Martinez, S. v. Temple University

J-A17037-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SANTIAGO MARTINEZ IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL-
EPISCOPAL CAMPUS AND BARRY CLARK
Appellee No. 3074 EDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 16, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): 111202680
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2015
Appellant, Santiago Martinez (“Mr. Martinez”), appeals from the
judgment entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, in
favor of Appellee, Temple University Hospital-Episcopal Campus (“Hospital”)
and Barry Clark,1 in this slip and fall case. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On December 22, 2009, at approximately 6:45 a.m., Mr. Martinez exited the
Market-Frankford elevated SEPTA train headed toward COMHAR, Inc., a drug
and rehabilitation facility in Philadelphia not affiliated with Hospital. To
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1
On May 23, 2013, at the conclusion of evidence at trial, the court
dismissed Barry Clark from the case by agreement of the parties. Mr. Clark
is not a party to this appeal.
J-A17037-15
reach his destination, Mr. Martinez walked through a private parking area
owned and operated by Hospital located on Hospital’s Episcopal campus.
While traversing Hospital’s property, Mr. Martinez slipped and fell on snow
and ice.
On December 21, 2011, Mr. Martinez filed a negligence complaint
against Hospital and Barry Clark d/b/a the Degreasers (the company
Hospital hired to perform snow removal services), seeking damages for
injuries Mr. Martinez sustained in the fall. On March 19, 2013, the Hospital
filed a motion in limine to preclude, inter alia, introduction at trial of
statements from unidentified declarants. Specifically, the Hospital alleged
Mr. Martinez had testified at his deposition that two unidentified nurses
called for help after Mr. Martinez’s fall and told him about Hospital’s
inadequate snow removal practices over the years. Mr. Martinez also
alleged at his deposition that an unidentified security guard told Mr. Martinez
the day after the fall that he had heard about Mr. Martinez’s fall from co-
workers. Hospital sought to preclude Mr. Martinez from testifying at trial
about the unidentified declarants’ statements based on hearsay grounds.
Mr. Martinez filed a response on March 29, 2013, claiming the unidentified
declarants’ statements met exceptions to the hearsay rule as present sense
impressions and admissions by a party opponent.
On May 20, 2013, prior to trial, the court heard argument on Hospital’s
motion in limine. Hospital argued the unidentified declarants’ statements
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constituted inadmissible hearsay. Mr. Martinez maintained the statements
from the nurses were admissions by a party opponent.2 The court decided
Mr. Martinez’s deposition testimony was insufficient to establish that the
unidentified nurses were actually Hospital employees. Consequently, the
court granted Hospital’s motion. Mr. Martinez objected to the court’s ruling.
Following the objection, the court said it would permit Mr. Martinez to
reopen the issue during trial if Mr. Martinez could provide additional evidence
to support his position that the unidentified declarants were Hospital
employees.
In addition, Mr. Martinez complained that Hospital’s proposed points
for charge included a jury instruction on the definition of trespasser and the
duty a possessor of land owes to a trespasser. Mr. Martinez sought an offer
of proof from Hospital that it had prima facie evidence to support its claim
that Mr. Martinez was a trespasser. The court said Mr. Martinez’s complaint
was premature, and the court would instruct the jury on the definition of
trespasser if the evidence presented at trial warranted that charge.
Following the hearing, a jury trial commenced.
After the conclusion of the evidence, the court held a charging
conference, at which time the court heard arguments regarding whether Mr.
____________________________________________
2
Mr. Martinez did not offer any argument at the hearing on the present
sense impression claim or mention the statement made by the security
guard.
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Martinez was an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. Hospital argued Mr.
Martinez’s own testimony confirmed he was a trespasser because Mr.
Martinez admitted he was not on Hospital’s property to do any business
related to Hospital; he was not there to visit a patient; and he was not there
for medical treatment. Mr. Martinez complained there was not enough
evidence to warrant a trespasser jury instruction where no signs on
Hospital’s property alerted the public not to pass through, and the parking
lot attendant did not stop Mr. Martinez. Rather, Mr. Martinez suggested he
was either a licensee or invitee. Ultimately, the court determined the
evidence warranted jury instructions only on the definitions of trespasser
and licensee. The court also included special interrogatories on the verdict
sheet asking the jury to determine as a threshold matter whether Mr.
