Commonwealth v. Haynes

J-A35037-14
2015 Pa. Super. 94
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DOMINICK WILLIAM HAYNES,
Appellant No. 353 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 4, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-65-CR-0001600-2012
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 22, 2015
Dominick William Haynes appeals from the judgment of sentence of
twelve to thirty years incarceration after a jury found him guilty of four
counts of possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), two counts of corrupt
organizations, and one count of criminal conspiracy and hindering
apprehension. After careful review, we vacate the judgment of sentence and
remand for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
The relevant facts pertaining to Appellant’s issues are as follows.
Pennsylvania State Police conducted a warrantless entry into an apartment.
Specifically, Trooper Jeffrey Brautigam was conducting surveillance on
February 22, 2012, outside the Hawksworth Garden Apartments in
Greensburg, Westmoreland County. Approximately one and one-half hour
earlier, two other troopers had been surveilling the apartments and
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witnessed drug sale activity. Those officers followed the buyer and
performed a traffic stop. The driver was found with heroin and indicated
that he bought the heroin from a woman at the Hawksworth apartments.
Trooper Brautigam, as part of his surveillance, observed a woman exit
Building B of the apartments and meet a series of individuals in the parking
lot. He indicated that he had seen hundreds of drug transactions transpire
and described the woman’s interactions with these individuals as drug
transactions. Trooper Brautigam testified that the female, later identified as
Kristin Weightman, would exit the apartment building and a car would pull
into the parking lot. Weightman would then hand something to the driver or
passenger and the passenger would hand something to her. The car would
then leave, and Weightman would return to the building. This occurred
three times.
At the time, Trooper Brautigam also had information that another
individual, Chauncy “Gunner” Bray, was in the area with Weightman.
Trooper Brautigam knew Bray from past encounters and was told that Bray
may be in possession of a firearm. Trooper Edward Malloy witnessed which
apartment Weightman entered and relayed that information to Trooper
Brautigam. Trooper Brautigam and Trooper Malloy then watched Weightman
meet a white male, later identified as Kurt McCamley, and return to the
apartment building. Police intended to question Weightman before she
entered the apartment, but were unable to intercept her. Trooper Brautigam
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then elected to knock on the door to speak with Weightman. As the two
officers approached, Trooper Brautigam smelled burning marijuana
emanating from inside the apartment.
Trooper Brautigam knocked on the door and an individual asked who it
was. He responded that he needed to speak to the renter and heard
rumbling inside. He then identified himself as the police and asked that
someone open the door. Those inside would not answer the door, and,
according to Trooper Brautigam, they became quiet. After twenty to thirty
seconds, the police kicked open the door. Entry occurred at approximately
12:30 in the afternoon. Bray attempted to flee and toss money away but
was captured. Four other males were inside, including Appellant, as were
Weightman and McCamley.1 In plain view was a plastic bag with nine bricks
of heroin, money on the sofa, and burnt marijuana blunts on a window sill.
Thereafter, police secured a search warrant for the apartment and
questioned those present. Appellant maintained that he was just visiting
and that the drugs were not his. The heroin inside the apartment was
confirmed to weigh 7.8 grams.
Appellant unsuccessfully litigated a suppression motion and proceeded
to trial with one other individual, James Moore. A different judge presided
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1
Trial testimony revealed that Appellant and Ms. Weightman arrived the
night before and spent the night. The apartment was being rented by a
Jillian Davis.
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over the jury trial. As part of the investigation into the same drug ring,
police, on the same day as the apartment raid, conducted a warrant-based
search of another apartment rented by a Nicole Dudek. They recovered six
bricks of heroin, suboxone, money, and cell phones. Police then called
Dudek and informed her of their discovery. She did not turn herself in at
that time and stayed with Moore for five days and Appellant for one night.
Thereafter, she did turn herself in to the authorities. Additional testimony
from several drug addicts indicated that Appellant was involved in the sale of
heroin.
The jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned charges. The
court sentenced Appellant to twelve to thirty years imprisonment, including
a mandatory minimum sentence relative to the weight of the drugs involved.
The jury was not instructed to make a finding regarding the weight of the
drugs. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the court
denied. This appeal ensued. The trial court and Appellant complied with
Rule 1925. Appellant raises four issues for this Court’s review.
I. Whether the honorable trial court erred in failing to
suppress the fruits of the raid on the Hawksworth Garden
Apartments?
II. Whether the honorable trial court erred in failing to dismiss
all of the charges filed against the Defendant as being the
fruits of the illegal search and seizure at the Hawksworth
Garden Apartments?
III. Whether the honorable trial court issued an illegal
sentence by imposing a mandatory minimum sentence at
count 16 whenever the predicate facts necessary for an
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enhanced sentence were not submitted to the jury or
found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt?
IV. Whether the honorable trial court erred in failing to grant
the motion for judgment of acquittal of the harboring a
fugitive charge?
Appellant’s brief at 6.
Appellant’s first two claims pertain to the suppression of evidence. In
evaluating a suppression ruling, we consider the evidence of the
Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below, and any evidence of the
defendant that is uncontradicted when examined in the context of the
record. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 330 (Pa.Super. 2012).
This Court is bound by the factual findings of the suppression court where
the record supports those findings and may only reverse when the legal
conclusions drawn from those facts are in error. Id.
