Com. v. Saragih, C.

J-S43039-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHAIRIL AMRIL SARAGIH
Appellant No. 128 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 14, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0000357-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and OLSON, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 26, 2015
Appellant, Chairil Amril Saragih, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following
his jury trial convictions for solicitation of involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse (“IDSI”) with a person less than sixteen (16) years of age,
attempt to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a person less
than sixteen (16) years of age, and criminal use of a communication facility.1
We affirm in part and vacate in part.
The trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion sets forth the relevant facts and
procedural history of this case; it also incorporates the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the suppression court, filed April 25, 2014, 1-3.
____________________________________________
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 902(a), 901(a), 7512(a), respectively.
J-S43039-15
Therefore, we only briefly summarize them as follows. Sergeant Smith is an
undercover police officer working for the Delaware County Internet Crimes
Against Children task force. In this capacity, he frequently monitors
websites like Craigslist, looking for people soliciting sexual encounters with
minors. On November 1, 2013, Sergeant Smith replied to Appellant’s post
on Craigslist, which indicated Appellant was looking for a sexual encounter
with “young college boys.” Sergeant Smith posed as a fifteen-year-old boy
named “Sam.” Following several graphic email communications, Appellant
and “Sam” arranged to meet on November 8, 2013, at an ice-skating rink in
Aston, PA. Appellant and “Sam” had previously agreed via email that they
would participate in sex acts at this meeting.
Appellant arrived at the ice-skating rink, and the police apprehended
him, handcuffed him, and took him into custody. Appellant waited in
handcuffs at the station for fifteen minutes while Sergeant Smith gathered
his paperwork for the case. Sergeant Smith and another detective then
escorted Appellant to an interview room, where Sergeant Smith read
Appellant his Miranda2 rights before beginning the interview. Appellant
demonstrated a thorough understanding of the English language when he
waived his Miranda rights. During the interview, Appellant admitted he had
sent the sexually explicit emails to “Sam,” knowing “Sam” was fifteen years
____________________________________________
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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old.
Procedurally, the suppression court heard argument on April 24, 2014,
regarding Appellant’s pre-trial motion to suppress the statements he made
in the police station. Ultimately, the court denied the motion to suppress in
an order issued on April 25, 2014. The case proceeded to a jury trial on May
7, 2014, and the jury found Appellant guilty of solicitation of IDSI, attempt
to commit IDSI, and criminal use of a communication facility. On August 14,
2014, the court sentenced Appellant to three (3) to six (6) years’
incarceration each for the solicitation of IDSI conviction and the attempt to
commit IDSI conviction, to run concurrently. The court also sentenced
Appellant to one (1) year of probation for the criminal use of a
communication facility conviction, to run consecutively to the other
sentences. On August 22, 2014, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence
motion contesting the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, and alleging
various suppression claims. The court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion
on September 17, 2014, and denied it on September 25, 2014. Appellant
timely filed a notice of appeal on October 24, 2014. On November 13, 2014,
the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) and, with one extension,
Appellant timely complied.
Appellant raises two issues for our review on appeal:
WHETHER THE [TRIAL] COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED
TO SUPPRESS THE STATEMENTS MADE BY [APPELLANT]
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SINCE THEY WERE SUPPLIED UNDER COERCIVE
CONDITIONS, AND BECAUSE THE STATEMENTS AND
MIRANDA WAIVER WERE NOT KNOWING, VOLUNTARY,
OR INTELLIGENT?
WHETHER THE CONVICTIONS AND JUDGMENT OF
SENTENCE FOR SOLICITATION TO COMMIT INVOLUNTARY
DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE (PERSON LESS THAN AGE
SIXTEEN), AND ATTEMPTED INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE (PERSON LESS THAN AGE
SIXTEEN) ARE ILLEGAL SINCE A PERSON MAY NOT BE
CONVICTED OF MORE THAN ONE OF THESE INCHOATE
OFFENSES FOR ALLEGED CONDUCT THAT IS DESIGNED
TO CULMINATE IN THE SAME CRIME?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5).
In his first issue, Appellant argues the circumstances of his interview
with the police at the station constituted unlawful coercion. Appellant
maintains the police knew Appellant did not fully understand English, but
they failed to provide Appellant with a translator. Appellant claims the police
kept him in tight handcuffs during the entire interview process. Appellant
contends the police instructed him to discuss the emails at issue. Appellant
asserts that the trial court should not have considered his Miranda waiver
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary under these circumstances. Appellant
concludes this Court must reverse the trial court’s suppression ruling and
grant Appellant a new trial. We disagree.
“Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s
denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual
findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d
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108, 115 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. LaMonte, 859
A.2d 495, 499 (Pa.Super. 2004)).