Martinez was a trespasser or licensee; Mr. Martinez objected to including
“trespasser” on the verdict sheet. On May 23, 2013, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of Hospital, finding Mr. Martinez was a trespasser, and
Hospital did not engage in any willful or reckless misconduct that would
necessarily cause injury to Mr. Martinez.
On May 31, 2013, Mr. Martinez timely filed post-trial motions, which
the court denied on October 7, 2013. On October 22, 2013, Mr. Martinez
filed a premature notice of appeal. On October 31, 2013, the trial court
ordered Mr. Martinez to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Mr. Martinez filed his Rule 1925(b)
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statement on November 19, 2013. On December 9, 2013, this Court
entered a per curiam order directing Mr. Martinez to praecipe for entry of
final judgment. On December 16, 2013, Mr. Martinez filed a praecipe for
final judgment in favor of Hospital, which the court entered that day.3
Mr. Martinez raises four issues for our review:
WHETHER THE COURT’S ORDER OF OCTOBER 7, 2013,
DENYING [MR. MARTINEZ’S] POST-TRIAL MOTIONS TO
VACATE THE JURY VERDICT ENTERED ON MAY 23, 2013,
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW BY CHARGING THE JURY WITH
REGARD TO TRESPASSER, DESPITE FAILING TO REQUIRE
[HOSPITAL] TO SHOW THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE OF RECORD TO ARGUE THAT [MR. MARTINEZ]
COULD BE A TRESPASSER?
WHETHER THE COURT’S ORDER OF OCTOBER 7, 2013,
DENYING [MR. MARTINEZ’S] POST-TRIAL MOTIONS TO
VACATE THE JURY VERDICT ENTERED ON MAY 23, 2013,
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO FULLY AND
ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DUTY OF CARE
OWED TO [MR. MARTINEZ], INCLUDING COMPLETE
INSTRUCTIONS ON INVITEES, LICENSEES, AND KNOWN
____________________________________________
3
Ordinarily, an appeal properly lies from the entry of judgment, not from
the order denying post-trial motions. See generally Johnston the Florist,
Inc. v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511 (Pa.Super. 1995) (en banc).
Nevertheless, a final judgment entered during the pendency of an appeal is
sufficient to perfect appellate jurisdiction. Drum v. Shaull Equipment and
Supply, Co., 787 A.2d 1050 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal denied, 569 Pa. 693,
803 A.2d 735 (2002). Mr. Martinez’s notice of appeal was premature when
filed, but it related forward to December 16, 2013, the date the final
judgment was entered. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a) (stating: “A notice of appeal
filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry of an
appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof”). Hence, there are no jurisdictional impediments to our review.
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TRESPASSERS, DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF
RECORD TO SUBMIT THOSE STANDARDS TO THE JURY?
WHETHER THE COURT’S ORDER OF OCTOBER 7, 2013,
DENYING [MR. MARTINEZ’S] POST-TRIAL MOTIONS TO
VACATE THE JURY VERDICT ENTERED ON MAY 23, 2013,
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW BY PLACING THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER [MR. MARTINEZ] WAS A TRESPASSER ON THE
VERDICT SHEET WHILE EXCLUDING INVITEE FROM THE
VERDICT SHEET, DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO THE
CONTRARY, WHICH MISLED THE JURY AND WAS UNFAIRLY
PREJUDICIAL TO [MR. MARTINEZ]?
WHETHER THE COURT’S ORDER OF OCTOBER 7, 2013,
DENYING [MR. MARTINEZ’S] POST-TRIAL MOTIONS TO
VACATE THE JURY VERDICT ENTERED ON MAY 23, 2013
MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
AS A MATTER OF LAW BY GRANTING [HOSPITAL’S]
MOTION IN LIMINE, …AND PRECLUDING TESTIMONY
ABOUT OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS THAT WERE
PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS, OPPOSING PARTY
STATEMENTS, AND ALSO OFFERED TO PROVE NOTICE OR
KNOWLEDGE?