Appellant argues that the warrantless search of the apartment violated
both his Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 8 right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, his main focus is on the
Pennsylvania Constitution. In this respect, he maintains that the
Pennsylvania charter provides greater protections than the Fourth
Amendment. In support, he relies on Commonwealth v. Demshock, 854
A.2d 553 (Pa.Super. 2004), and Commonwealth v. Waddell, 61 A.3d 198
(Pa.Super. 2012), and distinguishes the United States Supreme Court
decision in Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
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Ordinarily, law enforcement must obtain a warrant before conducting a
search. Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 102 (Pa. 2013). In
this respect, warrantless searches are generally presumed unreasonable.
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Pa. 2001). Nonetheless,
there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, including those situations
where probable cause exists in conjunction with exigent circumstances.
Commonwealth v. Petroll, 738 A.2d 993, 999 (Pa. 1999).
In Demshock, police received complaints of a car theft and vandalism
in the area of an apartment complex. A detective was patrolling the area on
foot as a result. While doing so, he walked past an apartment and observed
through a one-foot vertical blind of a sliding door what appeared to be
teenagers drinking beer. Based on this observation, he radioed other
officers who were patrolling the complex. While covering the apartment’s
peep hole, the detective knocked on the door. A person inside asked who it
was and the detective said, “hey man, it is me.” Demshock, supra at 554.
An individual opened the door slightly and looked outside. Upon seeing that
it was police, the person stepped back and police pushed the door open and
entered. Police then saw marijuana in plain view.
The trial court denied a suppression motion, and Demshock was found
guilty of possession of marijuana and underage drinking. This Court
reversed on appeal, finding that the entry into the apartment violated the
Fourth Amendment. We noted that the detective did not testify that he
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entered the apartment to prevent the destruction of evidence. See id. at
556. The Demshock panel continued, “Here, the officers observed the
illegal activity from outside the premises without the occupants detecting
their presence. Under these circumstances, the officers could have made
efforts to secure a search warrant and quite possibly could have secured a
warrant prior to any of the partygoers realizing that the police were outside.”
Id. at 557. According to the Demshock Court, if an exigency existed
therein, once police had probable cause, “police could simply knock upon the
door rather than go through the trouble of obtaining a warrant.” Id. at 558.
It continued stating, “The Fourth Amendment could be made substantially
impotent if this were the case.” Id.
In Waddell, this Court, relying on Demshock, ruled that suppression
was warranted on Fourth Amendment grounds where the police created their
own exigency by knocking and announcing. The facts in Waddell are as
follows. Police in Homestead, Allegheny County, received information from a
neighboring police officer that large amounts of marijuana were being sold
from a house at 314 West 12th Avenue. Homestead’s Chief of Police
contacted an informant who confirmed that the house was used to sell
narcotics and maintained that there were two black males transporting
marijuana from the house. The informant further provided a description of
the car. Police stopped the car described by the informant several blocks
from the house. Two individuals were arrested for being in possession of
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thirteen pounds of marijuana. In addition, police located a firearm. One of
those men indicated that he got the marijuana “up on the hill, at the little
house.” Waddell, supra at 209.
Homestead police and Munhall officers travelled to 314 West 12th
Avenue. As they approached, a strong odor of marijuana was detected
coming from the house. Police knocked on the door and, after hearing no
response, discerned the sound of slight movement inside. Police knocked
twice more, the final time stating that it was the police and asking someone
to open the door. At that time, more movement was heard and another
officer radioed that a person had jumped out of a window from the rear of
the home. Based on the belief that someone inside might destroy evidence
or retrieve a gun, police kicked in the door and entered the house. Two
handguns, an AK-47 magazine, and marijuana were in plain view. Citing
Demshock, the panel stated, “It is well established that police cannot rely
upon exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry where the
exigency derives from their own actions.” Waddell, supra at 214. The
Waddell panel added that, “Hurried movement does not provide a strong
inference that evidence was being destroyed[.]” Id. at 216.
The court continued that it was reasonable to assume that the “‘knock
and talk’ was conducted with the hope that events would transpire in such a
fashion as to obviate the warrant requirement altogether.” Id. at 217. It
further reasoned, “To prevent dilution of the sanctity of a citizen’s home, the
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core element of the Fourth Amendment, we must remain vigilant against
attempts by police to actively seek out exigency, no matter how well-
intentioned their efforts might be.” Id. The Waddell Court did not discuss
King, nor did the Commonwealth brief that case.
In King, police set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine outside an
apartment complex. An undercover officer watched the transaction occur
and then radioed to uniformed officers to arrest the suspect. The officers
were unable to stop the person before he entered an apartment. Unlike this
case, police did not see which apartment the suspect entered, but heard a
door close and detected a very strong odor of marijuana from one of two
apartments in the vicinity. The suspect actually entered the apartment not
at issue.2 One officer knocked loudly and announced the presence of police
at the apartment from which the marijuana smell was emanating. That
officer maintained that he could hear the sound of things being moved
inside. Therefore, he kicked down the door. Marijuana and powder cocaine
were located in plain view.
____________________________________________
2
At early American common law, this would have been an important
distinction since warrantless entry was only permitted if the felon being
pursued was actually inside the premises. See e.g., William Waller Hening,
The New Virginia Justice, 303-304 (Richmond, 2nd ed. 1810) (citing Matthew
Hale and Serjeant Hawkins, two of the most influential English legal treatise
writers at the time of America’s founding).
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The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that police improperly created their
own exigency in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the exigent
circumstance rule applies “when police, by knocking on the door of a
residence and announcing their presence, cause the occupants to attempt to
destroy evidence.” King, supra at 1854.
