Com. v. McClelland, D.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID J. MCCLELLAND
Appellant No. 1776 WDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 6, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-63-CR-0001884-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and OTT, J.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:
FILED: September 21, 2015
I must respectfully dissent from the majority decision with respect to
the conviction of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. As will be
discussed infra, I agree with the majority that there was sufficient testimony
and evidence presented that McClelland conspired with his father to
burglarize the neighbor’s home, but there was no evidence presented that
McClelland conspired with his father to kill the neighbor. Accordingly, I
agree with McClelland that there is insufficient evidence to support the
conviction on that count.
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Second-degree murder is defined as a homicide “committed when the
defendant was engaged as a principal or accomplice in the perpetration of a
felony.”1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2052(b).
The statutory definition of conspiracy is:
A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons
to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating
its commission he:
(1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or
one or more of them will engage in conduct which
constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to
commit such crime; or
(2) agrees to aid such other person or person in the
planning or commission of such crime or attempt or
solicitation to commit such crime.
18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1),(2).
Additionally,
No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit a crime
unless an overt act in pursuant of such conspiracy is alleged and
proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he
conspired.
18 Pa.C.S. § 903(e).
Here, “such crime” is second-degree murder. As noted above, second-
degree murder contains three elements: (1) it must be committed by a
principal or accomplice; (2) there must be a homicide, either intended or
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1
Section 2052(d) specifically lists burglary as one of the underlying felonies
that support the charge of second-degree murder.
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not; and (3) the homicide must have been committed during the
perpetration of a specifically listed felony. Therefore, to be guilty of
conspiracy to commit a second-degree murder, one must have agreed to
engage or aid in the conduct that constitutes second-degree murder, and an
overt act to complete the crime must have occurred. There is no evidence
of record indicating McClelland ever agreed with his Father to kill the
neighbor. Accordingly, under the instant factual scenario, there is
insufficient evidence to support the conviction for conspiracy to commit
second-degree murder.
The evidence presented in this matter did allow the jury to convict
McClelland of second-degree murder.
Evidence of record demonstrated that Father entered the neighbor’s
home through the basement window. There was testimony Father was
physically incapable of accomplishing such an entry on his own.
Additionally, a neighbor testified that an individual that could have been
McClelland was seen leaving the neighbor’s home, carrying a bag, at the
approximate time of the March 2011 burglary. Accepting these facts, even
though there was no physical evidence that McClelland was in the neighbor’s
residence that day, the jury would be allowed to infer that McClelland acted
as his Father’s accomplice, aiding his Father’s entry into the neighbor’s home
on the day she was stabbed to death.
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There was also evidence presented allowing the jury to find McClelland
conspired with his Father to commit several of the burglaries, including the
ultimate, fatal crime. In this regard, the trial court correctly noted:
Due to the repetitive nature of the larcenous activity over an
extended period of time, [McClellan] was aware that the money
was being acquired through the multiple and regular invasions
into the home of [victim]. A conspiracy “may be inferred where
it is demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or circumstances of
the parties, and the overt acts of the co-conspirator sufficiently
prove the formation of a criminal confederation.”
Commonwealth v. McCoy, 69 A.3d 658, 7664 (Pa. Super.
2013).
Trial Court Opinion, 4/29/2014, at 8.
As a conspirator, one is responsible for the natural and probable
consequences of the object of the conspiracy. Father had committed at least
three other burglaries beginning in June, 2010,2 13 months prior to the fatal
burglary. Under the specific facts in this matter, confrontation with the
neighbor was a risk of the burglary, but her murder was not necessarily a
natural and probable consequence of the burglary. However, whether the
homicide was a natural and probable consequence of the burglary is
immaterial as the murder was committed during the perpetration of the
burglary. This fact is sufficient to sustain the conviction for second-degree
murder.
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2
It is possible the burglaries began as early as August 2009. Neighbor
reported a burglary to the police, but the police could find no evidence of a
break-in.
