Com. v. Williams, T.

J-A26036-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TIRRELL WILLIAMS
Appellant No. 2145 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of September 16, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-41-CR-0000590-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., WECHT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY WECHT, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2015
Tirrell Williams appeals the September 16, 2014 judgment of
sentence, which was imposed after he was convicted by a jury of two counts
of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”).1
Herein, Williams contends that the trial court erroneously denied his pre-trial
motion in limine. We affirm.
The trial court has summarized the factual and procedural history of
this case as follows:
On November 12, 2013, police stopped a vehicle being driven by
[Williams] because they had a warrant for his arrest. The police
removed [Williams] from the vehicle, searched him incident to
arrest, and found $111 and a cell phone. The police handcuffed
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
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[Williams] and placed him in the back of Officer Justin Snyder’s
cruiser.
There were four other occupants in the vehicle. The other
occupants also were removed from the vehicle and patted down.
Two of the occupants possessed controlled substances. The
front seat passenger possessed heroin and [crack] cocaine, and
another occupant possessed marijuana and cocaine. [The heroin
found on the front seat passenger was stamped “American Idol.”
The bags were packaged with rice in a plastic baggie. The crack
cocaine was packaged in knotted plastic sandwich baggies.]
[Officer Snyder requested another officer to remove Williams
from the cruiser, and search him a second time. The officer did
so, but again did not find any weapons or contraband.] Officer
Snyder transported [Williams] back to police headquarters.
When Officer Snyder removed [Williams] from the vehicle, he
discovered a clear plastic sandwich bag (sometimes referred to
as a distribution bag) on the floor board of the cruiser in the
area where [Williams] had just been sitting. The distribution bag
contained a knotted sandwich bag with rice and twenty-one blue
waxen bags of heroin stamped “American Idol” and another
knotted sandwich bag with twenty baggies of crack cocaine. No
controlled substances were in the cruiser when Officer Snyder
began his shift, and [Williams] was the first person to be placed
in the back of Officer Snyder’s cruiser.
The police also did not discover any paraphernalia to ingest the
controlled substances on [Williams’] person, in [Williams’]
vehicle, or in Officer Snyder’s police cruiser.
Officer Snyder charged [Williams] with [two counts of PWID.]
On August 29, 2014, [Williams] filed a motion in limine in which
he sought to preclude the Commonwealth from introducing
evidence that other occupants of the vehicle were found in
possession of drugs with similar packaging as the drugs allegedly
possessed by [Williams]. He asserted that the relevancy of the
similar packaging was outweighed by its prejudicial nature and
the confusion it would cause. The court held an argument on
[Williams’] motion and denied it on September 15, 2014 on the
basis that the evidence was circumstantial evidence of intent to
distribute.
A jury trial was held on September 16, 2014. The jury convicted
[Williams] of both charges. [Williams] requested immediate
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sentencing, and the court sentenced him to incarceration in a
state correctional institution for one and one-half to three years.
[Williams] filed a post-sentence motion in which he requested a
new trial, because the court erred in denying his motion in
limine. The court denied [Williams’] post-sentence motion on
December 16, 2014. Two days later, [Williams] filed [a] notice
of appeal.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 4/29/2015, at 1-3 (minor modifications made
for clarity and consistency).
On January 6, 2015, the trial court directed Williams to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On January 26, 2015, Williams timely filed a concise statement. On April 29,
2015, the trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Williams raises the following question for our review:
Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion in
denying [Williams’] motion to preclude the Commonwealth from
admitting evidence of drugs found in the groin area of other
occupants of the vehicle that [Williams] was driving in order to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Williams] possessed
drugs found on the floor of a police cruiser?
Brief for Williams at 7.
We begin with the legal standards and principles that govern our
review of this case.
When reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, we apply an
evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of review. See
Commonwealth v. Zugay, 745 A.2d 639 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(explaining that because a motion in limine is a procedure for
obtaining a ruling on the admissibility of evidence prior to trial,
which is similar to a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, our
standard of review of a motion in limine is the same as that of a
motion to suppress). The admission of evidence is committed to
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the sound discretion of the trial court and our review is for an
abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720
A.2d 693, 704 (Pa. 1999).
Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187, 1190 (Pa. Super. 2007).
The threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether the
evidence is relevant. “Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to
establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at
issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference
or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact.”
Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696, 699 (Pa. 1992).
In addition, evidence is only admissible where the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact.
Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155 (Pa. 1978). However,
where the evidence is not relevant there is no need to determine
whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial impact. Id. Instead, once it is determined that the
trial court erred in admitting the evidence, the inquiry becomes
whether the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that such error was harmless. Id. Harmless error exists
where: (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the
prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence
was merely cumulative of other untainted evidence which was
substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3)
the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was
so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662
A.2d 621 (Pa. 1995) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 573
A.2d 536 (Pa. 1990)).
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 350 (Pa. 1998) (citations
modified).
Williams argues that evidence of the drugs that were found in the
groin area of the front seat passenger was irrelevant to his case, primarily
because Williams “cannot be connected to the drugs other than his proximity
to the other occupant and his later proximity to drugs found in the police
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cruiser.” Brief for Williams at 11. “The absence of connection between the
passenger’s possession of drugs and the drugs found in the police cruiser
make this evidence irrelevant.” Id. We disagree.
Despite Williams’ contention to the contrary, there is a very clear link
between the drugs found on the floor of the police cruiser and the drugs
found in the groin area of the front passenger: the “American Idol” stamp
on the heroin. The Commonwealth was required at trial to prove that
Williams possessed the drugs that were found on the floor of the police
cruiser. Williams was the first person arrested and placed in the cruiser on
the day in question. The drugs were not on the floor before Williams was
placed in the car. However, he vehemently denied possession of the drugs
at trial, in particular because he was searched twice before being placed in
the back seat of the car. The evidence at issue unquestionably was relevant
not only as circumstantial evidence of possession, but also to refute
Williams’ assertion that he was not the person who dropped the drugs on the
floor of the vehicle.
As noted, the evidence was relevant as circumstantial evidence of
possession. The Commonwealth had to prove the identity of the person who
placed the drugs in the police cruiser. Williams, only minutes before, was in
a vehicle with another person who had a quantity of drugs that was marked
and packaged identically to those found at Williams’ feet in the police car. In
proving that Williams was the person who secreted the drugs on the floor of
the cruiser, the Commonwealth demonstrated that Williams was the only
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person in the cruiser, that no drugs were in the cruiser before he was placed
in the car, and the drugs were marked exactly as those found on a person in
the vehicle that Williams was driving immediately before being arrested.
The drugs on the front passenger were a relevant, and arguably necessary,
piece of the Commonwealth’s proof of possession. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in holding the evidence to be relevant.
Williams next argues that, if the evidence was relevant, the prejudicial
effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value. For this argument,
Williams maintains that the evidence amounted to a prior bad act that was
used for the sole purpose of proving another bad act, which is strictly
proscribed by Pa.R.E. 404. This argument fails before it starts, because the
very language of the rule that Williams relies upon precludes its applicability
to Williams in this situation. Pursuant to Rule 404, “[e]vidence of a person’s
character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” In
other words, per its own terms, Rule 404’s proscription applies only when
the bad act being introduced was committed by the person against whom
the act is being offered. In this case, that would mean that Rule 404 only
applies if one of Williams’ prior bad acts is being used to show that Williams
is acting in conformity with his own prior bad act. Here, it was the front
passenger’s bad act that was proffered against Williams. Rule 404 has no
applicability here.
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The evidence in this case undoubtedly was prejudicial. Most, if not all,
relevant evidence introduced against a criminal defendant is prejudicial.
However, as detailed above, the evidence was highly probative to prove that
Williams was the person who possessed, and then abandoned, the drugs in
the police cruiser. We discern nothing in the record to indicate that the
prejudicial value outweighed the highly probative nature of the contested
evidence. Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion either in ruling
the evidence to be relevant or in determining that the probative value of the
evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/2/2015
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