(Mr. Martinez’s Brief at 4-5).
When reviewing a trial court’s jury instruction:
Under Pennsylvania law, our standard of review when
considering the adequacy of jury instructions in a civil case
is to determine whether the trial court committed a clear
abuse of discretion or error of law controlling the outcome
of the case. It is only when the charge as a whole is
inadequate or not clear or has a tendency to mislead or
confuse rather than clarify a material issue that error in a
charge will be found to be a sufficient basis for the award
of a new trial.
Smith v. Morrison, 47 A.3d 131, 134-34 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied,
618 Pa. 690, 57 A.3d 71 (2012). Additionally:
In reviewing a challenge to the trial court’s refusal to give
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a specific jury instruction, it is the function of [the
reviewing Court] to determine whether the record supports
the trial court’s decision. In so reviewing, we are mindful
that a trial court is bound to charge only on that law for
which there is some factual support in the record.
Levey v. DeNardo, 555 Pa. 514, 517, 725 A.2d 733, 735 (1999) (internal
citations omitted). Further, the court may grant or refuse a request for
special interrogatories on a verdict sheet based on whether they would add
to the logical and reasonable understanding of the issues; we will not disturb
the trial court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Century 21 Heritage
Realty, Inc. v. Bair, 563 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa.Super. 1989).
With respect to a trial court’s decision regarding the admission or
exclusion of evidence:
It is well established in this Commonwealth that the
decision to admit or to exclude evidence, including expert
testimony, lies within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Moreover, our standard of review is very narrow;
we may only reverse upon a showing that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion or committed an error of law.
To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must
not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to
the complaining party.
Harris v. Toys “R” Us-Penn, Inc., 880 A.2d 1270, 1274 (Pa.Super. 2005),
appeal denied, 586 Pa. 770, 895 A.2d 1262 (2006).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Shelley
Robins New, we conclude Mr. Martinez’s issues merit no relief. The trial
court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the
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questions presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed November 20, 2014, at
2-8) (finding: (issues 1-3) evidence at trial showed Mr. Martinez walked
through Hospital’s property as shortcut to his destination on date of fall; Mr.
Martinez admitted he had no business with Hospital that day, he was not
visiting any patient at Hospital, and he was not seeking treatment at
Hospital; no evidence demonstrated Mr. Martinez was invitee of Hospital, so
court declined to give jury instruction for invitee status; court instructed jury
on licensee and trespasser definitions, where evidence warranted those
instructions; court issued standard jury instructions for trespasser and
licensee, and duty of care possessor of land owes to trespasser or licensee;
court included on verdict sheet question asking jury if Mr. Martinez was
trespasser or licensee, and directing jury to answer subsequent questions
based on that threshold determination; jury returned unanimous verdict
finding Mr. Martinez was trespasser on Hospital’s property on date of fall;
thus, Mr. Martinez’s claim that court gave improper jury instructions and his
related complaints fail; (issue 4) Hospital filed motion in limine based on
hearsay grounds to exclude Mr. Martinez from testifying about statements
made by two unidentified declarants at time of Mr. Martinez’s fall; declarants
allegedly told Mr. Martinez there was “always accumulating snow in this area
over the years”; Mr. Martinez offered no evidence to support declarants were
employees of Hospital (necessary to satisfy admission by party opponent
exception to hearsay rule), other than Mr. Martinez’s deposition testimony
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that declarants wore lab coats with nametags, which Mr. Martinez could not
identify; absent more, court granted Hospital’s motion; at trial, Mr. Martinez
provided further description that declarants’ lab coats had “T” on side of
coats, which Mr. Martinez claimed represented Hospital’s insignia; based on
this testimony, court gave counsel for Mr. Martinez opportunity to lay
foundation to establish connection between Hospital and declarants; Mr.