[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution
and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal
conclusions based upon the facts.
Jones, supra at 115 (quoting Commonwealth v. Grundza, 819 A.2d 66,
67 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 764, 832 A.2d 435 (2003)).
Generally, statements made during custodial interrogation are
presumptively involuntary, unless the police first inform the accused of his
Miranda rights. Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 579
(Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 569 Pa. 716, 806 A.2d 858 (2002). “[T]he
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.”
Commonwealth v. Gaul, 590 Pa. 175, 180, 912 A.2d 252, 255 (2006),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 939, 128 S. Ct. 43, 169 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2007). Whether
a person is in custody depends on “whether the person is physically denied
[his] freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in
which [he] reasonably believes that [his] freedom of action or movement is
restricted by the interrogation.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 941 A.2d
14, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Clayton
Williams, 539 Pa. 61, 74, 650 A.2d 420, 427 (1994)).
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Custodial interrogation is “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, supra at 444, 86
S.Ct at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at ___. “Interrogation occurs where the police
should know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” Williams, supra at 30 (quoting
Commonwealth v. Ingram, 814 A.2d 264, 271 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal
denied, 573 Pa. 671, 821 A.2d 586 (2003)).
We also observe:
The determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a
conclusion of law and, as such, is subject to plenary
review. Moreover, the totality of the circumstances must
be considered in evaluating the voluntariness of a
confession. The determination of whether a defendant has
validly waived his Miranda rights depends upon a two-
prong analysis: (1) whether the waiver was voluntary, in
the sense that defendant’s choice was not the end result of
governmental pressure, and (2) whether the waiver was
knowing and intelligent, in the sense that it was made with
full comprehension of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequence of that choice.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 588 Pa. 19, 53-54, 902 A.2d 430, 451
(2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1169, 127 S. Ct. 1126, 166 L. Ed. 2d 897
(2007). “Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of
comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have
been waived. Commonwealth v. Cephas, 522 A.2d 63, 65 (Pa.Super.
1987), appeal denied, 516 Pa. 616, 531 A.2d 1118 (1987), cert. denied, 484
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U.S. 981, 108 S. Ct. 495, 98 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1987) (emphasis added). The
Commonwealth has the burden to prove “by a preponderance of the
evidence that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” Id.
When assessing voluntariness the court should look at the following
factors: (1) the duration and means of the interrogation; (2) the physical
and psychological state of the accused; (3) the conditions attendant to the
detention; (4) the attitude of the interrogator; and (5) any and all other
factors WHICH could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and
coercion. Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 164, 709 A.2d 879, 883
(1998). See also Commonwealth v. Sanabria, 478 Pa. 22, 385 A.2d
1292 (1978) (holding appellant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent despite appellant’s claimed difficulty in
understanding English; appellant’s ability to communicate effectively in
English with police before and after his arrest belied his claims);
Commonwealth v. Padilla, 854 A.2d 549 (Pa.Super. 2004) (holding
appellant possessed sufficient fluency in English to understand verbal
communication despite his inability to read or write English; statements
made after police read Miranda warnings in English did not require
suppression).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable John P.
Capuzzi, Sr., we conclude Appellant’s first issue merits no relief. The trial
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court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of Appellant’s
first question. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed January 8, 2015, at 13,
incorporating suppression court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
filed April 25, 2014, at 1-5) (finding: police did not question Appellant prior
to recorded interview; audio recording of interview clearly demonstrated
Appellant had no difficulty understanding or communicating in English;
recording also verified police read Appellant his Miranda rights prior to any
questioning; police did not promise Appellant anything or threaten him to
give a statement; police loosened Appellant’s handcuffs after he complained
they were too tight; Appellant voluntarily gave statement to police regarding
sexually explicit emails he sent and his plan to meet with “Sam” to engage
in sexual activity; absence of translator did not render Appellant’s confession
unknowing or coerced; Appellant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary). The record supports the court’s
conclusion that Appellant’s statements were knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily made. Thus, as to Appellant’s first issue, we affirm on the basis
of the trial court opinions.
In his second issue, Appellant argues his attempt and solicitation
convictions stem from conduct designed to culminate in the commission of
the same crime. Appellant contends Pennsylvania law prohibits sentencing
of a defendant on more than one inchoate conviction. Appellant maintains
the court imposed a concurrent sentence of three (3) to six (6) years on
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both the attempt and the solicitation convictions. Appellant concludes the
sentence is illegal, and this Court must vacate the sentence on Appellant’s
attempt conviction, as the trial court has recommended. We agree.
