, Dr. Breck stated that she could not answer
because “I don’t have that knowledge.” Id. at 106. On redirect, however,
when presented with the same statistic, Dr. Breck stated: “It’s hard for me
to believe.” Id. at 107.
In rebuttal, Dr. Carrasco testified as an expert in the area of child
abuse, and explained that according to the most widely used study on the
subject, only five percent of children referred for a sexual-abuse evaluation
exhibited any physical evidence of such abuse. N.T., 8/28/13, at 139-140.
Dr. Carrasco further explained that, in her twenty-five years of experience
examining children for signs of sexual abuse, she used a colposcope “as a
magnifying device to record the appearance of the hymen in case there’s a
need to look at the evidence instead of simply examining the child, we would
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be able to see it.” Id. at 136-138, 141. Dr. Carrasco explained that while
“it’s not impossible to [examine the hymen] visually, it’s much better with a
[colposcope] because you can see a much greater level of detail of sexual
abuse.” Id. at 142.
As is reflected above, Dr. Breck, in fact, provided testimony regarding
her opinion as to whether the Victim was subject to sexual abuse by
testifying that the Victim’s vagina and hymen appeared “normal” and that
there was no evidence of penetration sex. Furthermore, Dr. Breck stated
that it was “hard for her to believe” the statistic establishing that children
who were subjected to sexual abuse may not show signs of such abuse.
Accordingly, Dr. Carrasco’s testimony was appropriately admitted for
purposes of rebutting Dr. Breck’s. Dr. Carrasco’s testimony suggested that
Dr. Breck’s examinations were not as thorough as necessary due to her
failure to use the proper instrument for examination and that a “normal”
vagina and hymen did not necessarily mean that the Victim had not
experienced vaginal penetration or that the Victim had not been subjected to
sexual abuse. Additionally, Dr. Carrasco’s testimony regarding the statistic
of known child victims of sexual abuse not reflecting signs of that abuse
served to rebut Dr. Breck’s opinion that such a statistic was “hard for her to
believe.” Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
the rebuttal testimony of Dr. Carassco. Appellant’s first claim lacks merit.
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Appellant next contends that “the trial judge abused her discretion by
permitting the Commonwealth to cross-examine all character witnesses as to
whether they were aware that [Appellant] was an illegal alien without
limiting the ruling as to whether the character witnesses should testify that
[Appellant] was law-abiding.” Appellant’s Brief at 20. Appellant filed a
motion in limine, stating that Appellant was an undocumented alien and
requesting that the trial court enter an order prohibiting the Commonwealth
from introducing this fact to the jury. Id. at 20-21. After jury selection,
Appellant asserts, the parties met in chambers and discussed the motion in
limine. Id. at 21. Appellant contends that although the meeting was not
placed on the record and a written order was never entered, the trial court
ruled “in blanket fashion” that the Commonwealth could, in fact, cross-
examine defense character witnesses as to whether they were aware that
Appellant was an illegal alien. Id. at 22. Appellant further maintains that
the ruling was not limited to whether the character witnesses testified that
Appellant was law-abiding. Id. Appellant now argues that it was error for
the trial court to issue a blanket order that any character witness could be
cross-examined by the Commonwealth regarding Appellant’s status as an
undocumented alien. Id. at 25. Appellant relies on Commonwealth v.
Kouma, 53 A.3d 760 (Pa. Super. 2012), for the proposition that cross-
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examination is permitted in Pennsylvania only when the character witness
testifies as to a defendant’s “reputation for being law-abiding.” Id. at 26.
The Commonwealth contends that Appellant never requested that the
trial court judge limit the Commonwealth’s references to Appellant’s illegal
immigrant status to those instances in which a character witness had already
testified to Appellant’s reputation for law-abidingness. Commonwealth’s
Brief at 15. Because Appellant failed to make this request to the trial court,
the Commonwealth argues the claim is waived. Id. at 15-16. The
Commonwealth further asserts that even if the claim is not waived, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the prosecutor to question the
witnesses regarding Appellant’s illegal alien status. Id. at 20.
“It is a settled principle of appellate review, of course, that courts
should not reach claims that were not raised below.” Commonwealth v.
Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 891 (Pa. 2010). Pennsylvania Appellate Rule 302
provides as follows:
Rule 302. Requisites for Reviewable Issue
(a) General rule. Issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
(b) Charge to jury. A general exception to the charge to the
jury will not preserve an issue for appeal. Specific exception shall
be taken to the language or omission complained of.
Pa.R.A.P. 302. Additionally, the note to Pa.R.A.P. 302 states:
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Note: This rule sets forth a frequently overlooked requirement.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Piper, 458 Pa. 307, 328 A.2d
845 (1974), as to Subdivision (a). See, e.g., Dilliplaine v.
Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974);
Commonwealth v. Light, 458 Pa. 328, 326 A.2d 288 (1974) as
to Subdivision (b). Rule 2117(c) (statement of place of raising
or preservation of issues) and Rule 2119(e) (statement of place
of raising or preservation of issues) require that the brief
expressly set forth in both the statement of the case and in the
argument reference to the place in the record where the issue
presented for decision on appeal has been raised or preserved
below.
