Com. v. White, J.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOEY BATISTA WHITE
Appellant No. 276 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-64-CR-0000480-2013
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2015
Appellant, Joey Batista White, appeals from the December 4, 2014
aggregate judgment of sentence of one to five years’ imprisonment, imposed
after being convicted at a bench trial of driving under the influence (DUI) –
general impairment, DUI - highest rate, and two further violations of the
Motor Vehicle Code: turning movements and required signals, and careless
driving.1
The relevant facts and procedural history, as gleaned from the certified
record, are as follows. On August 10, 2013, Appellant was arrested and
charged with the aforementioned offenses. On April 4, 2014, Appellant filed
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), 3802(c), 3334, and 3714, respectively.
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an omnibus pre-trial motion requesting, inter alia, suppression of all
evidence seized as a result of the initial traffic stop on the basis that said
stop was not supported by probable cause. Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial
Motion, 4/4/14, at ¶¶ 26-29. On June 12, 2014, the trial court held a
hearing on Appellant’s motion. Thereafter, on July 1, 2014, the trial court
denied Appellant’s motion and a non-jury trial was scheduled. On October
15, 2014, a one day bench trial was held at the conclusion of which
Appellant was found guilty of all charges. On December 4, 2014, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to one to five years of imprisonment.
On December 15, 2014, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence
motion.2 On December 18, 2014, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-
sentence motion. Thereafter, on January 16, 2015, Appellant filed a timely
notice of appeal. On January 20, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to
file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal in accordance with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b). On February 10, 2015,
Appellant timely complied. Thereafter, on March 3, 2015, the trial court filed
its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for our review.
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2
The expiration of Appellant’s 10-day period to file a timely post-sentence
motion fell on Sunday December 14, 2014; therefore, his post-sentence
motion filed on December 15, 2014 was timely. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908
(providing that when the last day of a calculated period of time falls on a
Saturday or Sunday, such days shall be omitted from the computation).
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[I.] Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of
law, in finding sufficient probable cause to justify the
underlying traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle for
failure to utilize a turn signal; where the trial court
made a clear and unambiguous factual
determination, based upon a substantially
undisputed record, that the use of a turn signal was
not required at that particular junction of the road?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
When reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a suppression
motion, we adhere to the following well-established standard of review.
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in
addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression
motion is limited to determining whether the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
from those facts are correct. Because the
Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression
court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the
defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where … the appeal of
the determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate
court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the
facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
below are subject to [] plenary review.
Commonwealth v. Garibay, 106 A.3d 136, 138-139 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010)
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(internal citations and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 832(2010).3
We begin by noting, “[i]t is undisputed that the stopping of an
automobile and the detention of its occupants is a seizure subject to
constitutional restraints.” Id. at 139 (citation omitted). Therefore,
Appellant’s issue implicates the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as
both afford protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S.
Const. amend. IV; Pa. Const. art. I, § 8. “While warrantless seizures such
as a vehicle stop are generally prohibited, they are permissible if they fall
within one of a few well-delineated exceptions.” Commonwealth v.
Brown, 996 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted). The Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Code provides for one such exception, based on reasonable
suspicion of a motor vehicle code violation. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).
____________________________________________
3
Our Supreme Court has recently clarified our scope of review when
considering a challenge to a trial court’s suppression ruling is limited to the
suppression hearing record, and “it is inappropriate to consider trial evidence
as a matter of course, because it is simply not part of the suppression
record, absent a finding that such evidence was unavailable during the
suppression hearing.” In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085. Because prior cases
held that a reviewing court could consider the trial record in addition to the
suppression record, the Supreme Court determined that the more limited
scope announced in In re L.J. would apply prospectively to cases where the
suppression hearing occurred after October 30, 2013. Id. at 1088-1089.
Instantly, the subject suppression hearing was held on June 12, 2014.
Accordingly, our scope of review is limited to the suppression hearing record.
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“However, in [Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super.
2010) (en banc),] this Court held that a police officer must have probable
cause to support a vehicle stop where the officer’s investigation subsequent
to the stop serves no ‘investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected
[Motor Vehicle Code] violation.’” Id. Instantly, Officer Felsman initiated a
traffic stop on the basis that the vehicle Appellant was operating had “made
a left hand turn without signaling[]” in violation of Section 3334(a) of the
Motor Vehicle Code. N.T., 6/12/14, at 4. This Court has held that probable
cause is required for a traffic stop made under Section 3334(a) of the Motor
Vehicle Code. Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super.
2013), appeal denied, 79 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2013).
Therefore, at the suppression hearing, Officer Felsman was required
to “articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned
stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the
driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.” Feczko, supra(citation omitted; emphasis in original).
Appellant argues the trial court “made a finding of fact that the portion
of the road in question here does not constitute a turn in which a turn signal
is required pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Code.” Appellant’s Brief at 9.
Specifically, the trial court found that Appellant “was not making a turn, he
was merely following the continual path of the roadway as it curved … and
the lack of any evidence of signage indicating that a motorist is leaving
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Church Street and turning onto Park Street leads [the trial c]ourt to conclude
that the part of the road in question here does not constitute a turn in which
a turn signal is required pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Code.” Suppression
Opinion, 7/1/14, at 4. As such, Appellant argues that because the sole basis
of Officer Felsman’s stop was Appellant’s failure to use his turn signal, the
stop resulted in an illegal seizure and subsequent arrest. Appellant’s Brief at
9.
