Com. v. Serrano-Torres, J.

J-A14024-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JUAN MIGUEL SERRANO-TORRES,
Appellant No. 1586 MDA 2013
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of August 7, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002943-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 30, 2014
Appellant, Juan Miguel Serrano-Torres, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on August 7, 2013. We affirm.
The factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. On April
courtyard. A vehicle occupied by the victim and another individual soon
pulled up near the courtyard. The victim and Figueroa then engaged in a
drug transaction. While the victim was walking away, Appellant shot him in
therefrom.
Eventually, Figueroa was arrested for suspicion of committing the
above described crime. During questioning by police, Figueroa implicated
several individuals who turned out to not be involved. Eventually, Figueroa
* Retired Senior Judge Assigned to the Superior Court.
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implicated Appellant as the triggerman. Appellant was arrested on April 19,
2012 at approximately 7:15 a.m. Appellant initially invoked his right to
counsel and officers ceased their interviews; however, at approximately 6:45
p.m. that same day, he waived his right to counsel. Police then played
sed to killing the victim.
On July 31, 2012, Appellant was charged via criminal information with
criminal homicide,1 robbery,2 criminal conspiracy,3 and carrying a firearm
without a license.4 On July 23, 2013, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial
motion which included a motion to suppress the statement he gave to police.
On August 5, 2013, a suppression hearing was held at the conclusion of
2013, a jury found Appellant guilty of second-degree murder,5 robbery,
criminal conspiracy, and carrying a firearm without a license. The trial court
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501.
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701.
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
4
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106.
5
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b).
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sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole. This timely appeal followed.6
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
1. -]
trial motion to suppress his statements?
2. Whether the evidence presented was insufficient as a matter
of law to enable t[he] jury to convict Appellant of the charges
in the above captioned case?
In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress his statement given to police. He argues
confession rendered his subsequent waiver of Miranda rights invalid and his
Brief at 17.
motion, we are limited to determining whether the factual findings are
supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 89 A.3d 679, 683
6
On September 5, 2013, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On September 10, 2013, Appellant filed his concise
statement. On November 4, 2013, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a)
statement.
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(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).7
In re L.J., 79
consider only the
Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 106 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a suspect has a
right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. Prior to any
custodial interrogation, the police must inform a suspect of his rights under
Miranda, including the right to have an attorney pres
asserts his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, not only must the current
interrogation cease, but he may not be approached for further interrogation
until counsel has been made available to him, unless he himself initiates
further co Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d
1050, 1067 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).
7
We remind the trial court of the mandatory nature of Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 581(I), which provides that:
At the conclusion of the [suppression] hearing, the judge shall
enter on the record a statement of findings of fact and
conclusions of law as to whether the evidence was obtained in
or any statute, and shall make an order granting or denying the
relief sought.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). A simple statement that the motion to suppress is
denied is not sufficient to satisfy the Rule 581(I) requirement.
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If a suspect re-initiates a conversation with police and subsequently
waives his right to counsel, we then examine whether that waiver was
knowing and voluntary. As we have explained:
Miranda
rights is valid, a trial court must consider: (1) whether the
waiver was voluntary, in the sense that the waiver was not the
result of governmental pressure; and (2) whether the waiver
was knowing and intelligent, in the sense that it was made with
full comprehension of both the nature of the right being
abandoned and the consequence of that choice. The
Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 76 (Pa. 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court
has set forth the following numerous factors that should be
considered under a totality of the circumstances test to
determine whether a statement was freely and voluntarily made:
the duration and means of interrogation, including whether
questioning was repeated, prolonged, or accompanied by
detention prior to the confession; whether the accused was
advised of his or her constitutional rights; the attitude exhibited
psychological state, including whether he or she was injured, ill,
drugged, or intoxicated; the conditions attendant to the
detention, including whether the accused was deprived of food,
drink, sleep, or medical attention; the age, education, and
intelligence of the accused; the experience of the accused with
law enforcement and the criminal justice system; and any other
suggestion and coercion.
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 724 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
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Appellant does not argue that police re-initiated the conversation with
him. Instead, he argues that the time that elapsed between his arrest and
his confession was unreasonably long. Appellant contends that he should
have been brought before a judicial officer for arraignment in a more
expedient manner. He implicitly contends that if he were arraigned promptly
he would not have confessed to the murder. Appellant also alleges that he
was ingesting illegal narcotics while in custody and that he had not slept the
night before. Thus, he argues that the totality of the circumstances show he
did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.
We will evaluate the Bryant factors seriatim. As to the duration and
means of interrogation, the total duration of the interrogation prior to
Appellant waiving his Miranda rights was only a few minutes. See N.T.
8/5/13, at 68, 97. The interrogation occurred in a large room. See id. at
26. There is no evidence that there was physical violence, or threats
thereof. There was also no evidence of other improper interrogation
techniques. Thus, the first Bryant factor weighs in favor of a finding of
voluntariness.
approximately 11.5 hours prior to his confession. Between 1977 and 2004,
our Supreme Court adhered to a brightline six-hour rule. See
Commonwealth v. Davenport, 370 A.2d 301, 306 (Pa. 1977), overruled
Commonwealth v. Perez, 845 A.2d 779, 787 (Pa. 2004). Under that rule,
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any statement given to police more than six hours after arrest, and before
arraignment, was per se inadmissible. Davenport, 370 A.2d at 306.