The King Court reasoned that a rule precluding police from making a
warrantless entry to prevent destruction of evidence “would unreasonably
shrink the reach of this well-established exception to the warrant
requirement.” Id. at 1857. The Supreme Court discussed various state and
federal approaches that precluded a finding of exigency under similar
circumstances. With respect to cases concluding that police possessed
probable cause and sufficient time to secure a warrant, it submitted that
such an approach “unjustifiably interferes with legitimate law enforcement
strategies.” Id. at 1860. The King Court found that, “Faulting the police for
failing to apply for a search warrant at the earliest possible time after
obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is nowhere to be found in the
Constitution.” Id. at 1861. Thus, King held that the police, by knocking
and announcing, did not impermissibly create the exigency needed for a
warrantless search.
King thus calls into question portions of Demshock and Waddell
insofar as they rely on the Fourth Amendment and the now-overruled view
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that under the Fourth Amendment the police cannot create their own
exigency by knocking and announcing. For this reason, Appellant maintains
that Pennsylvania constitutional principles should be applied more broadly.
As noted, Appellant’s position is essentially that the police created
their own exigent circumstances by knocking on the door of the apartment
rather than securing a search warrant. He highlights that police knew that
Weightman had sold drugs to one person one and one-half hour before
entering the apartment. Appellant adds that Trooper Brautigam also saw
Weightman engage in three separate drug sales and knew what apartment
she was entering. Accordingly, Appellant posits that police had sufficient
information to secure a warrant but elected to create their own exigency by
approaching and knocking on the door.
The Commonwealth responds by arguing for the first time, though the
issue is not waived, see Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 718 A.2d 265, 268
n.3 (Pa. 1998), that Appellant did not establish an expectation of privacy in
the apartment. This argument fails in light of Commonwealth v. Arnold,
932 A.2d 143 (Pa.Super. 2006). Therein, this Court held that a visitor to an
apartment has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place being visited.
We found that to hold otherwise “would permit police officers to provide
retroactive justifications and randomly invade homes on the pretense that
any person found not to be a non-resident after the fact could be searched.”
Id. at 149; see also Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990) (“We
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think that society recognizes that a houseguest has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his host's home.”).
In the alternative, the Commonwealth contends that the police had
both probable cause and exigent circumstances to enter the apartment.
Accordingly, it maintains that the warrantless entry was lawful. Here,
Appellant disputes only the exigent circumstances. The Commonwealth
relies heavily on King, supra, and asserts that, after police knocked on the
door, exigent circumstances arose because those inside refused to answer,
movement was heard, and a powerful smell of marijuana was coming from
the residence.
We begin by noting that in several contexts, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, § 8 to afford broader protections
than interpretations of the Fourth Amendment by the United States Supreme
Court. Theodore v. Delaware Valley School District, 836 A.2d 76 (Pa.
2003) (finding Article I, § 8 provides greater protections for suspicion-less
drug testing of students than does the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence); Commonwealth v. Matos, 543 Pa. 449, 672
A.2d 769 (Pa. 1996) (rejecting the Supreme Court's decision in California
v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621 (1991), and holding that, under Article I, § 8,
pursuit by a police officer without probable cause or reasonable suspicion
constitutes a seizure); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa.
1991) (declining to adopt “good faith” exception to exclusionary rule under
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United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)); Commonwealth v. Melilli,
555 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 1989) (installation of pen register requires probable
cause); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1979)
(expectation of privacy exist in bank records); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470
A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983) (retaining automatic standing rule in Pennsylvania and
declining to adopt Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States
v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)).
However, in other situations, our High Court has declined to interpret
Article I, § 8 as providing greater protections than the United States
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Commonwealth
v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2007) (open fields doctrine);
Commonwealth v. Duncan 817 A.2d 455 (Pa. 2003) (no privacy right in
name and address); Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655 (Pa. 2000)
(anticipatory search warrants); Commonwealth v. Waltson, 724 A.2d 289
(Pa. 1998) (search warrant of house not overbroad); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 692 A.2d 1031 (Pa. 1997) (search of parolee); Commonwealth
v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (plurality) (automobile searches).
We consider four factors in analyzing whether our state charter offers
more protections than does the federal constitution as interpreted by the
Supreme Court: (1) the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision; (2)
the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law; (3) related
case law from other states; and (4) policy considerations, including unique
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issues of state and local concern and applicability within modern
Pennsylvania jurisprudence. See Edmunds, supra at 895.
In addition, when considering the Pennsylvania Constitution, "great
regard should be paid to spirit and intention," and it is important to examine
the "probable intent of the makers." Commonwealth v. Rose, 81 A.3d
123, 127 (Pa. Super. 2013), allowance of appeal granted on other ground,
95 A.3d 274 (Pa. 2014) (citing Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Smith, 3
Serg. & Rawle 63, 1817 WL 1771, 5 (Pa. 1817), reversed on other grounds
at 19 U.S. 131, 5 L. Ed. 224 (1821) (emphases omitted), and Firing v.
Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833, 835-836 (Pa. 1976)).
In performing this examination, we keep in mind that “[a] constitution
is made, not particularly for the inspection of lawyers, but for the inspection
of the million, that they may read and discern in it their rights and their
duties; and it is consequently expressed in the terms that are most familiar
to them.” Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons, 6 Watts & Serg. 101,
114 (Pa. 1843). Thus, we construe words in their plain and natural
meaning, unless the words themselves denote a technical sense. Id.