Martinez provided insufficient detail to lay proper foundation, and counsel for
Mr. Martinez did not elicit additional testimony throughout trial to establish
declarants were employees of Hospital; thus, trial court’s ruling on Hospital’s
motion was proper, and Mr. Martinez’s claim on appeal merits no relief 4).
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
Judgment affirmed.
____________________________________________
4
On appeal, Mr. Martinez also argues the declarants’ statements satisfied
the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule, and the court
should have admitted Mr. Martinez’s testimony about their alleged
statements to demonstrate Hospital’s knowledge about the condition in the
parking area. Mr. Martinez further asserts the court should have allowed
him to testify about statements an unidentified security guard made to Mr.
Martinez the day after his fall. Mr. Martinez failed to preserve these precise
claims before the trial court at the hearing on Hospital’s motion in limine and
in his Rule 1925(b) statement, so they are waived. See HSBC Bank, NA v.
Donaghy, 101 A.3d 129 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating issues not raised in Rule
1925(b) statement will be deemed waived on appeal); McManamon v.
Washko, 906 A.2d 1259 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 736, 921
A.2d 497 (2007) (explaining party must make timely and specific objection
at appropriate stage of proceedings to preserve issue for appellate review;
Superior Court will not consider claim which was not called to trial court’s
attention at time when any error committed could have been corrected).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/7/2015
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· . ) COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL TRIAL DIVISION
SANTIAGO MARTINEZ 0
. ·.)
.... ..
DECEMBER TERM, 2011
v.
No. 2680 c., {)
-;
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL
EPISCOPAL CAMPUS, ET AL. -r: ,_,
·~·::::;
!"'"!
OPINION
Robins New, J. November 20, 2014
Plaintiff, Santiago Martinez, appeals from this Court's Order entering judgment in
favor of Defendant Temple University Hospital Episcopal Campus et al. after a jury trial.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs Appeal the Order entering judgment should be
affirmed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This was a slip and fall case heard as a jury trial before this Court from May 20 to
23, 2013. The jury then returned with a verdict that in favor of defendant, finding: 1)
Plaintiff to have been a trespasser upon Defendant's property, and 2) that Defendant did
not breach its duty owed to the trespassing plaintiff. Post verdict motions were filed,
orally argued and denied. Judgment was entered in favor of defendant based upon the
jury's verdict. A timely notice of appeal was filed. After the Court entered its Order
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Plaintiff then filed his concise statement of matters
Martinez Vs Temple University Hospilal - Epl-OPFLD
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-~_Jnplained ~f on appeal.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Most of Plaintiffs complained-of matters on appeal are related to the jury's
classification of Plaintiff as a trespasser. The courts of this Commonwealth have long
held that the "duty of a possessor of land toward a third party entering the land depends
upon whether the entrant is a trespasser, licensee, or invitee." Updykev. BP Oil Co., 717
A.2d 546, 549 (Pa. Super. 1998). A trespasser is one who enters another's land with no
consent or privilege to do so, while a licensee is present on the land with the possessor's
consent. Palange v. City of Philadelphia, Law Dept., 640 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. Super.
1994) (quoting Second Restatement of Torts, §§329, 330.) An invitee is one who is
present upon the land either for the purpose that the land was made public or for activities
connected the possessor's business interests. Id. (quoting Second Restatement of Torts,
§332). The determination of the category an individual on another's land falls into is a
question for the jury. Id at 1307.
Possessors of land owe no duty to a trespasser upon their land except the
avoidance of "willful or wanton misconduct." Dudley v. USX Corp., 606 A.2d 916, 921
(Pa. Super. 1992). A possessor may be held liable for injury to a licensee by a condition
on the land if the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and its potential
danger to entrants upon the land, the possessor fails to correct the condition or warn the
licensee(s) of its presence, and the licensee(s) do not know or have reason to know of the
danger. Sharp v. Luska, 269 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1970) (quoting Second Restatement of
Torts, §342). The duty of care extends one step further for invitees, demanding that a
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isessor not only protect invitees against known dangers but also to take reasonable care
to eliminate the risk of any foreseeable harm that may come to an invitee while on the
property. Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (Pa. 1983).