“A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes
raises a challenge to the legality of the sentence. Therefore, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 806 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 621 Pa. 655, 72
A.3d 602 (2013). “In evaluating a trial court’s application of a statute, our
standard of review is plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial
court committed an error of law.” Commonwealth v. Poland, 26 A.3d
518, 523 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 614 Pa. 702, 37 A.3d 1195
(2012).
Section 906 of the Crimes Code provides:
§ 906. Multiple convictions of inchoate crimes
barred
A person may not be convicted of more than one of the
inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or
criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to
culminate in the commission of the same crime.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906. In this context, “When the law speaks of a ‘conviction,’
it means a judgment, and not merely a verdict, which in common parlance
is called a conviction.” Commonwealth v. Maguire, 452 A.2d 1047, 1049
(Pa.Super. 1982) (emphasis in original). “When a trial court is faced with a
jury verdict of guilty of more than one inchoate crime, it is required by
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Section 906 to render a judgment of sentence for no more than one of those
crimes.” Id. at 1050. “[I]nchoate crimes merge only when directed to the
commission of the same crime, not merely because they arise out of the
same incident.” Commonwealth v. Graves, 510 Pa. 423, 424, 508 A.2d
1198, 1198 (1986). Section 906 “is designed to eliminate multiple
convictions, i.e., judgments of sentence, for conduct which constitutes
preparation for a single criminal objective.” Commonwealth v. Grekis,
601 A.2d 1284, 1295 (Pa.Super. 1992). But see Commonwealth v.
Jacobs, 614 Pa. 664, 39 A.3d 977 (2012) (holding appellant’s sentences for
attempt to escape and conspiracy to commit escape from prison did not
merge under Section 906, where conspiracy conviction was based on joint
plan to escape, while attempt to escape conviction involved either or both
escapes).
“[W]here the trial court has erroneously…sentenced an appellant for
two inchoate crimes, the remedy has been either to amend the sentence…or
to remand for resentencing for either one or the other.” Maguire, supra at
1050. See also In Interest of Mark C., 489 A.2d 887 (Pa.Super. 1985)
(holding when trial court errs by sentencing appellant on both inchoate
crimes, appellate court has option either to remand for resentencing or to
amend sentence directly); Commonwealth v. Watts, 465 A.2d 1267
(Pa.Super. 1983) (vacating appellant’s judgment of sentence for one
inchoate crime and affirming judgment of sentence for other crime where
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trial court imposed concurrent sentences on each conviction).
Instantly, the trial court observed:
Appellant argues, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, that it
was illegal for the jury to convict him of both criminal
solicitation and criminal attempt to involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse. However, [S]ection 906 defines
conviction as “a judgment of sentence not a finding of guilt
by the jury,” therefore; Appellant’s argument is without
merit.
Next, Appellant argues that it was illegal for this [c]ourt to
sentence him on both the criminal solicitation and criminal
attempt to commit involuntary deviate sexual intercourse.
This [c]ourt agrees that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 is applicable.
Therefore, this [c]ourt respectfully [re]quests that the
judgment of sentence for Count 6: Criminal Attempt to
Commit Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a
Person Less than 16 Years of Age be vacated and the rest
of Appellant’s sentence be affirmed.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed January 8, 2015, at 12-13). We agree. The jury
properly convicted Appellant of both offenses, but the offenses should have
merged for sentencing purposes. Because the court has asked us to amend
the sentence directly by vacating the judgment of sentence for attempt to
commit IDSI, we vacate the judgment of sentence for that conviction and
affirm the judgment of sentence in all other respects.
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/26/2015
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA CP-23-CR-0357-2014
v.
Chairil Saragih
A. Sheldon Kovach, Esquire, Deputy District Attorney, for the Commonwealth
Steven M. Pappi, Esquire, for the Appellant
OPINION
Capuzzi, J. Filed: / - 8 - /5
This is an appeal from this Court's sentence imposed on August 14, 2014. On
appeal, Appellant alleges that (1) his convictions and sentences for Criminal Attempt to
Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse and Criminal Solicitation to Involuntary Deviate
Sexual Intercourse are illegal because they are both inchoate offenses; and (2) this
Court erred in suppressing the statements Appellant made to police because his
statements and Miranda waiver were supplied to police under coercive conditions and
not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily given. For the forthcoming reasons, this
Court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress should be affirmed; however, this Court
agrees with Appellant that his sentence is illegal and respectfully requests that the
Superior Court vacate judgment of sentence on Count 6: Criminal Attempt to
Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse and affirm the sentence for Count 1: Criminal
1
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Solicitation to Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse and Count 11: Criminal Use of a
Communication Facility.