“Concomitantly, a fundamental precept in interpreting our constitution is
that the language ‘must be interpreted in its popular sense, as understood
by the people when they voted on its adoption. Our ultimate touchstone is
the actual language of the Constitution itself.’” Rose, supra at 127 (quoting
Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539, 905 A.2d 918, 939 (Pa. 2006)). In
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short, we consider “the original public meaning of the text at issue, giving
due regard to both its spirit and the intent of the framers of the clause.”
Rose, supra at 127.
The current version of Article I, § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
provides,
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no
warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things
shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation
subscribed by the affiant.
Pa.Const., Article I, § 8. Similarly, the Fourth Amendment reads,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S.Const. Am. IV.
The Fourth Amendment, proposed by Congress in 1789, was ratified
December 15, 1791. Of note, however, is that Pennsylvania’s right against
unlawful searches and seizures predates the ratification of the Fourth
Amendment. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 set forth:
That the people have a right to hold themselves, their houses,
papers, and possessions free from search and seizure, and
therefore warrants without oaths or affirmations first made,
affording a sufficient foundation for them, and whereby any
officer or messenger may be commanded or required to search
suspected places, or to seize any person or persons, his or their
property, not particularly described, are contrary to that right,
and ought not to be granted.
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Pa. Const., (1776) Chapt. 1, Article X.
This provision did not utilize the term “unreasonable” and focused on
repudiating the issuance of general warrants. Accordingly, this provision
was directly aimed at banning searches using general, i.e., overbroad
warrants. This, of course, is not surprising when considered in historical
context.
John Dickinson, a prominent Pennsylvania revolutionary leader and
signer of the federal constitution as a Delaware delegate, writing in his
Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer, complained of the 1767 Townshend Act’s
allowance of customs officers “‘to enter into any house, warehouse, shop,
cellar, or other place in the British colonies or plantations in America, to
search for, or seize prohibited or unaccustomed goods,’ . . . on ‘writs
granted by the inferior or supreme court of justice, having jurisdiction within
such colony or plantation respectively.’” Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer,
Letter IX, 88-89 (reprinted Philadelphia, 1774).
He noted that he was “well aware that writs of this kind may be
granted at home, under the seal of the court of exchequer: But I know also
that the greatest asserters of the rights of Englishmen, have always
strenuously contended, that such a power was dangerous to freedom, and
expressly contrary to the common law, which ever regarded a man’s house,
as his castle, or a place of perfect security.” Id. at 89; see also Gary,
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supra at (Todd, J., dissenting) (discussing Dickinson and Pennsylvania
opposition to such writs).
Even before Dickinson’s well-known and widely disseminated “Letters”
was the Writs of Assistance case, also commonly called Paxton’s Case. The
case was widely known in Boston in 1761, although the reporting of the case
is untraditional. Much of what is known about the case comes from the
notes of John Adams regarding the argument of James Otis, Jr. (hereinafter
“Otis”). Otis would later serve in the Stamp Act Congress with Dickinson in
1765.
Writs of assistance were a type of general warrant that authorized
government officials to look for smuggled materials. “Prior to 1755, local
customs officers carried out warrantless searches under an assumed power
of forcible entry ex officio. Massachusetts residents vigorously opposed
these intrusions, thereby impelling Governor William Shirley to begin issuing
his own warrants to customs officers.” Tracy Maclin, The Complexity of the
Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U.L. Rev. 925, 945 (2014)
(footnote omitted). Nonetheless, “opposition to gubernatorial warrants
forced Shirley to order his officers to obtain writs of assistance from the
judiciary.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Writs of assistance were valid for six months after the death of the
sovereign. The death of King George II in 1760, among other reasons,
resulted in Boston merchants opposing renewal of the writs. One Boston
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customs official who had been using writs of assistance at the time was
Charles Paxton. Paxton utilized what we now would refer to as confidential
informants to learn of places where smuggled goods were being kept. See
M.H. Smith, The Writs of Assistance Case, 128 (1978).
Sixty-three Boston merchants petitioned against the continued
issuance of the writs. Id. at 131. Otis resigned his position as advocate
general to the vice-admiralty court in order to avoid defending the writ and
was retained by the Boston merchants. The Boston surveyor general of
customs, Thomas Lechmere, issued a “memorial” to the Massachusetts
Superior Court asking that his council be heard on the subject so that writs
of assistance could be issued to his officers.3 Id. at 130. The case was
heard in February and November of 1761.
Otis began by stating that such writs were “the worst instrument of
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law-book.” Gary, supra
at 145 (Todd, J., dissenting). While Otis was unsuccessful in persuading the
colonial Massachusetts Superior Judicial Court, it would become difficult for
such writs to be enforced in various colonies even in the face of direct
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3
It appears that in November 1760, James Cockle, a Salem, Massachusetts
customs official, had petitioned for a writ of assistance prior to the death of
King George II. The question was to be considered in February of 1761 by
the Massachusetts Superior Court. See M.H. Smith, The Writs of Assistance
Case, 135-148 (1978) (providing a thorough discussion on how the case
arrived before the Massachusetts Superior Court).
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parliamentary authorization. See Gary, supra at 146 (Todd, J., dissenting)
(discussing Pennsylvania and Connecticut opposition).