The Superior Court addressed facts and circumstances similar to the instant case
in Ott v. Unclaimed Freight Co., 577 A.2d 894 (Pa. Super. 1990). In Ott, the plaintiff
was injured by a patch of ice while using a parking lot as a shortcut. Id. at 895. As Ott
was an appeal from summary judgment, the record was unclear on the status of the
plaintiff as an entrant on land. Id at 896. Even with the ambiguity in the record, the
Superior Court determined that in such a situation plaintiff was not an invitee but was
either a licensee or a trespasser.1 Id. The Superior Court has also held that if a plaintiffs
status between those two categories is disputed at trial, "the classification of [the
plaintiffJ as either a trespasser or a licensee should [be] resolved by the jury." Long v.
Manzo, 682 A.2d 370, 373 (Pa. Super. 1996).
The evidence presented before this Court demonstrated that Plaintiff, as in Ott,
was not an invitee. Plaintiff was cutting through Defendant's property as a shortcut to his
destination. (N.T. 5/21/13 at 10) He admitted that when he was on Defendant's property
the day he was injured he had no business with Defendant, was not visiting any patient at
Defendant, nor en route to treatment at Defendant. (N.T. 5/21/13 at 38) Plaintiff was not
on Defendant's land for Defendant's purpose and he was thus not an invitee at the time
he was injured. With invitee eliminated, the jury only needed to consider whether
Plaintiff was a licensee or a trespasser.
1 The distinction between licensee and trespasser was not required for
the resolution of the appeal in Ott.
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Evidence to support Plaintiffs status as either a licensee or a trespasser was
presented to the jury. Plaintiff admitted he was crossing Defendant's property as a
shortcut and he had no business with Defendant, from which a jury could infer that
Plaintiff was a trespasser. Id Conversely, Plaintiff also testified that the gate of
Defendant's parking lot was always open and that others used the parking lot as a
shortcut, from which a fact finder could could infer Defendant's consent and thus provide
Plaintiff with licensee status. (N.T. 5/21/13 at 9) As stated above, the resolution of an
individual's status on another's land lies in the control of the jury, and this Court
entrusted the jury with that decision. Palange, 640 A.2d at 1307; Long, 682 A.2d at 373.
This Court charged the jury on the definitions and duties of care of licensees and
trespassers directly from the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions.
Instructions 18.00, 18.20, 18.30, 18.50, and 18.60 were read to the jury verbatim, both in
this Court's charge and again when the jury requested it during deliberations. (N.T.
5/22/13 at 21, N.T. 5/23/13 at 6) To ensure that the jury resolved Plaintiff's
categorization, the first question on the jury verdict sheet specifically asked, "Was
plaintiff a licensee or was plaintiff a trespasser?" (N.T. 5/22/13 at 32) Based on the
answer to that threshold question, the verdict sheet then guided the jury to questions
based on the appropriate standard of care owed by Defendant - "willful or reckless
misconduct" for trespasser and basic negligence for licensee. (N.T. 5/22/13 at 33) The
jury returned a unanimous verdict that Plaintiff was a trespasser, and that Defendant did
not commit any willful or reckless misconduct. (N.T. 5/23/13 at 14)
This Court properly applied the law of this Commonwealth in determining
Plaintiff's status as an entrant upon Defendant's land. No evidence was presented that
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)ntiff was an invitee, and thus no charge or jury question on that matter was warranted.
Evidence was presented before this Court that could lead a reasonable factfinder to infer
that Plaintiff was either a licensee or a trespasser. That factual dispute was directly
presented to the jury, which returned a verdict that Plaintiff was a trespasser. As such,
any of Plaintiffs contentions that this Court erred in that process are without merit.
Next, Plaintiff alleges this Court erred in granting Defendant's Motion in Limine
13033061, which precluded the testimony of certain individuals who were allegedly
Defendant's employees. Defendant moved in limine to exclude Plaintiffs testimony of
statements by two unidentified declarants as hearsay. The declarants allegedly called for
help after Plaintiff fell and told him that there was "always accumulating snow in this
area over the years." (N.T. 5/20/13 at 9) Plaintiff wished to introduce this evidence as
statements of a party opponent, as Plaintiff claimed they were employees of Defendant.