FACTUAL BASIS
Sergeant Gary Smith has been a patrol sergeant for Aston Township Police
Department for twenty-six veers, [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 33]. Sergeant Smith is also
employed by the Delaware County District Attorney's Office as part of the Internet
Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force; a task force comprised of federal, state,
and local law enforcement who conduct online investigations, respond to complaints
from parents and other people about children being sexually exploited over the internet
and lead community education, schools, and other groups. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 34].
When acting in an undercover capacity online, Sergeant Smith patrols the internet for
different ads containing certain keywords, specifically adults looking for younger
children for sexual activity. [N.T., 5/7/1014, p.34].
Sergeant Smith typically looks for these ads on Craigslist, which he describes as:
"an online company that, they have all types of personal ads, sell things, buy things,
anything you want to do, look for, purchase, learn, it's all on Craigslist." [N.T.,
5/7/2014, p. 35]. Technically, anyone can post an ad to the site; the only time there is
an age requirement is to post in the personal ad section, and at that, a person simply
has to click the box that says they are over eighteen. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 35]. In his
experience as an ICAC Task Force member, Sergeant Smith knows that children under
eighteen use the personal ad section. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 37]. Sergeant Smith accesses
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the male for male section of the personal ads and then looks for posts about men
seeking younger men. When he finds one, Sergeant Smith replies to the add by saying
"hey, what's up" and then waits to see if the person who posted the add replies. [N.T.,
5/7/2-014, p.38].
On November 1, 2013, Sergeant Smith was acting in his capacity as an ICAC
Task Force Agent and was browsing Craigslist, particularly the male for male personal
ad section. Sergeant Smith was acting in an undercover capacity as "Sam," a 15 year
old boy. Sergeant Smith came across a post by Appellant. In the subject line the post
1
read, "any young college boys, 18 to 24, need a BJ M for M, 39, Philly." Based on his
experience, Sergeant Smith explained that BJ meant blow job. The body of the post
said, "looking for college boys, 18 to 24, y-o who need BJ to completion, hung· and
uncut, sit back and relax, enjoy my mouth and shoot that load down my throat, no
recip necessary.' [N.T., 5/7/2014 p. 42].
Sergeant Smith replied by clicking on the ad, which directs you to the poster's
email address associated with the post. [N.T., 5/7/2014 p. 43]. Sergeant Smith's
account is associated with the email address SammyBPA99@gmail.com [N.T., 5/7/2014
p. 48]. Appellant's craigslist email was: 36MD4-4165539652@peers.craiglist.org . The
following conversation ensued between Sergeant Smith as "Sam" and Appellant:
1
Basedon his training and experience, Sergeant Smith explained that even though the post said seeking 18-24
year old males, he responded because if you put any age under 18 the post will automatically be flagged and not
permitted on the site. So, someone looking for a younger child would have to post at least 18. (N.T., 5/7/2014, p.
89).
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Sam: "Hey. What's up?"
Appellant:"Not much, man, age and stats?"
2
Sam: "15, about 5'8", at 140, I'm new at this. HSU?"
Appellant:"how big is tour dick? Cut or uncut? Have you a pie of your die? 5'7,
155, just looking to suck." 3 ·
Sam: "I don't know never measured it, is that what you like to do?"
Appellant: I'm looking to give BJ, period. I will suck you long and slow until you
come in my mouth, period; I will swallow if you want me to."
Sam: "Never done that before, really."
Appellant:"Well if you want to, if you want to, I guess, go for it-or, if you
4
want to, it come over, I will suck you and make you feel good."
Appellant: I will suck you and make you moan and I can only it's b-r-g me to
5
keep sucking.
Sam: "Where are you from?"
Appellant:"you?"
Sam: Delaware County, do you know where that is?"
Appellant:"That's far, man. Can you travel here?"
Sam: "I don't think so because I'm too young to drive. Do you drive?"
Appellant:"I do. Where is Delco, and send me your face pie."
Sam: "Near 95."
Appellant:"Can you send me your pie?"
2
"HBU" is short for how about you.
3
Sergeant Smith explained that he understood "tour" to mean your and "die" to mean dick. [N.T., 5/7/2014 p. 53J.
4
Sergeant Smith testified that Appellant's misspellings did not confuse him, that the message Appellant was trying
to get across was clear. [N.T.,5/7/2014, p. 54J.
5
Sergeant Smith took "brg" to mean beg. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 54].
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Sam: "I can; HBU?"
Appellant:"yes"
Appellant:"send me your pie; I can drive to you and I can suck you in my car."
Sam: "Okay, when I send it will you send me a picture of you so I know what
you look like too?"
At this point in the conversation, Sergeant Smith sent Appellant a picture of a
fellow officer when he was fifteen, marked as CW-2. Appellant also sent his picture. The
conversation continued:
Sam: "Nice, what is your name and how old are you?"