John Adams, many years later, would write, “Then and there, the child
Independence was born.” See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 364 n.3
(1959). Adams himself would introduce the use of the phrase
“unreasonable” into constitutional search and seizure provisions when
crafting the Massachusetts prohibition against unlawful searches and
seizures for the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution.4 According to one modern
leading Fourth Amendment scholar, Adams construed “unreasonable” as
meaning “inherent illegality or unconstitutionality[.]” Thomas Y. Davies,
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 555
(1999); see also id. at 555 n.5.
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4
The original Massachusetts provision read:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers,
and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to
this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in a warrant to
a civil officer, to make search in all suspected places, or to arrest
one or more suspected persons, or seize their property, be not
accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects
of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued,
but in cases and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.
Mass.Const. Declaration of Rights, Art. XIV (1780), reprinted in The
Constitutions of the Several Independent States of America, at 45-46
(London, 2nd ed. 1783).
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One of this Commonwealth’s most illustrious attorneys and an early
constitutional commentator, William Rawle, described the Fourth
Amendment as follows. “Here again we find the general terms which
prohibit all violations of these person rights, and of course extend both to
the state and the United States.[5] The term unreasonable is used to
indicate that the sanction of a legal warrant is to be obtained, before such
searches or seizures are made.” William Rawle, A View of the Constitution
of the United States of America, at 127 (Philadelphia, 2nd ed. 1829).
Importantly, it was not just in Massachusetts where opposition to
general warrants was voiced. In Pennsylvania, “our Court's colonial
predecessor, along with that of Connecticut, was unique in basing its refusal
to issue such writs on the fact that they failed to restrict searches to only
specific places and enumerated items and did not require an official to
disclose to a judicial officer, prior to a search, his reasons for conducting it.”
Gary, supra at 146 (Todd, J., dissenting).
There is, of course, little dispute that the framers of the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights and those who framed and ratified the Fourth
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5
Rawle was writing before Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Barron
v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), which held that the Fifth Amendment did
not apply to the states. Rawle himself distinguished between which
amendments he believed applied to the states and those that did not. The
Fourteenth Amendment has subsequently been interpreted to require the
application of much of the first eight amendments in the federal constitution
to the states.
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Amendment did not intend for warrants to be required for all searches and
seizures. As of 1790, there were recognized common law exceptions to the
prohibition against warrantless arrests and searches. These exceptions
applied to both private citizens and law enforcement.
Framing-era law enforcement could only justify felony warrantless
arrests if a felony in fact had been committed, and such an arrest was
ordinarily required to be based on exceptional circumstances. Wakely v.
Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 318 (Pa. 1814) (emphases in original) (“it is no where
said, that there shall be no arrest without warrant. To have said so would
have endangered the safety of society. The felon who is seen to commit
murder or robbery, must be arrested on the spot or suffered to escape. So
although not seen, yet if known to have committed a felony, and pursued
with or without warrant, he may be arrested by any person.”); see also
Davies, at 578 (citing James Wilson’s law lectures of 1790-1791 contained in
2 The Works of James Wilson, 685 (Robert G. McCloseky ed., 1967)).
The exceptions generally applied to prevent escape. Wakely, supra;
William Waller Hening, The New Virginia Justice, 71, 303-305 (Richmond, 2nd
ed. 1810) (warrantless arrests allowed where person views a felony,
dangerous wounding, breach of peace, and is in fresh pursuit); compare id.
at 51 (“a constable hath no power to arrest a man for an affray done out of
his own view, without a warrant from a justice, unless a felony were done,
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or likely to be done”);6 see also Kimball v. Munson, 2 Kirby 3 (Conn.
1786). Law enforcement could also make a warrantless entry to prevent an
escape if there was an affray or breach of the peace. Knot v. Gay, 1 Root
66, 67 (Conn. 1774); Hening, supra at 74.
Of course, a public offense committed or attempted in the person’s
presence could permit any person to arrest even for a misdemeanor.
Hening, supra at 50-51, 71. Importantly, during the 18th century, most
crimes were misdemeanors. See 5 Tucker’s Blackstone, 216 (Philadelphia,
1803) (defining assaults, batteries, wounding, false imprisonment, and
kidnapping as misdemeanors).7 Serious crimes such as aggravated assault
and kidnapping were not felonies; indeed, the term “felony” at common law
was largely synonymous with capital crimes.
In addition to arrest authority being extremely limited unless the crime
was observed by the arrestor, so too was the ability to enter a residence
without permission. “From the earliest days, the common law drastically
limited the authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an
____________________________________________
6
An affray was defined by William Waller Hening, in his justice of the peace
manual, as “the fighting of two or more persons in some public place, to the
terror the people.” William Waller Hening, The New Virginia Justice, 49 (2 nd
ed. Richmond, 1810).
7
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England consisted of four
books. St. George Tucker, frequently referred to as America’s Blackstone,
was one of America’s earliest constitutional commentators and annotated
Blackstone for purposes of teaching law at the College of William and Mary.
His annotated commentaries consisted of five volumes.
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arrest[,]” Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958), even when
the officer had a warrant. The home as a person’s castle dates back to at
least Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng.Rep. 194 (1603). Therein, the court
declared that “in all cases when the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be
not open) may break the party’s house, either to arrest him or to do other
execution of the King’s process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he
breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make request
to open doors[.]” Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (quoting
Semayne’s Case, supra at 195); see also Miller, supra at 308; Hening,
supra at 73-75, 303-304.