Pa.R.A.P. 302, Note.
Nothing in the record reflects the trial court’s ruling on Appellant’s
motion in limine prior to trial. This fact is consistent with Appellant’s
assertion that an unrecorded, in-chambers meeting between parties took
place, during which the trial court ruled that if the defense called character
witnesses, the Commonwealth would be able to cross-examine them as to
whether they were aware that Appellant was an illegal alien. A review of the
record does reflect, however, the following exchange between counsel and
the trial court, during trial, regarding cross-examination of witnesses related
to Appellant’s illegal alien status:
[Commonwealth]: So you are in this country legally?
[Appellant]: No.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: You are a citizen of the United
States?
[Appellant]: No, I’m sorry, no.
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[Appellant’s counsel]: May we approach, Your Honor?
---
(A discussion at sidebar was held as follows:)
---
[Appellant’s counsel]: Two things. First, I filed a motion
that none of that could be brought into this case and [the
Commonwealth] agreed with that motion but the Court didn’t get
to rule on it, that’s Number One.
Number Two, the Court did not rule that if I presented
character testimony that the character witness was aware that
[Appellant] was here illegally, if that question could be asked,
that was fair game in cross examination. This is improper cross
examination.
The Court: I thought you weren’t calling character
witnesses. I also don’t think it makes any difference.
[Appellant’s counsel]: Your Honor, there’s a couple of
things. First of all, I might change my mind about calling
character witnesses. In this case, cross examination is not
permitted, it’s improper. Number Two, there’s a time and place
for everything and the time and place for that type of cross
examination is only as to whether or not they knew about it.
The Court: Well, the credibility of [Appellant] was in taking
the stand.
[Appellant’s counsel]: But I don’t see how it could be
used.
The Court: That he was a Mexican national.
[Appellant’s counsel]: And I said that.
[Commonwealth]: I was picking up his direct. He was
asking the question if he was in the country legally and he said
he came in through Arizona.
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The Court: I agree with [Appellant’s Counsel] that it never
came up. My suggestion would be to move on at this point. If
you call character witnesses, then [the Commonwealth] can
cross examine them on whether [Appellant] is here illegally. If
not, I will initiate a cautionary instruction to the jury.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: If I might point out something. I
did ask him and he did say he entered illegally.
The Court: He has a right to cross examine him.
[Appellant’s Counsel]: It is not evidence of bad character,
it is not evidence of crimen falsi, it is not evidence of
impeachment.
The Court: Well, you did open the door and I believe [the
Commonwealth] has indicated you did, but I will allow you to
continue.
[Commonwealth]: Thank you, Your Honor.
---
(Discussion at sidebar was concluded)
---
The Court: Objection overruled.
N.T., 8/27/13, at 116-118.
Even after the trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could cross-
examine character witnesses regarding their knowledge of Appellant’s
illegal-alien status, Appellant’s counsel did not request that cross-
examination be limited and permissible only after the witness testified to
Appellant having a reputation for being law-abiding. Furthermore, Appellant
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has failed to identify where in the record he requested that the trial court
limit any cross-examination as to his illegal-alien status to be in response to
a character witness’s testimony that Appellant was law-abiding. Thus, we
are constrained to agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant has failed to
preserve this issue for appellate review.
We further note that, contrary to Appellant’s assertions, Kouma does
not pronounce a blanket holding that character witnesses can be questioned
regarding an appellant’s illegal alien status only when an appellant’s law-
abidingness is raised. In Kouma, the appellant’s specific contention was
that “the trial court erred in ruling that, if [a]ppellant called character
witnesses to testify as to his reputation for being law-abiding, the prosecutor
could cross-examine the witnesses as to their knowledge of Appellant’s
immigration status as an illegal alien.” Kouma, 53 A.3d 760, 768.
Accordingly, this Court was required to determine whether appellant’s
immigration status as an illegal alien, subject to deportation, was probative
as it related to his trait of being law-abiding. Id. at 769. After conducting
its analysis, this Court concluded that the Commonwealth was permitted to
use the appellant’s immigration status as an illegal alien to call into question
the character witnesses’ qualifications to speak for the community on the
issue, i.e., their basis of knowledge of the person or law-abiding trait and
the standard by which they measure reputation. Id. at 770. As such, the
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Court’s ruling in Kouma was specific to the facts in the case before it and
does not stand for the proposition, as stated by Appellant, that a defendant’s
status as an illegal alien can be referenced during the cross-examination of a
character witness only when that witness had testified to the defendant’s
reputation for law-abidingness. Thus, Appellant’s second claim lacks merit.
In his final issue, Appellant maintains that because he was not
convicted of a felony of the first degree, the trial court erred in sentencing
him to nine to eighteen years in prison. Appellant’s Brief at 28. Appellant
relies on Commonwealth v. Reed, 9 A.3d 1138 (Pa. 2010), in support of
his position. Id. at 31-32. Appellant asserts that because the trial court
committed an error of law, the case should be remanded for resentencing.
