In the Interest of: J.B., a Minor

J-S10045-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.B., A MINOR
No. 1835 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Dispositional Order May 18, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Juvenile Division at No.: CP-09-JV-0000640-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 19, 2016
Appellant, J.B.1, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order
following his adjudication of delinquency for simple assault and harassment.2
We affirm.
The juvenile court set forth the facts of this case as follows:
On September 17, 2014, the Appellant, who was in
seventh grade at Shafer Middle School in Bensalem Township,
Bucks County, arrived at school. The Appellant was in the
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Although his full name appears in the certified record, Appellant was
fourteen years old when charged with the underlying crimes and thus we will
refer to him by his initials. See Commonwealth v. Bryson, 860 A.2d
1101, 1102 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 875 A.2d 1072 (Pa.
2005).
2
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.
J-S10045-16
cafeteria, which serves as a holding area as school busses arrive,
and the students must wait until the bell rings at 8:00am to go
to their homerooms. The victim, a teacher at the school, . . .
was standing at the two cafeteria doors facing the hallway as the
students exited the cafeteria. After two or three minutes, most
of the students had gone to their homerooms, and the Appellant
left the cafeteria and walked approximately ten feet down the
hallway. The Appellant turned around and walked back towards
the cafeteria. Next, the victim testified that the Appellant karate
kicked her with his left foot on the side of her leg, and down into
her heel and foot. The victim testified that she doubled over in
pain. Other students who observed the incident notified the vice
principal. Since the victim was in pain, she did not say anything
to the Appellant, and the Appellant left. The victim then testified
that she went over to the vice principal’s office to report the
incident, and also went to the school nurse. As a result of being
kicked, the victim suffered bruising to her ankle, the front of her
foot, and the side of her leg.
Less than ten minutes after the incident occurred, the vice
principal called the Appellant to the main office. The victim also
testified that she did not know the Appellant prior to the
incident, but learned his name from the other students. While
the Appellant was in the main office, he was asked why he
kicked the victim. The Appellant at first denied the incident,
then stated that it was an accident, and then later apologized
and stated that he did do it.
The school filed a report with police. Appellant was
charged with aggravated assault, harassment-subject other to
physical contact, and simple assault. On March 17, 2015, an
adjudicatory and dispositional hearing was held. The Appellant
did not admit to any of the offenses and [on May 18, 2015] the
Appellant was adjudicated delinquent on the harassment-subject
other to physical contact, as well as simple assault. The
aggravated assault charge was found not substantiated. The
Appellant was found in need of treatment, supervision, and
rehabilitation by the [j]uvenile [c]ourt and was placed on
probation.
(Juvenile Court Opinion, 9/08/15, at 1-3) (record citations and footnotes
omitted).
-2-
J-S10045-16
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on June 16, 2015. Pursuant to
the juvenile court’s order, Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement of
errors complained of on appeal on July 9, 2015, and the court entered a Rule
1925(a) opinion on September 8, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises two questions on appeal.
A. Whether the evidence was insufficient to adjudicate Appellant
delinquent of simple assault when there was no evidence that
Appellant acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly or caused
bodily injury to the complainant[?]
B. Whether the evidence was insufficient to adjudicate Appellant
delinquent of harassment when there was no evidence that
Appellant acted with intent to harass, annoy or alarm the
complainant[?]
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4) (most capitalization omitted).
Our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a juvenile adjudication of delinquency is well settled.
The Superior Court will not disturb the [juvenile] court’s
disposition absent a manifest abuse of discretion. When a
juvenile is charged with an act that would constitute a crime if
committed by an adult, the Commonwealth must establish the
elements of the crime by proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
following an adjudication of delinquency, we must review the
entire record and view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth.
In determining whether the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof, the test to
be applied is whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, and drawing all
reasonable inferences therefrom, there is sufficient
evidence to find every element of the crime charged. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by wholly
circumstantial evidence.
-3-
J-S10045-16
The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
need not be absolutely incompatible with a defendant’s
innocence. Questions of doubt are for the hearing judge, unless
the evidence is so weak that, as a matter of law, no probability
of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances
established by the Commonwealth.
In re R.N., 951 A.2d 363, 366-67 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).
Appellant first argues that the evidence does not support his
adjudication of delinquency for simple assault. (See Appellant’s Brief at 9-
12). Specifically he claims that he lacked the requisite specific intent for
simple assault because his “conduct did not rise to the level of gross
negligence necessary to be deemed reckless behavior.” (Id. at 12). We
disagree.
A person commits simple assault where “a person attempts to cause or
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” In re
K.J.V., 939 A.2d 426, 429 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
2701(a)(1)).
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result
from his conduct. The risk must be of such nature and degree
that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct
and circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s position.
Id. at 429 (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3)).
Here, the victim testified that she saw “Appellant leave the cafeteria,
continue approximately ten feet down the hallway, stop, turn around and
walk back towards the cafeteria where she was standing . . . [then he]
-4-
J-S10045-16
kicked her leg with his left foot . . . . As a result, [she] had bruising to her
leg, foot and heel[.]” (Juvenile Ct. Op., at 5). The court concluded that this
was sufficient evidence “to find that the Appellant, in the very least,
recklessly caused bodily injury to the victim.” (Id.).
After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, we find
that J.B. recklessly caused bodily injury to the victim.3 See In re K.J.V.,
supra at 429. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to
support Appellant’s adjudication of delinquency for simple assault. See In
re R.N., supra at 366-67. Appellant’s first issue does not merit relief.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence does not
support his adjudication of delinquency for harassment. (See Appellant’s
Brief, at 9-12). Specifically, he claims that there was no evidence that he
____________________________________________
3
Although Appellant’s statement of the questions presented challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish that he caused bodily injury, (see
Appellant’s Brief, at 4), Appellant has failed to develop any legal argument
or cite to any legal authority to support this claim. (See id. at 9-12).
Accordingly, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Moreover, it would not
merit relief.
The juvenile court found, and Appellant does not contest, that as a
result of Appellant kicking her, “the victim suffered bruising to her ankle, the
front of her foot, and the side of her leg.” (Juvenile Ct. Op., at 2; see
Appellant’s Brief, at 9-12). This is sufficient to support a finding of bodily
injury. See In re M.H., 758 A.2d 1249, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal
denied, 766 A.2d 1250 (Pa. 2001) (finding bodily injury where appellant
grabbed educational aid’s arm in an aggressive fashion, which caused
bruising, and pushed her against wall.).
-5-
J-S10045-16
acted with the intent to harass, annoy or alarm the victim. (See id. at 10-
12). We disagree.
“A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to
harass, annoy or alarm another, the person: (1) strikes, shoves, kicks or
otherwise subjects the other person to physical contact, or attempts or
threatens to do the same[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709(a)(1). “An intent to
harass may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.”
Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Here, the juvenile court found that Appellant’s “actions make it clear
that he intended to harass, annoy or alarm another person when he stopped
walking down the hallway to his homeroom, turned around and began
walking back towards the cafeteria, and kicked the victim while she was
standing at the cafeteria doors.” (Juvenile Ct. Op., at 5-6). The juvenile
court concluded that this was “sufficient evidence to find that the Appellant
had the intent to harass, annoy or alarm the victim[.]” (Id. at 6).
After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, and drawing all reasonable inferences
therefrom, we find that J.B. intended to harass his victim. See Cox, supra
at 721. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support
his adjudication of delinquency for harassment. See In re R.N., supra at
366-67. Appellant’s second issue does not merit relief.
Dispositional Order affirmed.
-6-
J-S10045-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/19/2016
-7-