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As noted above, the relevant statutory definitions of conspiracy and
second-degree murder render it logically impossible to conspire to commit a
second-degree murder when the homicide is an unintended consequence of
the underlying felony. In this, I am guided by the dissenting opinions of
Judges John M. Cleland and Richard B. Klein in Commonwealth v.
Marquez, 980 A.2d 145 ([pa. Super. 2009 (en banc). Judge Cleland
cogently noted:
Proving the existence of an agreement, however, does not prove
the existence of a conspiracy. “Conspiracy” is not synonymous
with “agreement.” Not all agreements constitute the crime of
conspiracy. To prove the crime of conspiracy the Commonwealth
must also prove the purpose of the agreement was to commit a
specific crime.
Com. v. Marquez, 980 A.2d 145, 154 (Pa.Super.,2009)
Judge Klein added,
However, a defendant may not be found guilty of homicide
simply because it appears some kind of confrontation was about
to take place and another participant, without knowledge,
request, or encouragement of the defendant, radically alters the
nature of incident by a using deadly weapon that the defendant
did not know the participant had. See Commonwealth v.
Menginie, 477 Pa. 156, 383 A.2d 870, 873 (1978). Our Court
has stated that a defendant may not be liable as a co-
conspirator when he or she “had no expectation that a minor
scuffle would unexpectedly explode into murder.”
[Commonwealth v.] Johnson, 791 A.2d [778] at 786 [(Pa.
Super. 1998) (en banc)].
Id. at 151.3
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3
I am aware Marquez addressed third-degree murder, not second.
Nonetheless, the logic in Marquez remains relevant herein.
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Simply put, one cannot agree to participate in an unintended action.4
I believe there may be some confusion over this concept because as a
conspirator, one is generally responsible for the natural and probable
consequences of the object of the conspiracy. However, the definition of
second-degree murder includes the concept of shared culpability that is also
expressed in conspiracy. Accordingly, it is unnecessary and improper to
charge a person with conspiracy to commit second-degree murder, because
all the elements of the conspiracy are included in the definition of the
second-degree murder itself.
Finally, I note there is an axiom of law that holds while not all
accomplices are necessarily co-conspirators, all co-conspirators are
necessarily accomplices. The statutory definition of an accomplice is:
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an
offense if:
(1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the
commission of the offense, he:
(i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
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4
In Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456 (Pa. 1998), our Supreme
Court determined that one could not be guilty via conspiracy of first-degree
murder where that murder was not the object of the conspiracy. While one
is generally responsible for the natural and probable consequence of a
conspiracy, first-degree murder requires a specific intent to kill. If the
conspiracy does not include the murder, one cannot possess that specific
intent.
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(ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other
person in planning or committing it.
18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c)(1)(i),(ii).
One is not required to have agreed to plan or commit the crime to be
an accomplice. That requirement applies to a conspiracy. All the remaining
elements of being an accomplice are found in the definition of conspiracy.
Accordingly, conspiring to commit a burglary, one of the underlying felonies
to commit second-degree murder, necessarily makes one an accomplice to
that crime. Therefore, if an unintended murder is committed during the
perpetration of the burglary, as happened instantly, one has committed
second-degree murder, but not the separate crime of conspiracy to commit
second-degree murder.5
In light of the above analysis, I believe the only factual scenario in
which it would be proper to separately charge a person with conspiracy to
commit second-degree murder is when the conspiracy encompasses both
the underlying felony and the homicide. The Commonwealth would be
required to prove the agreement to commit both the felony and the
homicide. That situation is not instantly present. Because the
Commonwealth did not present any evidence that McClelland conspired to
kill the victim, I believe there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
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5
In this scenario, the defendant would be guilty of conspiracy to commit
burglary and second-degree murder.
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conviction on the charge of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder, but
all other convictions should be affirmed.6
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6
I am aware that this would have no practical effect on McClelland’s
sentence, as he is serving a mandatory life sentence for second-degree
murder, and the conspiracy sentence runs concurrently.
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