Appellant:"Alec, 37"
Sam: "Hi Alec, do you know where Aston or Upper Chichester is?"
Appellant:"Not really, maybe you can give me an address close to you; I will
google it."
Sam: "I hang out at a place called IceWorks on Dutton Mill Road in Aston."
Appellant:"I need a full address to put in the GPS, what's your name, man?"
Sam: "Sam, I should be here over the weekend and be able to get and send it
to you."
Appellant:"Cool. When are you usually free?"
Appellant:"Are you ever free nighttime? Or early daytime?"
Sam: "most nights coming up this week because of midterm exams are over."
Sam: "days on the weekend and around 3 when I get out of school, HBU?" 6
Appellant:"Nice, email me your address, maybe I can get a hotel room so I can
suck you real long. You never got a BJ at all, from a girl, maybe?"
6
Sergeant Smith testified that he was using acronyms and was trying to be brief in his responses because that his
how kids talk and people in general communicate over the internet. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 62].
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Sam: "No. What's it like?"
Appellant: "I'm only free after 5:00. I'm free all day Wednesday."
Sam: "What kind of car do you have?"
Appellant: "Sedan, and I don't have tinted windows. That's why I want to get a
room, so I can suck you better."
~J!.ell~nt: It's good, better than jerk off, lol, can I have your email address,
man?"
Sam: "sure it's sammybpa99@gmail.com. What's yours?"
Appellant: "willpleaseyou99@gmail.com."
Sam: "Got it. Can I email you later? My mom just came home and wants to eat.
Do you want to use Craig's List or your email?"
Appellant: "use my email. Don't forget to email me."
At this point, the November 1st, 2013, conversation between Appellant and
Sergeant Smith ended. The conversation started at 4:51p.m., and ended at 6:56p.m.
[N.T., 5/7/2014, p42-65].
On the following day, Saturday, November 2, 2013, Sergeant Smith followed
Appellant's request for him to send an email. The two engaged in a brief conversation.
On Monday, November 4, 2013, the following conversation occurred between Sergeant
Smith and Appellant via their email addresses:
Sam: "Hey"
Appellant: "how are you?"
Appellant: "Did you get the address of the place?"
Sam: "I had to look it up online. It says 3100 Dutton Mill Road, Aston, PA
19014."
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Appellant: "Thanks, when are you free and do you know any hotels around
your place?"
Sam: "I think there are a few near here. What do you want to do?"
Appellant: "I will get a room for us. I can give you a nice BJ there."
Sam: "K. I will have time Thursday or Friday night. Will you pick me up near
Iceworks?
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Appellant:"What actually are you looking to get into?"
Sam: "I'm not sure, anything else- not sure, anything else you're into/I. will have
my bike but there is a place I can hide it right across so we don't have to take
it."
Appellant:"T, I can pick up-I'm sorry, T, I can pick you up there around 7p.m."
Sergeant: "which night?"
Appellant:"You're going to have your bike right across where? Ice works? Or
hotel?"
Sam:" From IceWorks, if that's okay. There is a business center right across the
street, unless you have a truck."
Appellant:"I am open to do whatever you want to try. You want to try anal?
You want to get fucked? Or you want to fuck?"
Appellant:"I don't have a truck. BlW, how much time can you spare? What
time do you have to go home? Or can you spend the night with me?"
Sam: "not sure, but K, do you know which night?"
Appellant:"Friday is better."
Sam: "Me, too."
Appellant:"Nice, do you know the name of a hotel close to IceWorks so I can
book it online?" ·
Sam: "Not sure but I know that kids from Iceworks come from all over."
Appellant:"I will try to look online © "
Appellant:"Do you want to try to get a rim job?"
Sam: "okay. But what's that?"
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Appellant: "Can't wait to have your dick in my mouth.© Where do you want to
come? My mouth or face? Do you want me to swallow your cum?"
Appellant: "Rim job means I will eat out your hole"
Sam: "Wow. K"
Appellant: "You will like it. I will make you moan like crazy."
Sam: "I'm sure you will."
Appellant: "I think I want your first cum in my mouth and I will swallow it. I
want you to sit back and relax. I will suck you till you cum. Then we can take a
rest a bit. Then I will suck you again. This I will lay down and you can face fuck
me, then you can shoot your load on my face. That would be fun."
Sam: "It sounds like it, my first."
Appellant: "Try to find some excuse to sleep over. I promise I will suck you all
night."
Sam: "I will have to lie and say I'm going over a friend's house, but I have to
stay out all night."
Appellant:"Do it man, I want your all night."