(N.T. 5/20/13 at 10) However, the only evidence available prior to trial that these
declarants were Defendant's employees or agents was Plaintiffs deposition testimony
that their lab coats had a "nametag" that he could not identify. (N.T. 5/20/13 at 8) With
no direct link present in the record between the declarants and Defendant, this Court
granted Defendant's motion in limine and excluded the testimony. (N.T. 5/20/13 at 20)
This testimony fell under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(25)(0), a statement
offered against a party opponent that "was made by the party's agent or employee on a
matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed[.]" The rule follows by
stating that such a statement "does not by itself establish ... the existence or scope of the
relationship under (D)[.]" Pa.R.E. 803(25). For such a statement to be admissible, the
proponent must establish that the declarant was in fact an employee of the party
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}onent. Sehl v. Vista Linen Rental Service Inc., 763 A.2d 858, 862 (Pa. Super. 2000).
The determination of that employment relationship lies within the discretion of the trial
judge, who may rightfully exclude testimony if that relationship is not definitively
established. Id. at 863.
The circumstances of the instant case are remarkably similar to those found in
Harris v. Toys "R" Us-Penn, Inc., 80 A.2d 1270 (Pa. Super. 2005). In Harris, the
plaintiff was struck by a toy that fell from a high shelf. Harris, 880 A.2d at 1272. The
declarant at issue in the case, allegedly an employee of the defendant, ran over to plaintiff
and apologized to her for not placing the toy back on the shelf properly. Id. at 1273.
However, plaintiff testified that she was not wearing her glasses when she saw the
declarant, she did not see a nametag on the declarant, she could not give any sort of
specific description of him, nor did she ever see or speak to him again after the alleged
statements. Id. at 1275. Plaintiffs daughter, who also witnessed the incident, gave the
only specific indication that the declarant was an employee of defendant by alleging he
was wearing a shirt with the "Toys R Us" logo. Id at 1276. Yet even this testimony was
vague, because plaintiffs daughter could not remember the color of the shirt nor could
she give any sort of specific physical description of the declarant other than a young
white male. Id at 1277. Presented with these unclear facts, the trial court in Harris
refused to permit testimony of the declarant' s statement and the Superior Court upheld
the trial court's decision. Id
In the instant case, there was no clear evidence presented to establish that the
declarants were in fact employees of Defendant. The pretrial motion in limine was
granted because the pretrial record contained no evidence that the declarants were in fact
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anected to Defendant, only that they were two unidentified females wearing white lab
coats with nametags. (N.T. 5/20/13 at 20) At trial, Plaintiff testified about seeing the two
unknown females, but this time stated that the lab coats had "a 'T' on the side" which he
recognized as Defendant's insignia. (N.T. 5/21/13 at 19) This testimony provided more
detail about the declarants than Plaintiffs deposition or any other part of the pretrial
record, and opened the possibility that the declarants were indeed employees of
Defendant. (N.T. 5/21/13 at 21) As a result, this Court allowed Plaintiff the opportunity
to lay a foundation to establish the connection between Defendant and declarants. (N. T.
5/21/13 at 22)
Plaintiff then testified that two of his personal doctors, who were part of
Defendant's hospital system, wore a coat with a similar insignia. (N.T. 5/21/13 at 22)
However, when asked if he had ever seen anyone but doctors wearing such a coat,
Plaintiff replied that "Sometimes on Broad Street you see them wearing in the street
[sic]." Id. This vague assertion was insufficient to establish the declarants' relationship
with Defendant and closed the door to any testimony by them. Plaintiffs counsel did not
return to the issue throughout the rest of trial. The additional foundation testimony which
this Court still did not establish that the declarants were Defendant's employees, and as
such this Court did not err in refusing to admit the statements.
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WHEREFORE
, for all of the reasons stated above, the Order entering judgment
should be affirmed.
BY THE COURT:
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