Importantly, Semayne’s Case was referencing when a sheriff actually
was executing the King’s process, i.e., a warrant. Similarly, William
Hawkins, in his influential 18th century criminal treatise, maintained: “where
one lies under a probable Suspicion only, and is not indicted, it seems the
better Opinion at this Day, That no one can justify the Breaking open Doors
in Order to apprehend him.” Miller, supra at 308. Nonetheless, another
leading English legal commentator, Matthew Hale, in his well-known Pleas of
the Crown, did opine, “A man, that arrests upon suspicion of felony, may
break open doors, if the party refuse upon demand to open them[.]” Ker,
supra at 48 n.1 (quoting 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 583 (1736)); Henings,
supra at 73. Citing Hale and Hawkins, William Blackstone in his influential
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Commentaries condemned general warrants and also voiced disapproval of
general criminal warrants. See 5 Tucker’s Blackstone, 291.
Since the constitutional prohibitions against general warrants was
because such warrants provided discretionary authority to constables,
customs officers, and other peace officers, “it is wholly implausible that the
Framers would have approved of broad use of warrantless intrusions,
because such intrusions would necessarily have rested solely on the officers’
own judgment.” Davies, supra at 582.
A warrantless seizure or search at that time, unlike today, permitted
resistance,8 allowed a civil suit for trespass damages and false imprisonment
against magistrates and police, see Grumon, supra,9 and could potentially
result in criminal prosecution. Federalist Paper 83, reprinted in The
Federalist Papers, 499 (Charles R. Kesler, ed. 1961) (Alexander Hamilton
discussing bringing criminal charges for customs officers who exceeded their
____________________________________________
8
State v. Curtis, 2 N.C. 471 (1797) (“as the officer did not tell Curtis for
what he arrested him, and the warrant he had was not under seal, Curtis
who resisted, and beat him for making the arrest, was acquitted.”); Coyle v.
Hurtin, 10 John 85 (N.Y. 1813); State v. Worley, 33 N.C. 242, 243 (1850)
(“a seal is essential to every warrant, issued by a magistrate to arrest any
person upon a criminal charge. If there be no seal, the precept is void and
affords no protection to the officer attempting to execute it; and, if its
execution is resisted by the defendant, he is guilty of no offence against the
law, though, in doing so, the person of the officer be assaulted.”).
9
See also Roger Root, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule, 45 Gonzaga L.Rev. 1, 10 n.45 (2010) (collecting cases).
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authority); cf. State v. Armfield, 9 N.C. 246 (1822); State v. Brown, 5
Del. 505 (1854). Hence, warrantless searches were, in general, unlawful
and, therefore, unreasonable.
As mentioned, at English and early American common law, law
enforcement officials could only enter a private home, even with a warrant,
where those inside were made aware of the presence of someone outside
and those inside refused a demand to open the door. Semayne’s Case,
supra;10 Curtis’ Case, 168 Eng.Rep. 67 (1756); 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the
Crown, 86-87 (1721) (asserting that an officer could enter a house if he
believed violence was occurring inside or was in pursuit of a person he
witnessed commit an affray or felony); 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 582-583,
588-589 (1736);11 1 Joseph Shaw, The Practical Justice of Peace, 76 (4 th ed.
1744); Hening, supra at 73-75; 1 Burn, Justice of the Peace, 275-276 (28th
ed. 1837).
American cases authorizing forcible entry into a home required
exceptional circumstances. For example, if a felon escaped after arrest, an
officer or private citizen in fresh, i.e., hot pursuit, could enter a house that
____________________________________________
10
In Semayne’s Case, Lord Coke indicated that a warrantless entry was
authorized only where the criminal retreated into the home and was
pursued, i.e., hot pursuit of a fleeing felon. 77 Eng. Rep. at 196.
11
In discussing warrantless entries, Hale also generally maintained that the
person being pursued must be present. 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown at 92,
95, 103.
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the escapee took refuge in by breaking down the door. Ker, supra at 54-
55; see also 5 Tucker’s Blackstone, 293; Hening, supra 73-74, 218
(“wherever a person is lawfully arrested for any cause, and afterwards
escapes, and shelters himself in a house, the doors may be broken open to
take him, on refusal of admittance”); compare also Read v. Case, 4 Conn.
166 (1822).
However, there was no common law authority for a warrantless search
in a home, other than a search for the fleeing individual or of an individual’s
person incident to an arrest. See generally William Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment, Origins and Original Meaning (2009); cf. Sailly v. Smith, 11
Johns 500 (N.Y. Sup. 1814) (questioning, in dicta, a statute’s authorization
of warrantless home searches by a customs official, despite New York having
no constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches or seizures at
the time).
In sum, at the time of Pennsylvania’s early constitutions, it was
generally recognized by the people that an unreasonable search and seizure
occurred unless a specific warrant authorized the search or seizure. Hot
pursuit after observing a felony was one exception to the warrant
requirement. Further, it was unreasonable to enter a home with or without
a warrant without knocking and announcing. No destruction of evidence
exception to a specific warrant requirement before entering a home was
regularly claimed at the time of the founding.
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Two Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases regarding exigent
circumstances, which have been the subject of criticism and curtailed on
other grounds, Commonwealth v. Mason, 637 A.2d 251 (Pa. 1993), and
Commonwealth v. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1996), are implicated in
this case. In Mason, an undercover police officer met with an individual to
purchase cocaine. That person and a police informant traveled to an
apartment complex to purchase the cocaine with money the officer provided.
A different undercover officer witnessed the individual enter a specific
apartment and return to a car occupied by the other undercover officer and
informant.