Sam: "Can you bring me something to eat or to drink?"
Appellant:"Sure what do you want?"
Sam: "I like Monster, the green can, and maybe regular Doritios?
Appellant:"I got you man, I want to make sure you have enough food and
drink because you need energy. I'm going to do you all night, lol."
Sam: "Funny. You mean with the Monster energy drink? But they are pretty
good."
Appellant:"Loi. I know. I will bring cans for you . ©" 7
Sam: "good."
[N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 71-78].
7
Loi stands for laugh out loud. [N.T.,5/7/2014, p. 78).
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On Wednesday, November 6, 2014, Sergeant Smith and Appellant engaged in
another conversation, during which Sergeant Smith and Appellant confirmed that they
would still be meeting, physical descriptions of each other, and the food that Appellant
was to supply. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 79-80]. That same day, later in the evening, the two
engaged in a second conversation during which Appellant asked Sergeant if he was still
able to meet on Friday, which Sergeant responded that he was. They decided on
7:00p.m., at IceWorks. Appellant asked for a phone number; Sergeant Smith gave
Appellant the undercover number of Detective Joe Walsh. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 85].
On Friday, November 8, 2014, the scheduled meeting date, Sergeant Smith and
fellow detectives from Delaware County CID went to Aston IceWorks, 3100 Dutton Mill
Road, Aston PA. Sergeant Smith and Detective Walsh parked across the street in the
Industrial Center. Sergeant Smith texted Appellant and instructed him to walk down
Dutton Mill Road and cross the street into the Industrial Park. [N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 93].
Sergeant Smith could see Appellant cross the street onto Turner Industrial Drive. At this
point, Sergeant Smith and the other officers present arrested Appellant. Appellant was
taken into custody. A black and green Monster can was located in his back pocket.
[N.T., 5/7/2014, p. 97].
Appellant was transported to the Aston Township Police Department, where he
waived his Miranda rights and Sergeant Smith conducted an interview. [N.T., 5/7/2014,
p. 117].
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As a result of the facts presented above, Appellant was arrested on November 8,
2014. On April 21, 2014, this Court selected a jury but did not swear the jury in. On
April 23, 2014, counsel for Appellant filed a motion to suppress alleging that the taped
confession given to police by Appellant should be suppressed because Appellant's
Miranda waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. On April 24, 2014, Counsel
for both parties and this Court dismissed the jury until May 7, 2014 in order for this
Court to hear testimony on the suppression and to make any necessary redactions to
the taped statement.
On April 24, 2014, this Court held a hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress.
Sergeant Gary Smith testified and this Court listened to the taped confession. On April
25, 2014, this Court denied Appellant's request and issued Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.
On May 7, 2014, a jury trial was held. Sergeant Gary Smith and Detective Joseph
Walsh testified. The jury also listened to Appellant's taped confession, in which
Appellant admits to sending and receiving those emails and that he knew Sam was
fifteen years old. Appellant was found guilty of the following offenses: Count 1:
Criminal Solicitation to Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Person Less than
16 Years of Age, Count 6: Criminal Attempt to Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse
with a Person Less Than 16 Years of Age, and Count 11 :Criminal Use of A
Communication Facility. The jury also found that the alleged victim "Sam" was under
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the age of 16 at the time the offense occurred and that Appellant, age 45, was four or
more years older than Sam at the time the offense occurred.
On August 14, 2014, this Court sentenced Appellant as follows: Count 1: 36-72
months in a state correctional facility; Count 6: 36-72 months in a state correctional
facility concurrent to Count 1; Count 11: 12 month's state probation consecutive to
Count 6. Appellant was not classified as a sexually violent predator. [N.T., 8/14/2014].
On August 22, 2014, counsel for Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to vacate
the verdict for lack of sufficient evidence, to vacate the verdict because it was against
the weight of the evidence, and a motion for a new trial. This Court held a hearing on
September 17, 2014 and denied the motion on September 24, 2014.
On October 24, 2014, counsel for Appellant filed a notice of appeal. This Court
issued a 1925(b) Order on November 12, 2014. On November 25, 2014, this Court
granted Appellant an extension of time to file his 1925(b) statement. On December 17,
2014, Appellant filed his 1925(b) statement raising two issues for appeal: (1) that his
sentence was illegal because he should not have been convicted of and sentenced on
two inchoate crimes and (2) that this Court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
APPELLANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SENTENCED ON CRIMINAL ATTEMPT
TO COMMIT INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE AND CRIMINAL
SOLITICATION TO COMMIT INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
PURSUANT TO 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906.
"A person may not be convicted of more than one of the following inchoate
crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy for conduct
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designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same crime." 18 Pa.CS.A.
