In The Int. of: C.C.R., a Minor

J-S42004-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.C.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.D.R., SR. AKA C.D.R., :
FATHER :
:
:
: No. 1048 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered March 7, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000929-2018
BEFORE: OTT, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 02, 2019
C.D.R. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered March 7, 2019, which
involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his minor child, C.C.R., a female
born in August 2017 (“Child”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), and
2511(b).1 On appeal, Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
by demonstrating bias in its judgment where the court had previously
involuntarily terminated his rights to Child’s other siblings. After careful
review, we affirm.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Child’s mother, W.H., is not a party to this appeal. The juvenile court also
terminated her parental rights by a separate decree on March 7, 2019, and
she did not file an appeal. See Department of Human Services’s Brief at 3
n.1.
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The facts and procedural history underlying this appeal are well-known
to the parties, and detailed in the juvenile court’s opinion. See Juvenile Court
Opinion, 5/16/2019, at 2-14. Accordingly, we need not reiterate them herein.
In summary, the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) has been involved
in Child’s life since two weeks after her birth. Child was born at 30 weeks
gestation, weighed 4 pounds, 12 ounces at the time of birth, and required
hospitalization for a kidney disorder. It was also indicated that the court
previously involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father
with respect to Child’s four other siblings, and Father had a history of
substance abuse. Upon Child’s discharge from the hospital on October 10,
2017, she was placed in a foster home and DHS obtained an order of
protective custody. At the conclusion of a hearing on January 23, 2018, Child
was adjudicated dependent.2 Several permanency review hearings and a
family service plan meeting were subsequently held. On November 20, 2018,
DHS filed petitions for involuntary termination of parental rights and goal
change to adoption with respect to both parents. On March 7, 2019, at a goal
change/involuntary termination hearing, the juvenile court heard testimony
from: (1) Barbara Forrest, a social worker for DHS; (2) Dr. William Russell,
an expert in forensic psychology and parenting capacity; (3) Arielle Fonrose,
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2 The court also entered an order, finding aggravated circumstances existed
as to Mother and Father pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(5) (“The parental
rights of the parent have been involuntarily terminated with respect to a child
of the parent.”). See Aggravated Circumstances Order, 1/23/2018.
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a social worker at The Village, a foster care service; and (4) Father. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court involuntarily terminated both Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights, and changed the permanency goal to adoption.
A decree and order was entered on the same day reflecting the court’s
determination. On April 5, 2019, Father filed this notice of appeal as to the
decree terminating his parental rights.3
Father now raises the following issue for our review: “Did the [juvenile
c]ourt abuse its discretion by involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights
by demonstrating bias in its judgment – having previously involuntarily
terminated Father’s rights to [Child]’s siblings?” Father’s Brief at 6.
When considering an appeal from an order terminating parental rights,
we are guided by the following standard.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
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3 Father also filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on April 5, 2019. The trial court issued an
opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on May 16, 2019.
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
As noted above, the court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant
to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
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…
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). Moreover, we note that while the court
may find that DHS met its burden of proof under multiple sections, “we need
only agree with its decision as to any one subsection in order to affirm the
termination of parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.
2004), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
Turning to the present matter, Father frames his argument in terms of
judicial bias because the court presided over other dependency proceedings
involving Father’s other children. However, a review of the record, including
the March 7, 2019, hearing, reveals that neither Father nor his counsel asked
for the presiding judge to recuse himself from the matter. Accordingly, Father
has waived any challenge to potential judicial bias or the appearance of
impropriety on the court’s part in this proceeding. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.”)
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Moreover, after an extensive review of the record, the briefs of the
parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned decision of the Honorable
Allan J. Tereshko, we conclude Father’s issue merits no substantive relief. See
Juvenile Court Opinion, 5/16/2019, at 17-27 (finding: (1) Father failed to
meet certain objectives set in his family service plan meetings, including
attending family school and a parenting capacity evaluation as well as
undergoing drug screens and assessment; (2) Father failed to attend all but
one of Child’s 32 medical appointments, which were critical because of Child’s
significant health issues; (3) there were aggravated circumstances because
Child’s four other siblings had been under DHS supervision and Father’s rights
had been involuntarily terminated; (4) “Father tended to minimize any
difficulties that his children had and believed they did not have disorders or
disabilities;”4 (5) “Father’s conduct for at least the six months prior to the
filing of the petition to terminate, revealed a settled purpose relinquishing
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4 Juvenile Court Opinion, 5/16/2019, at 23. The court also noted:
The lack of understanding on the part of the parents as to why the
[c]hildren came into care effects their ability to integrate any
feedback into their parenting skills. That is crucial because
[Child], now presents with more special needs than any of the
other [c]hildren, and there has not been any significant change in
those same areas and that is very concerning. The parents were
receptive to the verbal feedback, however, how much they
incorporated into their visits was very limited.
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parental claim to the Child and revealed a failure to perform parental duties;”5
(6) “Father lacks the present and future capacity to provide parental care,
control or subsistence necessary for the Child’s physical and mental well-
being” as he “cannot provide for the Child's basic needs nor can he provide a
structured environment for this one and one-half year old Child;”6 and (7) it
is in Child’s best interest to terminate the parental rights as Father has
minimal contact with Child, she will not suffer detrimental harm, and Child is
bonded and happy with her foster parent, and all of her needs, including
medical, physical, and emotional, are being met by foster parent).
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the juvenile court opinion.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/2/19
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5 Id. at 24.
6 Id.
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Circulated 09/12/2019 01:52 PM