After the undercover officer exited the car, police arrested the
individual two blocks from the apartment. The arrested individual identified
the apartment where he bought the cocaine and stated that it housed
additional cocaine. Police then elected to get a search warrant. However,
before the warrant was secured, another officer forcefully entered the
apartment, fearful that the cocaine would be destroyed. Specifically, an
officer knocked on the door for two minutes without receiving a response.
He did not identify himself as police. Police then used a battering ram to
break down the door.
The Mason Court stated that the “sole issue in the case is whether the
trial court properly denied Mason’s motion to suppress evidence seized in
alleged violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.”
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Mason, supra at 253. Ultimately, the Mason Court found such a violation.
Mason argued that the entry was illegal, there were no exigent
circumstances, and that the independent source doctrine in Pennsylvania
was not identical to federal constitutional jurisprudence. Beginning with the
premise that the entry was unlawful under the Pennsylvania Constitution,12
the Court rejected adopting the federal independent source rule in Murray
v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988). But see Commonwealth v.
Henderson, 47 A.3d 797 (Pa. 2012).
The Mason Court concluded by holding that forcefully entering the
apartment without exigent circumstances and a warrant was an
unconstitutional violation of Article I, § 8. In doing so, the Court opined that
there must be more than suspicion that destruction of evidence might occur.
Thereafter, in Melendez, supra, the Court found a warrantless entry into a
home illegal. There, police were watching a residence for three weeks.
While awaiting approval of a search warrant, police stopped the defendant in
her car after she left the house. A search revealed a handgun and large
amount of cash. This stop and search was deemed unlawful by the
Melendez Court. Police then drove the defendant back to the house and
used her keys to enter. Upon entering, the police saw an individual with a
bag of cocaine.
____________________________________________
12
If the entry had been considered lawful, then the Court would not have
had to engage in any discussion of the independent source doctrine.
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The Melendez Court opined, “if the police created a danger that their
surveillance might be discovered because they stopped Melendez’s car, they
can hardly be allowed to rely on that to justify a warrantless intrusion. Had
the police simply waited for the search warrant, they could have searched
the dwelling[.]” Melendez, supra at 229. It then maintained, under the
Pennsylvania Constitution, “If the concern was that police activity might
have been witnessed by a person remaining in the house who might begin to
destroy evidence, such a possibility is of no legal consequence, for police
may not create their own exigencies, which they then use as justification for
exclusion from normal warrant requirements.” Id. at 230.
Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930
(Pa.Super. 2013), this Court discussed Mason, Melendez, Demshock,
Waddell, and, in two footnotes, quoted extensively from King. In
Johnson, police received information from two anonymous sources
regarding ongoing drug activity at a trailer park. One informant reported
that an older white female with red hair was involved. Police responded to
the area and encountered a person matching that description. They did not
arrest her and, after informing her that they were police, asked her to leave
the vicinity. The officers, as they climbed the steps to a residence earlier
identified as the place where drugs were being sold, detected a strong odor
of marijuana. They then knocked and the door was opened by the
defendant.
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The officers observed that the trailer was smoke-filled and the odor of
burning marijuana was even stronger. Police asked if they could speak with
the defendant inside. The defendant refused, swearing at the officers. The
officers instructed the defendant that they would return with a warrant and
attempted to restrain the defendant from re-entering the premises while
they secured the warrant. The defendant struggled with police before they
placed him under arrest. In response to a question, he indicated that
another person was inside the residence. Accordingly, two officers again
knocked and asked for the occupant to respond. When no one answered,
the police entered. The police then encountered the defendant’s wife, who
asked them to leave. Police informed her that they were securing the
residence for the arrival of a warrant and looked into several rooms to see if
anyone else was present. They did not search for contraband, and only
observed a burning marijuana cigarette in plain view. We upheld the police
actions.
In light of the above constitutional analysis and consistent with Mason
and Melendez, we decline to jettison long-standing Pennsylvania
constitutional law that prohibits actual police-created exigencies to justify a
warrantless arrest. Nonetheless, we do not find that, under the facts of this
case, the police created an exigency since their actions were consistent with
the limited authority afforded peace officers at the time of the passage of
Pennsylvania’s 1776 and 1790 constitutions.
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Here, police personally observed the drug transactions. They then
pursued the culprit, knocked, asked to speak to the renter, and announced
that it was police before entering. These actions are consistent with
allowable, i.e., reasonable, 18th century common law practice. See also
Commonwealth v. Govens, 632 A.2d 1316, 1326-1327 (Pa.Super. 1993)
(en banc) (discussing Fourth Amendment and police created exigency law).
Police only forcibly entered after the renter refused to open the door, again a
practice not prohibited by the 1776 and 1790 constitutions. Further, police
did not uncover the drugs in question by undertaking an overbroad and
prohibited search of the entire residence on the grounds that it was incident
to arrest. Rather, the drugs were seized in plain view. Thus, this case is
markedly different from Mason, Melendez, and even Demshock and
Waddell, which both relied on the Fourth Amendment.
The defendant in Mason was not personally observed committing a
crime. Instead, police witnessed a different individual commit the drug
transaction after leaving the residence of the defendant. Further, while a
police officer did knock, he did not announce that he was an officer and
testified that he intended to pose as a maintenance worker.13 Hence, the
____________________________________________
13
We are aware that at trial, but not during the suppression hearing, one
officer in this case did indicate that he initially identified himself as a
maintenance worker and covered the outside peep hole. However,
consistent with the suppression hearing testimony of a separate officer, the
police did announce their presence before entering. Pursuant to In re L.J.,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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forced warrantless entry in Mason was not consistent with the common law
warrant exceptions when the early Pennsylvania Constitutions went into
effect. Phrased differently, there was no fresh pursuit of a felon after
personally witnessing the commission of the crime and an announcement
after knocking.