Id. at 34.
The Commonwealth agrees with Appellant’s claim that he was
improperly sentenced. Commonwealth’s Brief at 23-25. The Commonwealth
also relies on Reed in its analysis. Id. at 24-25. The Commonwealth
concedes that it was error for the trial court to have graded the unlawful-
contact-with-a-minor conviction as anything greater than a felony of the
third degree. Id. at 25. As such, the Commonwealth asserts that
resentencing is necessary. Id.
We first note that the statutory provision defining the offense and
establishing grading provides, in relevant part, as follows:
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§ 6318. Unlawful contact with minor
(a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he is
intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement
officer acting in the performance of his duties who has assumed
the identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity
prohibited under any of the following, and either the person
initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this
Commonwealth:
(1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31
(relating to sexual offenses).
(2) Open lewdness as defined in section 5901
(relating to open lewdness).
(3) Prostitution as defined in section 5902 (relating
to prostitution and related offenses).
(4) Obscene and other sexual materials and
performances as defined in section 5903 (relating to
obscene and other sexual materials and
performances).
(5) Sexual abuse of children as defined in section
6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children).
(6) Sexual exploitation of children as defined in
section 6320 (relating to sexual exploitation of
children).
(b) Grading.--A violation of subsection (a) is:
(1) an offense of the same grade and degree as the most
serious underlying offense in subsection (a) for which the
defendant contacted the minor; or
(2) a felony of the third degree;
whichever is greater.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (a) & (b).
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Additionally, in Reed, our Supreme Court was confronted with a
factual scenario similar to the one presented herein. In Reed, the
defendant was charged with attempted unlawful contact with a minor and
criminal attempt of the following crimes: rape of a child and involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), which are first-degree felony offenses,
statutory sexual assault, a second-degree felony, indecent assault, a
second-degree misdemeanor, and corruption of a minor, a first-degree
misdemeanor. Reed, 9 A.3d at 1141. The defendant was acquitted of all
charges except criminal attempt to commit unlawful contact with a minor.
Id. At sentencing, the trial court graded defendant’s conviction for
attempted unlawful contact with a minor as a first-degree felony based on
the fact that defendant also was charged with the first-degree felony
offenses of rape and IDSI, determining that the grading scheme was not
contingent upon an actual conviction of those underlying offenses. Id. at
1141-1142. This Court, after concluding that the trial court erred in grading
defendant’s offense as a first-degree felony and ruling that grading under 18
Pa.C.S. § 6318(b)(1) depended “upon whether [defendant] was actually
convicted of the underlying offenses,” vacated the judgment of sentence and
remanded the matter for resentencing. Id. at 1142, 1144. Our Supreme
Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal for the
purpose of deciding the following issue:
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What is the proper grading of a conviction under 18 Pa.C.S. §
6318, where the trial court at sentencing concluded that the
most serious underlying offenses for which the defendant
contacted the minor were offenses for which the defendant was
acquitted?
Id. at 1142.
The Court explained that pursuant to the express statutory language,
a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a), unlawful contact with a minor, is graded
as either the most serious underlying offense for which the defendant
attempted contact with the minor, or a first-degree misdemeanor, the
default grading under section 6318(b)(2), whichever is greater. 2 Reed, 9
A.3d at 1146-1147. The Court stated that because a fact-finder acquitted
the defendant of the other charges, those acquittals cannot be ignored when
applying the appropriate grading under subsection 6318(b). Id. at 1147.
Thus, the Court concluded that because the defendant had been acquitted of
the separate Chapter 31 charges, the default sentencing provision applied.
Id. at 1148.
In the case sub judice, as noted, Appellant was convicted of indecent
assault of a person under thirteen and corruption of minors in addition to his
conviction for unlawful contact with a minor. Appellant was acquitted of
rape. The convictions of indecent assault and corruption of minors are
2
At the time, section 6318(b)(2) provided that the default grading for the
offense was a misdemeanor of the first degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318 (1997);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 35 A.3d 1206, 1211 (Pa. 2012).
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graded as misdemeanors of the first degree. Because the default grading
provision of section 6318(b)(2), a felony of the third degree, is greater than
the two other convictions for misdemeanors of the first degree, Appellant’s
conviction of unlawful contact with a minor must be graded as a felony of
the third degree. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(b)(2); Reed, 9 A.3d at 1148.
Sentencing for a felony of the third degree “shall be fixed by the court
at not more than seven years.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3). Appellant was
sentenced to incarceration for nine to eighteen years. As such, the trial
court erred in sentencing Appellant. Thus, we are constrained to vacate
Appellant’s sentence and remand the matter for resentencing.
Vacate sentence and remand for resentencing on all counts. See
Commonwealth v. Stemple, 940 A.2d 504, 513 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(holding that where vacating the sentence reduces the aggregate penalty
and upsets the overall sentencing scheme, “the appropriate step is to vacate
the entire sentence and to remand for resentencing.”) Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Musmanno joins this Memorandum.
Judge Olson Concurs in the Result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/8/2014
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