§ 906. The term of conviction in relation to section 906 means "entry of a judgment of
sentence not a finding of guilty by the jury. Commonwealth v. Grekis, 411 Pa. Super.
513, 533 (1992}. Section 906 is only applicable where conduct constitutes
preparation for a single criminal objective. Grekis, 411 Pa. Super. 533 citing
Commonwealth v. Zappacosta, 265 Pa. Super. 71, 401 A.2d 805 (1979}.
"A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the intent of
promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another
person to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or an attempt
to commit such crime or which would establish his complicity in its commission or
attempted commission." 18 Pa.CS.A.§ 902. A person commits an attempt when, with
intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a substantial step
toward the commission of that crime. 18 Pa.CS.A.§ 901.
Appellant argues, pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, that it was illegal for the jury
to convict him of both criminal solicitation and criminal attempt to involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse. However, section 906 defines conviction as "a judgment of sentence
not a finding of guilt by the jury," therefore; Appellant's argument is without merit.
Next, Appellant argues that it was illegal for this Court to sentence him on both
the criminal solicitation and criminal attempt to commit involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse. This Court agrees that 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 is applicable. Therefore, this
Court respectfully quests that the judgment of sentence for Count 6: Criminal Attempt
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to Commit Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Person Less than 16 Years of
Age be vacated and the rest of Appellant's sentence be affirmed.
THIS COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
When addressing a party's challenge to a trials court's ruling on a motion to
suppress, the appellate court examines the suppression court's factual findings to
determine if they are supported by the record and if its legal conclusions are drawn
therefrom are correct. Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679 (Pa. Super. 2014).
This Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of its
denial of the motion on April 25, 2014. Attached, as "Exhibit A" is a copy of this Court's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. For purposes of this issue, this Court adopts~
its reasoning set forth in "Exhibit A."
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CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Appellant's sentence is illegal and Count 6
should be vacated and the rest of the sentence affirmed. In addition, this Court's denial
of Appellant's motion to suppress was proper and should be affirmed.
J.
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EXHIBIT A
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FILE COPY
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
COMMONWEALTHOF PENNSYLVANIA CP-23-CR-357·2014
v.
· Chairil Saragih
ORDER
AND NOW, to wit, this 25th day of April, 2014, upon consideration of
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Defendant's statement to police and after a hearing
held on April 24, 2014, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that said motion is
DENIED.
I. findings of Fact:
1. On April 24, 2014 a suppression hearing was held. Sgt. Gary Smith testified
rortne Commonwealth and defendant Chairil Saragih testified on his own
behalf.
2. Defendant, being of lndonisian decent was provided with an interpreter.
3. Defendant contends that the audio recorded statement he provided was
coerced as a result of police mistreatment and that his waiver of his Miranda
rights was not knowing, voluntary and intelligent.
4. Defendant was arrested at approximately 6: 10 p.m. on November 8, 2013 by
the Aston Township Police Department in conjunction with the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) of the Delaware County Office of the District
Attorney.
5. The primary arresting officers were Sgt. Gary Smith if the Aston Township
Police Department and Detective Joseph Walsh of CID.
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6. Sgt. Smith is also a member of the Delaware County Internet Crimes Against
Children task force.
7. As a member of ICAC, Sgt. Smith is involved in investigating crimes against
children.
8·. On November 1, 2013, using a computer, Sgt. Smith responded by way of an
e-mail to an ad placed on Craig's List by the defendant.
9. In the ad, defendant sought young college boys looking for a "blow job."
10. Sgt. Smith identified himself as "Sam," a fifteen (15) year old male.
11. During the ensuing week, ''Sam" and the defendant communicated by e-mail.
12. It was agreed between the defendant and "Sam" that they would meet on
November 8, 2013 at Ice Works in Aston Township.
13.At the meeting, defendant intended to perform oral sex on "Sam."
14. When defendant arrived at Ice Works, he was sent a text message directing
him to cross the street and come into the Turner Industrial Park.
15. Defendant did as directed and was approximately 50 feet up the driveway
when he surrounded by approximately six to eight police officers, some of
whom were in uniform.
16. Defendant was taken down and handcuffed, placed in a patrol car and
transported to the Aston police station.
17. There is no allegation that defendant was interrogated while in the police car,
nor is there any assertion that defendant made any statement while in the
police car.
18.At the Aston police station, defendant was initially placed on a bench for
approximately 15 to 20 minutes, while Sgt. Smith retrieved his paperwork.
One of defendant's hands was handcuffed to a ring on the wall.
19. Defendant was subsequently escorted to the interview room on the second
floor of the police station.
20. Defendant was interviewed for about an hour and said interview was
recorded.