Melendez involved even more egregious police action. There, police
did not have grounds to stop the defendant, having observed no suspicious
activity on her part. Police then transported the defendant back to her
residence and directed her to open her door. Not a single common law
exception to warrantless entry into a defendant’s home applied. With
respect to Demshock, police witnessed a minor offense, underage drinking,
occur inside the home. While knocking, police intentionally did not announce
their presence. The minor nature of the offense and the failure to indicate
they were police in order to gain entry are distinguishable facts from the
present case.
Similarly, Waddell, though focusing on a Fourth Amendment analysis,
is consistent with this decision and Pennsylvania constitutional
jurisprudence. The distinction between Waddell and this matter is that
therein the police did not observe any drug transactions, and the defendant
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013), in analyzing suppression issues, we no longer
consider evidence outside the suppression record. However, the L.J.
decision was prospective and occurred after the suppression hearing in this
matter. Thus, it does not affect this case.
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was no longer inside, having exited out a window. Waddell, supra at 215.
Under the common law at the time of the passage of Pennsylvania’s first two
constitutions, forced entry would have been unlawful because the fleeing
felon was not inside and police were not in fresh pursuit after seeing the
crime. For the aforementioned reasons, we find that the police in this
matter did not violate Article I, § 8.
Having resolved Appellant’s first two issues, we now consider his
remaining claims. Appellant contends that his sentence is unconstitutional
under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Alleyne held that
facts that increase a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence are
elements of the crime and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or a
defendant’s jury trial right is violated. Accordingly, many mandatory
minimum sentencing statutes in Pennsylvania are no longer constitutionally
sound. See Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en
banc). More recently, this Court has held that the statute governing drug
mandatories, at issue here, is unconstitutional as a whole and that a
sentence under such a provision is illegal.14 Commonwealth v. Cardwell,
____________________________________________
14
Writing solely for myself in the case herein, I note that I have disagreed
with the rationale expressing that our mandatory minimum sentencing
statutes are not severable. See Commonwealth v. Bizzel, 107 A.3d 102
(Bowes, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Bowes,
J., concurring). I continue to adhere to that view. Nonetheless, even absent
the severability decisions relative to the mandatory sentencing statutes,
Appellant’s sentence does not fall within the Alleyne harmless error analysis
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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105 A.3d 748 (Pa.Super. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Thompson,
93 A.3d 478 (Pa.Super. 2014) (defendant entitled to resentencing pursuant
to Alleyne where the weight of the drugs was not determined by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt). Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to sentencing
relief.
Appellant’s final claim contests the sufficiency of the evidence as to his
hindering apprehension conviction. Ordinarily, we address sufficiency claims
at the outset because they entitle the defendant to discharge. See
Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d 29 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc)
However, since Appellant was convicted of multiple charges, he would only
be entitled to discharge on this crime and his remaining issues pertained to
his other convictions. Accordingly, we have addressed the issue in the order
presented.
In conducting a sufficiency of the evidence review, we view all of the
evidence admitted, even improperly-admitted evidence. Watley, supra at
113. We consider such evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, drawing all reasonable inferences
from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. Id. When evidence
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
posited by myself in Bizzel or the majority in Commonwealth v. Watley,
81 A.3d 108 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). Phrased differently, the jury
verdict in this case does not make it clear that it determined that Appellant
possessed the requisite weight of heroin beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478 (Pa.Super. 2014).
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exists to allow the fact-finder to determine beyond a reasonable doubt each
element of the crimes charged, the sufficiency claim will fail. Id.
The evidence “need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the
fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.”
Id. In addition, the Commonwealth can prove its case by circumstantial
evidence. Where “the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a
matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined
circumstances[,]” a defendant is entitled to relief. This Court is not
permitted “to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of
the fact-finder.” Id.
Instantly, Appellant’s challenge relates to his allowing Nicole Dudek to
stay with him when she was wanted by police. Dudek had informed
Appellant that police were seeking to arrest her based on discovering heroin
at her home. The crime of hindering apprehension is defined in pertinent
part as follows, “A person commits an offense if, with intent to hinder the
apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for crime or
violation of the terms of probation, parole, intermediate punishment or
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition, he: (1) harbors or conceals the
other[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5105(a)(1).
Appellant argues that Ms. Dudek’s testimony revealed that he told her
to turn herself in after she stayed one night at his residence. According to
Appellant, his instructions to her reveal a lack of criminal intent to harbor
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Ms. Dudek. Appellant continues that, even if the jury believed Ms. Dudek
was lying about him telling her to turn herself in to police, there was no
other evidence that he harbored her.
The Commonwealth responds that Appellant’s own argument defeats
his claim. It maintains that Appellant concedes that he allowed Ms. Dudek,
a known fugitive, to stay with him. The Commonwealth submits that it is
immaterial that he asked her to turn herself in after he already harbored her
for one night. It asserts that Appellant gave shelter to a fugitive, which is
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s finding. We agree. Viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Appellant
permitted a known fugitive to stay with him and only expressed his desire
that she turn herself over to police after he allowed her to spend the night.
Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/22/2015
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