We begin by looking at the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion clarifying
its holding in its suppression opinion.
Th[e trial c]ourt acknowledges that “reasonable
suspicion” was not the appropriate standard in this
case, however, Trooper Felsman’s traffic stop of
[Appellant] remains justified under the appropriate
standard of “probable cause.”
In determining when a traffic stop is justified,
our Supreme Court has stated that an officer must
“articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the
time of the questioned stop, which would provide
probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the
driver was in violation of some provision of the
Code.” Com[monwealth] v. Spieler, 887 A.2d
1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). “Probable cause
does not require certainty, but rather exists when
criminality is one reasonable inference, not
necessarily even the most likely inference.” Id. An
actual violation of the Code, therefore, does not need
to be established to validate a vehicle stop. Id. An
officer only needs a “reasonable and articulable
belief” that there has been a violation of Code based
on the specific facts possessed by him at the time of
the stop. Id.In Com[monwealth] v. Brown, [64 A.3d
1101 (Pa. Super. 2013)] a Pennsylvania State
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Trooper observed the Defendant make a left turn
from Richhill Street onto Greene Street without using
a turn signal. Brown, [supra at] 1103[]. Upon a
roadway, under 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3334(a), “no person
shall turn a vehicle or move from one traffic lane to
another or enter the traffic stream from a parked
position unless and until the movement can be made
with reasonable safety nor without giving an
appropriate signal….” Based upon this statute, the
Court in Brown held that since the Trooper testified
that he personally observed the defendant turn his
vehicle from one street to another without using his
turn signal, he unquestionably possessed facts to
warrant belief by any reasonable person that
Defendant violated the vehicle code. Brown,
[supra] at 1105-06.
In the present case, Trooper Felsman had a
similar “reasonable and articulable belief” that there
had been a violation of Code. For instance, similar
to the Trooper’s testimony in Brown, Trooper
Felsman testified that he observed [Appellant] turn
his vehicle from one street to another without using
his turn signal. More specifically, Trooper Felsman
testified that: (1) he observed [Appellant] turn left
onto Park Street from the right-hand lane of Church
Street without using his turn signal, (2) Park Street
and Church Street come to a T-intersection, and (3)
[Appellant] had the option to turn left or right onto
Park Street. Trooper Felsman further testified that
he was familiar with the Brown case at the time of
the stop and believed it applied to the case at hand.
The facts in this case, as the facts were in Brown,
would unquestionably warrant belief by any
reasonable person that [Appellant] violated the
vehicle code. Therefore, the traffic stop at issue was
valid. The Trial Court, therefore, did not abuse its
discretion and commit reversible error by denying
[Appellant]’s Omnibus Motion to Suppress Evidence.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/15, at 1-3.
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In reviewing the trial court’s conclusion, we are guided by the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530(2015). In Heien, the Court held a “mistake of law can nonetheless give
rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold the seizure under the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 534. Specifically, Heien was driving a vehicle
with one stop light out, which the officer believed was a violation of North
Carolina law. The trial court agreed and denied Heien’s motion to suppress,
however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed “determin[ing] that a
single working brake light was all the law required.” Id.
Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded “[i]t was … objectively
reasonable for an officer in Sergeant Darisse’s position to think that Heien’s
faulty right brake light was a violation of North Carolina law. And because
the mistake of law was reasonable, there was reasonable suspicion justifying
the stop.” Id. at 540. The Court stated that to qualify as a reasonable
mistake of law, it must be objectively reasonable. Id. at 539. A mistake of
law will be considered objectively reasonable where “the application of a
statute is unclear—however clear it may later become.” Id. As Justice
Kagan explained, “[i]f the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that
overturning the officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the
officer has made a reasonable mistake. But if not, not.” Id. at 541 (Kagan,
J., concurring).
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Here, the relevant statute, Section 3334(b), requires “[a]t speeds of
less than 35 miles per hour, an appropriate signal of intention to turn right
or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet
traveled by the vehicle before turning.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334(b). The
statute’s text contains no exceptions. Instantly, Officer Felsman, similar to
the officer in Heien, believed that a turn signal was necessary pursuant to
Section 3334 of the Motor Vehicle Code in order to effectuate a left turn onto
Park Street. The trial court correctly observed “the Motor Vehicle Code is
silent on what constitutes a ‘turn’ and … minds can reasonably differ on
whether or not the intersection in question does constitute a turn[.]”
Suppression Court Opinion, 7/1/14, at 2. As in Heien, Officer Felsman was
incorrect. However, in our view, it was objectively reasonable for him to
conclude that Section 3334(b) required a turn signal in an intersection such
as this one, where a driver has the option to turn right or left, but the flow of
traffic continues around to the left. As the trial court concluded, consistent
with Heien, this was an objectively reasonable mistake of law, as Section
3334(b)’s application to this intersection was “unclear.” See Heien, supra.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court correctly decided that Officer
Felsman had probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude the trial court did not
err when it found Officer Felsman was within his authority to initiate a traffic
stop for a violation of the motor vehicle code. See Feczko, supra.-9-
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Accordingly, the trial court’s December 14, 2014 judgment of sentence is
affirmed.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Justice Fitzgerald joins the memorandum.
Judge Shogan concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/2/2015
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