However, in Perez our Supreme Court determined that the per se rule was
not appropriate and reverted to a totality of the circumstances test, which
we apply in this case. Perez, 845 A.3d at 787.
Nonetheless, the six-hour rule still provides a good baseline from
ody. In this case, the time
almost twice that length 11.5 hours. Thus, it is obvious that this factor
the weight of this factor is not as significant as it may appear.
Appellant was the triggerman in the murder. These steps were necessary
because Figueroa had implicated several other individuals in the murder
prior to implicating Appellant. After brief periods of investigation, police
were able to ascertain that those individuals were not involved in the
murder. Thus, police had reason to believe that Figueroa was falsely
implicating Appellant.
In Commonwealth v. Perez, 760 A.2d 873 (Pa. Super. 2000),
affirmed, 845 A.2d 779 (Pa. 2004), this Court recognized that a police
investigation which may exonerate a defendant may cause him to be
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detained for longer than six hours without being arraigned. Specifically, we
can reasonably relate to . . . limited preliminary investigation into [a
nnection with the crime for which he was arrested, especially
Id. at 875,
quoting Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(Burger, J. concurring).
The facts in the case sub judice are similar to those in
Commonwealth v. Seilhamer, 862 A.2d 1263 (Pa. Super. 2004). In
Seilhamer, approximately seven hours elapsed between the initial contact
Miranda rights. The police had sufficient probable cause to arraign the
defendant two hours after the initial contact; however, they delayed
arraignment because they were seeking other witnesses and evidence. Id.
at 1269-1270. Under the totality of the circumstances, including three
Miranda rights and a delay attributed to further
police investigation, we concluded her waiver was voluntary. Id. at 1270.
longer, the rationale employed in Seilhamer and Perez offers persuasive
force. Thus, although we conclude that the second Bryant factor weighs
against a finding of voluntariness, the weight afforded to that factor is
somewhat diminished because of the reason for the delay.
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As to whether Appellant was advised of his constitutional rights, the
record reflects that Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights on several
occasions. Immediately prior to his confession, he was read his rights orally
and signed a form, which outlined his rights in Spanish. N.T., 8/5/13, at 92,
97. Thus, the third Bryant factor weighs in favor of a finding of
voluntariness.
that Appellant was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See Trial
Court Opinion, 11/4/13, at 20. This finding of fact is supported by the
record. The police officer that was interrogating Appellant testified that
Appellant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. N.T.,
8/5/13, at 132. Although Appellant testified that he was under the influence
of drugs and alcohol, the trial court made a credibility determination. See
Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/13, at 20. We may not overturn this credibility
determination with the record before us. Furthermore, there was no
evidence that Appellant was injured or ill. Thus, the fourth Bryant factor
weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness.
As to the conditions attendant to the detention, Appellant admitted
that the police offered him food and coffee during the course of his
detention. See N.T., 8/5/13, at 172. There is no evidence that the police
ever denied Appellant a request for food, drink, medical care, or use of the
restroom. Although he may not have slept the night before, Appellant was
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given a chance to sleep while in detention. Trial Court Opinion, 11/4/13, at
21. Thus, the fifth Bryant factor weighs in favor of a finding of
voluntariness.
questioned Appellant testified that he did not have any educational problems
or low level of intelligence. N.T., 8/5/13, at 148. Appellant was 33 years
old at the time of his waiver. Thus, the sixth Bryant factor weighs in favor
of a finding of voluntariness.
with the criminal justice system. As such, the seventh Bryant factor is
neutral. The parties do not contend, nor do we find evidence in the record,
that there were non-enumerated factors that the trial court should have
Although one of the seven Bryant factors weighs against a finding
that his waiver was voluntary. There is little doubt that the one factor that
weighs in favor of Appellant is significant. However, for the reasons set
forth above, the time Appellant was in custody is mitigated because the
actions taken by the police had the possibility of exonerating Appellant.
Furthermore, one of the factors that weighs in favor of the Commonwealth,
i.e., how often and by what means Appellant was given his constitutional
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voluntary. When combined with the other four factors that weigh in favor of
the Commonwealth, we conclude that those factors outweigh the length of
In his second issue, Appellant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to convict him of second-degree murder, robbery, and
question of law; thus, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of
Patterson, 91 A.3d at 66 (citation omitted). In
revi
viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the
[Commonwealth], there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to
find every element of the crime be
Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 64 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
possibility of innocence . . . . [T]he fact-finder is free to believe all, part[,] or
non Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 90 A.3d 721, 728
(Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in
underlying felony was the robbery.
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course of committing a theft, he[ ] inflicts serious bodily injury upon
with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of
promoting or facilitating its commission he[ ] agrees with such other person
or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which
§ 903(a)(1).
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth did
intended to steal or knew Figueroa intended to steal the drugs from the
evidence was overwhelming that Appellant and Figueroa planned the robbery
well in advance. Veronica Ortiz testified that, on the day of the murder, she
Appellant admitted to several individuals that he had robbed the victim. See
id. at 103 (statement to Wanda Baez-Lugo); id. at 136 (statement to
Jacqueline Arroyo); id. at 149 (statement to Elizabeth Lopez). If the jury
believed this evidence, it could reasonably find that Appellant possessed the
requisite intent for robbery, and thus also second-degree murder and
conspiracy. Accordingly, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/30/2014
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