21.Both Sgt. Smith and Detective Walsh conducted the interview.
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22. Sgt. Smith testified that the defendant was read his Miranda warnings and
signed the Miranda warning sheet before being interviewed. (CS-1).
23. Sgt. Smith stated that his volume and tone was normal and that defendant
.appeered normal and that defendant was not crying or sweating.
24. Sgt. Smith testified that defendant understood the question; was not
threatened; no promises were made to him; there was no physical contact
with the defendant; and defendant had no injuries.
25.At the end of the interview, defendant was asked If he was mistreated and
that he said he felt he was, but Sgt, Smith thought this referred to the
handcuffs being too tight
26.Sgt. Smith believed that the defendant was not handcuffed during the
interview, but defendant contended otherwise.
27. Defendant testified the handcuffs were too tight and left marks for two
months.
28. As the audio recording was the lynchpin of defendant's motion, both the
Assistant District Attorney and counsel for the defendant agreed that the
court needed to listen to the audio recording.
29. The court did listen to the relevant part of the audio recording shortly after
the conclusion of the hearing.
30. The audio recording demonstrated that defendant had absolutely no difficulty
understanding or communicating in English with the officers.
II. ConcJusions of Law:
1. Statements made during custodial interrogation are presumptively
involuntary, unless the accused is first advised of their Miranda rights. Com v.
Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173 (Pa. Super. 2013).
2. Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Kunkle, 29 A.3d at 1180 citing
Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1996).
3. In order to avoid suppression based on a violation of Miranda, the
Commonwealth must establish that warnings were given and that "the
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accused manifested an understanding of those warnings." Com v. Cohen, 53
A.3d 882, 885 (Pa. Super. 2012).
4. In considering whether a defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights, the
trial court engages in a two-pronged analysis: (t) whether the waiver was
voluntary, in the sense that the defendant's choice was not the end result of
governmental pressure; and (2) whether the waiver was knowing and
intelligent, in the sense that it was made with full comprehension of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequence of that choice.
Com v. Kunkle, 79 A.3d 1173, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2013) citing Com v. Pruitt
951 A.2d 307 (Pa. 2008).
5. When examining whether a statement was voluntary, the court looks to the
totality of circumstances that surrounds the statement. Com. v. Bryant, 67
A.3d 716 (Pa. 2013).
6. To assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement,
several factors are examined: (1) the duration and means of interrogation;
(2) whether the questioning was repeated, prolonged, or accompanied by
physical abuse or threats thereof; (3) the length of the accused's detention
prior to the confession; (4) whether the accused was advised of his or her
constitutional rights; (5) the attitude exhibited by the police during the
interrogation; (6) the accused's physical and psychological state, including
whether he or she was injured, Ill, drugged, or intoxicated; (7) the conditions
attendant to the detention including whether the accused was deprived of
food, drink, sleep, or medical attention; (8) the age, education, and
intelligence of the accused; (9) the experience of the accused with the law
enforcement system and other factors which might serve to drain ones
powers or resistance to suggestion and coercion. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716 (Pa.
2013).
7. The question of voluntariness isn't whether or not defendant would have
confessed without interrogation, "but whether the interrogation was so
manipulative or coercive that it depraved the defendant of his ability to make
a free and unconstrained decision to confess. Com v. Rushing/ 71 A.3d 939
(Pa. Super 2013).
8. Sgt. Smith testified that he read verbatim the Miranda Warnings to the
defendant before he began any questioning. Sgt. Smith stated that the
defendant appeared calm and collected and he was certain that the
defendant understood his rights and the English language.
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9. The audio from the interview substantiates Sgt. Smith's testimony. Both
Sergeant Smith and Detective Walsh were speaking in calm tones and were
not In any way threatening or coercing the defendant to speak with them. In
addition, the defendant appears calm and willingly to interact. In the
beginning, the defendant states that "he will stop talking if he wishes to
consult an attorney."
10. The audio further evidences that the defendant had no trouble understanding
or speaking English with Sgt. Smith or Detective Walsh.
11.Counsel claims that simply because the defendant was wearing handcuffs
during the interview that he was essentially coerced Into giving a statement.
While the audio shows that the defendant was handcuffed, it also shows the
Officer's making sure the defendant was comfortable; even loosening them
when they were too tight.
Conclusion
1. Based on the testimony provided by Sergeant Smith and this Court's review of
the oral statement, the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent; therefore, the statement will not be suppressed.
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. Additional findings of fact and
conclusions of law will be submitted in the Opinion of the Court at the appropriate time,
should it be deemed necessary.
Cc: Ryan Grace; Assistant District Attorney
David Daniel, Assistant Public Defender
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